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Abstract: 
 
The Medvedev Years: An Examination of the External Forces & Internal Dynamics 
Affecting the Kremlin's Foreign Policy Decisions  
 
 The central question of this thesis is what forces and personal dynamics ultimately 
shape the Kremlin’s responses to foreign policy issues. The legacies of Mikhail Gorbachev 
and Boris Yeltsin are traced from the Soviet democratization during the 1980’s and the 
constitutional empowerment of the Russian presidency during the 1990’s. These two 
coexistent forces of empowering the average citizen in a country in which the President is 
the most powerful authority in decision-making are examined. 
 
 The forces of the Kremlin affect the current inner circle of Siloviki, Technocrats, 
and Yeltsin Liberals who are integral members of the policy formulation. Vladimir Putin 
and his handpicked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, were now at the helm of a government 
with these three groups of bureaucrats from 2008 to 2012. The Medvedev presidency was 
confronted with challenges in the post-Soviet space, which included Georgian military 
operations against Russia and an anti-Russian leader in Kyrgyzstan. In addition to this, the 
Kremlin was faced with the decisions to enforce sanctions against rogue regimes pursuing 
nuclear capability, specifically Iran and North Korea. The Arab Spring of 2011 brought 
with it momentous change in the Middle East and the Russian Federation was forced to 
decide whether to consent to sanctions against the Khadafy regime in Libya and the Assad 
regime in Syria. 
 
 The six foreign policy decisions in this thesis illuminate the Kremlin’s internal 
dynamics as well as the handling of the external political forces enacted by Mikhail 
Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Graham Allison’s Governmental Politics Model, which 
analyzes foreign policy from a personal perspective of the chief decision-makers, is used 
throughout this body of doctoral research.   
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The Medvedev Years: An Examination of the External Forces & Internal Dynamics 
Affecting the Kremlin's Foreign Policy Decisions. 
 
Introduction: 
 
 The Russian Federation has consolidated its political and foreign policy stances,  
strengths, and interests and has moulded its role in international affairs by virtue of the  
cataclysmic events, which occurred during its early years. Russian foreign policy has been  
seen by scholars through the prism of Soviet era-Cold War analysis, notwithstanding the  
structural transformations of the world stage and political evolution within the Russian 
Federation. Kremlinology is a vastly different era of study compared with Sovietology 
because of many factors, but few discern the difference and some assume Russian foreign 
policy is a mirror image of its predecessor.
1
 The goal of this body of research is to 
illuminate the integral processes and evolutionary catalysts that can be attributed to 
Russia’s distinct choices while navigating on the world stage. The author argues that 
Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev’s foreign policy must be distinguished from its 
immediate predecessor, that of Boris Yeltsin. A much more vigorous, cohesive, and 
calculated foreign policy can be attributed to the current vision and pragmatism of Russia’s 
leaders. However, broadly speaking scholarly research of the Russian Federation does not 
link the current successes or failures of Russia’s foreign policy to the important events that 
are associated with its inception. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva, a public intellectual and relative of 
Nikita Khrushchev, notes that ‘Gorbachev’s legacy was not important during the Medvedev 
presidency.’2 This research uses foreign policy analysis to understand the mechanisms and 
procedures of policy formulation in order to enhance the current understanding of Russia’s 
role in world affairs.   
                                                 
1 G. Arbatov, ‘Sovietology and Kremlinology?’, International Institute for Strategic Studies [online journal], 12:6, 208-209,                                    
< http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396337008441111>, accessed 1 June 2012. 
2 N. Khrushcheva, ‘The Russian Public & The Medvedev Presidency’ [interviewed by Julian Reder], 23 January 2013, New School 
University, New York, New York 
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 The fundamental issue arising within Russian political circles is what the new status 
on the world stage is. The impulses, synergies, and ideologies of those within the decision-
making apparatus in the Kremlin warranted investigation. In theoretical terms, Soviet 
foreign policy has always been an important and commonly studied area of research, but 
the analysis of the mechanics of its decision-making has yet to take account of the effects of 
Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin’s respective tenures within the realm of foreign 
policy-making in the Russian Federation.                                                                                                       
 The crux of this research therefore delves into Russian decision-making by 
analyzing the Russian Federation’s behaviour in security, war, and diplomacy during the 
tenure of President Dmitry Medvedev from 2008 to 2012. The events of the early 1990’s 
serve as a guide to understanding the transformational effects on the foreign policy 
apparatus inherited by Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. This research expounds on 
the lasting legacies of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin in terms of their respective 
impacts on the mechanisms and processes responsible for formulating the Kremlin’s role in 
world affairs two decades after. 
Conceptual Framework: 
 There are several issues that are addressed in relation to foreign policy decisions 
made during the tenure of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev in the Kremlin’s upper 
echelon. The first research question is what effect Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms had on 
current foreign policy formulation. The extent of Glasnost and Soviet democratization’s 
reconfiguration in the foreign policy formulation in today’s Russia is therefore a focal point 
of investigation. The aftermath and lasting legacy of the 1991 coup against Gorbachev is of 
central importance. The thesis takes into account the legacy of Gorbachev’s reforms, which 
can summarily be described as empowering the average citizen in relation to the 
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government.
3
                     
 The ‘Yeltsonian’ theme acknowledges and traces the legacy of the attempted coup 
against Boris Yeltsin and his transformational legacy on the powers and apparatus of the 
Russian presidency. The primary analysis involves the 1993 constitutional crisis in which 
Boris Yeltsin emerged victorious, and investigates how this event transformed the 
presidential system and apparatus with regards to foreign policy decisions in today’s Russia 
under the helm of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. The attempted coup turned into a 
victory for the Russian President against the Russian legislative body and a powerful 
presidency was created during the early 1990’s. 
 The thesis analyzes and expounds on how the two coups are related and what were 
early instances of their transformational effects, as well as the effects the Gorbachovian and 
Yeltsonian forces have had on contemporary Russian foreign policy decisions. This body of 
research is based on the governmental standpoint as outlined and advocated by Graham 
Allison’s seminal work, Essence of Decision.4 What can be derived from the actions of key 
players within the Kremlin in the context of personal dynamics and political forces of the 
system is an important research question in the following chapters. How the coups affected 
the operational mechanisms, as well as the individuals within the decision-making power 
structure is a research area addressed in this thesis.   
 The Governmental Politics Model as first authored by Graham Allison and then 
with Philip Zelikow posits five important principles for analysis.
5
 These principles provide 
the theoretical framework for analyzing the internal dynamics of the Kremlin.
6
 The list of 
principles is as follows: 
                                                 
3 A. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, (Oxford, Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
4 Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow, Essence of Decision, (Boston, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Publisher Inc., 1999). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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1. Individual decision-makers are the key units for analysis. 
2. Individuals who possess great influence exert and ultimately sway the decision-making 
according to their individual perceptions and priorities.  
3. The individuals under scrutiny operate within informal and formal networks of power. 
4. Personal friendship and animosities among decision-makers play an important role in 
decision-making. 
5. Conflicting interests create a causal relationship with governmental bargaining. The 
result of this clash is a negotiated, compromised result.  
  
 The Governmental Politics Model is an excellent method to analyze Russian foreign  
 
policy on several grounds. First, the Kremlin is occupied by three distinct groups in which  
 
individuals have varying perceptions of the world stage. This emphasis on individuals and  
 
their respective perceptions is useful in understanding the Putin-Medvedev duo, as well as  
 
the Siloviki, Technocrats, and Yeltsin Liberals who are primary members of the policy  
 
formulation. Varying levels of influence is an inherent concept in the Governmental  
 
Politics Model and this, the author claims, is a key aspect that enhances the understanding  
 
of Russian foreign policy. Kremlin bureaucrats do not exude equal influence. Certain  
 
members of the Kremlin are more influential because of personal qualities that  
 
‘drown out’ the less visible and ardent bureaucrats. Examining personal dynamics among  
 
the bureaucrats is also useful in the Medvedev presidency because of the very nature of the  
 
agreement that two men would serve as the leaders of the Russian Federation. The personal  
 
dynamics as well as the clash in perceptions and ideologies are instrumental in the analysis  
 
that is posited by the Governmental Politics Model and is used throughout this body of  
 
research. 
 
 As for the operational analysis of the mechanics of Russian foreign policy-making,  
 
the following organs are considered. These were selected based on importance in terms of  
 
involvement, role, and effectiveness in the formulation of foreign policy. The Russian  
 
presidency is examined considering the ‘Gorbachovian’ effects of democratization and the  
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importance of public opinion, as well as the ‘Yeltsonian’ effects of establishing a superior  
 
presidency with broad powers over the legislature and other branches of the Russian  
 
government.  
 
 The ultimate decision-making process for the Russian President involves the  
 
Security Council of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of  
 
Defence. Yeltsin’s revitalization of the National Security Council has been an important  
 
factor in today’s Russian foreign policy. His usage of it has created an important forum for  
 
dialogue among members of the political elite. The Russian Security Council’s  
 
membership includes anyone the President desires.
7
 There is no limit to how fluid the  
 
Security Council’s membership is.8 The age old clash of the generals and the diplomats as  
 
evidenced by the 1991 coup has fundamentally evolved to include the Russian Security  
 
Council which has many different schools of thought, agendas, and influences as a result of  
 
the open membership.
9
 This policy apparatus can solely be attributed to Boris Yeltsin’s  
 
lasting legacy. 
 
 The themes for the analysis of this thesis are the transformative forces of  
 
Gorbachev’s legacy of democratization which led to disorder among the masses and  
 
Yeltsin’s resistance to this disorder through the creation of an imperial presidency.10 These  
 
opposing forces have clashed and coexisted and will continue to as long as the Russian  
 
presidency maintains its constitutional superiority and the Russian Federation’s government  
 
is beholden to the public opinion of its constituency, which is linked to its democratically  
 
gained legitimacy. Voter preference, political expediency, the foreign policy apparatus, and  
 
the constitutional dominance of the presidency are important facets of the analysis for this  
                                                 
7 Robert H. Donaldson, ‘Boris Yeltsin’s Foreign Policy Legacy.’, University of Tulsa, [web page], (2000),                                                                    
< http://www.personal.utulsa.edu/~robert-donaldson/yeltsin.htm>, accessed 12 June 2012. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 A. Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004). 
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thesis. The transformative forces enacted by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin have  
 
therefore been researched in order to provide a better understanding of the decisions and  
 
policies of the Putin-Medvedev regime. 
 
 The political regime currently in the Kremlin as previously mentioned is composed 
of three groups. First, the Yeltsin Liberals are included in this thesis; they believe in a close 
relationship with the Western world and have remained loyal to the Putin era bureaucrats 
now occupying the Kremlin. Second, the Silovik faction is an important group because of 
its overall dominance in modern Russia. These bureaucrats are categorized as ‘Putin- 
types.’ Namely, they are former intelligence officers who are keen to maintain stability and 
have an ‘intelligence officer’s worldview.’ Their goal is to maintain Russian prestige and 
security at any cost. The Technocrats can be described as ‘Medvedev-types.’ This is a 
fundamentally different group from the Siloviki. They are composed of economists, 
professors, and attorneys from the culturally and intellectually driven St. Petersburg, who 
were brought into government by Vladimir Putin. It is necessary to understand the 
ideological nature and personal dynamics of these three groups that contribute to the policy 
formulation in the Kremlin. The formulation of Russian foreign policy is derived from the 
cohesion and clashes of these three groups, which this body of research examines 
throughout the following chapters.                 
Literature Review: 
 The author has needed to locate important themes and nuances in the available 
literature to understand the Russian Federation’s foreign policy during the presidency of 
Dmitry Medvedev. While no one has carried out the type of analysis which forms the basis 
of this thesis, there is a useful body of work in which to start the argument in this research. 
Andrei P. Tsygankov’s Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National 
11 
 
Identity in 2006 has postulated that the post-Soviet Russian political spectrum is in search 
of its national identity.
11
 This book puts forth the convincing argument that Russian foreign 
policy is the result of clashing schools of thought.
12
 The Yeltsin years and early Putin years 
are analyzed by using the theoretical framework of Statism, Westernism, and 
Civilizationism. These three broad ideologies were deftly and analytically applied to the 
major political figures in the Russian Federation. This theoretical framework is the most 
expansive and inclusive litmus test for understanding the foreign policy decisions of the 
main players in the Russian government. Tsygankov also usefully distinguishes the 
divisions within individual schools of thought. Each school of thought grapples with the 
question of whether Russia’s loyalty lies toward the Atlantic sphere or Eastward.13 
Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists fall into different camps regarding this question 
regardless of ideology. Tsygankov acknowledges this clash and overlap of ideologies. 
While Tsygankov’s book is meant to provide a broad view of the foreign policy 
community, Putin’s actions are not probed to the extent to ascertain that his beliefs can be 
characterized as both Statist and Westernist. The overlap is present in the book, but 
Tsygankov ultimately shies away from it being used as an important focal point in foreign 
policy analysis. The overlap of competing schools of thought therefore requires a fresh look 
and this is an important factor in assessing the overall direction of Russia’s foreign policy 
during the Putin-Medvedev leadership.  
 Of course much depends on the date of any publication. Tsygankov’s book was 
published during the beginning of Putin’s second term and so at that point it had become 
apparent that this Russian political figure was the dominant actor in the Kremlin and 
                                                 
11 A. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2006). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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Russian society. Studies on Putin though at this point were still trying to make sense of the 
man and his inner circle. Tsygankov’s work never meant to catapult Putin’s importance in 
Russia, but as the events of the 2012 presidential election in Russia were unfolding, it 
became clear that Putin and his inner circle merited even further analysis. Tsygankov’s 
research was a broad view that did not distinguish Putin for his fundamental and 
unshakable grasp on the Kremlin and its bureaucracy. The school of thought, not the 
individual, mattered in Tsygankov’s research. While such a broad foreign policy 
assessment is important, in the author’s view there must also be a thorough investigation of 
those occupying the Kremlin’s power apparatus. Tsygankov aimed for a broad overview of 
the political spectrum and understandably neglected the inner workings of the Kremlin. 
This thesis seeks to add to and enhance this view. 
 Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap’s article The Siloviki in Putin’s Russia: Who They 
Are and What They Want is a necessary and complementary analysis of the inner circle 
operating in today’s Kremlin.14 Tsygankov did not focus on Yeltsin or Putin’s close 
advisors or influential members of their respective inner circles. Tsygankov’s broad 
analysis neglected the impact of the members of Putin’s ‘inner sanctum’ and their 
operational status quo. These however are important factors in the Kremlin, and Bremmer 
and Charap wrote brilliantly on the Silovik worldview and belief system. Namely, the neo-
KGB influence and control of the state, as well as the clash with the Liberals who were left 
over from the Yeltsin years is a primary facet.
15
 This is a necessary portion of any analysis 
of Putin’s inner circle. While published before Medvedev’s ascension to the presidency, it 
strongly argues that the Technocrats are an important group in this analysis of the Kremlin, 
                                                 
14 Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap, ‘The Siloviki in Putin’s Russia: Who They Are and What They Want’, The Washington Quarterly  
[online journal], 30/1 (2006), 83–92 <http://www.units.muohio.edu/havighurstcenter/russianstudies/documents/siloviki.pdf>, accessed 18 
July 2012. 
15 Ibid. 
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holding the reins of power within Putin’s inner circle.16 These individuals with academic, 
engineering, and law careers are loyal to Putin and compete for influence with the Liberals 
of the Yeltsin years who remained in power. The competing influences for control of the 
Kremlin’s decisions within the inner circle is of central importance to this body of research 
and is a fundamental theme that compliment’s the analysis provided by Tsygankov.  
 Dmitry Shlapentokh masterfully builds on Tsygankov’s research, specifically the 
Eurasianist dilemma in his journal article on Alexander Dugin’s advocacy of Eurasian 
political and economic integration.
17
 The Russian Federation’s identity crisis as to whether 
it is a European or Asian country continues in academic and political realms. Shlapentokh 
emphasizes that Eurasianism is broadly supported among nationalists who fall into the 
Civilizationist category of the Russian political spectrum and refuse to believe the Cold 
War was lost; furthermore, the nationalists believe that the conflict between the United 
States and Russia is irreconcilable.
18
 While Tsygankov analyzed each category and 
persuasion of the Russian political spectrum, this journal article focused solely on what has 
been the most important ideological battle in recent Russian history. The Russian 
Federation’s foreign policy has been pragmatic since the Putin era began but the country 
still oscillates between the East and West. The author pointed out that Dugin was not 
appalled with former United States National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 
statement admitting that the role of the United States in Eurasia is to control and influence 
important events on the world stage stemming from this region.
19
 Dugin’s ideological 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Dmitry Shlapentolkh, ‘Dugin Eurasianism: a window on the minds of the Russian elite or an intellectual ploy?’ Studies in East 
European Thought [online journal], 59/3 (2007), 215 – 236 < http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11212-007-9030-y/fulltext.html>, 
accessed 19 July 2012. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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stance is rooted in this very notion, which he wholeheartedly opposes.
20
 The nationalist 
sentiment is that Russian civilization is highly superior to the Western world and that the 
Russian leadership must strive to be independent and free of any Western intervention or 
entanglement.
21
 The journal article proposes various options, which includes nationalist 
isolation or conciliatory engagement with the West.
22
 It even outlines the faint but possible 
option of retaliating against a vastly superior United States and its armed forces.
23
 All of 
these policy options discussed by Shlapentokh seem so unlikely that the journal article only 
discusses them in passing while arriving to the only logical option, which is to engage both 
the East and West by Russia playing an independent but important role on the world 
stage.
24
 Shlapentokh’s journal article however misses a crucial element of the Eurasianist 
dilemma in the Russian Federation’s political discourse. Eurasianism does not wholly 
belong to the Civilizationist school of thought, but also belongs to the Statist category of 
the political spectrum. The Primakovian model, which advocated power balancing between 
East and West, was brought into practice by a Statist, not a Civilizationist.
25
 Yevgeni 
Primakov advocated a statist approach to government and elevated power-balancing as a 
fundamental facet of Russian foreign policy.
26
 Shlapentokh wilfully neglects this clash 
among Eurasianists and the journal article is not central in this debate.  
 While scholarly research has generally focused on broad ideologies, a new focus on 
the individual as more important than any ideology, inner circle, or event on the world 
stage is becoming an increasing trend in Social Science. James M. Goldgeier’s book from 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 A. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2006). 
26 Ibid. 
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1994 entitled: Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy enhances the reader’s 
understanding of the Soviet relationship between the political leader and national and 
international politics.
27
 The  leadership style, which Goldgeier asserts is formed during the 
early years of a politician’s career, has a direct and lasting impact on the foreign policy 
decisions he or she makes in the prime of their careers.
28
 This book is compatible with 
Essence of Decision in terms of its approach to understanding the motivations and styles of 
political leaders. There can be no thesis formulation without linking the actions of Russia’s 
leaders to their formative experiences, which had an impact on their worldview, leadership 
style, and modus operandi. However, even Goldgeier acknowledges that personal 
leadership style does not account for all political courses and decisions.
29
 Gorbachev is a 
case that defies this line of thinking.
30
 Mikhail Gorbachev was a loyal Communist 
apparatchik and showed no signs of what ultimately became his reformist agenda, which 
decentralized the Soviet Union.
31
 This acknowledgment is an important admission that 
personal leadership style, which is forged during a politician’s early years, maintains its 
status as a fundamental factor in policy-making but is never to be used to develop a 
complete perspective of Russia’s decisions.  
 Jeff Checkel attempts to dissect what exactly Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘foreign policy 
revolution’ entailed by examining institutional changes.32 Instead of doing what he set out 
to do, Checkel’s article dwells on what possibly contributed to the various changes in 
Soviet foreign policy during the Gorbachev years by theorizing that the evolution was a 
                                                 
27 J. Goldgeier, Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy (Baltimore, Maryland, The John Hopkins University Press, 1994). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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result of ‘policy windows’ being taken advantage of by ‘policy entrepreneurs.’33 This 
analysis makes a broad assumption that ambitious apparatchiks were the key elements in 
what can be described as a new era of foreign policy. Checkel postulates that the 
international system is low in terms of importance when comparing it with the domestic 
situation and key political players involved.
34
 This sort of analysis is deficient in explaining 
foreign policy in the response to unexpected events. Checkel emphasized several important 
shifts within the domestic political situation.
35
 For example, Gorbachev’s revision of the 
myopic Marxist-Leninist vision of international affairs and the growing influence of 
Yevgeni Primakov and Alexander Yakovlev were correlated to the new shift in foreign 
policy.
36
 This analysis of the individual’s thinking in the foreign policy agenda illustrates 
the importance of the individual in the policy-making apparatus, but Checkel makes no 
attempt to place it in perspective in light of the momentous and consequential changes in 
the world. The Cold War was turning into rapprochement, the threat of nuclear 
confrontation was becoming unlikely, and a new decentralized Soviet system was 
developing as a result of reforms. All of these factors are marginally important to Checkel, 
and he largely dwells on the emerging intellectual forces.
37
 The Soviet Union’s think tank 
and governmental ideologists were more influential than public or world opinion according 
to Checkel.
38
 The analysis is deficient because his attempt to probe the institutional 
evolution of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus is admittedly based on assumptions.
39
 
                                                 
33 Jeff Checkel, ‘Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution.’, World Politics [online journal], 45/2 (1993), 271-300 
< http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2950660?seq=1&type=ref#infoRef>, accessed 13 July 2012. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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Checkel correlates foreign policy based on outcomes and ideologies of emerging 
influences, and this is not a sufficient mode of analysis.  
 James Goldgeier and Graham Allison’s respective literature has contributed far 
more by analyzing the individual’s motivation, ideology, and style when confronted with 
international and domestic events. Public opinion is highly important according to 
Goldgeier’s book.40 However, Checkel correlates outcomes based on assumed influence, 
while James Goldgeier and Graham Allison’s respective literature provides decisive 
actions, statements, and decisions as evidence of the individual’s mindset. Also, it is 
difficult for Checkel to even define a ‘policy entrepreneur’ and his framework has to be 
forced on the intended apparatchik. This is evidently a lack of explanation that does not fit 
well in academic research. Checkel carried out a more complete analysis of what a ‘policy 
window’ is but this was marginalized by his emphasis on Primakov and Yakovlev and their 
influence on Gorbachev’s thinking.41  
 This thesis draws heavily on the institutional changes during the Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin years that affected the foreign policy apparatus during the tenure of President 
Dmitry Medvedev. The article written by Frederick Starr in 1995 analytically summarized 
the aftermath of the 1993 coup and its future trends.
42
 The national chaos and economic 
stagnation were prime motives for Boris Yeltsin to seize the moment and expand the scope 
of presidential power.
43
 The article alludes to the mass disorder characterizing Russia 
during the 1990’s and systemic inefficiency of the government’s bureaucracy.44 Starr 
expounds on the authoritarian transformation of the Russian government after cataclysmic 
                                                 
40 J. Goldgeier, Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy (Baltimore, Maryland, The John Hopkins University Press, 1994). 
41 Ibid. 
42 S. Frederick Starr , ‘The Paradox of Yeltsin's Russia.’, The Wilson Quarterly [online journal] 19/3 (1995), 66-73                                                  
< http://www.jstor.org/stable/40259015>, accessed July 19, 2012. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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democratization.
45
 Starr discusses key issues such as the floundering economy, a rebellious 
and inefficient bureaucracy, and Yeltsin’s attempt to manage the disorder.46 Yeltsin came to 
prominence as an anti-Statist Liberal who foresaw a future which empowered the people.
47
 
Starr described Yeltsin’s failure to rescue the economy or provide federal management for 
the new country.
48
  The problems of the new country lay in its government’s decentralized 
powers and operating mechanisms.
49
 Starr wrote about how the Russian Federation’s 
government was so decentralized that it lacked the ability to collect tax revenue from 
constituents and businesses.
50
  
 However, Starr does not cast blame on Yeltsin for his authoritarian tendencies or 
mass centralization of the government’s power.51 Rather he realistically assesses the 
Russian government’s inability to serve its constituents’ needs, as well as manage the new 
free market economy, which required guidance and supervision.
52
 Starr has no qualms in 
asserting that Yeltsin’s quasi-democracy with authoritarian impulses is the proper course.53 
The 1990’s brought great changes and overwhelming problems according to the article; 
these conditions prevented the viability of a weak presidency to manage the affairs of a 
country in desperate need of a strong hand to guide it.
54
 Starr emphasizes that disconnect 
between theory and practice exists; the democratization of the Soviet Union was intended 
to set it on a course of peace and prosperity.
55
 The Yeltsin Administration was the first 
presidency to tackle these issues under the democratic framework established. Starr 
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concludes his article by insisting that Russia is ‘under governed’ given the vast and 
numerous problems facing the country, which is still in its developmental infancy.
56
  
 Shlapentokh’s article dealing with Eurasianism did not discuss Vladimir Putin’s 
power, which was established because of the 1993 coup, to categorically decide whether 
Russia sides with the East or West. His article dwelled on the value of the debate, but it 
largely ignores the fact that Putin can forge alliances without the consent of the legislative 
body or judiciary because of Yeltsin’s ‘atavistic actions’ that reversed the democratization 
set in place from the Gorbachev years with respect to the Russian government. Ultimately, 
Frederick Starr’s article about Yeltsin’s expansion of powers to manage the disorder of the 
1990’s is related to the current debate faced by the Russian leadership about whether to 
align with the East or West.
57
 The Russian presidency has the authority and powers to 
decide the question to this debate in the form of treaties, alliances, and diplomatic forums 
because of Yeltsin’s legacy.  Starr’s article about Yeltsin’s presidency is a succinct, 
scholarly analysis that provides great insights into the legacy of the first President of the 
Russian Federation. 
 Academic circles were not entirely cognizant of Yeltsin’s unprecedented political 
moves and institutional reconfigurations. The 1990’s in Russia saw widespread political 
chaos and economic stagnation, and because of his alcoholism, the consensus in the 
Western world was that Yeltsin was ineffectual and incapable of carrying out the 
responsibilities of office. The constitutional crisis was dismissed as being Yeltsin’s attempt 
to bring back authoritarianism and scholarly research at the time did not wholly appreciate 
his contributions to foreign policy-making and presidential mechanisms. Neil Malcolm and 
Alex Pravda’s journal article delicately lays out the important contributions made by 
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Yeltsin to the Russian presidency by virtue of Yeltsin’s actions, personal style, and 
responses to unpredictable events.
58
 Democratization and Foreign Policy is one of the first 
and most important research articles that link democratic reform to foreign policy-making, 
which is a central idea of this thesis. It makes the case that democratization has led to 
different political groups and the politicization of foreign policy has contributed to the 
discourse becoming a myriad of ideologies attempting to influence Russia’s direction on 
the world stage.
59
 The authors correlate the divisions of the political spectrum with visions 
of Russia’s role on the world stage, while Tsygankov’s literature broadly and 
systematically addresses all these divisions.
60
 Tsygankov’s literature emphasized that 
elections and public opinion swayed the policy-makers to a powerful degree, but Malcolm 
and Pravda assert that this is a ‘double-edged sword.’61 Specifically they are referring to the 
political rallying and mobilization of the masses by political leaders to facilitate change in 
policy.
62
 However, there is little supporting evidence for this claim. A vague mention of 
changing the nuances of foreign policy is mentioned in relation to Chechnya but nothing 
concrete is offered to support the claim that mobilizing public support earns political capital 
for politicians.
63
 On the other hand, Yeltsin’s decentralization of power of the legislature is 
a primary point of the article.
64
 The authors make no attempt to hide the fact that the Duma 
is a relatively powerless institution after the constitutional crisis in which Yeltsin emerged 
the victor.
65
 This was an important acknowledgement in the 1990’s and was a 
foreshadowing of the vastly powerful Russian presidency that would continue to dominate 
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the political arena. The article analyzes the quandary of the Yeltsin presidency.
66
 Namely, 
power and influence are concentrated in a small circle of elites, but the forces of 
democratization affected Yeltsin’s actions and inner circle.67 Voter preference and public 
support remained cornerstones of the new leadership’s legitimacy and no authoritarian 
behaviour would diminish that.
68
 The authors concluded that political expediency and 
‘pandering’ are now the guiding principles in democratic Russia.69 Regardless of what will 
be written about the democratic transition, the Russian Federation’s President will be 
forced to make foreign policy decisions with the conflicting forces of democratization and 
authoritarian impulses.  
 Most research on Russia focuses on the personalities and actions of those occupying 
the highest corridors of power, but this begs the question of whether the scholarly analysis 
is biased or not. It is debateable whether any analysis of influential and powerful figures 
such as Boris Yeltsin or Vladimir Putin is untainted by political bias or scholarly myopia. 
Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications by The Rand Project Air Force is a 
comprehensive and integral study of the Russian Federation’s current state of affairs, 
capabilities, and trends.
70
 It reflects a systemic perspective of all facets of Russia’s 
economy, political environment, responses to changes on the world stage, and historical 
background.
71
 Unlike Goldgeier’s work, which continued the trend of analyzing a country 
solely from the standpoint of its leaders, it makes no attempt to understand the individual 
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leader at the apex of power, but focuses on Russia’s progress and transformation from the 
stagnant Yeltsin years.
72
 
 The report makes no attempt to hide the fact that it views Russia’s internal progress 
as a path for Russian policy-makers to enhance and attain global influence.
73
 In terms of 
security, the Russian Federation seeks to deter NATO as it openly dominates the global 
security architecture.
74
 This comprehensive assessment made a specific effort to highlight 
and align the reader’s thoughts with Russia’s frustration over NATO’s Missile Defence 
Shield in Prague, which created apprehension among the Russian public and political 
circles.
75
 There was little debate in Russia as to whether the Kremlin should be conciliatory 
or combative toward NATO’s efforts to ensure its security grasp in the post-Soviet space. 
This is an important aspect of this thesis; linking security measures with public opinion is a 
vital element in understanding Russian foreign policy. The intentions of individual leaders 
were not considered in this report, but the overall Russian sentiment among the masses and 
political circles is that Russia strives to be a great modern power.
76
 This was the guiding 
principle that the authors felt summed up Russia’s foreign policy.77 Namely, it seeks to 
compete in a multipolar world, where it can once again sway influence in the international 
arena and over its former territory.
78
 The report expounds on the Russian desire not to 
repeat the blunders of the 1990’s and to be an independent power.79 This collective 
realization among Russians is the core of the research that concluded that Russia’s foreign 
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policy and the transformation of economy and infrastructure are inherent with those 
wishes.
80
 
 Roy Allison’s journal article examining the 2008 Russian-Georgian War titled: 
Russia Resurgent? Moscow's Campaign to “Coerce Georgia to Peace” is an excellent 
pivot toward a scholarly recognition that Russia is now an assertive force striving to shape 
the international system in its favour.
81
 Roy Allison is among the first major scholars to 
both recognize that the Russian Federation during the Medvedev years is seeking to use 
coercive diplomacy to solidify its interests in the post-Soviet space, which it still sees as 
belonging to its sphere of influence, and that this is directly stemming from the 
psychological mindset and perception of the top brass of the Kremlin.
82
  Furthermore, Roy 
Allison correctly details that this foreign policy episode ranks as highly important and may 
be the most vital point in the Russian Federation’s diplomacy on the world stage, which 
this body of research examines thoroughly in Chapter 2. Roy Allison also shrewdly notes 
that it merits further examination whether Russian’s ‘new interventionism’ is the product of 
certain conditions that may have precipitated this or a concerted effort by the Kremlin to be 
recognized as an aspiring global power that will assert itself in order to maximize benefits 
for the Russian Federation.
83
 The article elucidates on the fact that the Kremlin’s 
characterization of this foreign policy episode is mired in anti-Western rhetoric, which 
serves the leaders of the Russian Federation abundantly in terms of gaining and maintaining 
political capital from constituents.
84
 The multi-layered analysis of this conflict elevates it to 
major importance, emphasizes the importance of the perceptions of leaders in the Kremlin, 
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and details the political pandering necessary to maintain public and political support of the 
Russian citizens.
85
 This multi-faceted approach is an inherent method to examine the 
foreign policy episodes of major importance during the Medvedev presidency in this body 
of research. 
 The new democracy in the Russian Federation as a result of Gorbachev’s reforms 
and the lasting legacy of these democratic forces of empowering the average citizen are 
best understood by a reading of Archie Brown’s book, The Gorbachev Factor.86 This book 
is exceptionally well written and chooses to examine the details and processes of the 
reforms that Mikhail Gorbachev enacted through a politically skilful manner in order to 
save the country by liberalization and decentralization.
87
 Archie Brown specifically 
examines the gradual process that created democratic elections, a news media free of 
government control, and the new social compact that required the ultimate consent of the 
governed for the government to operate and govern.
88
 Democratically-linked legitimacy 
was now the new political norm in a country that had not tolerated such ‘revolutionary’ and 
anti-Communist measures.
89
 The Gorbachev Factor is an important book for understanding 
Gorbachev’s lasting legacy; a legacy that remains relevant in the Russian Federation’s 
foreign policy decisions today. It began a new trend in reassessing how important 
Gorbachev’s tenure was. The Kremlin’s policy formulation today has been indelibly shaped 
by Mikhail Gorbachev and his reforms. This is an important theme in this body of research 
and builds upon the work of Archie Brown in acknowledging its importance.                 
 This thesis makes use of various news sources accessible online. The chapters 
include articles from The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, 
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The London Telegraph, and The Guardian, as well as other news publications. These 
sources provide a critical view of the Kremlin and its policies, which illuminates much of 
the processes and mechanisms used in formulation of foreign policy decisions. The author 
chooses to largely use Russian sources, which have been translated into English for the 
benefit of the reader by Google Translate, in a secondary sense to broaden knowledge from 
a Russian vantage point. However, Pravda, Izvestia, Kommersant, and other Russian 
newspapers provide quality reporting, but fail to provide necessary criticism and scepticism 
that are needed to fully probe the Kremlin. For example, no American newspapers provided 
critical analysis before the United States launched military operations in Afghanistan or 
Iraq. In a similar case, no Russian newspaper provided a critical analysis of the Russian 
activity in Georgia’s breakaway regions. The fact is that journalists are still citizens who 
are mired in the nationalist sentiment in which they grew up and live in while they write 
articles. Therefore, the author made a conscience decision to use Western sources that 
provide the necessary analysis that is not influenced by patriotic sentiment in addition to 
Russian sources. 
 The author has conducted research for this thesis at the Harvard University Kennedy 
School of Government, Brown University Watson Institute of International Studies, 
Columbia University School of Public & International Affairs, New York University 
Centre for Global Studies, New School University, Carnegie Council for Ethics in 
International Affairs, and American Enterprise Institute. For the Russian viewpoint, the 
author has interviewed Dr. Sergei Khrushchev and Dr. Nina Khrushcheva, who are both 
well known academics in the field of Russian foreign policy.                                                                                                  
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Structure of Thesis: 
 This body of research examines Russian foreign policy in nine chapters. The 
introductory chapter contains an overview of the necessary themes that will play an 
important role in establishing the Russian Federation’s foreign policy analysis. The 
introduction provides a perspective on the importance of understanding Russian foreign 
policy and the available research that attempts to do this. The issues worthy of examination 
have been established by the literature review and objectives that have been put forth to 
bridge scholarly gaps with the necessary analytical questions. Chapter 1 establishes the 
themes of this research by explaining the theoretical framework of the political forces 
affecting the Kremlin. Chapter 1 expounds on the Gorbachovian and Yeltsonian attributes 
of Russia’s contemporary foreign policy formulation. The reforms and legacies of President 
Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, and President Boris Yeltsin, the 
first leader of the Russian Federation, are examined to link the evolutionary aspects of their 
influences on Russian foreign policy-making. Chapter 1 incorporated Graham Allison’s 
Governmental Politics Model in order to apply this to the current foreign policy apparatus 
occupied by Russia’s current leaders during the Medvedev presidency. An analysis of the 
respective departmental bureaucrats by virtue of Graham Allison’s model provides the 
theoretical framework for analyzing foreign policy decision s. 
 Chapter 2 examines the decision to respond to Georgian forces militarily by the 
Russian Federation in August 2008, and specifically the internal dynamics that were 
inherent with the order to use military force against Georgia. The Russian Federation’s first 
and only unilateral war against another country to date is an important episode in its foreign 
policy. Chapter 3 focuses on the Russian Federation’s response to North Korea’s nuclear 
testing in 2009 and the decision of whether to consent to sanctions on the United Nations 
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Security Council. Chapter 4 investigates the Kremlin’s response to Kyrgyzstan’s civil 
uprising and the Russian Federation’s role in the ouster of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 
2010. Chapter 5 examines Russia’s decision to support sanctions against Iran in relation to 
the move to consent to United Nations Resolution 1929, which has been the most stringent 
set of sanctions against Iran in the history of the United Nations Security Council.
90
  
  Chapter 6 assesses Russian foreign policy in the response to the Libyan Civil War 
and the Kremlin’s involvement in enforcing a no-fly zone that signalled the death knell for 
the Khadafy regime. These events have had a direct effect on the Russian Federation’s 
decision not to support sanctions against the Assad regime in Syria. Chapter 7 examines 
Russia’s reluctance and ultimate refusal to support sanctions or intervention in the Syrian 
Civil War after the Libyan outcome and its political consequences. The conclusion of the 
thesis emphasizes the importance of Russia’s current political arena as a result of the 
Gorbachovian and Yeltsonian forces and the foreign policy as formulated by the Kremlin 
during the Medvedev presidency, as well as its intertwined state of internal dynamics with 
the presence of three distinct groups that are responsible for formulating and executing 
foreign policy decisions.  
 This doctoral dissertation focuses on six important foreign policy episodes during 
the Medvedev presidency. Russia’s war with Georgia, which had innumerable 
consequences on the world stage, was a daring and unexpected event that solidifies 
Russia’s standing as an assertive state aiming to maximize its power. This event began a 
new chapter in Russia’s foreign policy and maintains an important place in this research. In 
the same vein, Russia’s new power aspirations continue its trend of intervening in the post-
Soviet space and the foreign policy episode with Kyrgyzstan, which was a strategic 
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competition between Moscow and Washington D.C. over military basing, serves as an 
important issue that illuminates the Kremlin’s predispositions with respect to shaping the 
international system. The Russian Federation’s decisions on the United Nations Security 
Council in relation to North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria further allow the author to assess 
the Kremlin’s role in the age of liberal institutionalism, where power politics plays out in 
diplomatic settings. Each foreign policy episode was chosen specifically because of the 
wide-ranging political and diplomatic consequences on the world stage. International 
security has been the overarching Silovik concern and Russia’s vital foreign policy 
episodes during the Medvedev presidency deal with this very aspect of the world stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Chapter 1: The Transformational Themes of the Kremlin & a Theoretical Framework 
 Mikhail Gorbachev was one of the most important historical figures of the twentieth 
century, but ironically he is known more for the end result of his reforms, not the actual 
transformation of the Soviet Union from totalitarian socialism to a democratic 
confederation of republics under the structural framework of a decentralized union. The 
scope of the reforms affected every citizen and former republic irreversibly. Gorbachev 
showed no signs of the reformer he would become during his early career, but the rhetoric 
immediately prior to his ascension to Secretary General provided glimpses into the mind of 
a man who started a revolution and lost his own country.
91
 
 Gorbachev’s years in power had seen the most chaotic times within the Soviet 
Union, and the reforms were carried out within this confluence of events. The aftermath 
brought about serious questions as to the extent and relevance of his tenure, but Gorbachev 
remains to this day unapologetic for the course he took. In his closing speech as the Soviet 
Union was dissolved in 1991, Gorbachev expressed regret that the republics decided to 
secede, and he notes that it was done not by referendum or acting in accordance with 
popular will.
92
 This statement speaks volumes about Gorbachev’s thinking and political 
leanings. According to this philosophy, any government must act according to the wishes of 
the governed, and Gorbachev’s democratic leanings were expressed vociferously in terms 
of the several years of reforms that reversed the Soviet Union’s grasp on its denizens and 
empowered their voices.  
 Gorbachev was at times contradictory and polarizing. His career is difficult to 
describe if analyzed through the lens of a ‘right or wrong’ framework. Gorbachev believed 
in socialism, but he also believed that the government’s role in the distribution of resources, 
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wealth, and services should not impede or infringe on the liberties of citizens.
93
 Gorbachev 
stated:  
The totalitarian system which deprived the country of an opportunity to become 
successful and prosperous long ago has been eliminated. A breakthrough has been 
achieved on the way to democratic changes. Free elections, freedom of the press, 
religious freedoms, representative organs of power, a multiparty system became a 
reality; human rights are recognized as the supreme principle.
94
  
 
 Gorbachev’s democratization and program of Glasnost earned him praise from 
liberals and criticism from Soviet hardliners, but there is no question as to whether these 
policies transformed the Soviet Union irreversibly. 
 Gorbachev fully distinguished the Western European socialist model, which aimed 
for democratization and empowerment of its citizens, from the Communist control of the 
masses and subversion of freedoms in the domestic political environment. According to 
Jerry F. Hough, ‘The essence of communism was an erection of an Iron Curtain against 
frightening market forces (especially foreign ones) but also against frightening modern 
Western culture.’95 Gorbachev was simply not convinced that Western democratic 
principles would lead to an abrogation of the socialist model. For Gorbachev, personal and 
political freedoms were the necessary paths toward prosperity. Hough states: ‘Just as Stalin 
justified his policy of autarky as necessary to build Soviet national power, Gorbachev 
makes the same claim for his policy of ending autarky.’96 According to a PBS Charlie Rose 
interview in 2006 marking the fifteenth anniversary of the fall of the Soviet Union, 
Gorbachev believed that the course of democratization and decentralization was the only 
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viable option, given the decadent state of the Soviet economy and quality of life.
97
 He, 
however, believed that the fall of the Soviet Union was not a result of his reforms, but 
rather because of the treachery of Boris Yeltsin’s ploy.98 Namely, Yeltsin played the part of 
saviour, which ended the 1991 coup, and then resorted to formally sever ties with the 
Soviet Union in the interest of accelerating the transformation of the Russian economy 
from market socialism to market capitalism.
99
 Gorbachev quipped that if he could relive the 
past, Yeltsin would have been appointed an ambassador to relegate his position in the 
domestic political environment.
100
 The responsibility for the fate of the Soviet Union is 
debateable, but the forces that created the viability for its end are unquestionable.  
 No one understood better the power of public opinion than Mikhail Gorbachev. 
Every policy step, major program of reform, and foreign policy action was conveyed to the 
Soviet masses in order to gain legitimacy in the relationship between the government and 
the governed. ‘As he (Gorbachev) put it at a closed meeting with a group of Soviet writers 
on 19 June 1986, “All our plans depend on influencing the people.”’101 Gaining the support 
of the masses was crucial to Perestroika and the Soviet-American rapprochement.  
Gorbachev’s political style was forged in the years when denouncing Stalin and his 
infringement on personal liberty became publicly and intellectually acceptable. As James 
Goldgeier’s Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy postulates, a leader’s political style 
is forged during his or her early years.
102
 Based on this theory, it would be natural for 
Gorbachev to have a disdain for authoritarianism, especially because he was personally 
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affected by Stalin’s purges with the disappearance of his grandfather. Goldgeier cites 
Gorbachev’s acquiescence in having East Germany decide whether it should reunify with 
its Western counterpart as stemming directly from his personal style of empowering the 
people.
103
 Therefore, Gorbachev’s affinity for freedom and aversion toward 
authoritarianism can be directly linked to his experiences from childhood and young 
adulthood.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 Gorbachev’s legacy and lasting impact on the Russian Federation was his successful  
 
attempt to reconfigure and transform the ‘old system’ to better suit the needs of the people  
 
by empowering them through democratization and transparency. According to Peter Frank:  
 
Democratisation is not a new word in Gorbachev's vocabulary; indeed, he has 
referred to it in practically every speech he has made since December 1984. Yet, 
according to Gorbachev, “It is difficult to get some comrades to understand what is 
meant by democratisation - that it is not just a slogan, but the essence of 
reconstruction.” At the heart of the concept, Gorbachev explained, is the principle of 
electivity.
104
  
 
 Gorbachev believed that an informed citizenry with a democratically elected 
government will neutralize any social or historical impediment, and be the catalyst for 
societal and fiscal improvements. Gorbachev spent his years at the apex of power 
attempting to refashion the authoritarian impulses of the Communist apparatus and enhance 
the power of the people to either consent or reject the course chosen by democratically 
elected leaders. This was a vast and multi-faceted process, but the key points in time for the 
purpose of this specific body of research are the 1989 election and the 1991 coup. 
 Gorbachev’s tenure as Secretary General forced him to confront the stagnant 
economy that had become the ultimate burden on Soviet innovation, ingenuity, and 
productivity. The economic reforms, as Gorbachev believed, could only be effective if they 
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were complemented with political reforms.
105
 When Gorbachev took the reins of power in 
1985, it was inconceivable that democratic reforms could be enacted that entailed a free 
news media, fair elections, and an adoption of democratic principles in the Soviet Union.
106
 
Gorbachev’s chief concern revolved around the economy and infrastructure, which his 
predecessors had been unable to fundamentally and conclusively rehabilitate.
107
 It was 
unforeseeable to any Soviet politician at the time that the economic woes would bring about 
momentous political change. Perestroika and its inherent liberalization of the command 
economy forced the political elite to acknowledge and rectify the political system’s 
inadequacies. The transformation of a command economy to market socialism was a 
fundamental change in the status quo, but with market socialism came the emphasis of the 
importance of the consumer. The individual and his or her choices in the new economy 
relegated the importance of the government, which prior to reforms allocated resources and 
goods according to its own goals and wishes. This was the beginning of the eventual 
‘Moscow Spring.’ 
 Empowering the people became Gorbachev’s primary goal when Perestroika began. 
Democratization for Gorbachev meant a more prosperous country and during the early 
years of his tenure he sought to accelerate reforms while still having the support of the 
intelligentsia and liberal Communists before Yeltsin’s rapid ascent in terms of political 
influence.
108
 The post 1990 period saw a much more reserved and conciliatory Gorbachev 
who sought to allay the fears and satisfy the wishes of opposite ends of the political 
spectrum.
109
 This later set the stage for a decisive battle within the Soviet realms of power, 
which ended with Gorbachev’s ouster. Gorbachev’s approach to the new institution of the 
                                                 
105 A. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, (Oxford, Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
34 
 
Soviet presidency is a case in point. While certainly aiming to create a democratic 
leadership position in accordance with the democratization taking place, the election 
required a majority of Soviet deputies to consent to a candidate, not the citizens.
110
 It was a 
step toward democratization, but lacked the true character of Gorbachev’s reforms, which 
called for empowering the average citizen.  
 The reason that the hardliners opposed free and fair elections was because Glasnost 
had transformed the essence of the Soviet political culture. The transparency of government 
and newly formed news media created a new dynamic for Soviet politicians to struggle in 
when formulating and implementing policies. There is little doubt that hardliners who spent 
decades operating with absolute impunity were apprehensive when Gorbachev seized the 
moment to create a political environment in which politicians were held accountable for 
their actions by virtue of a new era of transparency and free news media. The constituents 
were now a major factor in the actions of every Soviet government official. Gorbachev 
became weary and cautious as he was losing support from both sides of the political 
spectrum, which ironically was keeping him in power. A delicate balancing act ensued for 
the rest of his tenure as Secretary General and President of the Soviet Union. The tide of 
democratization was uncontainable and the Soviet Union’s demise was a result of this. In a 
speech about the progress of Perestroika in 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev stated: 
Reforming our political system is a powerful tool for tackling all those problems and 
implementing all our initiatives. We are building an open, democratic and free society 
which has learned the lessons of its past, a society based on law and responsibility, a 
society that keeps its citizens well informed, that rests on its citizens' initiative and 
enterprise, on Soviet socialist patriotism and dedication to humane socialism aimed at 
elevating the human being.
111
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 Yegor Ligachev’s opposition toward the reforms stemmed from these very 
initiatives that Gorbachev believed were essential for transforming the Soviet Union into a 
prosperous country.
112
 The conservative opposition defined its litany of grievances by 
denouncing the move from Soviet Communism to a Western European socialist democratic 
model, which was seen as a blasphemous revocation of the Communist mantra and 
Marxist-Leninism.
113
 Glasnost was particularly criticized as being a vehicle for subversion 
and dissidence.
114
 Communist totalitarianism could not survive with an engaged citizenry 
that had unlimited and comprehensive information about politics and policies. Furthermore, 
democratization weakened the elite bureaucrats who had formulated Soviet domestic and 
foreign policies without the consent or input of the governed. The tide of democratization 
eliminated the impunity and infallibility stemming from the patriotic discourse with regards 
to the Soviet government. The 1990 election of the Soviet presidency was not a microcosm 
of the effects of Gorbachev’s reforms because it was only a political move aimed to satisfy 
both ends of the political spectrum, and it was vastly overshadowed by the election of 1989 
and the coup of 1991. The 1990 election was more of the balancing act that Gorbachev 
came to utilize in order to ensure his political survival. These two events, the 1989 election 
and 1991 coup, were the cataclysmic moments that shook and evolved the very foundations 
of the Soviet Union.  
 Gorbachev’s path of democratization did not take full effect during his tenure not 
least because of the institutional hindrances and systemic nature within which he was 
operating. ‘Free and fair elections’ were revolutionary in the Soviet political culture. The 
New York Times noted in March 1989 that after seven decades of a ‘shamocracy’ with 
uncontested elections and a powerless and ineffectual legislature, the Soviet Union is 
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reforming its electoral process in the true spirit of giving the people the opportunity to 
choose their leaders.
115
 From the early days after the Communist Revolution to 1989, there 
had never been a true democratic contest of candidates vying for positions of power. The 
elite apparatchiks were a cabal with highly secretive methods and starkly different 
ambitions from Gorbachev’s reforms. Yegor Ligachev, who initially supported reforms, 
became Gorbachev’s arch-nemesis because of the Soviet government’s inherent loss of 
power over the Soviet masses.
116
 Namely, Gorbachev’s reforms sought to empower the 
people and make government transparent and beholden to its constituents. Nothing 
possessed the potential to alter the status quo more than this new political path. 
 In another article from March 26, 1989, The New York Times described the election 
as a step forward in terms of making the Soviet legislature more accountable, but only two-
thirds of the seats available are multi-candidate contests.
117
 According to the article, one-
third of the seats were limited to one candidate, which effectively became an 
appointment.
118
 The wheels of democratization were not spinning at full speed, but 
nonetheless, it was a momentous occasion in which Soviet voters had substantial reasons to 
participate in the election.
119
 Mikhail Gorbachev’s consent to this limited democratic 
contest is an extension of his balancing act with respect to the political forces that were 
keeping him in power. Multi-candidate elections were introduced, but multi-party elections 
were not even a conceivable idea at that point. Gorbachev’s motives may have ranged from 
his desire to sustain socialism in the Soviet Union to limiting the competing forces for the 
Secretary General position and the new presidency. According to Hough:  
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The vast majority of Russians, even highly educated Russians, including the 
intelligentsia are very leery of the possibility that a multiparty democracy would lead 
to the establishment of separatist parties in union and autonomous republics that 
would gain majority support.
120
  
 
 Furthermore, Gorbachev aimed to save the union from falling apart, not accelerate 
its fragmentation. David Speedie, senior fellow at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in 
International Affairs, opines: ‘Gorbachev, was a thoughtful, visionary man who tried to 
create a new union agreement with his constituents.’121 This cautious approach did not win 
him favour within the liberal ranks of the Soviet political spectrum and the Communist 
hardliners were alienated well before the election because of the weakening of the Soviet 
government’s power by virtue of democratization and Glasnost.122 David Speedie notes, 
‘Gorbachev has been widely criticized within Russia and outside Russia. He’s known as the 
man who ended the country.’123 
1989 Election: 
 Mikhail Gorbachev commented on this historic significance of the 1989 election: 
Those developments were the result of perestroika in the Soviet Union, where 
democratic changes had reached the point by March 1989 that for the first time in 
Russia's history democratic, competitive elections took place. You remember how 
enthusiastically people participated in those elections for a new Soviet Congress. And 
as a result thirty-five regional Communist Party secretaries were defeated. By the 
way, of the deputies elected, 84 percent were Communists, because there were a lot 
of ordinary people in the party--workers and intellectuals.
124
 
 
 Democratic reforms accelerated rapidly from 1987 to 1990 to the point where 
political dissent was acceptable and popular support bolstered democratic reforms while 
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eroding the power of conservative forces aiming to reverse the path taken by the Soviet 
leadership.
125
 Gorbachev’s inherent open-mindedness created a window of opportunity for 
political pluralism, which the liberals made use of for their own purposes. Boris Yeltsin 
remains a prime example of someone who gained power and influence because political 
dissent was no longer taboo.
126
 Archie Brown opines that Gorbachev’s democratization and 
the 1989 election were primary elements of the course taken, but Gorbachev sought to 
reform the system, not abandon it.
127
 Therefore, Gorbachev truly was firmly in the middle 
of the spectrum, but the introduction of political pluralism was the beginning of the final 
chapter of the Soviet Union because its very existence now assured Soviet citizens that 
dissent was acceptable. Soviet citizens were now responsible for choosing their political 
destiny. 
 The crack in seventy years of unshakable and unquestionable leadership in the 
Soviet Union was a harbinger of a new age, where denizens were in control of their lives. 
People flocked to vote in large numbers and voter apathy diminished. The predictability 
and predetermination of who would occupy positions in the corridors of power became a 
remnant of the past. Democratization began by offering options to well-informed citizens 
who benefited from Glasnost. The government’s new transparency and the newly formed 
news media, which was free of government control, empowered the citizens to make 
informed decisions. 35 regional secretaries were voted out and a ripple of change began to 
infiltrate all aspects of Soviet society.
128
 People were excited because of the abundance of 
new opportunities to shape their lives and choose their government. The Soviet era created 
mass voter apathy, which can be best illustrated by Soviet citizens not participating in 
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anything known to be sanctioned by the government. Public confidence in the government 
was nonexistent in relation to Soviet bureaucratic politics and policy agendas, but it 
remained inconceivable to successfully oppose the government. Elections were the only 
venue by which accountability could be ascertained. The 1989 election, while not 
producing a highly proportionate change in the government’s composition, nullified the 
Communist party’s unquestionable and unanimous control of the echelons of power. The 
Soviet government, specifically the Communist hardliners, became weary and anxious of 
what the future held for them. Popular support became the necessary tool for achieving the 
goals of those elected and this in itself was a revolutionary concept in a country that was 
defined by disdain for liberal democracy.  
 The elevation of popular support firmly gave the liberal leaders, such as Boris 
Yeltsin, the upper-hand when confronted with the hardliners. For example, Yegor Ligachev 
gradually lost influence as the liberals were gaining momentum and he resigned from his 
position with full recognition that he was fighting a ‘losing battle.’ The Communist party 
began to lose legitimacy and this is why Boris Yeltsin, the antithesis to Ligachev, began a 
meteoric rise to power after resigning from the Communist party because of the lack of 
progress in reforming the country.
129
 Ligachev chose to battle the new reforms by 
Gorbachev when the Soviet Union’s authority over its constituents diminished, while 
Yeltsin welcomed this newfound liberalization that people were now becoming accustomed 
to. The nature of holding power in the Soviet Union had changed dramatically and now 
required popular consent and legitimacy for political purposes. This set the stage for the 
coup of 1991 in which the hardliners desperately sought to return to the previous power 
apparatus when their grasp on the country was firm and unquestionable. 
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 The coup of August 1991 in the Soviet Union was symptomatic of several important 
political clashes. In the realms of foreign policy, this can be best demonstrated by the clash 
of the military elite with the foreign policy ministers, and in the domestic political scene it 
is apparent that that staunch Soviet Communists were apprehensive as the pendulum of 
power was swinging toward the liberals, who sought to write a new chapter in the Soviet 
Union with a decentralized and democratized central government with the viability of the 
Soviet republics being able to secede from it. The opposing forces that maintained 
Gorbachev’s power by neutralizing each other and having him serve as their contact point 
embarked in a battle that was ultimately decided by popular consent. Legitimacy by the 
consent of the governed was after years of democratization and Glasnost a superior force in 
the affairs of the state when compared with military strength.  
 Soviet hardliners who staged the coup against Gorbachev in 1991 executed their 
plans with the conviction that the Soviet people thirsted for stability and were averse to the 
instability that was brought along with democratization.
130
 The eight man committee, which 
sought a return to the pre-Gorbachev era state of affairs, operated under the guise of ‘saving 
the union from annihilation.’131 The Soviet era mentality of acting for the sake of people 
without considering public opinion in policy deliberations was natural to these men who 
favoured a more totalitarian system. There was no consideration given to the effects of 
what Glasnost and democratization had on the people. The Soviet masses were better 
informed and more active in political affairs than at any time since the inception of the 
Soviet Union.
132
 There was blatant disregard for the powerful effect the people now had on 
the political discourse by the Soviet hardliners, whose government was becoming 
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increasingly beholden to its constituents. Powerful protest movements against the coup 
leaders composed of Soviet denizens motivated by their political views began the new era 
started by Gorbachev, which pointed to vibrant and overwhelming support of democratic 
leadership.
133
 Public opinion was against any attempt to derail the empowerment of the 
people by Gorbachev’s reforms, and at this point there was little likelihood for the coup’s 
survival because of the government’s decentralization and democratization, which created a 
new dynamic between the Soviet government and its people. Legitimacy by popular 
consent was the major enabling factor in the new political culture and the overwhelming 
protests against the coup that ensued in the days after the hardliners announced their 
removal of Gorbachev is a testament to the new democratic forces shaping the lives of the 
protestors and policy-makers.  
 The coup happened after several years of unprecedented weakening of the Soviet 
government. Few scholars or statesmen in the world would ever have predicted that 
Gorbachev would become revolutionary in the sense that the Soviet system would be 
radically changed to the point that it would become compatible with the Western 
democratic model of government.
134
 Soviet government officials no longer possessed the 
unlimited and secretive roles in operating the policy-making apparatus. The people’s 
opinions became a major factor in the minds of policy-makers. According to Ron Hill:  
Gorbachev also shocked and alienated the apparatchik!? The party and state 
bureaucrats who really ran the system by referring to the Communist Party's 
“infallibility complex,” and engaged in a drive against corruption in the system. In 
this his weapon was “Glasnost”, “openness” or “publicity”, which allowed the press 
to unmask abuse by officials at all levels in the system.
135
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 The eight-man committee, which sought control over a country that was 
increasingly drifting away from its grasp, could not escape the invasive free news media. 
Every action the hardliners took was reported to the people during the coup and this 
freedom of information was a necessary tool for the organization of protests. The 
government now had to act accordingly with an informed population that chose whether to 
support it; the planners of the coup were simply out of touch with what the people wanted, 
which was further democratization. No regard for the wishes of the governed was given and 
this was a crucial mistake. There was no possible reversal of the empowerment of the 
individual, which was Gorbachev’s lasting legacy, and the hardliners were oblivious to this 
new status quo. 
 The junta, which was composed of Soviet officials opposed to any democratic 
reform, seemed not to have an inkling of how the last several years had transformed the 
masses. It must have been an extraordinary and shocking moment when the military 
operating under its orders was confronted with an estimated 100,000 citizens led by liberal 
leader Boris Yeltsin.
136
 The elections in previous years had seen the people vote against the 
staunch Communists and this was a telling sign that public support was eroding for the 
Soviet hardliners, such as Ligachev and like-minded individuals. The national question, 
which was catapulted to importance by Gorbachev’s democratization, was eroding the 
cohesion of the Soviet Union.
137
 The junta staged the coup as a resistance to these forces 
that were well into fruition by 1991. As a result of Perestroika, the Soviet government no 
longer controlled the economy. Glasnost and democratization gave citizens a vastly 
superior position in society to choose their path when compared with the Stalin or Brezhnev 
years. The fundamental shift in power occurred from the central government to its citizens. 
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The individual was now the core of policy-making. According to Michael Mandelbaum, 
‘Democratization was to be a political weapon in his battle against the Communist Party 
apparatus.’138 Gorbachev’s aims were to rehabilitate the union by providing freedom to its 
citizens to engage and facilitate the change they desired.  
 The final outcome of the coup was as Michael Mandelbaum describes: ‘a coup 
d’état that became a coup de grace’ for the Soviet Union.139 Public support swung to Boris 
Yeltsin and his advocacy of liberal principles, and citizens attended protests in large 
numbers to confront the Soviet military. Individual, unarmed citizens coalesced to form an 
opposition to Communist totalitarianism and the people emerged victorious over the junta, 
which lost the most important tool for political survival – legitimacy from the governed. 
Gorbachev’s reforms made policy-makers beholden to well-informed and empowered 
citizens who now demanded and had the opportunity to choose their own fate. This was 
Gorbachev’s most powerful impact on governmental decisions and remains his lasting 
legacy. 
 One of the major decisions inspired by the new democratization of foreign policy 
decisions during the tenure of the first President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, 
involved the shift in foreign policy schools of thought from Westernism to Statism.
140
 Boris 
Yeltsin’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, served in this capacity from the 
inception of the Russian Federation until early 1996.
141
 Kozyrev was a fervent believer in 
Western liberal democratic principles and made no compromise in his belief that complete 
cooperation with the West was necessary in the post-Cold War era.
142
 Kozyrev and Yeltsin 
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were both liberal-minded Russians who sought a new chapter of harmonious relations with 
previous adversaries to the point of what may be perceived as capitulation by the Russian 
public. Kozyrev was the advocate of this new approach to international affairs, which can 
be described as the Westernist school of thought. 
143
 
 Gone were the days when policy formulation was confined to the debates of 
government elites with no regard for the masses they governed. Glasnost and 
democratization made it impossible for the Russian government to make decisions without 
being beholden to the people, who were well-informed of international developments and 
maintained the right to use their power in the voting booth. Boris Yeltsin made a major 
miscalculation in his approach to the new foreign policy during his first term. Namely, he 
never took into account the possible reaction of his constituents. The question of whether 
rapprochement with the West to the point of publicly perceived capitulation would unnerve 
his people was not an important facet in Yeltsin’s foreign policy formulation, and this 
blatant disregard for the new forces that have transformed the Russian Federation cost him 
a great deal of political capital. Russia was in search of its new identity on the world stage 
and Boris Yeltsin attempted to forge one that was naturally and characteristically adverse to 
the perceived Russian role in world affairs by the citizens he governed. 
 After spending several years pursuing peaceful and conducive integration with the 
West, Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev were reluctant and ill-advised to acknowledge the 
importance of public opinion. Two reasons may be attributed to this. The first is that both 
men schooled in Soviet politics were still totalitarian in character and were riding on the 
institutional momentum of the historical era that ended in 1985, notwithstanding their 
devotion to liberal principles of Western influence. The second is that this was, above all 
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else, the first democratic presidency in Russia and the relationship between the public and 
office of the Russian President was ill-defined and not clearly understood by its occupant 
and his advisors. The disconnection was apparent throughout Yeltsin’s presidency by the 
authoritarian tendencies he maintained during his tenure and the abysmally low approval 
ratings he had. According to The New York Times article detailing the election results in 
1995, it makes specific mention that Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the ultranationalist who 
opposes any cooperation with the West, and his party gained significantly in the Duma, as 
well as the Communist party led by Gennady Zyuganov who similarly opposed the 
engagement with the West advocated by Kozyrev.
144
 According to election results 
published by The New York Times, both parties won heavily in the Duma and were 
energized to begin a political coalition that could successfully combat the presidency of 
Boris Yeltsin.
145
 The Russian people voted in significant numbers and elected members to 
the Duma who advocated Eurasianism as opposed to Atlanticism or the Westernist school 
of thought. The Kozyrev course was conclusively and undeniably rejected by the Russian 
people. Yeltsin’s authoritarian disregard for the wishes of the masses damaged him 
politically and he was in crisis mode until the end of his presidency. 
 The true essence of democracy is when governments are genuinely fearful of their 
people.
146
 In Boris Yeltsin’s case this took the form of Kozyrev’s dismissal after the 
disastrous 1995 parliamentary elections and the appointment of Yevgeni Primakov, who 
advocated a Statist approach to international affairs, which balanced East and West and 
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sought to leverage the great powers for Russia’s benefit.147 Boris Yeltsin’s new chief 
foreign policy minister and foreign affairs path were chosen to be in sync with what the 
voters wanted. The forces of democratization guaranteed that any elected chief executive of 
the Russian Federation needed to maintain a political course compatible with a well-
informed and empowered public or risk the end of his or her political career, which is 
exactly what Gorbachev’s reforms desired and accomplished.  
 Ultimately, the Russian people were unhappy because of their perception of 
Yeltsin’s capitulation to the West and NATO, its military alliance.148 NATO was seen as 
being an intrusive force invading the post-Soviet space and Eastern Europe. The benefits 
for the Russian Federation were difficult to discern and the people perceived Yeltsin and 
Kozyrev as puppets of the United States that compromised Russian security for integration 
with the West. Professor Michael McFaul argues that Russia was successful in defending 
its traditional sphere of influence under Kozyrev and criticism of integration with the West 
was not fair.
149
 Any examination of Kozyrev’s diplomacy will show that NATO expansion 
was stalled to a substantial degree and Primakov continued this trend.
150
 Regardless, this is 
not how voters perceived Russia’s rapprochement with the West, and they voted 
overwhelmingly for a new course. Allen Lynch asserts, ‘Why then was Kozyrev sacked in 
favour of Primakov? Already before 1993 was out, Kozyrev was becoming a growing 
liability for President Yeltsin in terms of the domestic politics of Russian foreign policy.’151 
Boris Yeltsin’s re-election campaign was to start the following year and he made a 
politically astute decision to begin a new foreign policy path under Primakov. This 
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demonstrated to his constituents that he was listening and ready to make changes in order to 
acquiesce to their wishes. Legitimacy by popular support was now the most important force 
in the Russian Federation and this was an early instance of how powerful the average 
citizen became in the new Russia.     
Boris Yeltsin’s Legacy:         
  
 At the time of his death in 2007, Boris Yeltsin was erroneously considered the 
standard bearer of Russian democracy and the complete antithesis to his hand-picked 
successor, President Vladimir Putin. In 2007, Vladimir Putin was navigating on the world 
stage with deep pragmatism and calculated risk-taking. Putin’s foreign policy was a 
cohesive and succinct expression of the Russian Federation’s new role in world affairs. It 
would not kowtow to the West and would not become beholden to the East. It was an 
independent arsenal of tactics, policies, and strategies to start a new chapter in Russian 
foreign policy. No one would have even considered crediting Boris Yeltsin with Putin’s 
fundamental exercise of an enhanced, powerful presidency granted by a constitution 
expressly empowering the office of the Russian chief executive. A major facet of Vladimir 
Putin’s ‘sovereign democracy’ is a powerful presidency with powers to be the ultimate 
decision-maker and policy formulator.
152
 Any examination of Yeltsin’s presidency is 
incomplete without examining the transformation of the Russian presidency during his 
tenure. 
 It is true however that Yeltsin was the first democratically elected President, but 
Archie Brown unequivocally dismisses the notion that Yeltsin was a democratic stalwart 
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and founder of the new Russian system of government.
153
 ‘Yeltsin came close to cancelling 
the 1996 presidential contest and only allowed it to go ahead when he knew that, with TV 
on his side and huge sums of money from the oligarchs, he could win. He overlooked vote-
rigging in both Duma and presidential elections.’154 Yeltsin was first and foremost a 
political agent of the liberal-minded intelligentsia, but that does not negate his grab for 
power and the willingness to do anything to maintain it. It is clear that the Yeltsin 
Administration sought unfair advantages during its tenure, and it would be a baseless 
assertion to claim that Yeltsin was the vanguard of the new democracy. The rule of law 
when it did not suit his needs or purposes was non-existent in Yeltsin’s mind. His 
authoritarian tendencies did not simply vanish when the Soviet Union dissolved. A man, 
even as liberal-minded as he was, could not suddenly abandon the Soviet methods and 
tendencies that were definitive of the time period in which his early political experiences 
were formed. Free and fair elections, criticism from the news media, and accountability to 
the constituents were still revolutionary concepts in the new Russian Federation. Success in 
the new Russia required Yeltsin to engage in some political posturing and power grabbing 
reminiscent of the Soviet era.  
 A focal point for the analysis of this body of research is the 1993 coup against 
Yeltsin, which turned out to be a constitutional crisis in which the Russian President 
prevailed over the legislature and national judiciary. The presidency clashed with the 
legislature over what branch of government would occupy the higher position on the 
hierarchy.
155
 Yeltsin felt that any democratic institutions that infringed or impeded his 
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ability to exercise complete authority over the affairs of the state were to be weakened or 
neutralized. It was this imperial view of his power and the mechanisms that were 
transformed by this that were inherited by his successors, which is now a major facet of the 
Russian political arena. According to Archie Brown:               
 Yeltsin's main merit as President of post-Soviet Russia was that he preserved many 
of the freedoms introduced by Gorbachev. His principal fault was that he helped 
discredit the very ideas of democracy which had evoked real enthusiasm in the last 
three years of the Soviet Union. This was partly a result of his lack of interest in 
democratic institution-building. He was disdainful of political parties, and refused to 
join one. He was scarcely less dismissive of legislatures, most literally in 1993 when 
he ordered the bombardment of the parliament building. He had little understanding 
of the significance of the rule of law.
156
  
 
 The constitutional period that ended when the 1993 constitution was adopted was a 
short period in the new Russian Federation when the Russian presidency operated under the 
rule of law, cooperation of the legislature, and consent of the judiciary. It was for a short 
time a legitimate democracy in the sense that no organ of government possessed nearly 
unlimited power. Boris Yeltsin’s lasting legacy was not the preservation of democracy, but 
rather the empowerment of the Russian presidency, a central theme in this thesis. 
  Relations between the Russian legislature and Yeltsin were tense and adversarial 
from the beginning. Boris Yeltsin never felt that it was proper for the Russian President to 
be beholden to any legislator representing a small fraction of the Russian constituents. 
There was never a doubt in the mind of Yeltsin that the Russian presidency was a position 
of dominance and superiority over the other branches of government. The judiciary and 
legislature were inferior in status and power according to Yeltsin’s imperial view of 
presidential power. There were mechanisms of power that were to be out of the scope of the 
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other branches of government, and Yeltsin sought to solidify this by constitutional means in 
order to ensure his success. 
 Yeltsin was a liberal by instinct. He regarded the Communist years with dread and 
the collective leadership of Khrushchev and Brezhnev were feeble attempts to manoeuvre 
the organs of power at the apex of the governmental apparatus. The power struggles and 
political gridlock between Alexei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev during the formative years 
of Yeltsin’s career must have contributed to this view of presidential entitlement according 
to a ‘Goldgeieran’ analysis. The need to solidify power by means of either coalescing 
powerful bureaucrats to your pursuit or neutralizing them to clear the path was the scourge 
of Communist times. Such chaos within the powerful ranks of policy-makers left Yeltsin 
with the belief that the chief executive must be an unquestionable and superior figure in the 
Russian government. It is with this defining experience of his formative years that he 
fought attempts to force him out of power after his dictatorial tendencies ingrained 
themselves in the office of the presidency. 
 The new Russian Federation was governed by a poorly defined ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ between a parliamentary system and presidential executive office. The 
President and the legislature operated with different impulses; the Russian legislative body 
believed it was the sole lawmaking authority. The President believed his office’s primary 
responsibility was to formulate the country’s policy decisions to his liking. Both believed 
that legitimacy granted to them by voters entitled them to free rein over the affairs of 
government. A battle of wills ensued over which branch of government was the primary 
policy-maker. This early battle in the new country’s history established the status quo for 
intergovernmental interaction, which defined the Russian presidency as being a more 
powerful and pervasive force over all elements of the government. The new constitution 
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adopted in 1993, which was authored by Boris Yeltsin, set the tone for a dynamic that 
precluded outright challenges to the Russian presidency’s dominance in governing and 
lawmaking. This was a direct reflection of Yeltsin’s vision of the Russian presidency. The 
trauma of the October 1993 crisis left both sides unwilling to engage in governmental 
infighting and constitutional jousting in future disagreements.
157
 This event was a 
cataclysmic event that shaped the future of presidential-parliamentary relations. Therefore, 
the constitution adopted as a result of this crisis has remained nearly unchanged, except for 
a few minor revisions regarding the term limits of the Russian presidency. No significant 
alteration of presidential power granted by the constitution was ever enacted after 1993.  
 The President of the Russian Federation became the official leader on top of the 
power hierarchy within the government. Presidential decrees and national referendums are 
the ultimate weapons of the presidency. Ultimately, the legislature can be overruled when 
clashing with the wishes of the Russian President. Thomas Remington states:  
The constitution gives the President the power to enact decrees (ukazy) without 
requiring any special delegation of power; this is “constitutional decree power.” The 
President does not even face the constraint that existed under the previous 
constitution, when parliament delegated him emergency decree power but reserved 
for itself the right to block his decrees by countermanding them.
158
  
 
 Therefore, Boris Yeltsin ensured that the will of the Russian President be the 
overwhelming force in government. The 1993 constitution allowed the Russian President to 
be the ultimate policy-maker and this reduced the legislature to a secondary body of  minor 
importance that was left neutralized in the event of conflict with the office of the 
presidency. The Russian Duma’s main mode of inquiry into the affairs of the presidency 
was ‘government hour,’ which entailed a non-invasive and voluntary hearing for legislators 
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to seek information from the executive branch.
159
 This was hardly ideologically compatible 
with an ‘equal branches’ model of government. Yeltsin sought to curtail the power of 
others in his pursuit to consolidate his own power to govern imperiously in opposition to 
proposed transparency and forced cooperation with the other branches of government.  
  Yeltsin left the Russian presidency a powerful position, which contrasted sharply 
with the multiple limitations and hindrances of wielding power when he entered it. The 
Soviet Constitution of 1978 had been designed for collective leadership, and there was an 
inherent aversion to the Soviet model of government in Yeltsin’s new life as the first 
democratic President of Russia. Any federal ambiguities ceased to exist in the new Russian 
government when Yeltsin sought not only to be head of state but also de facto head of the 
government with the President’s constitutional right to appoint the Prime Minister and 
constitutionally granted ability to dissolve the legislature in the event that his nominee is 
rejected three times.
160
 This effectively means that the Russian Duma has no choice but to 
accept the President’s nominee to control the reins of the government under threat of being 
dissolved and repeating the 1993 constitutional crisis in which the government nearly 
imploded. The 1993 constitution essentially demoted the Russian legislative body to an 
inferior status.  
 Yeltsin’s place in history will be one of some contradiction. He was both 
democratic and authoritarian; this hybrid of political persuasions has ingrained itself in the 
office he occupied. Without explicitly outlining the relationship between the judiciary, 
legislature, and presidency, Boris Yeltsin leapt forward in promoting economic reform. The 
dismal economy, which had been a constant malady in Russia for several decades, needed 
to be rehabilitated and reformed. Yeltsin sought to reform the economy first and placed 
                                                 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
53 
 
political matters, such as the grievances of his political opposition, to a lower priority 
category. The adoption of market capitalism and its inherent problematic adjustments 
stymied progress for the duration of Yeltsin’s tenure. This preoccupation with the economy 
left relations between the legislature and presidency to be defined and resolved on an ad 
hoc basis using informal mechanisms with the cooperation of both branches.  
 Yeltsin’s opponents felt he was abusing his power and not allowing the other 
branches of government to function properly, while Yeltsin claimed his actions were 
justified within the scope of his office. The needed economic reforms required political 
leeway and the Soviet Constitution of 1978 was a relic of history and obsolete for modern 
times. Yeltsin sought to redefine the Russian presidency to suit his needs and ensure the 
success of future successors to act without the impediments of governmental oversight or 
obstruction. The constitution of 1993 is Boris Yeltsin’s gift to any successor who wishes to 
exercise vastly superior powers when compared with the other branches of government.  
 In order to fully understand Boris Yeltsin’s legacy in foreign policy-making during 
the Medvedev presidency, it is of central importance to examine relevant articles of the 
Russian Constitution in 1993 that detail the enhanced role of the presidency. These articles 
in the 1993 constitution were Yeltsin’s lasting legacy in the institution he occupied first in 
the Russian Federation’s history. 
An examination of pertinent excerpts of the 1993 Constitution: 
Let us start with an examination of Chapter 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
CHAPTER 4. THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
Article 80
161
 
 
1. The President of the Russian Federation shall be the Head of State. 
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2. The President of the Russian Federation shall be the guarantor of the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation and of human and civil rights and freedoms. In accordance with the 
procedure established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, he (she) shall adopt 
measures to protect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and State 
integrity, and shall ensure the coordinated functioning and interaction of State government 
bodies. 
3. The President of the Russian Federation shall, in accordance with the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation and federal laws, determine the basic objectives of the internal and 
foreign policy of the State. 
4. The President of the Russian Federation, as the Head of State, shall represent the Russian 
Federation within the country and in international relations. 
 The Russian presidency is given its new role beginning in Article 80 of the 1993 
Russian Constitution. Provision 2 stipulates that the President is responsible for ensuring 
‘coordinated functioning and interaction of state government bodies.’162 This precludes the 
judiciary or legislature from engaging in constitutional or ad hoc mechanisms to resolve 
bureaucratic or intergovernmental squabbles and conflicts when the President chooses to 
take the matter into his or her own hands. The President is the sole guarantor that the 
government will work effectively and cohesively, which can give the Russian presidency 
legal and constitutional leeway to act in what the office believes the best interests of the 
constituents. Furthermore, provisions 3 and 4 magnify the President’s role by explicitly 
mentioning that the office is responsible for determining ‘the basic objectives of the 
internal and foreign policy of the State.’163 This means that the President initiates and 
implements policies with regards to national legislation and foreign affairs. The fourth 
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provision emphasizes this as designating the President as chief representative of the 
Russian constituents nationally and abroad. Yeltsin authored this in order to maintain 
complete authority over foreign affairs and to limit the legislature’s role in domestic 
matters. Yeltsin envisioned the presidency as being threefold: chief representative abroad, 
most influential in terms of legislation, and the most important advocate for the Russian 
citizens. Therefore, this confluence of responsibilities blurred the lines between the 
executive and legislative branches, while relegating the judiciary from attempting to 
intervene in the event of intergovernmental gridlock.   
 Article 83 further demonstrates the enlargement of presidential authority and 
constitutional entitlements. 
     Article 83
164
 
 
g) shall form and head the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the status of which 
shall be determined by federal law; 
h) shall approve the military doctrine of the Russian Federation; 
i) shall form the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation; 
j) shall appoint and dismiss plenipotentiary representatives of the President of the Russian 
Federation; 
k) shall appoint and dismiss supreme commanders of the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation; 
l) shall appoint and recall after consultations with appropriate committees and commissions 
of the chambers of the Federal Assembly diplomatic representatives of the Russian 
Federation in foreign States and international organisations. 
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 Article 83 gives the Russian President superior constitutional authority and 
presidential prerogatives in order to not repeat the 1993 clash in which the executive and 
legislative bodies of the government sought to clarify the governmental hierarchy. Boris 
Yeltsin’s bureaucratic legacy, which has greatly defined the foreign policy-making process 
in the Russian Federation, is his adoption and instalment of the Russian National Security 
Council. The relevant details for this decision-making mechanism are discussed later in this 
chapter. For constitutional purposes, the consultative body, which included a wide range of 
diplomatic, defence, and political members, was to remain out of the Duma’s jurisdiction 
and intentionally lack transparency. This deliberative body became the Russian 
presidency’s chief avenue to formulate foreign policies and decisions to looming crises. 
The implementation of foreign policy however stemmed from the President’s ability to 
control the presidential administration, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. In essence, Boris Yeltsin constitutionally obstructed any other branch of 
government to impede or infringe on his selection of diplomats, military commanders, and 
presidential appointees. The legislative body had no influence or authority to intervene in 
presidential affairs, which is what Yeltsin sought. Article 83 enlarges the Russian 
President’s authority to establish military doctrine as he or she wishes and formulate 
diplomatic relations on the world stage, as well as implement these presidential 
prerogatives. Lastly, there is the last provision that calls for ‘consultations with appropriate 
committees and commissions of the chambers of the Federal Assembly.’165 This last 
provision is essentially meaningless as there is no mechanism to accept or reject the 
President’s appointees.  
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Article 84
166
 
 
The President of the Russian Federation: 
a) shall announce elections to the State Duma in accordance with the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation and federal law; 
b) shall dissolve the State Duma in the cases and in accordance with the procedure provided 
for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation; 
c) shall announce referendums in accordance with the procedure established by federal 
constitutional law; 
d) shall submit draft laws to the State Duma; 
e) shall sign and promulgate federal laws; 
f) shall address the Federal Assembly with annual messages on the situation in the country 
and on the basic objectives of the internal and foreign policy of the State. 
 Article 84 reflects Boris Yeltsin’s battles with the Russian legislature from 1991 to 
December 1993 that left a lasting impact on his philosophical view of the presidential role 
in government. Not only did he seek to empower the presidency in relation to its control of 
the executive branch, but he also sought to neutralize the legislative body by expanding the 
role of the President in legislative affairs. Therefore, the powerful presidential system 
allows the Russian President to be the chief executive and most powerful legislator. The 
President has the option of submitting draft laws and signing them into federal law. This 
vast and encompassing role in Russian affairs places the presidency on the top of the power 
hierarchy. There is no doubt that any future occupant of the Russian presidency will be 
opposed to any diminished role by constitutional amendment. Yeltsin’s constitution is a gift 
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to any President who seeks to impose his or her will in opposition to the legislative body or 
political opponents in general. 
Article 85
167
 
 
1. The President of the Russian Federation may use conciliatory procedures to resolve 
disputes between State government bodies of the Russian Federation and State government 
bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and disputes between State 
government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation. In the event that no 
agreed decision is reached, he (she) shall have the right to refer the dispute to the 
appropriate court. 
2. The President of the Russian Federation shall have the right to suspend acts of executive 
government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation in the event that these 
acts conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws or with 
international commitments of the Russian Federation, or violate human and civil rights and 
freedoms until the issue is resolved by an appropriate court. 
 The first provision of Article 85 assigns the President as the chief mediator and 
primary official to maintain cohesion in the government. In the event that the governmental 
gridlock is not resolved by the President, the judiciary is to settle the matter. However, 
Boris Yeltsin neutralized the judiciary by expanding the membership of the Russian 
Supreme Court and appointing pro-government judges.
168
 This trend has continued under 
Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. Therefore, the judiciary has been altered to become 
compatible with the wishes of the Russian presidency. It is theoretically and practically 
impossible to challenge the actions of the Russian President. 
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Article 86
169
 
The President of the Russian Federation: 
a) shall direct the foreign policy of the Russian Federation; 
b) shall hold negotiations and sign international treaties of the Russian Federation; 
c) shall sign instruments of ratification; 
d) shall receive letters of credence and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives 
accredited to his (her) office. 
 The 1993 Russian Constitution specifically emphasized that the Russian presidency 
is the sole foreign policy-maker and is not beholden to any branch of government in this 
regard. The Russian President’s role is to direct foreign policy, participate in mediation of 
international conflicts, sign any interstate ratification, and be the sole interlocutor for 
foreign diplomats and ambassadors. The legislature and judiciary have no role in any of 
these categories and are to allow the President full mobility to operate with the presidential 
mechanisms granted to him or her by the constitution.  
 
Article 87
170
 
 
1. The President of the Russian Federation shall be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. 
2. In the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or of a direct threat of 
aggression, the President of the Russian Federation shall introduce martial law on the 
territory of the Russian Federation or on certain parts thereof and shall immediately inform 
the Council of Federation and the State Duma of this. 
3. The regime of martial law shall be defined by federal constitutional law. 
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 Article 87 reflects Yeltsin’s desire to always keep the defence apparatus solely 
under the President’s authority. The coup against Yeltsin failed abysmally because the 
plotters failed to take into account the allegiance and importance of the armed forces. The 
military commanders claimed to be neutral but ultimately sided with Boris Yeltsin and 
cooperated with orders to attack the Russian White House.
171
 The military was not a 
political organ, but it did respect authority, which it felt the democratically elected 
President had over quarrelsome legislators who felt Yeltsin was being authoritarian. The 
generals felt that the chain of command must be preserved and the chain led to the Russian 
President. Yeltsin learned from his successful battle against the attempted coup and 
specifically authored an article that in no uncertain terms made the military beholden to the 
President and no one else. In the event of an attack deemed by the Russian presidency to be 
a threat to national security, the President is constitutionally empowered to declare martial 
law. This gives the President the ability to militarily impose his will on any breakaway 
region or neighbour that engages in what can be construed as dangerous activity.  
Article 88
172
 
 
The President of the Russian Federation, in the circumstances and in accordance with the 
procedure envisaged by federal constitutional law, shall introduce a state of emergency on 
the territory of the Russian Federation or on certain parts thereof and shall immediately 
inform the Council of Federation and the State Duma of this. 
 Article 88 complements article 87. Yeltsin’s motives for this article were not as 
noble as one might assume.  The President is required to ‘inform the Council of Federation 
and the State Duma’ in the event of a state of emergency.173 In practical terms, this means 
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that the President will convey his reasons for taking such actions, but this is the extent that 
these two organs of government are to be involved. In essence, the Council of Federation 
and State Duma have no role in this process. The Russian President is free to act decisively 
and quickly as he or she wishes without any intergovernmental hindrances. In the next 
article, this newfound presidential superiority is given legal luxuries that continue the 
constitutional trend of empowering the Russian presidency. 
Article 91
174
 
 
The President of the Russian Federation shall have immunity. 
 Yeltsin sought an imperial presidency, which made the rule-of-law inapplicable to 
his office. According to his philosophical view of the presidency’s role in the Russian 
government, the President must be free of any legal hindrances and not subject to the threat 
of imprisonment. In history, democratically elected leaders have been subjected to legal 
penalties in the event that the national judiciary believed that an abuse of power was 
committed.
175
 Richard Nixon, for example, resigned as a result of using his office to 
obstruct a criminal investigation of the American White House during his tenure.
176
 This 
coup against Yeltsin sought to remove him because of his purported abuse of power in the 
same vein. Therefore, Yeltsin believed that the Russian presidency must not be legally 
liable to regard the rule-of-law and must be immune to any criminal or civil investigation. 
This entitled the President to exercise his or her power to a maximum degree by the 
absence of judicial oversight as stated in the 1993 constitution. Boris Yeltsin envisioned a 
presidency free of legal hindrances to conducting presidential duties, and his successors 
have benefited greatly from this enhanced office they inherited from him. 
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Article 93
177
 
1. The President of the Russian Federation may be impeached by the Council of Federation 
only on the basis of charges of high treason or of another grave crime brought by the State 
Duma and confirmed by a resolution of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on the 
existence of indications of a crime in the actions of the President of the Russian Federation 
and by a resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation confirming that 
the established procedure for bringing charges has been observed. 
2. The decision of the State Duma to bring charges and the decision of the Council of 
Federation to impeach the President must be adopted by two-thirds of votes of the total 
number of members of each chamber on the initiative of not less than one third of deputies 
of the State Duma and on the basis of a resolution of a special commission set up by the 
State Duma. 
3. The decision of the Council of Federation to impeach the President of the Russian 
Federation must be adopted not later than three months after the State Duma brings charges 
against the President. If a decision of the Council of Federation is not adopted within this 
time the charges against the President shall be regarded as having been declined. 
 Regardless of Yeltsin’s authoritarian tendencies and imperial philosophy of the 
presidential role in government, he still believed that the presidency was not an absolute 
monarchy. There were to be rare circumstances in which the President may be impeached. 
As the Yeltsonian model of the presidency envisioned, a terrible act against the state 
justified impeachment. However, the wording of this constitution is vague and poorly-
defined. ‘Charges of high treason or another grave crime’ has no actual meaning or 
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relevance.
178
 In theory, the State Duma, which is comprised of legislators of different 
political and philosophical leanings, would never be able to unify against the President by 
agreeing that certain actions fit this vague wording. An attempt to impeach the President 
would fail because legislators could never agree on whether the actions justified 
impeachment. Furthermore, the Council of Federation is not elected by the people but by 
the State Duma, who are legislators advised by their party bosses and channels from the 
Kremlin on whom to select. This makes the impeachment process difficult to separate from 
the influence of the Kremlin. Lastly, the State Duma has ninety days to decide on this 
matter from the day charges were brought against the President. This stipulation makes it 
nearly impossible for impeachment to occur. Legal and political proceedings are rarely as 
fast as this constitution requires and this was another hindrance to presidential 
impeachment authored by Boris Yeltsin in order not to repeat the coup against him in 1993. 
In essence, impeaching the Russian President is highly improbable because of the 
constitutional constraints. With the presidency being an enormously powerful institution, 
the next chapter of the constitution emphasizes that the Russian President controls all the 
levers of power in the government. 
CHAPTER 6. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
Article 110
179
 
 
1. Executive power in the Russian Federation shall be exercised by the Government of the 
Russian Federation. 
2. The Government of the Russian Federation shall consist of the Chairman of the 
Government of the Russian Federation, deputy chairmen of the Government of the Russian 
Federation and federal ministers. 
                                                 
178Ibid.  
179 Ibid. 
64 
 
Article 111
180
 
1. The Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation shall be appointed by the 
President of the Russian Federation with the consent of the State Duma. 
2. Nominations for the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation shall be 
submitted not later than two weeks after a newly-elected President of the Russian 
Federation assumes office or after the resignation of the Government of the Russian 
Federation or within one week after the State Duma has rejected a nomination. 
3. The State Duma shall consider the candidate nominated by the President of the Russian 
Federation for the post of Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation within 
one week after the submission of the nomination. 
4. In the event that the State Duma rejects the candidates for the post of Chairman of the 
Government of the Russian Federation three times, the President of the Russian Federation 
shall appoint the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, dissolve the State 
Duma and announce new elections. 
 Article 110 lays out that the Chairman of Government (Prime Minister) is 
responsible for maintaining bureaucratic, constitutional, and fiscal issues pertaining to the 
operating mechanisms of the Russian government. Therefore, the Prime Minister is a highly 
important officeholder who is second in power only to the President. The role of Prime 
Minister was envisioned to successfully manage the government, while the President was 
the ultimate decision-maker and policy formulator in domestic and foreign affairs. Article 
111 gives the power to appoint the Prime Minister to the President, and his or her choice is 
to be submitted to the legislature. If the State Duma rejects the nominee three times, under 
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the law of decree the President may dissolve parliament and call for new elections.
181
 This 
effectively limits the Duma’s role in choosing the Prime Minister and it must either consent 
or risk being dissolved. The President is not only the head of state because of this, but he or 
she by virtue of being the selector for Prime Minister is the de facto head of government as 
well. This ensures the President that he or she controls virtually all of the levers of power. 
Yeltsin’s goal of empowering the presidency was achieved by constitutional means. 
Reflections: 
 The office of the Russian presidency was inherited by Vladimir Putin and Dmitry 
Medvedev, who had free rein to control foreign policy decisions to an unusual degree. No 
major foreign policy decision was made without the Russian President’s express approval. 
Boris Yeltsin established this over-arching ability to allow the President to calibrate foreign 
policy with a high level of foresight, policy input, and mobility. No legislator or jurist will 
ever successfully obstruct the policies on the world stage initiated by the chief executive of 
the Russian Federation. This inherent facet of Russian foreign policy decision-making 
maintains its relevance to the present day. The Yeltsonian model of an empowered 
executive branch of government has survived two decades without the opposition ever 
being remotely close to amending the constitutional powers of the presidency in the 1993 
constitution. This is Boris Yeltsin’s lasting legacy and the Yeltsonian forces of presidential 
policy-making persist in every decision made by the Putin-Medvedev regime. As was 
outlined in the introduction, the Governmental Politics Model is used in this body of 
research to examine the key players in government and how they coexist with the powerful 
political forces of the Russian Federation.  
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The Governmental Politics Model: 
 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s seminal book, Essence of Decision, is utilized 
for the purpose of analysing Russian foreign policy decision-making in this thesis.
182
 
Allison sets forth two analytical frameworks, which jointly are known as ‘the Bureaucratic 
Politics Model.’183 In his work, he aimed to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 using 
the Rational Actor Model, Organizational Politics Model, and Governmental Politics 
Model.
184
 Allison acknowledges the importance of the rational actor theory, but concludes 
that it alone is lacking a comprehensive approach to understanding the internal dynamics of 
decision-making. 
185
 Therefore, Essence of Decision advocates the two models of analysis 
that fill the void left by the Rational Actor Model.
186
 
 The Governmental Politics Model, which will be used for the purpose of this thesis, 
involves the primary actors in the decision-making process of the Russian Federation. The 
Organizational Politics Model posits that a better explanation of foreign policy decisions 
can be deduced by investigating the various agencies and ministries involved in the 
decision-making process.
187
 Namely, each organization within the decision-making 
apparatus has its own institutional preferences, methods, and mechanisms to contribute to 
the policy formulation.
188
 Furthermore, the synergy between the intergovernmental 
organizations and whether they unify or clash are important factors that must be addressed 
and investigated in order to achieve a better understanding of the decisions and policies 
borne from this process. While this certainly will be a consideration, organizations are 
ultimately guided by individuals at the apex of power. It is for this primary reason that an 
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analysis of the key players accounts for the majority of research for this thesis. Secondly, 
the Governmental Politics Model complements the ultimate gap between policy and policy-
making by examining the motives, ideologies, and other contributory factors of the highest 
officials within a governmental ministry or agency involved in the decision-making 
process. There must be a personal analysis of decision-making figures in order to fully 
understand the complexity of the policy formulation. For example, the decisions made by 
the Russian President are to be understood by examining the office of the Russian 
presidency by analyzing the occupant of the office and how he or she approaches the 
challenges of formulating decisions.  
 Graham Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model has received its fair share of 
criticism.
189
 Three reasons for this exist. First, the Bureaucratic Politics Model is 
intellectually neglectful of socially and historically contingent factors on the word stage.
190
 
The internal dynamics of decision-making according to Graham Allison’s model takes into 
account consequential factors on the world stage but does not acknowledge these as 
fundamental when compared with the departments and officeholders of those involved in 
the policy formulation apparatus.
191
 Second, the model of analysis is not fully cognizant of 
the impact of global interdependence and liberal institutionalism, which are two hallmarks 
of the 21th century.
192
 The integration of the global economy and world institutions 
governing international economic and political affairs are powerful forces shaping the 
world stage. The Bureaucratic Politics Model is an internal examination of the decision-
making and therefore it remains limited in its cognizance of these external forces.
193
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Thirdly, critics contend that Allison’s model is systematically designed for the American 
government and is not applicable to foreign governments.
194
 The book’s analysis focuses 
solely on the Kennedy Administration in 1962, and the author does not elucidate on how 
this system of analysis may be applied to different governments.
195
 
 On this last point, Essence of Decision would have been difficult to regard as 
applicable to the Soviet government. First, the Secretary General of the Soviet Union was 
not the chief executive, but rather a leader among bureaucratic elites who were constantly 
engaged in power struggles. The Secretary General position was at times and depending on 
the individual more akin to a ‘secretary’ than a ‘general.’ There was no National Security 
Council in the Soviet Union until 1990 and its use was nominal at best. Allison’s book was 
written about a democratic government granted legitimacy by its constituents. The Soviet 
Union could not have been analyzed using the Bureaucratic Politics Model. A Communist 
totalitarian government led by cabals of bureaucratic elites and its inherent power struggles 
affecting the decisions of the Secretary General had no relevance or place in Allison’s 
literature. 
 The Russian Federation, however, is an entirely different proposition, and it is 
suited to Graham Allison’s literature. First, as Yeltsin desired, the Russian presidency is the 
supreme decision-making body of the state. There is no doubt that within the government 
as granted by the 1993 constitution the President is the sole occupant of the highest position 
on the policy formulation hierarchy. With Gorbachev’s reforms and empowerment of the 
constituents, regardless of who the occupant of the Russian President’s office is, he or she 
must take public opinion into account. There is no Russian President who can disregard the 
wishes of the governed, unless he or she wishes to lose the necessary legitimacy to govern, 
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which may create the viability for an ouster by the people or a lost election.  These 
important changes from Soviet times have made the Russian government compatible with 
Graham Allison’s model of analysis.196 The Russian Federation is governed primarily by a 
chief executive with superior constitutional entitlements at the behest of the governed. This 
fits ‘the Allisonian model’ perfectly. 
 From an organizational standpoint, Yeltsin’s adoption of a National Security 
Council further integrates it with Allison’s literature. The structure of Russia’s foreign 
policy apparatus is similar to the United States. The structure maintains the Russian 
President’s superiority in the process, while utilizing the National Security Council to 
include a wide array of advisors from the presidential administration, Ministry of Defence, 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This systematic approach to responding and initiating 
reactions to world affairs is highly compatible with Allison’s model and serves the purpose 
of this thesis. The agencies and ministries, as well as key figures of these units, are a source 
of analysis for understanding the path the Russian Federation has taken during the 
Medvedev presidency from 2008 to 2012. 
Structure of analysis of key players in the current Russian government: 
 The Russian Constitution of 1993 makes the State Duma a virtual non-entity in the 
grand scheme of policy formulation with regards to foreign affairs. Foreign policy is firmly 
in the hands of the President, and this powerful presidential system limits the relevance of 
various governmental bodies in policy deliberations. The decision-making by the Russian 
presidency is not beholden to any agency or ministry whether in the executive branch or a 
non-executive branch. The presidency maintains supremacy over the Russian government, 
but it is entirely beholden to the constituents from which it gains its legitimacy. These 
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clashing forces of democratization and imperial presidential powers are emblematic of the 
vastly different area of research that Kremlinology is compared with Sovietology. 
 This body of research in essence with the Governmental Politics Model examines  
 
key officeholders in the Russian Federation’s foreign policy apparatus. As the author of this 
thesis has decided, the chief bureaucrats of the foreign policy apparatus as determined by 
involvement in formulation and implementation of decisions have been examined as 
opposed to examining departments and bureaucrats with a marginal participation in 
decision-making. The Governmental Politics Model is a mode of analysis with an inherent 
focus on the chief decision-makers.
197
 Therefore, the author excluded bureaucrats who 
because of the agency or role in government did not affect decision-making or remained 
steadfastly in the background to assist and prop up the vital members of the Kremlin. 
Dmitry Medvedev and Anatoly Serdyukov’s connections to Technocrats serving in the 
presidential administration and Vladimir Putin and Nikolai Patrushev’s links to their former 
KGB operatives now serving in the Russian Federation’s FSB are foregone conclusions. 
The links to like-minded individuals who support the decision-makers is a well understood 
fact, but the thesis relies on the actions of the chief policy formulators, not the bureaucrats 
who serve them. The chief bureaucrats leading the offices of the Russian presidency, Head 
of Government (Prime Minister), Russian Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and Ministry of Defence outweigh the importance of the other facets of the foreign policy 
apparatus because the Russian Federation’s decisions are primarily formulated and 
implemented in these organs of government.  
President-Prime Minister: 
 The Russian presidency is examined in a two-fold process. First, the individual 
occupying the office will be understood by utilizing Graham Allison’s mode of analysis of 
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his or her formative years. Secondly the Gorbachovian and Yeltsonian forces affecting and 
ultimately defining the Russian presidency are investigated and synthesized in order to 
contribute to the overall goals of research.  
 Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev are the faces of modern Russian leadership. 
Their place in history will be cemented with the positive transformation of the Russian 
Federation after the Yeltsin years. Dmitry Medvedev’s tenure as President saw a man 
schooled in the Soviet era engage in political posturing completely different from the age of 
his formative years. There is no doubt that the foreign policy decisions he made were 
formulated with the distinct possibility that voters would reject his policies and vote him 
out of office. Therefore, the Russian presidency and Russian popular opinion are 
interconnected. No man or woman in the office of the presidency will make decisions that 
will either harm themselves or their party irreversibly. Political expediency and kowtowing 
to the wishes of the governed are therefore inherent with the decisions made by the Putin-
Medvedev regime. The Gorbachovian forces of democratization have empowered the 
people to an unusual degree in which their voices cannot be ignored.
198
 This aspect 
maintains a high priority in this thesis. 
 The 1993 constitution as previously discussed has contributed the Yeltsonian forces 
that created an imperial presidency. The President of Russia has full authority to control the 
Russian Security Council, Chair of Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry 
of Defence. In no uncertain terms, does the judiciary or legislature have significant means 
or influence to alter the chosen path by the office of the presidency. This important 
empowerment of the Russian presidency has made the Secretary General position of the 
Soviet Union and President of the Russian Federation before the 1993 constitution pale in 
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comparison with the enormous differences in scope of unquestionable power. These 
fundamental changes in the chief executive position exert a powerful measure of control on 
the mechanisms of establishing and conducting diplomatic relations and responding to 
crises on the world stage. Constitutionally, the President may appoint anyone without 
governmental oversight of any nature. The President is not beholden to any other 
government branch or mechanism.  
 From May 2008 to May 2012 Vladimir Putin was constitutionally required to step 
down and appointed to the position of Prime Minister. This position, while certainly 
powerful, precluded him from being the official top decision-maker. The Russian 
Constitution was amended and has now allowed him to be President until 2024 under 
foreseeable circumstances. This ‘lying in wait’ certainly did not lessen his influence. The 
Prime Minister still maintained a grip on the reins of government, and for the purposes of 
examining Russian foreign policy still summons and maintains an unusual degree of 
influence over the mechanisms of the foreign policy apparatus. Putin was appointed by his 
protégé who became President, and it is apparent that Dmitry Medvedev had no moral or 
political qualms about this ‘tandem arrangement.’199 Speaking about his close partnership 
with Putin in the final days of his presidency, Medvedev emphasized that this arrangement 
is beneficial and will continue.
200
 Medvedev stated: 
It’s not bad when the country’s future and political life depend not only on the whims 
of one man, but when all decisions are taken after a discussion, when there are several 
people in the country who can influence the political process. This is normal. This is 
movement toward democracy. Everybody should relax. This is for a long time.
201
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 For the purpose of this thesis’ analysis, the presidency will therefore be examined as 
Putin-Medvedev. A hybrid of interests, which as seen by Putin’s return to the presidency in 
2012, as being guided by the Prime Minister more so than the hand-picked President who 
wilfully and happily demoted himself to allow his predecessor and mentor to return to 
power. The London Telegraph noted in 2010 that the Putin-Medvedev relationship was not 
an equal partnership and that this was most evident by President Medvedev addressing his 
Prime Minister as ‘vy’ as one would address a superior, while Prime Minister Putin 
addresses President Medvedev by the casual ‘ty’ as one would address a junior 
colleague.
202
 This stark example speaks volumes about the power dynamic between the 
two, and it is not surprising that Vladimir Putin exerted unrelenting influence on 
Medvedev’s decision-making process. This was evident during the Medvedev years and the 
looming 2012 election in which Putin was re-elected; this election was surely on the minds 
of the Putin-Medvedev duo. This political marriage between a Silovik, who is characterized 
by the hawkish worldview that is inherent with his KGB background, and a Technocrat, 
who is characterized by a liberal temperament and methodical style that are inherent with 
his background as a legal professional, maintained its relevance and prevalence throughout 
every foreign policy decision. Dr. Graham Allison, author of the Governmental Politics 
Model and director of the Belfer Centre at Harvard University, stated during an interview 
with the author: ‘You have a nominal man on the throne and a power behind the throne as 
far as the Governmental Politics Model is concerned.’203 As The Moscow Times noted a 
few months before Medvedev’s ascension to the presidency, an overwhelming percentage 
of citizens polled trust Medvedev because of his closeness with Putin, who remains the 
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most popular living politician in the Russian Federation, notwithstanding the occasional 
protests from opposition groups.
204
 This is a testament to the Gorbachovian forces of 
democratization. Namely, this ‘tandem democracy’ was only possible because popular 
support did not erode for Putin, and therefore his successor was able to come to power with 
ease.  
 The President of the Russian Federation leads a bloated bureaucracy full of 
conflicting ideologies, interests, and personalities. The Ministry of Defence, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and Russian Security Council are fundamental organs for the formulation 
of foreign policy. The three groups in government are the Siloviki, the Technocrats, and the 
Yeltsin Liberals. These organs are therefore full of individuals who fall within one of these 
groups and it will be the purpose of this research to examine and ascertain what results 
from policy debates within the Kremlin. The Security Council of the Russian Federation is 
a prudent tool to not only communicate decisions, but to bring defence and foreign affairs 
interests within the President’s grasp while allowing the three groups that maintain a 
powerful presence in the Russian government to come together in a formal setting and 
formulate policy by virtue of face-to-face discussion. This mechanism and the inherent 
groups within the formal sessions of deliberation will be examined to understand Russia’s 
new pragmatism under the Putin-Medvedev regime. 
 The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, as evident during the 1993 
coup, has maintained an affinity and compatibility with the Russian Federation’s executive 
leadership. The Russian military and its generals have shown, particularly during the 1993 
coup, a predisposition is to be guided by an unquestionable executive office, which 
incidentally follows the ‘chain of command’ mentality by military personnel. Therefore, the 
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military and defence officials in the Russian Federation maintain their loyalty to the chief 
executive and seek to influence his or her decisions according to their own sense of 
international security, which can be characterized as a hawkish vision of Russian 
dominance in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as well as containing NATO.
205
 Russian 
defence has been historically opposed to NATO enlargement and remains a prevalent factor 
in its policy views.
206
 The Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov is an important 
bureaucrat for the analysis of Russian foreign policy decisions during the Medvedev 
presidency. 
Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov: 
 The Russian Ministry of Defence was headed by Anatoliy Serdyukov, a St. 
Petersburg Technocrat, brought in with Putin’s Siloviki as a counterweight to the Yeltsin 
Liberals who still occupied many positions within the government. After six years of being 
under the leadership of Silovik Sergei Ivanov, the Ministry of Defence was now guided by 
a Technocrat who has made little effort to disguise his role as a reformer during the 
Medvedev presidency. His reforms were centred on ending corruption, accelerating 
progress, and revitalizing defence capabilities by adjusting the apparatus to fit the times. 
Serdyukov commented, ‘No mobilisation, no large-scale war, no threats from Nato. Why 
was the threat of Nato so popular with the military? Because it allowed them to maintain 
the old system and consider themselves useful, even though the officers of those divisions 
had been doing nothing for the last 15 years.’207 The Cold War mentality was seen as a faux 
pas in some Russian political circles and updating the defence apparatus was long overdue. 
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The Russian Federation has been well-acquainted and maintained a working relationship 
with NATO since the early Yeltsin years and the Partnership for Peace. NATO was no 
longer the most serious security threat in the perceptions of the less hawkish bureaucrats in 
the Russian government. 
 Serdyukov has been unpopular to date because of his reforms, which are not seen by 
all to be advantageous for Russian defence capabilities. General Yuri Baluyevsky’s conflict 
with his superior, the Minister of Defence, is a microcosm of the inner departmental turmoil 
Serdyukov has had to deal with. Namely, the military traditionalists hardly view NATO and 
the West as non-threats and for them the Cold War never ended. General Baluyevsky in his 
position as Chief of General Staff had been a vocal opponent of the Serdyukov reforms, 
which he believed encroached on the military generals’ ability to maintain the Cold War 
defence apparatus and its capabilities. In addition to this, General Baluyevsky opposed the 
Ministry of Defence’s growing power over the generals and this was seen as a major reason 
for his transfer to the Russian Security Council. 
 Ultimately, Serdyukov’s tenure as Minister of Defence had brought in a pragmatic, 
reform-minded leadership with a starkly different worldview from his predecessor, Sergei 
Ivanov. Serdyukov’s background was not in Soviet espionage or intelligence, but rather in 
accounting. His approach to defence issues were methodical, systematic, and balanced from 
a policy standpoint. Namely, the accountant from St. Petersburg possesses none of the 
jingoistic or security impulses as Putin and the Siloviki. The Ministry of Defence was led 
by a minister during the Medvedev presidency that was intent on accelerating 
modernization and efficiency. In addition to this, the reforms facilitated an inherent 
empowerment of the Minister of Defence’s position over the generals. This fact contributes 
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to the thesis and its structural framework of analyzing Serdyukov’s input in foreign policy 
decisions. The Minister of Defence is now a major force in the decision-making process.  
Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev: 
 The Russian Security Council is an advisory board with the unique task of bridging 
the gap between the diplomats and generals and unifying the different wings of government 
in order to advise the President. The Russian Security Council has no direct effect on the 
mechanisms of foreign policy except for being a forum for deliberation. The Russian 
Security Council is open to all members as desired by the President, so the advisory board 
is not limited to the same individuals. What is certain is that the Russian Security Council is 
controlled by Nikolai Patrushev, whose long career in the KGB and Silovik mentality are 
well known. A stark example of Patrushev’s worldview is illustrated by the selection of his 
deputy, General Baluyevsky, who maintains the ‘Cold War warrior’ mentality and hardline 
Soviet worldview. Namely, this can be described as a mistrust of the West and NATO. 
These two men were responsible for drawing up the 2010 military doctrine and 2009 
National Security Strategy.
208
 Both men are ardent advocates of increasing Russia’s 
international prestige and power and this was greatly infused into the writing of crucial 
documents for Russian foreign policy.
209
 Nikolai Patrushev, Russian Security Council 
Secretary said: 
Today, on February 5, President Medvedev approved the Military Doctrine. First of 
all, I would like to say that in May of last year the President adopted the national 
security strategy up to 2020, where the national defence is determined as one of the 
strategic national priorities. We should continue to work on the strategy, and the 
Military Doctrine is one of the results of this work.
210
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 The Silovik worldview is a powerful influence in the decision-making process. The 
Russian Security Council maintains this position and maintains the ability to tilt foreign 
policy decisions in this manner. The Russian Security Council may posses a wide variety of 
opinions, ideologies, and biases, but the chief Russian Security Council agent possesses the 
ability to influence doctrines and decisions according to his or her liking by virtue of 
acquiring the Russian Security Council Secretary position. There can be little doubt that the 
Russian Security Council possesses an affinity for Vladimir Putin and like-minded 
individuals who are schooled in the KGB and are primarily concerned with Russia’s power 
status on the world stage. RIA Novosti reported Nikolai Patrushev as saying: 
In an interview with the Izvestia daily, Security Council head Nikolai Patrushev said 
Russia's national security can be ensured by “achieving an array of strategic national 
priorities,” including the country's sustained development and its evolution as “a 
competitive state” with a hi-tech industry, a modern defence capability, and “decent 
living standards.” In this context, he said Russia rejects NATO military expansion 
plans and attempts to grant the military alliance a global role. Russia is ready to build 
relations with NATO and the United States on the basis of equality and respect for 
international law.
211
 
 
 A major point of contention by the Russian Security Council Secretary is that the 
world’s security architecture is tilted in the West’s favour.212 This is a common grievance 
among Siloviki and military traditionalists that the OSCE, NATO, and most security 
arrangements are adversarial toward the Russian Federation and pose a significant threat to 
Russian security. Rarely do trade agreements, human rights, territorial issues, or any other 
aspect of international politics create ‘political waves’ among Russian policy-makers. 
Security is an issue that takes precedence among the Russian political intelligentsia and 
Kremlin leaders. Military reforms have changed the composition of the Russian armed 
forces, but nuclear capabilities have been reinforced by doctrine and a proactive approach 
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to ensure that Russia is not lagging behind. While treaties and executive agreements have 
been dovish in the sense that a sensible approach to nuclear weapon issues by virtue of The 
ABM Treaty and New START Treaty has been pursued on the part of the Russian 
Federation, its nuclear apparatus has remained robust. As the Russian Security Council 
document states: 
The main challenge of strengthening national defence in the medium term is the 
transition toward a qualitatively new profile for the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation, while maintaining the potential of the strategic nuclear forces, by 
improving the organizational staff structure and system of territorially-based troops 
and forces, increasing the number of divisions at constant readiness, and likewise 
improving operations and combat training, as well as improving the organization of 
interaction among different troops and forces.
213
 
 
 The Russian Security Council was Boris Yeltsin’s initiative to create an efficient 
tool to provide a cohesive forum to formulate policies and assemble the important players 
in the foreign policy apparatus. Both Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev have used this 
forum to deliberate policies and convey decisions within the upper echelons of government. 
It has served both as a tool for communication and policy discourse. The thesis will 
examine how exactly the Silovik controlled Russian Security Council affects the dynamics 
of three distinct groups competing for influence in this advisory forum. 
 The Silovik worldview is understood best as an array of tactics on the world stage 
ensuring Russian security and prosperity in addition to an aversion toward Western security 
architecture and influence in the Eastern hemisphere, especially in Europe and the post-
Soviet space. The Silovik worldview consists of the hawkish truculence and Cold War 
mentality of the former KGB operatives who insist that Russian power on the world stage 
and the international security sphere not remain infringed, entangled, or inhibited in any 
manner. Vladimir Putin’s first presidency from 2000 to 2008 has shown an affinity for this 
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vision of Russia’s role on the world stage, but Russian foreign policy during this period has 
shown him to oscillate between cautious cooperation with the West and hawkish insistence 
that the United States and the West do not overextend their tentacles in the Eastern 
hemisphere. For example, Vladimir Putin assisted the Bush Administration’s invasion of 
Afghanistan to the chagrin of the supremely hawkish bureaucrats, such as then Minister of 
Defence Sergei Ivanov, but wholeheartedly opposed the Iraq War and the Missile Defence 
Shield in the Czech Republic. Putin opposed both efforts by the United States to prevent 
the possibility of a nuclear arms race and regional instability in the Middle East. The 
Silovik worldview bends from outright anti-Western posturing to conciliatory, but cautious 
engagement. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov: 
 Sergei Lavrov has been Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2004 after 10 years of 
being the Russian Ambassador to the United Nations. Throughout his career, which began 
during the Soviet era, Lavrov has remained a diplomat working in the world’s multilateral 
status quo. His years at the United Nations are a testament to his experience navigating 
among the world’s representatives and conducting multilateral negotiations. Being a 
‘Yeltsin Liberal’ who established his career during the 1990’s has precluded him from 
exerting influence comparable to the Siloviki and the Technocrats. His ascension to the 
position of Minister of Foreign Affairs remains a powerful position to exercise his control 
in foreign policy formulation, but the inner sanctum of former KGB agents and educated 
professionals who once worked in Putin’s political circle in St. Petersburg remain and have 
been a powerful barrier between Lavrov and the ear of the Russian President.   
 From a logistical standpoint, the Minister of Foreign Affairs requires frequent travel 
to fulfil his duties and this is another obstacle for Lavrov in terms of penetrating the inner 
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sanctum. Russia’s foreign policy since the inauguration of Putin has been more assertive, 
principled, and independent. This is a complete reversal of the Yeltsin liberal foreign 
policy, which made Russia beholden to the West out of respect for Western civilization and 
a cognizance of the loss of the Cold War. Lavrov’s foreign policy liberalism will be 
assessed as to whether it evolved or remains the same. In addition to this, Lavrov’s role in 
the policy equation will be ascertained and compared with the powerful heads of the 
Russian Federation’s government. Lavrov’s role as travelling Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and foreign policy advisor will be a focal point of the decisions made during the Medvedev 
years. 
 Lavrov’s bona fides as a skilled diplomat are beyond reproach. His intellect, 
experience, and versatility make him a formidable negotiator and advocate. His ten years 
on the United Nations Security Council are viewed by the general public as being highly 
successful. According to Patrick Jackson’s article: ‘“I think everybody viewed him as the 
most powerful personality on the Security Council during his time there, with a rapid mind, 
with comprehensive and accurate knowledge and awareness of what was going on, and 
with a capacity for articulate intervention which could easily change the tenor of the 
debate,” one UN insider told the BBC News website.’214 Lavrov, even though a major 
player in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Yeltsin years, was not viewed by 
anyone as a capitulator to the West or formidable powers on the world stage.
215
 The 
Kremlin has kept him in powerful positions from the inception of the Russian Federation. 
His status as a visible player remains unchanged during the Putin-Medvedev years. 
Therefore, his importance in the policy debates deserves proper scrutiny.  
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 The Yeltsin years saw an emphasis on multilateral diplomacy as opposed to 
hawkish defence diplomacy. Kozyrev and Primakov were powerful advocates of their own 
respective foreign policy stances. Both men maintained powerful voices in the political and 
public debates during the 1990’s. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was a powerful position 
in relation to President Yeltsin, but the Putin-Medvedev years have seen a different 
treatment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The foreign affairs arm of the government has 
remained to a major extent unchanged with the same Yeltsin Liberals occupying powerful 
positions in diplomacy. For example, Vitaly Churkin, a diplomat who rose to prominence 
during the Yeltsin era, now occupies Lavrov’s previous position as Russian Ambassador to 
the United Nations in New York City. The Kremlin maintains the predisposition of not 
appointing Siloviki or Technocrats to the foreign affairs arm of the government. This 
predisposition reflected an increasing trend of emphasizing defence and executive 
leadership over the diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   
 Ultimately, Sergei Lavrov’s role as policy formulator in Russia’s affairs with other 
states has its barriers. The role of chief diplomat is not one that Vladimir Putin and Dmitry 
Medvedev feel that a member of the inner sanctum should occupy. ‘“The position of the 
head of Mid has been fairly marginalised over the last decade,” says Sarah Mendelson from 
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.’216 ‘I have the impression 
that the weight of foreign policy decisions is being decided in other parts of the 
government.’217 The foreign policy decisions of the Russian Federation during the 
Medvedev years have certainly included Sergei Lavrov, but his role and by a larger extent 
the role of chief diplomat will be examined to alter and update the fundamental 
understanding of Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs position. 
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Reflections: 
 The Kremlin today is shaped by democratic and constitutional forces. The 
Gorbachovian forces of democratization, which were facilitated by the reforms of the 
1980’s and early 1990’s, have forever altered the relationship between the citizenry and 
government officials. There is very little doubt that legitimacy by virtue of the consent of 
the governed is a high priority for those occupying powerful positions in the Russian 
government. Regardless of political ideology, background, or motivation, every elected 
government official must now recognize that political survival requires acting compatibly 
with an empowered and informed citizenry. The Russian presidency however is at the apex 
of the Gorbachovian forces. Russian Presidents are careful in public not to disparage or 
discount the voices of the citizens, but Boris Yeltsin had little regard for those within the 
government who aimed to insert themselves in his path. The 1993 coup against Yeltsin, 
which turned out to be Yeltsin’s greatest legacy, paved the way for the creation of an 
imperial presidency, the Yeltsonian forces. Boris Yeltsin was cognizant of the 
democratized and empowered masses he now governed, but the mechanics of the 
government were regarded as being nuisances. He therefore tailored the 1993 Russian 
Constitution to fit his needs and ensure that the presidency is unconfined by the judiciary or 
legislature. The Russian presidency was now unquestionably at the apex of power. This 
clash of forces on the ultimate decision-maker in the Russian government requires a 
comprehensive examination. 
 The decision-making by virtue of the vital bureaucrats and the offices they occupy 
within the constitutional framework of a powerful presidency that is ultimately subservient 
to the will of the constituents is a key aspect of this thesis. The Russian Constitution 
authored by Yeltsin in 1993 ultimately relegates all branches and departments in 
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government in relation to the superior presidency.
218
  The Russian presidency exists in a 
political environment where it may act in any manner within the government but externally 
must maintain a public persona that appeases the Russian public.
219
 The claims of a ‘virtual 
politics’ are not wholly applicable because any political party or president may be voted out 
of office.
220
 Therefore, while the presidency may confine the organs of government because 
of constitutional entitlements, the Russian public still maintains its superiority over any and 
all elected officials. 
 The delicate balance between the ardent views of the public and the personal 
popularity of Vladimir Putin and his party’s endorsement of actions when the public’s 
views are lacklustre in either direction has been addressed in this thesis. As proven in the 
case studies, the Russian public’s views of Georgian ‘aggression’ and President Bakiyev’s 
mercurial pro-American posturing emboldened the Kremlin to make decisions in response 
to these issues. In the case of Western-labelled ‘rogue regimes’ when the Russian public 
had no discernible opinion, the Putin-Medvedev duo were emboldened by their popularity 
to shape Russian public opinion. The thesis assessed the Russian public’s relationship with 
the Kremlin’s leadership in terms of whether legitimacy was granted by the constituents.  
Political legitimacy was now the fundamental tool in the ‘new Russian political 
environment’ by virtue of the Gorbachovian effects of democratization.221 However, in the 
case of the Yeltsonian forces, which were authored and implemented by the 1993 Russian 
Constitution, the Russian presidency is able to bypass popular opinion when formulating 
foreign policy decisions.
222
 This poses the risk of political demise, but as seen in 
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Medvedev’s decision to disregard the Russian public’s possible outrage over NATO 
intervention and the resulting crisis in legitimacy for the Putin-Medvedev duo during the 
Syrian crisis, the Gorbachovian and Yeltsonian forces coexist independently and 
simultaneously. Therefore, the 1993 Russian Constitution expanded the powers of the 
presidency and the effects of Gorbachev’s democratization that empowered the people are 
powerful contributory factors in which the Kremlin has had to have a populist approach in a 
country where the government is a quasi-democratic apparatus, especially when public 
opinion is vigorous in regards to a certain issue. Therefore, when the Russian public is 
unengaged regarding a certain issue or the President chooses to ignore the citizenry, any 
decision may be made as stated in the Russian Constitution. This, the Yeltsonian 
constitutional powers, is a conflicting force against the Gorbachovian democratization. The 
main players of the Kremlin will be examined considering these themes. 
 The important players in the policy formulation are the President, Prime Minister, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, and Russian Security Council Secretary. 
The confluence and cohesion in the debates of these individuals in response to important 
foreign policy events will be examined to understand how the Russian Federation acts on 
the world stage. Graham Allison’s Governmental Politics Model is best suited for the needs 
of this research; it posits that a government’s decisions are best understood when 
examining the main policy-makers.
223
 The synergy, friction, and clashes of those important 
individuals result in the product of decisions made in response to challenges on the world 
stage. This synthesis of examining the major players and the clashing forces of the system 
they have inherited from Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin are important facets in 
understanding Russian foreign policy during the Medvedev presidency. 
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Chapter 2: Russia’s War 
Introduction: 
 Dmitry Medvedev’s first major foreign policy challenge was not with the West or 
the United States, but rather a neighbouring country within the post-Soviet space. A new 
age with a vastly different world stage brought the Kremlin into a war that signified an 
assertive Russia much different from the Yeltsin era when Russian participation in world 
events was marginal at best. The United States during 2008 was already involved in two 
costly and extensive wars. The American efforts in Afghanistan’s reconstruction demanded 
Washington’s attention in light of severe structural and societal problems, and the military 
surge in Iraq, while providing a measure of ample success, created a limitation on 
American military resources. The West was simultaneously dealing with a financial crisis 
that complicated its involvement in world affairs. The trans-Atlantic alliance was 
problematic for these two primary reasons. The West was financially and military unable to 
extricate itself from the looming problems it was facing. Russia was free to assert itself in 
its former sphere of influence and made two vital foreign policy decisions with respect to 
Georgia. It responded to Saakashvili’s military in Georgia’s breakaway regions with 
disproportionate force and the Russian Federation ceased hostilities after five days. Dr. 
Lincoln Mitchell, Georgia scholar and professor at Columbia University, noted: ‘Russia 
stopped because Russia wanted to stop. They didn’t have to stop there and could have 
escalated further. Russia stopped Russia.’224 This foreign policy issue will be analyzed in 
this chapter as the Medvedev era’s first major foreign policy episode. 
 Mikhail Saakashvili’s tenure was troublesome for the Kremlin from the very 
beginning. The Rose Revolution in Georgia ousted President Eduard Shevardnadze for 
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corruption, a former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs who maintained close relations with 
his former underlings who were now integral members of the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Throughout Shevardnadze’s tenure, he sought to strengthen Russian-Georgian ties. 
Saakashvili’s first few months saw a complete reversal of Georgian foreign policy. Namely, 
at Saakashvili’s inaugural European Union flags were raised and the new President 
announced that Georgia will integrate with Europe and the West.
225
 Saakashvili visited 
NATO headquarters on many occasions with his Minister of Defence and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in order to seek NATO’s support for implementing defence goals and 
integrating Georgia with NATO’s security architecture.226 Russian foreign policy-makers 
were beginning to see a newly assertive Georgia increasingly exercise a pro-West, pro-
NATO alignment under its new leadership. Georgia’s ties with the Russian Federation were 
reprioritized to minor importance. Saakashvili possessed little desire to continue Georgia’s 
existence as a capitulator to Russia. These actions were adverse to Russia’s interests and 
security concerns developed as a result. The Russian Federation’s main goal was to 
maintain a strong defence against NATO enlargement, which in the first decade of the 
2000’s seemed unstoppable. This clash of interests and divergent foreign policies created 
fertile ground for a tense relationship unseen in the history of Russian-Georgian relations. 
 Saakashvili maintained no ties to Putin’s inner sanctum or anyone from the Soviet 
regime. Therefore, the Kremlin was distrustful and suspicious of the new Georgian leader 
from his inauguration. Hence, Dr. Lincoln Mitchell states: ‘Georgian foreign policy was to 
become a client of the West. That was his (Saakashvili’s) policy and his ultimate goal. That 
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framed the relationship with Russia.’227 The new Georgian foreign policy only added fuel 
to an increasingly tense relationship. Prior to Russia’s decision to respond to Georgian 
forces militarily, The Economist noted that Vladimir Putin’s dislike for the ‘maverick 
President’ is a direct reason for the Russian Prime Minister stating that the Russian 
Federation would retaliate militarily if the Georgian military involvement in the breakaway 
regions continued.
228
 ‘Misha (Saakashvili) and Putin, there was personalized rancour. They 
just didn’t like one another. Putin could not stand how Misha would not play along. Misha 
personally insulted him by calling him “Liliputin” (midget Putin), and Putin responded by 
saying he would hang Saakashvili by his testicles.’229  
 The Russian Prime Minister made a forceful warning of an impending military 
response, while the technocratic President remained visible but not as vocal.
230
 The 
Economist noted that despite Medvedev’s presidency and technocratic leanings, the 
security-minded officials and hardliners in the Kremlin’s foreign policy apparatus, the 
Siloviki and military traditionalists, may sway the new Russian President’s decision into 
starting a war with Georgia.
231
 The new President inherited a government with a strong 
presence of Putin’s like-minded former KGB agents and hardline military personnel. 
Medvedev was now at the apex of the decision-making power structure with the same 
rivalries that plagued his predecessor’s tenure. Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap’s analysis 
of the dynamics of these rivalries in the Kremlin was relatively similar to 2008 when 
Medvedev’s term began, except for the notable difference that a new President with a 
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different background and temperament compared with his predecessor was now in 
charge.
232
 
 ‘The Five Day War,’ as it now known, was Russia’s reminder to the world that it 
was a formidable force with a modernized, competent military. Russia’s exercise of 
military strength was intended to reflect a changing momentum, where Russia may 
intervene unilaterally on the world stage without any hesitation or cognizance of the West, 
which the latter had seen its influence over world affairs increase exponentially since the 
end of the Cold War. The decision regarding this military response to Georgia was made by 
the collusion of Putin’s Siloviki, Medvedev’s Technocrats, and the Yeltsin Liberals in a 
war-oriented policy. The war provided the Medvedev era with its first opportunity to shift 
the balance of power in the post-Soviet space in the Russian Federation’s favour. This 
momentous episode produced an important decision that had a powerful impact on Russia’s 
standing in the court of world opinion and symbolized its new assertiveness unseen since 
Soviet times.  
 On the third anniversary of the war in 2011, President Medvedev reflected on 
Russia’s successful attempt of stripping Georgian control of the breakaway regions.233 
Medvedev made no effort to hide his antipathy toward the Georgian President.
234
 In a New 
York Times interview, Medvedev stated that he would ‘never shake hands’ with the 
Georgian President and that Saakashvili should be tried for war crimes.
235
 Furthermore, 
Medvedev blames the conflict on Western interference in Georgia’s government, and he 
claims had the Russian Federation continued the conflict all the way to Tbilisi it would 
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have seen the ouster of Saakashvili.
236
 The Russian President’s assertiveness was a 
microcosm of the new Russian foreign policy, which differed significantly from the early 
years of the Russian Federation. ‘The Five Day War’ was a signal to the world that the 
‘new Russia’ would be a powerful force in world affairs and should not be discounted. 
The Decision: 
 The decision to respond militarily was Medvedev’s ultimatum after years of tension 
and intervention in the Georgian separatist conflict. Because of Georgia’s geographic 
proximity, such an issue could not be ignored by the Kremlin. Territorial issues threatening 
a country always take precedence, and it is for these primary reasons that the Russian 
Federation sent peacekeepers and military personnel to observe the situation. While 
Saakashvili claims that the Russian military had been preparing and bolstering its forces for 
an imminent war, neither NATO, nor US Defence officials acknowledge this.
237
 On the 
contrary, NATO and the US Defence Department have admitted that the Russian military 
was far below levels of any tangible build up and the Georgian claim is baseless.
238
 As a 
world summit and Olympic Games had commenced in Beijing, so had an intense bilateral 
dialogue between Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush.
239
 The dialogue was further 
substantiated by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s proximity to the two men as they had this 
discussion and it seemed that the two were enveloped in what was happening between 
Russia and Georgia, rather than the sports they had come to watch.
240
 While President 
Medvedev was officially the chief executive, it was his official underling who attended the 
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games and spoke directly with the American President. Putin’s influence seemed to have 
not waned with his demotion to Prime Minister. For example, rarely did Georgia’s Prime 
Minister have such a public and vocal position with regards to the conduct of this war when 
compared with Saakashvili.   
 When asked about the impromptu diplomatic discussions, George W. Bush 
responded to NBC News: ‘I was very firm with Vladimir Putin -- he and I have got a good 
relationship -- just like I was firm with the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev.’241 Bush 
in this statement inadvertently admitted that Putin was the primary interlocutor with whom 
to discuss this issue. As The Economist noted, Putin had no qualms about issuing a direct 
warning to Georgia that a military strike will occur if it continues its anti-separatist 
efforts.
242
 The Yeltsonian forces of a superior presidential system as granted by the 1993 
Russian Constitution have made it viable for any Prime Minister to exert such influence 
according to the constitutional framework and the Russian President’s behest. The new 
Putin-Medvedev leadership seemed to be inextricable from one another and the 1993 
Russian Constitution, while giving the President unquestionable authority over his 
underlings and other branches of government, now accommodated the Silovik power base 
that had been in the Kremlin since Putin’s ascension to the presidency in 2000. Putin’s 
Siloviki never left the government despite having their faction’s leader demoted to Prime 
Minister, and the Putinist rhetoric continued even though Putin was the second most 
powerful official in the Russian Federation.  
 Yeltsin’s legacy of empowering the Russian presidency remains relative in this new 
political arrangement of the President and Prime Minister acting as a two-man executive 
authority. Article 80 of the Russian Constitution clearly outlines that the Russian President 
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is the chief interlocutor and policy-maker for foreign affairs.
243
 Boris Yeltsin envisioned a 
presidency that was unencumbered by any non-executive branches of government or any of 
his underlings. There was to be no obstacle by policy mechanisms or rule of law. The 
President maintained absolute authority in foreign affairs and the constitution reflected this 
Yeltsonian legacy. The issue of the Putin-Medvedev governing arrangement is possible 
because of the Yeltsonian forces that empower the President to have the constitutional right 
and luxury to appoint his underlings without effective legislative or judicial oversight.  
Chapter 6 of the Russian Constitution as authored by Yeltsin allows the Russian President 
to be the sole official to select a Prime Minister of his or her choosing without any actual 
mechanisms to block such an appointment.
244
 When Dmitry Medvedev became President, 
the decision to appoint Putin was wholly his and no member of his presidential 
administration or any other departmental sector of government could have successfully 
objected to this. The President was empowered to appoint whomever he desired according 
to Article 111.
245
 The State Duma has no alternative but to confirm the President’s 
appointment or risk being dissolved.
246
 The Yeltsonian forces of the presidency allow the 
chief executive to enforce his or her will constitutionally and according to his or her own 
preferences. It is for these primary reasons that the State Duma had no choice but to 
confirm Vladimir Putin as the new Prime Minister.  
 The system of the Russian Federation can be described as a ‘superior presidential 
mode of governing,’ and a necessity of maintaining this system is being able to appoint 
anyone at the President’s behest. Boris Yeltsin understood that a successful presidency 
must be ingrained with tremendous and unquestionable authority to exert control over 
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matters of national and international interests to the Russian Federation. Boris Yeltsin was 
known to appoint an inner circle of his own full of loyal Yeltsin Liberals and family 
members rather than government officials based on merit, so too can future Presidents 
appoint their own inner circle for top tier positions. In this case, Vladimir Putin had 
appointed a St. Petersburg legal professional to serve as Prime Minister during his 
presidency, and now President Dmitry Medvedev was able to do the same only in reverse 
because of the Yeltsonian constitutional legacy. Yeltsin’s inherent practice of choosing 
government officials from his own preferred list of confidantes has continued to this 
present day in the Kremlin. The ‘tandem democracy’ as the Kremlin called it was 
essentially a constitutionally and legally sound arrangement, which allowed Vladimir Putin 
to maintain a powerful presence in government. The former President of the Russian 
Federation was now part of a governing duo that essentially led the government into its first 
major war since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Technocrats as led by 
Medvedev and Siloviki as led by Putin were now at the apex of the foreign policy decision-
making apparatus. This political union and hybrid of interests were now set to converge or 
diverge in policy debates with respect to foreign affairs. 
 Dmitry Medvedev’s decision to order a military response to Georgian forces and 
therefore start a war was carried out in the context of the Yeltsonian constitutional forces 
that emboldened him to make such a pronounced statement on the world stage. The 
decision to go to war carries with it a great deal of unintended consequences for a President 
in a democratic government. According to Graham Allison’s Governmental Politics Model, 
the examination of this decision would require to delve into the mindset of the chief 
executive and what options that mental process drove Medvedev to consider.
247
 As Robert 
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Kennedy’s account of the Cuban Missile Crisis gave a stark insider’s view of the events 
leading up to the successful avoidance of a nuclear confrontation in 1962, he mentions that 
President Kennedy was cognizant of the possibility that he may be impeached if his 
response were deemed foolish, illegal, or disproportionate.
248
 The 1993 Russian 
Constitution contains two articles that are relevant to the Russian President’s decision to go 
to war. Namely, Articles 91 and 93 empower the President to be virtually unimpeachable 
and shielded from the rule of law and legislative oversight.
249
  
 During Dmitry Medvedev’s speech announcing his decision he said: ‘In accordance 
with the Constitution and the federal laws, as President of the Russian Federation it is my 
duty to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may be.’250 This 
statement was spoken with the confidence of knowing that the Yeltsonian constitutional 
forces protected him to an unusually high degree, specifically the articles dealing with the 
legality of the Russian President’s actions. ‘Article 91: The President of the Russian 
Federation shall have immunity’ is the single most important constitutional entitlement 
allocated to the President.
251
 It is a powerful article that allows the Russian chief executive 
to make decisions with constitutional protection from accusations that a policy or policies 
may be illegal. The Russian Constitution expressly protects the President from any such 
accusation of malfeasance or legal challenge.
252
 Furthermore, Article 93 complements 
Article 91 by making the process of legally challenging a President virtually impossible.
253
 
The 1993 Russian Constitution vaguely defines what exactly qualifies as ‘treason or grave 
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crimes’ and requires a resolution from the Russian Supreme Court, which was neutralized 
during the Yeltsin presidency by expanding membership and appointing pro-government 
judges to life-terms. The judiciary has never posed as an obstacle to the Russian President 
since the inception of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the process of convincing two-
thirds of members of the State Duma and bringing the charges, which have no 
constitutional definition or precedence as what qualifies as ‘treason or grave crimes’, to the 
Council of the Federation that is legally obligated to adopt the measure to impeach the 
President within 90 days of the charges having been brought forth is cumbersome and 
nearly impossible to accomplish. The wheels of the legal system do not turn so quickly and 
efficiently. Dmitry Medvedev’s decision therefore was made with no concern for his legal 
survival and this created a powerful accelerant for the decision to respond to Georgian 
military operations against Russia.  
 Dmitry Medvedev’s perceptions and priorities were inspired because of his legal 
background. His four years as President saw an unprecedented battle against governmental 
corruption directed by the office of the Russian presidency.
254
 According to Graham 
Allison and James Goldgeier’s respective modes of analysis, Medvedev’s legal profession 
most certainly influenced his decisions, agendas, and policies. It would be difficult to 
separate his legal upbringing and tenure at the apex of the decision-making apparatus. As a 
legal professional now firmly holding the reins of power, Medvedev’s inaugural speech in 
2008 specifically emphasized the need for the strengthening of the rule of law and ending 
corruption in government and society: 
A mature and effective legal system is an essential condition for economic and social 
development, supporting entrepreneurship and fighting corruption. But it is no less 
important for increasing Russia’s influence in the international community, making 
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our country more open to the world and facilitating dialogue as equals with other 
peoples. Finally, true supremacy of the law is only possible if people feel safe in their 
lives. I will do everything I can to ensure that the safety of our citizens is not just 
enshrined in the law but is genuinely guaranteed by the state.
255
  
 
 Medvedev’s stance was, purely in constitutional terms, that the Russian military 
 
responded to Georgian ‘aggression’ that was threatening the Russian Federation, and  this 
 
gave the Russian President the moral and constitutional duties to order the Russian military 
 
to respond with force. All statements in the aftermath of Medvedev’s order were centred on 
 
the legal righteousness that the Russian Federation possessed according to the 
 
Russian President. Medvedev’s legal training enhanced his justification that his 
 
decision was the proper course and maintained full legal authority to execute and 
 
implement the decision. Dr. Mark Galeotti, Russia expert and professor at New York 
 
University, opined: ‘Putin was trained as a lawyer, but he didn’t internalize the training, 
 
whilst Medvedev certainly did.’256 The Kremlin was now being led by a man who 
 
understood Russian constitutional law better than anyone in the top tier of the Russian 
 
government. The decision was made with full legal cognizance by Medvedev. The claims 
 
that genocide, which if true violated every international norm, was being committed by the 
 
Georgian government were used to justify the Russian response. Medvedev saw a major 
 
opportunity to assert Russian foreign policy at a time the Russian defence forces were a 
 
non-factor in world affairs.
257
 The Russian President did this with the theoretical and 
 
practical knowledge that no impeachable offence was being committed and that 
 
constitutional law justified the Russian response. Medvedev’s decision was constitutionally 
 
sound and internationally plausible according to the Russian President. 
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 Medvedev’s speech on August 8, 2008, after the order to attack Georgia militarily 
was given, bares all the qualities of a prudent, pragmatic lawyer.
258
 None of Putin’s 
speeches ever contained so much legal justification for foreign policy decisions. The speech 
was clearly tailored to suit the preferences of a President with a long and distinguished 
legal upbringing. Medvedev begins his speech with the claim that Russian military 
presence in the breakaway regions was ‘absolutely lawful’ and Georgian ‘aggression’ was 
tantamount to ‘a gross violation of international law and of the mandates that the 
international community gave Russia as a partner in the peace process.’259 Being the clever 
legal professional that Medvedev is, he outlined that the breach of Russian security by 
Georgia required his response.
260
 Medvedev is subtly assuring his country and the world 
that his actions were executed within the scope of the rule of law; lastly, he concludes that 
according to the Russian Constitution he is free to pursue this conflict in the manner he has 
chosen.
261
 This legal manoeuvring is a stark glimpse into a major facet of Medvedev’s 
decision-making mental process. The legality and scope of rule of law were important 
theoretical and practical considerations for the decision. 
 With the legal and constitutional requirements seemingly satisfied, the Kremlin’s 
foreign policy apparatus is beholden to the democratically-linked constituents it needs to 
serve. The Gorbachovian forces of democratization were well into fruition by 2008. Twenty 
years of the Gorbachovian reforms have seeped into every facet of the Russian Federation. 
Dmitry Medvedev, the new President, was now the de jure chief interlocutor in conducting 
foreign affairs. A few months into his young presidency he is faced with a territorial 
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dilemma that poses a risk to Russian-speaking South Ossetians and Abkhazians as well as 
Russian citizens living near the Georgian border. The decision to respond to Georgian 
forces was made in the context of accommodating the political climate of the Russian 
Federation with respect to this issue. The Putin-Medvedev duo was on precarious ground in 
political terms. Medvedev’s tenure did not distance Putin from the Kremlin, while United 
Russia still controlled the government by virtue of a majority in the State Duma.  
Medvedev’s first major foreign policy decision was as vital to his presidency as any major 
piece of legislation or domestic program in relation to State Duma elections and the 2012 
presidential election. This was Russia’s ‘first war’ and whether the Kremlin was 
emboldened to make this decision stems directly from the empowered people whose voices 
could not be ignored.
262
 Gorbachev’s legacy of requiring public legitimacy from 
constituents is a product of his reforms and bares a powerful impact on those who occupy 
the office of the Russian presidency. 
 An opinion editorial by John Helmer in The Asia Times succinctly states that for 
Russia, Georgian military operations were tantamount to genocide in the same vein as 
Slobodan Milosevic’s actions in the Balkans.263 John Helmer opined: 
For all Russians, not only those with relatives in Ossetia, the near-total destruction by 
Georgian guns of Tskhinvali is a war crime. The deaths of about 2,000 civilians in the 
Georgian attack, and the forced flight of about 35,000 survivors from the town - the 
last census of Tskhinvali's population reported 30,000 - has been described by 
Russian leaders, and is understood by Russian public opinion, as a form of genocide. 
Ninety percent of the town's population are Russian citizens.
264
  
 
 The Russian public was fearful and disdainful of Georgia’s military escalation in the 
breakaway regions prior to the war. Saakashvili was compared to Milosevic and 
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characterized this way in order to dismiss any moral ambiguity over his actions.
265
 John 
Helmer’s opinion editorial is written from the Russian vantage point and he asserts that 
Georgia’s increasingly aggressive stances and efforts to join NATO have contributed to the 
Russian opinion that he was a dangerous leader fixated on ‘destabilizing the region’ and 
adversely affecting Russia’s grip on the post-Soviet space that Moscow once controlled.266 
Medvedev has persisted in characterizing the event as ‘Russia’s 9-11 moment’ and that the 
safety of Russia was at stake.
267
 The question over legitimacy from constituents was an 
important one for the express reasons that the new President needed firm public support to 
conduct the next four years of his presidency and maintain the Putin-Medvedev regime’s 
grasp on the Kremlin, State Duma, and presidential election in 2012. Political capital was 
needed to maintain control of the government and the Gorbachovian forces of 
democratization affected every major foreign policy decision. No major decision in foreign 
policy could be made by discounting Russian public opinion. The political survival of 
United Russia and the Putin-Medvedev regime were at stake. 
 Opinion polls related to the conflict with Georgia were published by the 
independent Levada Centre and Russian Analytical Digest. The previously mentioned 
publications are from the few public opinion organizations in the Russian Federation that 
are neither funded by nor associated with the Russian government. Russian Analytical 
Digest’s comprehensive questionnaire and statistical data confirm that the decision to attack 
Georgia was implemented in concert with Russian public opinion.
268
 The war with Georgia 
in the Levada publication suggests that Russian public opinion of Georgia has been in 
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freefall ever since Shevardnadze’s ouster and was abysmally low immediately prior and 
during the 2008 conflict.
269
 The poll result shows that 70% of Russian respondents feel that 
Russian authorities did everything to avoid this escalating conflict and the result stemmed 
from Georgia’s ‘wanton acts.’270 
 Levada’s polling asked Russians to assess Georgian motives for this war.271 Most 
Russians attribute this to personal motives for power on the part of the Georgian President 
and a large percentage attributes it to NATO, which is loathed throughout Russia.
272
 When 
asked whether ‘M. Saakashvili launched this campaign to boost his authority in Georgia 
and keep Presidential seat,’ 38% responded affirmatively, which was the highest percentage 
of respondents for this question.
273
 Furthermore, Levada asked whether Georgian 
‘aggression’ was ordered for NATO membership.274 ‘Georgia should fix its territorial 
issues in order to be admitted as NATO member?’275 43% answered affirmatively, the 
highest percentage among respondents.
276
 The majority of the Russian public did not 
attribute Georgia’s ‘aggression’ to any noble causes, but rather saw this as an effort for 
personal gain by Saakashvili and NATO membership to threaten Russia’s security. 
 The decision to respond militarily to Georgian ‘aggression’ was carried out with the 
political instinct to assess that the Russian public would support such measures. The 
Kremlin made this decision with the knowledge and certainty that the Russian constituents 
are supportive and patriotic against the Georgian leadership. Public opinion polls certainly 
confirm this. When asked to judge whether Medvedev’s order was the proper course, 
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Russian respondents strongly supported this decision.
277
 One poll question asked, ‘Do You 
Approve or Disapprove of the Decision of the Russian Leadership to Send Troops to South 
Ossetia to Conduct a Military Operation?’278 According to the Levada poll, 78% 
enthusiastically supported the military action on Russia’s part.279 The respondents were 
asked whether Georgia’s actions required a military response because of the Kremlin’s 
accusation that Saakashvili was guilty of genocide.
280
 ‘Do You Think that the Actions of 
the Georgian Army Can Be Described as Genocide?’281 72% of Russian respondents 
believed genocide was committed in the breakaway regions.
282
 Public legitimacy was 
another powerful factor in enabling the Kremlin to commit to a five day military offensive 
against Georgia. 
 As The Economist noted in 2008 prior to Russia’s retaliatory attack on Georgia, 
Putin warned that if Georgia’s treatment of the breakaway regions continued, military 
action will be taken by the Russians.
283
 It would be difficult to separate the Silovik 
impulses of the former President and current Prime Minister Putin from the new President 
Medvedev who was a handpicked successor and appointed Putin to his position. The 
partnership between these two men was personally and professionally close. In Medvedev’s 
inaugural speech in 2008, he singled out Putin for praise and insisted that he would 
maintain a powerful position in the Kremlin.
284
 ‘I give my sincere thanks to President 
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin for the unfailing personal support I have always received 
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from him. I am sure that this will not change.’285 It is a safe assumption that Putin and 
Medvedev discussed the grave military situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was a 
security issue that Silovik-minded Putin would be quick to assess and seek to ameliorate. 
Security and stability are a Silovik’s philosophical underpinnings and the dutiful, 
handpicked President would not hastily dismiss his mentor’s concerns. Furthermore, the 
other Siloviki and military traditionalists whose Cold War impulses remained would not 
ignore ‘aggression’ by a country moving increasingly closer to NATO and the European 
Union. Putin’s vocal warning to Georgia and the world in 2008 prior to Medvedev’s order 
confirms that the Silovik power base and military traditionalists had swayed the Kremlin 
decision-making apparatus prior to the war in favour of ordering military action if the 
Georgian military operations against Russia and the separatists continued. 
 The Russian Security Council met on August 1, 2008.
286
 Dmitry Medvedev chaired 
a meeting that included Vladimir Putin and Nikolai Patrushev.
287
 Both men are considered 
Siloviki with powerful roles in the foreign policy apparatus. Prime Minister Putin is an 
influential former President, while Russian Security Council Secretary Patrushev heads an 
advisory council that provides a forum for deliberation, as well as communication. The 
Silovik faction is focused on international prestige. It would be unimaginable that NATO 
enlargement and Georgia’s active efforts for membership were not discussed and that this 
did not place Georgian activity in the breakaway regions high on the priority list. Patrushev 
guided the council and Putin was the former President who once controlled it; their 
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opinions would be ingrained in the discussion and direction of the proceedings. Siloviki by 
definition would be fixated on this looming security problem. 
 Georgia’s theoretical attempt to normalize relations with its breakaway regions or in 
the practical reality subjugating the regions to its military might was implemented in the 
grand scheme of becoming a member of NATO.
288
 The Russian Siloviki and military 
traditionalists must have been outraged over the prospect of this post-Soviet country falling 
to NATO. Ever since 1991, NATO enlargement has enveloped most of what was once 
considered ‘the Soviet sphere of influence.’ The security instincts of the Silovik power base 
and Cold War era military personnel operating within the new Russian Federation were 
alarmed to find that Russia’s grasp on its region was slipping. As previously mentioned, a 
large percentage of Russians believes Saakashvili committed genocide to bring the 
breakaway regions under his control in order to accelerate membership into NATO.
289
 
Russia’s relations with NATO have been adversarial and troublesome throughout the 
history of the relationship; NATO was a toxic element for the security of the Russian 
Federation according to the Putin-minded individuals now occupying important positions in 
the Kremlin. Putin’s forewarning of Russia’s imminent retaliation was a testament to the 
Silovik controlled Russian Security Council deliberation that swayed in the direction of 
making the military response the most viable option. Putin’s confident and vocal warning 
was a direct result of prior formulation of the Russian response to the Georgian issue.  
 Dmitry Medvedev has claimed several times that he did not consult Vladimir Putin 
about ordering a Russian military response to Georgia and only spoke to him twenty-four 
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hours after military operations had begun.
290
 There is official proof from the Russian 
Security Council that he did meet with Vladimir Putin in the days before the war started.
291
 
Furthermore, the likelihood of the order to commence military operations is illustrated by 
the trend of anti-Georgian statements by Medvedev. On June 18, 2008, Medvedev informed 
Saakashvili during a telephone conversation that Georgian attacks on Russian peacekeepers 
were unacceptable.
292
 This blunt remark made to the Georgian President demonstrated a 
readiness to defend Russia’s interests. On July 7, 2008, Medvedev met with George W. 
Bush in Japan and when Bush mentioned Georgia, Medvedev insisted that Russian plans 
for ‘defusing tension’ in Georgia were already formulated.293 Medvedev was vague, but on 
July 18 while meeting with a German official in Moscow, he outlined that the only solution 
to this issue would be Georgia withdrawing its military from the breakaway regions and 
giving up control.
294
 Evidently, the Russian response to Georgian ‘aggression’ was not 
formulated in the wake of the Georgian attack that started ‘The Five Day War.’ 
Medvedev’s claim that no consultation or planning was involved in his decision is baseless. 
Vladimir Putin’s role in the decision-making process is evident by his attendance of the 
Russian Security Council meeting and forewarning immediately prior to the war. 
Furthermore, Medvedev’s decision may have been a quick reaction to Georgian military 
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operations, but it clearly accommodated the Silovik affinity for security against NATO 
enlargement. Dr. Lincoln Mitchell noted, ‘Georgia needed to take control of its territories to 
be considered for NATO membership.’295 By stripping Georgia of its control of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, Tbilisi’s future membership to NATO was in jeopardy.  
  Medvedev and Putin certainly shared an informal power network. The duo 
comprised a dutiful Technocrat and staunch Silovik who enjoyed a relationship comparable 
to a junior colleague and senior mentor.
296
 There would be few who distinguished the two 
as separate entities. ‘The 42-year-old President said George Bush had phoned him shortly 
after he had ordered Russian forces to drive the Georgians back. “You're a young President 
with a liberal background. Why do you need this?” Medvedev quoted Bush as saying. I told 
him we had no choice, he said.’297 Bush in this conversation implies that Medvedev’s 
actions do not reflect his ‘liberal background’ and reflect those of his predecessor. 
Medvedev’s use of the term ‘we’ instead of ‘I’ alludes to the fact that Medvedev’s decision 
did not involve his sole input, but rather was the result of a consensus. In addition to Putin’s 
forewarning and Bush’s informal negotiation with Putin, it would be baseless to assert that 
the Prime Minister’s role in this decision was minor. The Putin-Medvedev duo was 
inextricable from one another. The Yeltsonian constitutional forces allowed this to happen 
by virtue of the clause allowing the President to dissolve the State Duma in the event his 
nominee for Prime Minister is rejected three times. Putin’s role is guaranteed by the 
superior presidential powers granted by the 1993 Russian Constitution. Furthermore, 
Putin’s popularity among the Russian people was extremely high and the new President 
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was further enabled to give the order to attack Georgia. ‘The poll showed Putin's popularity 
peaking at 58 percent in August 2008 in the heat of Russia's five-day war against its much 
smaller neighbour Georgia.’298 Medvedev’s public legitimacy hinged on his popular Prime 
Minister and former President who was credited with Russia’s recovery after the Yeltsin 
years. Putin’s forewarning, which also served as a tacit endorsement, of what eventually 
happened and Russian antipathy toward the Georgian leadership bolstered Medvedev by 
virtue of the Gorbachovian forces that now shaped the political climate. The Gorbachovian 
democratization and Yeltsonian Constitution were now forces that either enabled or 
deterred actions by elected officials. In this case, Russia’s response to Georgia was a viable 
action because of the enabling forces. 
 An important issue has arisen in the years after the war; namely, why did Medvedev 
respond to Georgian forces on August 8 when Saakashvili ordered military action against 
Russia on August 6? Medvedev has been criticized by military traditionalists for delaying 
inevitable orders.
299
 General Baluyevsky, who was removed from the Chief of General 
Staff position and appointed to the Russian Security Council’s deputy position, has been 
the most vocal critic of the delay in responding to the Georgian military. ‘I am convinced, 
until there was a kick from Vladimir Vladimirovich (Putin) in Beijing, everyone here, 
speaking politely, was afraid of something,’ General Baluyevsky stated.300 Medvedev’s 
hesitance implies that his technocratic leanings precluded him from striking 
disproportionately, savagely, and expediently. The thoughtful and dutiful legal professional 
was not hasty in his decision and by virtue of his technocratic qualities did not retaliate in 
the manner a Silovik or Cold War military traditionalist would in the same case. In addition 
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to this, the two day interim provided plenty of time for Medvedev to communicate with 
Putin in relation to the conflict while he was in Beijing. Putin was well aware of the conflict 
and his personal dialogue with George W. Bush showed no signs of being less than fully-
briefed with what was occurring despite his geographic location and theoretically 
secondary position to the Russian President in terms of power and influence.  
 In the early days of Medvedev’s return to the position of Prime Minister in 2012 
and the fourth anniversary of the war, a barrage of scathing criticism erupted against former 
President Medvedev. A documentary entitled ‘The Lost Day’ casts blame on Medvedev’s 
hesitance in ordering the response to Georgian forces, which his critics claim would have 
prevented casualties.
301
 In 2012, Putin did admit to three fundamental facts about the war. 
The first was that despite what former President Medvedev claims, Putin did communicate 
with the Kremlin during those crucial days when he was in Beijing before the Russian 
forces responded to Georgian actions against Russia.
302
 Second, the plans to retaliate in the 
event of Georgian hostility were drawn up one to two years prior to the war.
303
 Putin firmly 
stated that the Russian response was pre-planned before the Medvedev presidency.
304
 
Third, the South Ossetian separatists did act as an integral unit of the Russian military, 
which undermined the Russian claim of ‘genocide’ by the Georgian government.305 There 
seems to be a strong concurrence that the Russian decision to respond to Georgian hostility 
was preordained by the Putin presidency, received considerable input from former 
President Putin during August 2008, and was aimed not to stop ‘genocide’ but rather strip 
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Georgia’s control over the breakaway regions to thwart its NATO membership and 
alignment with the West.  
 It would be uncharacteristic for Medvedev, a dutiful Technocrat and legal 
professional, who refers to Putin as one would a senior mentor and in turn Putin refers to 
Medvedev as a junior colleague even during the Medvedev presidency, to disregard Putin’s 
input in this decision.
306
 Medvedev’s hesitation and General Baluyevsky’s observation that 
Medvedev waited for Putin’s approval, as well as Putin’s admission that the two did 
communicate prior to the order given on August 8, illustrate that Vladimir Putin’s role in 
Medvedev’s order was important and may have been the overriding element in the fashion 
Medvedev responded to Georgian forces. Furthermore, the formulation for the Russian 
response was developed as Putin admitted during his own presidency.
307
 Dr. Sergei 
Khrushchev, Cold War historian and son of late Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, stated: 
‘There were plans for war against Georgia for years beforehand and it was clear it was 
going to happen.’308 Therefore, Medvedev’s constant assertions that the order he gave was 
his own without any consultation is not supported by any conclusive evidence. Even at the 
urging of the hawkish wing of Kremlin occupants such as General Baluyevsky, 
Medvedev’s technocratic pragmatism, patience, and dutifulness precluded him from 
ordering the Russian response prematurely or without the input of Vladimir Putin, the head 
of the Silovik faction who was fully supportive of the war and any effort to deter NATO 
enlargement.  
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 The order to respond to Georgian forces on August 8 was implemented by 
communication between Medvedev and his Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov.
309
 
Serdyukov’s temperament and defence reforms were powerful factors in the conduct of the 
war. First, Serdyukov was appointed Minister of Defence to replace Sergei Ivanov who was 
an influential Silovik to say the least. Sergei Ivanov, a former KGB official and 
contemporary of Putin, is known for being fanatically anti-NATO and hawkish. He was the 
sole dissenting voice challenging Putin over his assistance of NATO and US forces for the 
invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
310
 Sergei Ivanov was 
not a mere official who dutifully served the Kremlin; he was a powerful voice in the foreign 
policy discourse. Many political observers within and outside of Russia asserted that his 
credentials, qualifications, and vociferousness designated him as a viable presidential 
successor to Putin. Medvedev, the dutiful Technocrat whom Putin personally elevated to a 
public platform to attain the presidency, was designated as the next presidential successor. 
Sergei Ivanov was demoted to Security Council Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister 
afterward and never maintained the powerful pulpit he had during his tenure as Minister of 
Defence. Serdyukov was a polar opposite of his predecessor; he was a Technocrat from St. 
Petersburg whose previous post was leading the Russian taxation bureau. Serdyukov was 
not a hawkish Silovik and has never been vocal in the foreign policy discourse. Serdyukov 
was a dutiful Technocrat in the same vein as Medvedev. Loyalty and a sense of duty to 
serve the President were Serdyukov’s primary attributes. 
 Serdyukov’s reforms of the defence apparatus were unprecedented in terms of 
evolving the relationship between the Russian President and the military personnel, which 
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is the primary reason for the antipathy between Medvedev and the generals.
311
 During 2007 
to 2008, Serdyukov’s reforms demoted the Chief of General Staff position and enforced a 
new military protocol that created the Minister of Defence position as the sole and 
unquestionable commander of the military second only to the President.
312
 General 
Baluyevsky, a staunch military traditionalist whose upbringing was mired in the Cold War, 
criticized the new ‘shake up’ and proceeded to advocate the hawkish Cold War stances he 
believed were essential to Russian security and prosperity. Medvedev personally removed 
Baluyevsky and appointed him to the Russian Security Council that was led by Nikolai 
Patrushev, an ideological soulmate to Baluyevsky.
313
 This appointment only reinforced the 
Russian Security Council’s Silovik and hardliner led control of Medvedev’s advisory 
committee. Sergei Ivanov was also demoted and appointed to the Russian Security Council, 
which may be an effective tool for blunting the overly zealous rhetoric of the hawkish 
officials who oppose the occupant of the Russian presidency. Regardless of Baluyevsky’s 
replacement, Serdyukov was Medvedev’s main contact in terms of initiating Russia’s 
response to Georgian forces; no defence subordinate held this distinction. Dr. Mark Galeotti 
commented, ‘The Minister of Defence is in charge of the generals. That is the key aspect of 
the military reforms.’314 
 Vladimir Putin had admitted to being in direct contact with the Kremlin during the 
escalating conflict.
315
 ‘As far as telephone calls are concerned, yes, I called Dmitry 
Medvedev twice, on August 7 and August 8 [2008], as well as the defence minister, and we 
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talked about the problem,’ Putin said.316 Medvedev has in the years since claimed that the 
decision was his alone and that his Minister of Defence was the only person with whom he 
discussed ordering a military assault.
317
 As both sides of the story are told, the singular 
point of convergence is that Anatoliy Serdyukov, not any general or subordinate defence 
official, was the essential link to ordering the military operations that started the war with 
Georgia. As Dr. Sergei Khrushchev noted that while the relationship between Medvedev 
and Putin is close and the former did not challenge the latter, the resulting response to 
Georgia would have been the same regardless.
318
 Therefore, there is a simmering conflict 
between the methodical Technocrats and hawkish Siloviki who now bicker over who is 
responsible for the successes or failures of the war. Dr. Sergei Khrushchev notes, 
‘Medvedev gave the order because Putin was too far. It would not have been different from 
Putin’s order. There were plans and it was clear it was going to happen.’319 Dr. Sergei 
Khrushchev characterized the relationship between the Siloviki and Technocrats as follows: 
‘They are like cats and dogs.’320 This dispute between Medvedev and Putin over who gave 
the order to whom and who consulted on the matter is simply an extension of the rivalries 
that plague the decision-making apparatus in relation to foreign policy.  
 Centralization of power in the defence apparatus was not a Medvedev initiative but 
rather a joint reformist agenda by both Putin and Medvedev, which started in 2007 and was 
implemented in advance of the war with Georgia in terms of the defence hierarchy in 
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relation to the Russian President.
321
 The Yeltsonian and Gorbachovian forces enabled 
Kremlin leaders to pursue such reform as a direct result of the 1993 Russian Constitution, 
which limited legislative oversight of these reforms and publicly claiming that Serdyukov 
and the Russian President were implementing these changes as an ‘anti-corruption 
campaign.’322 By utilizing the constitutional empowerment established by Yeltsin and 
manipulating the public image of the reforms to sway the public that it was implemented to 
eradicate corruption to gain public legitimacy, Putin and Medvedev successfully centralized 
defence authority in the one official they controlled directly by virtue of the Russian 
presidency. The conduct of the war revealed that the Minister of Defence position was 
where the power lay to implement a decision to use military force. The Russian Security 
Council was consulted after Medvedev had given Serdyukov the order and military 
operations had already begun before the meeting of the Russian Security Council was 
convened.
323
 The Serdyukov defence reforms created a centre of power for decision-
making that effectively stripped the Russian Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and any advisors to have an official role in the decision to use military force. The Minister 
of Defence was the most important and sole actor in pre-war deliberations other than the 
President; Serdyukov’s technocratic background and methodical temperament enabled 
Medvedev to easily utilize his Minister of Defence as a dutiful government official as 
Medvedev had been to Putin during the latter’s presidency. Serdyukov did not make any 
notable statements prior to the war and his willingness to implement orders at the top of the 
power structure has never been questioned. 
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 The Russian Security Council was summoned on August 8, 2008.
324
 The meeting 
was entitled: ‘Emergency operative meeting of the permanent members of the Security 
Council of the Russian Federation.’325 A startling piece of information is missing from this 
official posting; while other Russian Security Council meetings are noted with the members 
in attendance, this meeting is recorded with only the speech announcing the order to 
respond to Georgian forces by Medvedev. It does not note any deliberations or discussions 
that took place, and the only possible inference is that the Russian Security Council was 
summoned to communicate what had already been decided. The Russian Security Council 
was summoned by Medvedev only after he had given the order to Serdyukov to begin 
military operations that commenced ‘The Five Day War.’326 Medvedev’s delay and 
intentional non-usage of the Russian Security Council to consult him on the issue of how to 
respond to Georgian forces beg the question of why he would do this when members of the 
Kremlin elite would have provided their insights to the President at a grave time.  
 Nikolai Patrushev’s background is virtually similar to Vladimir Putin; he is a like-
minded bureaucrat with an extensive KGB background. In addition to this, he is a member 
of the hawkish Silovik faction that emphasizes increasing Russia’s global power and 
prestige.
327
 Medvedev and Patrushev are in different factions, and it would be likely that 
their opinions clash more than they converge. Patrushev’s control of the Russian Security 
Council would tilt in the Silovik-minded faction’s favour. Namely, the consultative body is 
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directed by a man who believes in hawkish policy and diplomacy. Furthermore, Medvedev 
personally removed General Baluyevsky and appointed him to the Russian Security 
Council. Baluyevsky’s military traditionalist views borne of the Cold War did not 
accommodate Medvedev’s methodical, systematic Technocrat style. As seen in the early 
days of Medvedev’s post-presidency, several generals and Baluyevsky have criticized 
Medvedev for being hesitant and not giving the order to attack Georgia earlier. The Russian 
Security Council was guided and controlled by individuals who were adverse to 
Medvedev’s style, temperament, and methodical leadership in addition to not having a 
rapport with their new President. 
 Medvedev’s hesitation stemmed from three primary reasons. The first is that he did 
not possess the hawkish truculence displayed by the Siloviki and military traditionalists as 
Patrushev and Baluyevsky are known for as reported by media outlets.
328
 Medvedev’s 
intentional non-usage of the Russian Security Council was a method to delay the inevitable 
hawkish urging of the Silovik faction to strike quickly and savagely. Second, Medvedev 
desired to have free and unimpeded dialogue with his Minister of Defence without the 
interference of others in the Kremlin who would have been vocal advocates to give the 
order expeditiously, especially Baluyevsky, who is known to have a Cold War warrior 
mentality.
329
 Third, Vladimir Putin has admitted that he did communicate with the Kremlin 
prior to the order being given while he was in Beijing.
330
 The relationship between 
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Medvedev and Putin has always been one of a junior colleague and senior mentor.
331
 
Medvedev’s hesitation accommodated Putin by allowing his input to be heard during the 
presidential decision-making before the order was given. 
 Sergei Lavrov was not present during the Russian Security Council meeting prior to 
the war with Georgia.
332
 The Minister of Foreign Affairs was not consulted by Medvedev 
or Putin by all accounts prior to the war with Georgia. Lavrov has been a stalwart appointee 
of the Putin-Medvedev years. There has never been a serious disagreement between the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kremlin. Lavrov’s tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs 
started in 2004 and he continues to be in this role without any hindrance from the Kremlin. 
Lavrov is a Yeltsin Liberal who continues his role as the Kremlin’s assertive chief 
diplomat, and he was appointed to replace Igor Ivanov, another Yeltsin Liberal. Both men 
were well associated with Yeltsin and Kozyrev’s dovish approach to relations with the 
West, but neither has been demoted for these reasons. Igor Ivanov left his post and 
continued with many high-ranking positions for the Kremlin. Lavrov’s role continues 
uninterrupted by any Siloviki or Technocrats replacing him. Putin and his inner circle have 
not placed Lavrov to a powerful position in terms of influencing decision-making as 
evident by the episode with Georgia, but they have not reacted in a manner that would 
suggest that they disapprove of his tenure. The Putin-Medvedev regime clearly shows a 
predisposition to control the Kremlin, Russian Security Council, and Ministry of Defence 
by appointing Siloviki and Technocrats, but not producing any effort to appoint like-
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minded individuals to powerful positions in Russian diplomacy. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in the Russian Federation is the last bastion of Yeltsin Liberals still in power today. 
 Lavrov made a few notable contributions to the episode with Georgia and only in its 
aftermath. Lavrov’s assertiveness was channelled by two public pronouncements in the 
immediate weeks and months after the war. Lavrov wrote an opinion editorial published in 
several newspapers detailing Russia’s reasons for reacting to ‘the murder of civilians.’333 
Lavrov portrayed Russian peacekeepers as protectors of the civilians and that the Georgian 
military’s actions were tantamount to genocide.334 The opinion editorial regurgitated 
Medvedev’s opening speech that announced Russian military operations against Georgian 
forces. Furthermore, Lavrov continued to discredit Saakashvili and bolster his claim by 
claiming Russian security was breached.
335
 In essence, Lavrov’s opinion editorial was a 
repetition of what the Kremlin leadership had said. Lavrov has been the international 
spokesman for the sentiment among Kremlin elites; for example, Lavrov warned NATO 
against ‘pushing the current Georgian regime toward a repetition of their August 2008 
gamble.’336 Lavrov’s role in the episode with Georgia under the Putin-Medvedev regime 
has been chief spokesman, not chief diplomat or negotiator. His role in the war with 
Georgia and its aftermath was merely to convey what the leadership believed and he 
advocated these beliefs by virtue of public pronouncements. The Siloviki and Technocrats 
may differ on many issues, but their peripheral usage of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
resistance to appointing a member of the inner sanctum to this position have continued 
unchanged from the ascension of Putin to the presidency in 2000.  
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 Lavrov’s role in the weeks and months after the war was that of a perennial 
interviewee acting as a spokesman for the Kremlin and not a negotiator or diplomatic agent 
who sought to independently conduct interstate relations. Despite his role of a spokesman 
and not a chief diplomat, he did attend the two subsequent Russian Security Council 
meetings after the war was announced on August 8 during a meeting in which he was not 
present.
337
 Both meetings were held after the war concluded and the Russian Security 
Council did not meet during the five days of warfare, except for the meeting when 
Medvedev announced that his order had been given before the Russian Security Council 
convened. Lavrov did not have a chance to offer his consultation in a formal setting and 
Medvedev and Putin have never singled out any contribution to the decision to go to war by 
Lavrov. Medvedev’s preference to leave the Russian Security Council and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs out of his decision to go to war shows a preference to tame the Silovik 
faction by virtue of delaying the formal mechanism it controls and exclude the Yeltsin 
Liberals by continuing Putin’s marginalization of the Yeltsin holdovers from exerting 
influence. Medvedev consulted his Technocrat Minister of Defence and by most accounts 
Prime Minister Putin, who was also his mentor. Lavrov did not belong to the inner sanctum 
and his role on the Russian Security Council was further marginalized by the hardliners 
who controlled it such as Patrushev and Baluyevsky, who are inclined to distance the 
Yeltsin Liberals responsible for facilitating Russia’s poor state of affairs during the 1990’s 
when it remained a problematic and inconsequential member on the world stage. Lavrov’s 
obstacles to exerting his influence are therefore numerous and effective. 
 The Russian Security Council was convened twice after the decision was 
announced, and it convened after Putin’s return with him present at both of these 
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subsequent meetings on the matter.
338
 His role as Medvedev’s most important advisor is 
clear by his willingness to accommodate convening Russian Security Council meetings to 
Putin’s presence. The Russian Security Council meeting announcing the decision while 
Putin was in Beijing was merely a formality with no deliberation after the fact.
339
 The delay 
was meant to provide time for Putin and Medvedev to communicate and formulate a 
decision while delaying the inevitable push toward war that the Russian Security Council 
would recommend. Medvedev’s methodical approach to decision-making precluded a 
sudden response to Georgian forces, and while he did not feel it was necessary to appease 
the Silovik faction by convening a Russian Security Council meeting, he did feel it was 
appropriate to accommodate his Prime Minister whom he considers his senior mentor. Dr. 
Sergei Khrushchev’s assertion that the relationship between Putin and Medvedev is 
cohesive, but the same does not apply to their respective factions is well-founded.
340
 
Medvedev left the Siloviki out of the policy equation. 
 Serdyukov and Medvedev are both members of the same faction, and the military 
reforms elevated the Minister of Defence to a position of tremendous military control, 
which did overshadow the generals and particularly the occupant of the Chief of General 
Staff position. The generals and their inherent biases were no longer an impediment or 
accelerant for the decision to go to war. Serdyukov was now the sole agent in conducting 
military affairs at the behest of the Russian President. By virtue of the powerful 1993 
Russian Constitution that shielded the Russian President from legislative or judicial 
scrutiny in relation to military reforms and publicly bolstering the reforms by claiming it 
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was integral to an ‘anti-corruption campaign,’ Putin and Medvedev were able to effectively 
reshape the President’s grasp on the defence apparatus. The Yeltsonian constitutional 
powers of an empowered office of the presidency and the Gorbachovian democratization 
that required the Russian President to have public legitimacy were now enhancing the 
relations between the Russian President and Minister of Defence. In this case of a looming 
defence issue, the Russian President was empowered to implement his decision with a mere 
vocal communication to his powerful Minister of Defence. The trend of continuing a 
superior presidency that is emboldened by public legitimacy has been unimpeded since 
Yeltsin’s coup in 1993 in terms of foreign policy decisions. 
 The constitutional power allowing the President to restructure the defence apparatus 
is beyond reproach. There is no legal obstruction or legislative remedy that can be 
established in deterring the Russian presidency to empower the Minister of Defence in 
enhancing the Russian President’s control of the military.341 Ruslan Pukhov noted:  
What is particularly interesting is how Russia’s leadership has reacted to these 
military reforms. The Kremlin and White House, which are usually careful to avoid 
any action that could spark social unrest or upset the status quo bureaucracy, have 
given strong support to Serdyukov despite widespread criticism and hysterical 
opposition from members of the military establishment.
342
  
 
 The Kremlin portrayed these reforms as an effort to eradicate corruption and 
accelerate modernity. Opinions of Serdyukov vary among Russians; his non-military 
background and reticent technocratic public persona do not convince the public that he was 
an effective Minister of Defence when compared with his Silovik predecessor, Sergei 
Ivanov, who was widely assumed to be Putin’s natural successor. Regardless of this, the 
Russian public has been indifferent to the military reform. There have never been any 
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protests or opposition to the reforms by the constituents. Military reform and the technical 
nuances of the defence apparatus structure do not invigorate the masses with the exception 
of Cold War warriors in the military or Ministry of Defence criticizing these reforms; the 
Russian media did not make the reforms a focal point of its coverage because of lack of 
interest among the public. The Putin-Medvedev leadership has made the defence apparatus 
wholly within the control of the relationship between the President and Minister of 
Defence. This empowerment of the Minister of Defence directly by the Russian presidency 
has never been initiated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Russian Security Council with 
the respective chiefs of these units of the Russian government. Regardless of the rivalries 
that plague the decision-making apparatus, the Russian President has made the Minister of 
Defence his undisputed arm to engage in military operations by strengthening the power 
structure of the Minister of Defence’s office, and as a result this severely deters the Russian 
Security Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs from having a formal role in the decision 
to commence military operations. 
Reflections: 
 The external forces affecting the Kremlin by virtue of the Gorbachovian 
democratization, which empowered the people, and the Yeltsonian constitutional powers, 
which established a powerful presidency, were enabling factors in conducting the military 
operations against Georgia. Public opinion against Georgia and Prime Minister Putin’s tacit 
endorsement of Russia’s eventual response served to solidify Medvedev’s standing among 
the empowered Russian citizens. The Kremlin was given legitimacy by its constituents that 
overwhelmingly supported the measures taken against Saakashvili. In addition to this, 
Medvedev’s speech and rationale for giving the order stemmed directly from the powerful 
constitutional clauses making him responsible for Russian security and not requiring 
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legislative or judicial approval to take such action. The military action against Georgia was 
taken by utilizing public and constitutional legitimacy that are required in the Russian 
Federation. The legacies of Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev were fully ingrained in 
the Kremlin’s foreign policy decision with respect to Georgia. 
 The relationship between Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev was synthesized 
through a Governmental Politics Model that examined the personal ideologies and 
relationship between the two men. In the years after the war, it is apparent that such actions 
were pre-planned during the Putin presidency and that Medvedev’s hesitation 
accommodated Putin’s logistical predicament while he was in Beijing. There was 
communication between Putin and the Kremlin before the order was given, and 
Medvedev’s cognizance that his popular Prime Minister and senior mentor was integral to 
the foreign policy decision-making is clearly illustrated by his refusal to order military 
action before Putin had a chance to offer his input. The relationship between the two men is 
a close one as evident during the episode with Georgia, but their respective camps do not 
share the same affinity for one another. Namely, Medvedev’s intentional delay of the 
Silovik controlled Russian Security Council is a case in point. The Russian Security 
Council controlled by hawkish Silovik Patrushev and truculent General Baluyevsky, whom 
Medvedev personally removed from the Ministry of Defence, would have certainly 
recommended immediate and sudden military operations against Georgia. The relationship 
between Medvedev and Patrushev is not a particularly close one and the Russian 
President’s relationship with Baluyevsky is intensely adversarial. Medvedev’s patient 
technocratic temperament precluded such a hasty response that the Siloviki would have 
urged. The delay was a method for Technocrat Medvedev to lessen the Silovik faction’s 
jingoistic calls for immediate action. Medvedev did not rush to give the order and this was 
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heavily criticized by military traditionalists and former KGB operatives currently working 
in the Russian government. Medvedev was not personally concerned with the input of the 
Silovik base, but did take efforts to allow time for Putin to offer his input. The relationship 
between the two is fundamentally strong during this foreign policy episode, but the 
clashing factions are as seen during this event to be competing against each other for 
influence in the decision-making process.  
 Russia’s war with Georgia is arguably Medvedev’s most important foreign policy 
decision. The Russian Federation reasserted itself in the post-Soviet sphere and this was 
Russia’s first unilateral military conflict against another country since the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979. The weight of this decision would surely affect the world stage and 
international diplomacy in the future. It was carried out by virtue of communication with 
one individual: the Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov. The military reforms 
empowered the Minister of Defence and centralized defence capabilities in this position, 
while weakening the generals and Chief of General Staff. Putin and Medvedev differ on 
who was involved in the deliberations, but both admit that the Minister of Defence was the 
ultimate contact point in commencing military operations. This was achieved and enabled 
directly by the Yeltsonian constitutional forces that gave the Russian President the power to 
restructure the defence apparatus to his preferences without legislative or judicial oversight. 
It was advocated as an ‘anti-corruption campaign’ to appease the Gorbachovian forces so 
that the Kremlin did not have to contend with the empowered masses who would have risen 
to protest if they deemed the reforms adverse to the needs of the constituents. The defence 
apparatus in this episode overshadowed the Russian Security Council and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Serdyukov, a Technocrat and colleague of Medvedev’s as well as member 
of Putin’s inner sanctum, dutifully and obediently conducted military operations as he was 
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instructed by the Putin-Medvedev leadership. The Russian Security Council was 
summoned after military operations commenced to communicate the decision and Lavrov’s 
role in the days and weeks after was simply that of a spokesman. Medvedev chose to 
alienate the Silovik faction due to a difference in philosophy and temperament, and the 
Putin-Medvedev regime continued to marginalize the Yeltsin Liberals and their last bastion, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 Ultimately, President Medvedev was enabled by the Yeltsonian and Gorbachovian 
forces to give the order, but his implementation reflected his personal preferences with 
which he consulted or did not consult certain high-ranking officials in government. 
Furthermore, Medvedev’s personal preferences are reflected by his alienation of key figures 
in the foreign policy apparatus because of his disdain for the hawkish truculence of the 
Silovik faction and jingoistic military personnel he consented to weakening and transferring 
power from to empower the Minister of Defence. The internal dynamics of Medvedev’s 
decision do reflect an affinity for his mentor and predecessor, but the ideological divide 
between Technocrats and Siloviki could not be more apparent by the intentional non-usage 
of the Russian Security Council. Medvedev’s decision, which solidified Putin’s 
forewarning, was made and implemented by virtue of public support and constitutional 
entitlements that gave the Russian President the ability to conduct the war without any 
impediments or barriers from other branches of government. While Medvedev’s lack of 
utilizing the Minister of Foreign Affairs continues the trend started by Putin, his intentional 
alienation and non-usage of the Silovik controlled foreign policy mechanism is a powerful 
reminder that his technocratic upbringing influenced his use of the levers of power and 
consultation at his disposal. ‘The Five Day War’ was Russia’s first unilateral military 
conflict against another country in its short history and the chief executive was fully 
124 
 
empowered by the office of the Russian presidency to make this decision and further 
enabled by support from his constituents that were responsible for his and United Russia’s 
political survival. The war of words over who was ultimately responsible for Russia’s 
victory continues until the present day and this is an extension of the two warring camps 
that continue to battle for influence in the Russian President’s decision-making apparatus. 
The Russian Security Council met twice subsequently to discuss Russian-Georgian 
relations with Putin present at both meetings, but the deliberations to commence the war 
were far more important than any pronouncements after the military order was given. The 
external forces enabled the decision and the internal rivalries and personal dynamics 
determined how the order was formulated and implemented.  
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Chapter 3: Russia’s Response to East Asia’s Rogue Regime 
Introduction:  
 May 2009 was one of the most important periods in Russian history in terms of 
foreign policy; the trends of the Cold War continued in a new complex external 
environment. The North Korean regime still acted in opposition to the world and 
maintained its post-Korean War attitude that the world stage is still mired in a Cold War 
entanglement of Western and Communist rivalries. Modern day Russia reacted to the North 
Korean nuclear confrontation in 2009 with no concern for Kim Jung Il’s Communist or 
Soviet connections. The Russian Federation passed an unprecedented National Security 
Concept document that strengthened the role of the Russian Security Council while 
simultaneously responding to nuclear armament testing by the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea under the orders of Kim Jung Il. The world stage is a stable environment 
in modern times, except for the unexpected behaviour of rogue regimes and terrorist 
groups. North Korea has been a perennial source of international conflict since the end of 
the Korean War in 1953. The Medvedev Administration was faced with three United 
Nations-sponsored resolutions against North Korean nuclear activity. The North Korean 
issue was an important point in understanding Russian foreign policy during the Putin-
Medvedev years and this chapter examines this in the context of the National Security 
Concept document passed in May 2009 immediately prior to illegal North Korean activity 
in the form of nuclear development testing.  
 The Russian Federation’s history with North Korea reaches back to the inception of 
the latter country during Soviet times.
343
 Namely, the Soviet Union had always been an ally 
of the North Korean regime. This trend continued as Russia participated in the Six-Party 
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Talks acting as a counterweight to the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The Russian 
Federation’s relationship with China is a close one and China’s ‘younger brother,’ North 
Korea, has sought closer ties with the Russian Federation because of its strong relationship 
with China. The Russian Federation has consistently defended its neighbour that it shares a 
small border with and maintained its support for the country to the chagrin of the West, 
which deems North Korea a ‘police state’ that denies its citizens human rights and is a 
threat to the international community. One of Vladimir Putin’s first acts when he was 
sworn in as President of the Russian Federation in 2012 was to cancel his plans to attend a 
summit in the United States of the G8.
344
 This was a powerful message to the world that 
Russian interests lie in the Eastern hemisphere and anywhere within the post-Soviet sphere 
and by default its inherent issues such as North Korea take precedence over what happens 
in the Western hemisphere.  
 Russia’s war with Georgia demonstrated that the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation was an advisory board with little role in the decision-making apparatus. The 
President is the sole authority in allowing the Russian Security Council to participate in 
foreign policy deliberations. A technocratic President and the Silovik controlled Security 
Council of the Russian Federation did not act in unison when formulating a response to 
Georgian military operations. The National Security Concept document was Silovik 
Nikolai Patrushev and military traditionalist General Baluyevsky’s retaliatory move to 
counter the powerful presidency, which established by the 1993 constitution is 
constitutionally and legally enabled to delay any mechanisms in the foreign policy 
apparatus.
345
 The recalibration of the Russian Security Council has theoretically 
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strengthened its role and was intended to be a Silovik tool to exert more influence in 
Dmitry Medvedev’s decisions, especially in regard to foreign policy. 
 In May 2009, Russia consented to sanctions against North Korea for violating 
international norms in the form of its nuclear testing.
346
 Two subsequent sanctions by the 
United Nations against North Korea were passed to extend the original resolution to 
enforce sanctions.
347
 United Nations Resolution 1874 against North Korea and the 
strengthening of the Russian Security Council are primary issues in this chapter and are 
explored to better understand the evolution of the internal dynamics of the Kremlin. Also 
under scrutiny is what effect the external forces had on decision-making. The May 2009 
National Security Concept document is also examined to ascertain the extent to which it has 
evolved the Kremlin’s inner workings. 
 The North Korean issue is a multi-faceted foreign policy dilemma that encompasses 
nuclear politics, international security, and liberal institutionalism. The Putin-Medvedev 
regime has exhibited a cognizance to international security by virtue of its nearly constant 
attendance in United Nations Security Council deliberations, as well as its vocal 
involvement in pressing security issues on the world stage. The issue carries with it a 
concern over Sino-Russo relations, which is highly important; this cannot be discounted. 
As noted earlier, the Russian Federation acts as a counterweight to the United States and its 
allies in the Six-Party Talks, but it also bolsters the Chinese delegation, which chairs the 
negotiations and provides a forum. 
 The West has advocated measures against North Korea because according to 
Western governments it is a country governed by a nefarious regime that is adverse to 
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modern day norms. It is important to acknowledge that the Russian Federation, which seeks 
independence from the West and to further distance its role as a capitulator to the United 
States during the Yeltsin years, consented to the resolutions that enforced sanctions against 
North Korea during the post-Yeltsin years. The Russian Federation’s first supported United 
Nations resolution for sanctions against North Korea was in 2006 during Putin’s 
presidency.
348
 Therefore, there are continuing factors in the decision to support a concerted 
effort to deter North Korean nuclear activity. An examination of the foreign policy stance 
toward North Korea illuminates how the Russian Federation responds to looming nuclear 
threats and how it deals with Western advocacy against rogue regimes.  
 The role of the Silovik controlled Russian Security Council and the security 
document that strengthens its role is of high priority. The fundamentals of the foreign 
policy apparatus have now shifted to make the advisory board an important tool in the 
deliberations of foreign policy and the methods to respond to North Korean nuclear activity 
have been enhanced to rectify its non-involvement during the war against Georgia. The 
central investigation in this chapter examines the ‘key players’ to derive evidence on how 
the levers of power and mechanisms of deliberation were used to arrive to the decision that 
was formulated and then implemented. 
National Security Concept: 
 The Silovik faction was a driving force behind the new security document that 
strengthened the role of the Russian Security Council after its non-usage during the war 
with Georgia and accusations that it was merely a sinecure.
349
 The intended consequence of 
the drive was that the Russian Security Council, a stronghold of the hawkish advisors in the 
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Kremlin who are like-minded Putin associates and Cold War era military officials with the 
same impulses they had before the Berlin Wall fell, should be a necessary component in 
foreign policy matters. Medvedev’s delay in convening the forum was an evasive technique 
to blunt the Silovik faction’s influence in his decisions. The hardliners in the Kremlin’s 
inner circle would have surely attempted to accelerate his decision, but the Russian Security 
Council’s usage was poorly defined in previous years. It was a consultative body with no 
specific role. This changed after the Russian Security Council document was authorized 
and put into effect by Dmitry Medvedev. The hardliners on the Russian Security Council 
were eager to enforce their roles by virtue of assigning the council an expanded role in the 
foreign policy-making apparatus. Nowhere in Russian foreign policy is this more apparent 
than in the attitude of the hardliners toward NATO. 
 The Russian Security Council had become a beacon of anti-NATO enlargement, 
which is a fundamental concern among hardline elements of the Russian government. This 
indelible aspect of the Siloviki was a major ideology within the Russian Security Council 
deliberations as guided by Silovik Patrushev and his deputy General Baluyevsky whose 
quarrel with liberal-minded Medvedev resulted in his demotion. Patrushev reasserted that 
NATO military expansion was unacceptable and Russia would no longer be a capitulator in 
the arena of international security.
350
 This major security document enables Patrushev and 
like-minded individuals to steer the discourse in the direction that accommodates an anti-
NATO, hawkish sentiment to which the Russian President is not predisposed. Patrushev 
and Baluyevsky were given a powerful opportunity to enhance their ability to convey the 
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desire to increase Russian prestige on the world stage according to the Rand report in 
2009.
351
 
 The Russian Security Council was given specific guidelines by Patrushev and 
Baluyevsky in terms of what role it would have in an organizational and foundational 
sense.
352
 The Russian Security Concept document stated: 
V. Organisational, legal-normative and informational foundations of the realisation 
for the given strategy. 
97. The state policy of the Russian Federation in the area of national security is the 
result of the concerted effort of all elements of the system providing national security, 
with a coordinating role being played by the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation with respect to the realisation of a range of measures of an organisational, 
legal-normative and informational nature. 
102. By resolution of the President of the Russian Federation, documents regarding 
issues of domestic and foreign policy can be brought up for review before the 
Security Council of the Russian Federation.
353
 
 
 ‘97’ specifically states that state policy ‘is the result of the concerted effort of all 
elements of the system,’ which in subtle nuances means that the Russian Security Council 
must have a vital role as opposed to previous years.
354
  ‘With a coordinating role’ was 
included in the document to enhance the organizational role of the consultative body from 
the inception of foreign policy deliberation and throughout the implementation.
355
 As seen 
with the Georgian episode, the Russian Security Council was a meaningless tool used to 
communicate the decision and the implementation was seen through the Ministry of 
Defence. The Russian Security Council’s marginalization was theoretically no longer a 
viable option and the Russian Security Council Secretary now had the conceptual and legal 
means to insert the advisory forum into the Kremlin’s decision-making with respect to 
foreign policy. ‘102’ continues the trend of a powerful presidency by assuring the foreign 
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policy apparatus that the President is the principal agent for its use and by implication no 
other element of the government can include or exclude its usage.
356
  
 A bureaucratic rebellion against Medvedev’s preference to blunt the effectiveness of 
the Russian Security Council, which was controlled by individuals who shared no 
ideological or temperamental compatibility with the Russian President, was resulting in a 
proposed enlargement of the advisory board’s role in policy formulation. Patrushev was the 
key player in the formulation of this document and was responsible for revising it to 
accommodate President Medvedev’s wishes.357 The Russian Security Council was not an 
independent body and as illustrated by Patrushev’s willingness to revise the document 
according to Medvedev’s orders that the sole authority for this consultative body falls fully 
within the scope of the Russian presidency. While the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs have large, complex bureaucracies with a myriad of acting agents 
independent of the Kremlin’s oversight, the Russian Security Council is a forum for the 
formulation of policy and can only exert its influence at the behest of the President while 
not being able to interact independently with the world stage. Only the Russian Security 
Council Secretary meets with officials from different countries and institutions, but the 
Council itself has no independent role in international affairs. Dr. Mark Galeotti notes, ‘The 
Russian Security Council was never regarded as an executive body. It was always 
essentially a combination of a consultative committee and a monitoring mechanism.’358 
This is an inherent weakness of the Russian Security Council and the document strengthens 
its role in terms of the official obligations it has to advise the Kremlin’s decision-makers. 
The document as provision ‘97’outlines is also obligated to participate in multi-faceted 
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deliberations not centred on foreign policy.
359
 The Russian Security Council is privy to 
domestic policy deliberations and this entitlement can be interpreted in a number of ways 
all meant to enhance the body’s ability to insert itself in the dialogue whether it is regarding 
military reform, living standards, or anything else considered to be ‘strategic national 
priorities’ as Patrushev authored.360 The Russian Security Council is enabled to insert itself 
into any issue that involves bolstering the Russian Federation to become a ‘competitive 
state’ and this is a direct result of Patrushev and Baluyevsky’s ideological and practical 
preoccupation with Russia’s position in the world.361 
 In March of 2009 the Russian Security Council had quickly utilized the new 
security document to bolster its position in the Kremlin’s policy debates by virtue of being 
a key element in prolonging Russian military presence in the Arctic.
362
 The Russian 
Security Council became an influential voice in insisting the Russian military maintain its 
strategic lock on the region in order to protect its vital interests.
363
 This was a drastic 
difference from the Russian Security Council’s marginalization during Russia’s war with 
Georgia. The Russian Security Council became a forceful institution in the policy debate, 
which it had not been prior to the security document that was authorized earlier that year. A 
major first step in asserting its bureaucratic tentacles was taken. The Russian Security 
Council was no longer a forum for deliberation but rather a deliberative body concerned 
with defence, security, and national priorities. The Russian Security Council had the duty 
and mandate to assert itself in the face of different centres of power such as the Russian 
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presidency, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Russian Security 
Council Secretary possessed the platform to arguably be as vital to the Kremlin as the 
Minister of Defence, since military matters were now an integral component of the Russian 
Security Council’s subject-matter hinterland. After the war with Georgia, the Russian 
Security Council came under attack for being effete, archaic, and a sinecure under the guise 
of an important centre of policy debate.
364
 The following year in 2009 the new National 
Security Concept document reversed much of this discourse and elevated the Russian 
Security Council to an unusually high degree unseen in the history of the Russian 
Federation. Patrushev was an inherently powerful figure with the acceptance of the 
document and this would theoretically be a major obstacle if Medvedev tried to muffle the 
voices of the Siloviki or military traditionalists on the Russian Security Council as evident 
during the episode with Georgia in 2008. 
 The catalyst for the new National Security Concept document clearly stems from 
the Kremlin’s military order during the summer of 2008 against Georgia, and the war was 
certainly a powerful reminder that the Russian Security Council protocol needed to be 
updated because of Russia’s radical transformation since Putin took the reins of power.365 
The authorship of the document is difficult to pinpoint, but it was seen to have been 
supervised solely by Nikolai Patrushev.
366
 Throughout its history the Russian Security 
Council has been criticized as a meaningless mechanism, but the new National Security 
Concept document has seemingly made all these claims baseless because it gives the 
Russian Security Council unlimited duties and guidelines that enable it to assert itself in 
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virtually every aspect of national and international issues, including those pertaining to 
Russia’s prosperity and development. Patrushev, a diehard Silovik firmly within Putin’s 
inner circle, is now responsible for the new ‘coordinating role’ with all mechanisms and 
bodies of the government. The empowerment of the Russian Security Council is a drastic 
theoretical transformation from its meaningless existence prior to 2009.  
 Immediately after May 2009 the Russian Security Council began asserting itself in 
the formulation of the new Russian military doctrine guided by the council’s lead military 
traditionalist, General Baluyevsky.
367
 The hawkish elements of the Russian government 
now firmly hold the reins of influence and an assertive foreign policy is an entirely viable 
product after this transformation of the Russian Security Council. Even the tone of the 
National Security Concept document in 2009 compared with the one adopted in 2000 is 
vastly different in character and confidence.
368
 The 2009 document reflects a confident, 
vibrant country that rose from the economic and military quagmire that characterized it 
during the Yeltsin years. There was no sense of doom or catastrophe as Keir Giles, an 
eminent defence and security expert, describes it. 
369
 
 As noted earlier, Baluyevsky is Medvedev’s harshest critic regarding the delay of 
using force against Georgia and the relationship between the two men is a strained and 
cantankerous one. The Russian Security Council has bolstered the hardline elements of the 
Kremlin against the liberal-minded President who did not share an affinity for jingoistic 
truculence. Clashing temperaments and ideological predispositions have formalized into a 
shift of power within the inner workings of the Kremlin. The Russian Security Council has 
a powerful role in voicing its opposition or support for the President’s orders and agendas.  
Patrushev further cements the Russian Security Council’s role by supervising a document 
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that entitles it with a duty to intervene in security matters, which can relate to virtually any 
issue or agenda. The encompassing role of this institution has experienced a powerful 
elevation from its former status prior to 2009. 
 The powerful Russian presidency, which is wholly dependent on its superior 
presidential system that was granted by the Yeltsin-authored constitution in 1993, must 
control a mechanism that has an altered institutional protocol that gives it the viability to 
assert itself in every aspect of domestic and foreign affairs. Regardless of how powerful the 
Russian Security Council is now, the 1993 Russian Constitution firmly denies any 
mechanism of government to supersede or compete with the ultimate authority of the 
presidential officeholder.
370
 The Russian Security Council is shielded from the 
Gorbachovian forces of public legitimacy because none of its members require an electoral 
victory to stay in that position, but the Yeltsonian constitutional forces are firmly the reason 
Patrushev needed to revise the role of the advisory mechanism to satisfy Medvedev’s 
wishes. Even the language of the document makes it clear that the Russian Security Council 
is wholly dependent on the President it serves. Its mandate extends to a variety of issues, 
but its role is determined by the President. The Russian Security Council document states: 
‘By resolution of the President of the Russian Federation, documents regarding issues of 
domestic and foreign policy can be brought up for review before the Security Council of 
the Russian Federation.’371 The Security Council of the Russian Federation can only 
participate at the behest of the President and the Council’s document that strengthened its 
role was only possible by the decree of President Medvedev. Without the President’s 
express approval and consent, the Russian Security Council cannot be an integral 
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mechanism of the foreign policy decision-making process. While the Ministry of Defence 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs act independently by virtue of the large, complex 
bureaucracies and key players out of the Kremlin’s grasp, the Russian Security Council still 
remains an arm of the Russian President. The President may act without the Russian 
Security Council, even though the document gives it a more important role. The Russian 
Security Council depends solely on the wishes of the President whose constitutional powers 
grant the ultimate authority to formulate foreign policy wishes according to chosen methods 
and usage of mechanisms. The 2009 United Nations Security Council Resolution against 
North Korea for its illegal nuclear armament testing was the first test for the Russian 
Security Council’s ‘new’ role in the policy formulation of major decisions during the 
Medvedev presidency. 
United Nations Resolution 1874: 
 The United Nations Security Council resolutions against North Korea have always 
included the Russian Federation. To assert that United Nations Resolution 1874 imposed in 
June 2009 was unprecedented would be categorically incorrect. Two resolutions were 
passed against North Korea with Russia’s involvement during 2006. The same factors 
therefore exist during the Medvedev years as did during the Putin years. The common 
aggressive stance against Georgia and North Korea would indicate that territorial security is 
paramount to the Kremlin and supersedes any misgivings about intervening in foreign 
security dilemmas. The pattern of a new assertive foreign policy is evident and has 
continued unabated by the Medvedev presidency, even though the liberal-minded President 
claims to have his own guiding principles. However, United Nations Resolution 1874 was a 
severe set of diplomatic and economic sanctions against the rogue state. Therefore, the 
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internal and external forces affecting the Kremlin must be analyzed in order to ascertain 
what can be extrapolated from this decision by the Russian Federation.  
 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made two relevant statements in relation to 
North Korean actions in 2009 that ultimately resulted in United Nations sanctions: 
We call on our DPRK partners to display a responsible attitude for the sake of 
regional stability, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 
respect for and observation of the UN Security Council resolutions. We still think that 
the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula may be resolved only at the six-nation 
negotiations.
372
  
 
The latest steps of the DPRK escalate tensions in Northeast Asia and endanger 
regional security and stability. We recognize the lawful concerns of the DPRK and do 
not see any real alternative in the provision of its security to political and diplomatic 
efforts and the formation of relevant regional institutions with the participation of all 
interested sides.
373
 
  
 Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov rarely revealed the inner workings of his 
own thought process or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ deliberations over issues, but what 
is clear is that Lavrov spent the entire time leading up to the North Korean confrontation 
and several months afterwards staunchly chastising the nuclear activity. Lavrov was not a 
vocal proponent of United Nations sanctions; he instead was a proponent for the return to 
the Six-Party negotiations. These two official statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
directly reflect his stated views and are compatible with his temperament and diplomatic 
upbringing. Lavrov, a consummate diplomat who solidified his status in the Russian 
government during his years at the United Nations as an ambassador and continued as the 
chief minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, maintained his ‘diplomatic but assertive 
posturing’ as he had been known to do throughout his career.374 The solution for Lavrov, as 
evident during his ten years as United Nations Ambassador, involved the diplomat’s 
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method of sitting in one cohesive forum and communicating concerns and formulating 
solutions. Hence, ‘We must avoid any hasty conclusions. Clearly this situation does not 
cause joy, it causes our concern. We would like to have a clear understanding of all details,’ 
Lavrov was quoted as saying during a press conference.
375
 
 Lavrov’s role as chief diplomat has been unchallenged since he was appointed in 
2004, even though he was a holdover from the Yeltsin years. The emphasis on Russian 
diplomacy has been one of asserting Russian interests, but not reflecting a security-
obsessed trend or jingoistic truculence as clearly shown by the Siloviki and the military 
traditionalists. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to be a bastion for Lavrov and 
liberal-minded diplomatic operatives who do not possess the same qualities as those who 
now occupy the Kremlin. Putin’s tenure did not significantly alter the institutional 
predisposition of the foreign affairs arm of the government in the same vein as the 
presidency and defence apparatus were utilized to impose a new era completely different 
from the Yeltsin years.  
 Lavrov’s visit to North Korea during the escalating conflict was made for the sole 
reason of pleading with the North Korean leadership to return to the negotiating table.
376
 
Lavrov though was not met by any high-ranking members of the North Korean leadership, 
but his ‘diplomatic but assertive’ posturing is apparent throughout the entire 2009 ordeal.377 
He did not favour defence diplomacy or any harsh tactics as seen during the foreign policy 
episode with Georgia. Lavrov proceeded to advocate a return to the Six-Party Talks, even 
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after the resolution was passed. Lavrov’s position remained unchanged. 378 He believed this 
conflict was the result of North Korea’s refusal to engage in multilateral diplomacy.379  
 Vitaly Churkin, the Russian Ambassador to the United Nations and member of 
Lavrov’s ideological brethren, reflected the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ ‘diplomatic but 
assertive’ posturing. ‘Although some new restrictions against North Korea cannot be 
avoided, these measures must be targeted, proportionate to the threat of nuclear 
proliferation and reversible,’ Russia's Ambassador to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin 
stated.
380
 Lavrov and Churkin communicated a desire that the sanctions should not be 
excessive or adverse to the needs of North Korean civilians who truly do not have a role in 
their government’s decisions.381 Hence, ‘We also expect all the relevant parties to avoid 
any actions that might exacerbate tension,’ the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated.382 
 Lavrov, Churkin, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acted in unison to thwart what 
could be perceived as an excessive punishment because of North Korea’s illegal nuclear 
activity and chose to advocate multilateral negotiations to end this potentially catastrophic 
situation. They remained assertive, which reflects a major difference in overall philosophy 
established by the Yeltsin government, but remained diplomatic, which reflects that the 
institutional bias to remain open to negotiations and avoid violence has continued during 
the leadership of the Putin-Medvedev duo and the inner circle brought in to facilitate 
change in governance and foreign policy. Russian diplomacy has become more assertive in 
tone but fundamentally unchanged.  
 The other end of the apparatus spectrum, the Minister of Defence and his ministry, 
was not as visible during this nuclear crisis as had been Lavrov and the Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs. Serdyukov, a Technocrat with a methodical temperament, did not exhibit a 
predisposition to advocate against the nuclear situation, even though a small border 
between North Korea and Russia made the situation relevant to security interests. 
Serdyukov was not a security-obsessed Silovik or jingoistic military traditionalist. He was a 
career bureaucrat who was neither a dove, nor hawk, but rather a dutiful civil servant.  
Serdyukov’s actions during the Georgian crisis illustrated that he was a loyal arm of the 
foreign policy apparatus and was directly influenced by presidential decision. Serdyukov 
has never challenged the leadership of the Kremlin openly similar to his predecessor, Sergei 
Ivanov. The defence branch was led by a man who was obedient and methodical. The 
North Korean crisis proved this further. 
 Throughout Serdyukov’s tenure he has been criticized for being reticent and 
marginal in the foreign policy formulation process, even to the point of Medvedev having 
to constantly defend him in addresses to the country.
383
 Serdyukov never visited Pyongyang 
like Lavrov, but did visit China to discuss the North Korean issue among others in the 
months prior to the nuclear confrontation on the Korean peninsula in 2009.
384
 Only one 
brief statement on the issue was made to the media jointly by the Ministers of Defence from 
China and Russia: ‘On the North Korea nuclear issue, the source noted that, “Both Russia 
and China are convinced that the North Korean nuclear problem can and should be solved 
solely by peaceful means, and that any kind of sanctions against Pyongyang would prove 
counter-productive at the moment.”’385 As this meeting was reported, the NATO Missile 
Defence Shield was of primary importance for Russia and the North Korean issue fell into 
the backdrop. The Ministry of Defence in the Russian Federation has been far more 
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concerned with the NATO missile system in the Czech Republic. There are numerous 
statements and warnings from the Ministry of Defence about NATO defence issues, but 
scant references to the North Korean issue.
386
 Serdyukov’s primary concern during his 
tenure was that NATO not infringe upon Russian security, and this is clearly indicated by 
his preoccupation with the issue. The Silovik faction still maintain important positions in 
the Kremlin, and its leader Vladimir Putin ‘rules in tandem’ with Medvedev’s express 
approval. The security-obsessed Silovik traits have seeped into Serdyukov’s performance 
as Minister of Defence and this is reflected by his foremost attention drawn to the NATO 
Missile Defence Shield issue. Serdyukov’s obedient nature and absence of ideology make 
him a prime tool for the security-obsessed ideologues to exert their influence for the sake of 
Russian security interests.  Furthermore, the centralization of defence capability and 
authority in the Minister of Defence directly stemming from Serdyukov’s reforms, has 
created a powerful tool in neutralizing any dissent among defence and military officials in 
the event they clashed with the Kremlin’s wishes.387 The presidential decision could not be 
challenged by anyone within the defence apparatus, except the Minister of Defence. In this 
case, the Minister of Defence was simply a reflection of the Kremlin’s wishes and as 
evident by the Georgian and North Korean issues, Serdyukov did not challenge either 
decision.  
 Russian representation of its position in the lead up to the United Nations sanctions 
against North Korea in 2009 was wholly dominated by Sergei Lavrov. Russian foreign 
policy, whether consciously or not, treated this as a diplomatic issue more so than a threat 
to its own security. Serdyukov rarely spoke about this issue and the world media 
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communicated with Lavrov primarily. The pressing matter was to be decided at the United 
Nations and therefore this foreign policy decision was diplomatic in nature. Multilateral 
diplomacy was Lavrov’s area of expertise. While Lavrov was concerned by this issue 
affecting multilateral diplomacy, Serdyukov’s defence duties drew him to the NATO issue 
that affected Russian security in fundamental ways unlike the North Korean nuclear 
confrontation. Russia does not view the North Korean dilemma with the same apprehension 
as the West or the United States. Russia has consistently bolstered the Six-Party Talks and 
China’s tenure as chair. Lavrov and Serdyukov have different perceptions of what is more 
important on the world stage and have different priorities that reflect their respective 
organizations. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the United 
Nations Security Council and its actions were of foremost importance. The Ministry of 
Defence of Russia had little to no involvement in the multilateral diplomacy of the United 
Nations. Its primary concern was whether its military forces and post-Soviet sphere 
remained relatively safe to ensure Russian peace and prosperity. Serdyukov began his 
tenure as Minister of Defence with having to deal with NATO expansion viewed as a 
security intrusion by the Kremlin, while Lavrov spent his formative years at the United 
Nations and tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs intricately involved with the ongoing 
debates and deliberations on the United Nations Security Council. 
 Serdyukov’s relative nonchalance when compared with Lavrov can be attributed to 
different formative experiences, priorities, and personal qualities. Serdyukov, formerly the 
head of the taxation bureau, had no experience in multilateral diplomacy, and was mired in 
the Ministry of Defence’s preoccupation with NATO and its security architecture. 
Serdyukov remained a dutiful and obedient individual of Putin’s inner circle. His lack of 
ideology and fervent lack of enthusiasm over foreign policy issues as evident by his near 
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absence in communication with the news media have made him a viable arm for 
implementing the Kremlin’s decisions without fearing an ideological debate or bureaucratic 
rebellion. Putin personally appointed him to his position in 2007 to further tighten his grasp 
over the different mechanisms of the foreign policy apparatus. The North Korean issue 
illustrated that the Russian Minister of Defence is a marginal figure in diplomatic issues 
and loyal appointee in reflecting the Kremlin’s decisions when they are made. The United 
Nations Security Council decision directly involved the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs because the nature of the issue was treated by the Russian government as diplomatic 
rather than security-based by virtue of its handling of the crisis. 
 Six days prior to the North Korean nuclear test, Nikolai Patrushev was presented 
with a think tank report that concluded the NATO Missile Defence Shield system was 
useless and unnecessary to counter an improbable threat from Iran.
388
 According to the 
report, Iranian nuclear development was rudimentary in the most optimistic of the report’s 
assessments.
389
 This clearly was compatible with the overall Russian argument that NATO 
missiles in Europe were not tantamount to achieving international security. Patrushev, the 
staunch Silovik who previously headed the Federal Security Bureau, undoubtedly found 
this report reassuring and it subsequently bolstered his Silovik instincts. The Silovik 
faction’s chief grievance in recent years has been that NATO enlargement equates to 
encroachment of Russian security. North Korea and Iran were not primary concerns for 
security-obsessed individuals such as Patrushev, but rather NATO and its nuclear arsenal 
placed near Russia’s sphere maintained relevance in the daily foreign policy deliberations.   
 It is important to re-acknowledge the fact that Patrushev was the chief influence of 
the National Security Concept document that theoretically strengthened the role of the 
                                                 
388 RIA Novosti, ‘Russian-U.S. panel says missile shield in Europe ineffective’, RIA Novosti [web page] 
<http://www.rianovosti.com/world/20090519/155043876.html>, accessed 29 June 2012. 
389 Ibid. 
144 
 
Russian Security Council in the foreign policy apparatus.
390
 This was executed in the 
aftermath of the Georgian crisis in which the Russian Security Council was not used for 
deliberating the decision to respond militarily but rather to communicate the decision made 
prior to the meeting.
391
 The fundamental tactic to blunt the voices that may have disagreed 
with the presidential decision or wished to alter how the military order was implemented 
was achieved by a conscious marginalization of the Russian Security Council during what 
may be argued as Medvedev’s most consequential decision during his presidency in terms 
of foreign policy.
392
 Patrushev’s Silovik instincts were virtually ignored by Medvedev’s 
insistence on not using this advisory mechanism to deliberate his decision. The 
strengthening of the role of the Russian Security Council is a reaction to this neutralization 
of the mechanism’s potency during the Georgian crisis. This motivated the basis for the 
new document. 
 In essence, Patrushev was now able to assert his Silovik views into an official status 
while increasing the importance of the Russian Security Council after Medvedev left him 
out of the deliberations for war with Georgia. The strengthening of Patrushev’s advisory 
forum indicates an eagerness not to have the same marginalization repeated. Patrushev 
singled out two important facets of his document in the subsequent months of its 
formulation.
393
 Patrushev outlined his perception of Russia’s role in the world in its new  
energy doctrine.
394
 As published by The Jamestown Foundation: 
The document also claims that Russia has overcome the “consequences of the 
systemic political and socioeconomic crisis of the late 20th century” and has restored 
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its position in the world through “multi-polar international relations.” In fact, this 
concept stands out as its cornerstone. After designating the United States as Russia’s 
main rival, it turns to consider the ways in which Russia may maintain its position in 
the world in the future. Rivalry for controlling global energy resources is singled out 
as a long-term source of conflict.
395
 
  
 Patrushev and Baluyevsky are staunch advocates of increasing Russia’s dominance 
on the world stage and returning it to ‘great power status.’396 This ideology has clearly 
influenced the Russian Security Council document and the two hardliners seek to effectuate 
this shift in the foreign policy against the grain of any liberal-minded capitulators or 
apologists for Russia’s assertive role in world affairs. According to the document, the 
Russian Federation is now past its infancy and ready to return to the status of its 
predecessor, the Soviet Union.
397
 Patrushev and Baluyevsky maintain the Cold War era 
worldview that incorporates a demonization of the United States and its Western allies, as 
well as a chagrin of American domination on the world stage. The hardline elements of the 
Russian foreign policy spectrum have now asserted themselves by virtue of this document 
and its authors hope to shift the fundamentals of Russian foreign policy in this direction. 
 The emphasis of protecting energy interests as the document painstakingly details is 
a direct result of its contentious relationships with Georgia and Ukraine.
398
 The diplomatic 
impasses with Georgia and Ukraine severely restrain the supply routes and potential 
pipelines for energy supplies.
399
 The Silovik instinct in this situation would dictate a more 
abundant array of strategies to counter the obstacles in order to allow freer access of energy 
markets. Blocked supply routes are adverse to the Russian economy, national productivity, 
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and quality of life among Russian citizens. These important facets are all intricately 
essential to Russia’s standing on the world stage and Patrushev and Baluyevsky are 
cognizant of this as evident by the document they authored.  
 The foreign policy arms of the Kremlin are essentially neutralized. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is led by Lavrov, who is known to be a Yeltsin Liberal with no powerful 
role in foreign policy formulation.
400
 The Ministry of Defence is led by a man who is a 
Technocrat that favours pragmatism over ideology and remains a dutiful public servant for 
the Kremlin’s leadership. The Russian Security Council is a bastion for the hardline 
elements incorporated by the Siloviki and military traditionalists who advocate hawkish 
posturing and power politics in the ultimate hopes to return to great power status. The 
Kremlin’s leadership has these three distinct branches of its foreign policy apparatus that 
circle around it to influence the decision-making process. The Russian Security Council 
does not have a vital role in the policy formulation process comparable with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Defence. The Georgian episode revealed that the Russian 
Security Council’s existence as an advisory board was superfluous and essentially 
meaningless. Patrushev’s effort to amend the situation and evolve the role of his advisory 
forum to elevate it to a more important role in the Kremlin’s foreign policy apparatus was 
now theoretically achieved. This occurred simultaneously while attempting to give it a 
distinct ideology that was compatible with the Siloviki, who were advocates of policies and 
decisions that were not compatible with Medvedev’s liberal temperament and dovish 
posturing. The North Korean crisis in 2009 was an important test for the Russian Security 
Council’s new role. 
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 On May 13, 2009, which was nearly two weeks before the North Korean nuclear 
issue ignited, the Kremlin posted a long statement that emphasized the new role of the 
Russian Security Council, specifically in relation to the other branches of government: 
In the document, its subsequent comprehensive assessment and coordination 
representative departments of the Presidential Administration and the Office of the 
Plenipotentiary of the President of the Russian Federation in the federal districts, the 
Government of the Russian Federation, of the federal executive authorities, the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, and other state academies and academic 
institutions.
401
 
  
 The posting emphasizes that the Russian Security Council is equivalent to the 
important agencies and branches of government that it lists.
402
 This emphasis further 
cements that the Russian Security Council’s marginalization in the past cannot be repeated 
because the National Security Concept document has emboldened the importance of the 
advisory board; the goal of the authors was for the Russian Security Council to no longer 
be accused of being a ‘sinecure’ or ‘effete body.’ This was signed into decree by Dmitry 
Medvedev on May 13 and on May 25 North Korea violated international norms by testing 
nuclear weapons and continuing its status as a ‘rogue state.’ 
 Even though the nuclear launch was on May 25, the Russian Security Council did 
not convene until May 29.
403
 Medvedev still maintained the authority to summon the 
Russian Security Council at his behest and the National Security Concept document was 
certified by ‘presidential decree.’ Therefore, the mechanism of the Russian Security 
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Council, while strengthened in its role, does not act without the authority of the President. 
The presidential directive still maintains its overriding power as granted by the 1993 
Russian Constitution. The Russian Security Council does not act like a Prime Minister’s 
cabinet, but rather a committee of members who are dependent on whether the Russian 
President chooses to convene them in an official manner. This was Yeltsin’s vision of the 
presidency and his successors have used these Yeltsonian constitutional powers to exercise 
nearly absolute power over all agencies and branches of the Russian government. The 
Russian Security Council’s inability to counter the President’s marginalization of it is a 
testament to Yeltsin’s presidential empowerment that has allowed Medvedev to be the 
ultimate authority figure in the Kremlin’s decision-making apparatus.  
 Instead of instantly and officially advising the President on this matter, Patrushev 
spent May 28 holding bilateral discussions with middle-level officials from India and 
China.
404
 The importance of these meetings is debatable, but the Russian Security Council 
Secretary’s new document did not give him the powerful access to heads of state such as 
Lavrov and Serdyukov were entitled to by practice and institution. The Russian Security 
Council did not elevate itself to the same level as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or 
Ministry of Defence as evident by the lack of access to important foreign leaders. 
Regardless of the new National Security Concept document, the institution still lacked the 
access and importance within the foreign policy apparatus to which the ministries were 
privy.  
 The official government posting of the meeting on May 29 of the Russian Security 
Council did not elaborate on what issues were discussed and it was described as an 
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‘operational meeting,’ not an ‘emergency meeting.’405 Regardless of how it was classified, 
most of the important officials were present with one notable exception.
406
 Medvedev, 
Putin, Lavrov, and Patrushev attended to discuss all pertinent matters, but Serdyukov was 
conspicuously absent.
407
 Serdyukov, a dutiful Technocrat mired in the Ministry of 
Defence’s battle against NATO from his inaugural day as Minister of Defence, did not 
attend this meeting. The three obvious reasons can be extrapolated by analyzing the 
situation and his respective position. First, Medvedev enjoyed a collegiate relationship with 
the like-minded Serdyukov who did not possess any jingoistic tendencies or hawkish 
notions of the world. They were compatible with one another and Serdyukov’s amiable 
temperament would have made it easy for Medvedev to communicate his decision in 
relation to the North Korean issue. Second, Serdyukov’s main role as Minister of Defence 
precluded him from having any issue other than NATO enlargement and its threat to 
Russian security as the fundamental, overriding issue of his tenure. Finally, the meeting 
was classified as ‘operational’ and not ‘emergency’ as the crisis with Georgia was 
labelled.
408
 The defence apparatus was not inclined to involve itself with an issue that did 
not severely affect Russian security. The defence apparatus overall did not involve itself in 
the North Korean issue for the reasons previously stated. 
 On the same day, Patrushev attended a meeting with BRIC representatives by 
Russia’s initiative to discuss diplomatic and economic issues.409 The official statement had 
a veiled reference as to whether the North Korean issue would be open to discussion.
410
 The 
Kremlin’s website noted: ‘Generally agreed that it is not directed against any dialogue 
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between Brazil, Russia, India and China is based on mutual respect and consideration for 
the interests of each other and to strengthen cooperation BRIC, peace, stability and 
development in the countries participating in the meeting and on the planet.’411 The 
reference of the meeting ‘not directed against any dialogue between Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China’ would most certainly mean that the North Korean issue was precluded from 
being discussed. China has historically maintained the role of ‘big brother’ to its ‘little 
brother,’ North Korea.412 It also chaired the Six-Party Talks and was a constant defender of 
North Korea, despite having its quarrels with its neighbour. The meeting was clearly 
convened to discuss BRIC trade issues, not political or diplomatic issues pertaining to 
individual states. Therefore, this was another missed opportunity for the Russian Security 
Council Secretary to intervene in this important nuclear dilemma facilitated by North 
Korean actions on the world stage. The Kremlin leadership, despite the National Security 
Concept document that Medvedev signed into law, did not allocate the North Korean issue 
to Patrushev and his Security Council. With the delay of consulting the Russian Security 
Council and the new security document now decreed, it is safe to conclude that the Russian 
Security Council’s role remains on the sidelines.   
 The ultimate decision lay in the hands of Dmitry Medvedev and his non-usage of 
the Russian Security Council to react to North Korean provocation on the world stage 
further cements his hesitation to use this Silovik controlled institution to formulate 
decisions. As Dr. Sergei Khrushchev noted during an interview with the author, it was 
abundantly clear that while Medvedev and Putin maintain a close relationship, their 
respective factions do not share the same affinity for one another.
413
 With the Siloviki not 
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controlling the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Defence, the Russian Security 
Council is the last bastion of control for the security-obsessed hawks operating within the 
foreign policy apparatus. Medvedev did not summon the Russian Security Council in an 
emergency meeting, nor did he announce a decision after the first meeting in the aftermath 
of the North Korean launch. Medvedev’s methodical style and liberal-minded inclinations 
are primary reasons for this marginalization of the Silovik dominated mechanism. The 
National Security Concept document has yet to provide the Russian Security Council with 
the leverage necessary to be a prominent factor in foreign policy decisions. With the 
defence apparatus being uninvolved in the crisis and foreign affairs apparatus led by an 
outsider of Putin’s inner circle, the Putin-Medvedev duo had to make a decision, which was 
instructed to United Nations Ambassador Vitaly Churkin. Medvedev stated, ‘We need to 
think about some measures to deter those programs that are being conducted. We hope the 
North Korean leadership will get back to the negotiating table, because there is no other 
solution to this problem.’414 
 Dmitry Medvedev’s statement is clearly a product of the interpersonal bargaining 
between his liberal tendencies and his mentor’s, Vladimir Putin, hawkish posturing. The 
bilateral discussions between these two resulted in a stance that is compatible with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ ‘diplomatic but assertive’ modus operandi since the 
inauguration of Putin in 2000. The compromise between the Technocrat President and 
Silovik Prime Minister led to Russian support of sanctions that were firm but not excessive. 
The sanctions did not destroy the North Korean economy or infrastructure. In addition to 
this, Russia never mentioned the possibility of military sanctions. Vitaly Churkin and 
Sergei Lavrov, Yeltsin Liberals who utilized assertive tones were ideologically and 
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temperamentally compatible with United Nations Resolution 1874 passed on June 12, 
2009. This was an instance when the Putin-Medvedev duo, which came to power to change 
the country after the Yeltsin Liberals mismanaged Russian politics, fell in sync with the 
Yeltsin Liberals who still maintained powerful positions in the diplomatic arm of the 
Russian government. The Russian Ambassador to the United Nations was noted as saying: 
“The additional measures are substantive and targeted in nature and clearly tied to 
ending the DPRK program to create nuclear missiles,” Russian envoy Vitaly Churkin 
said after the vote. “The attempt by the DPRK to create nuclear missiles not only 
doesn’t strengthen security but on the contrary ratchets up tension on the Korean 
peninsula.”415  
 
 Also according to the United Nations Ambassador from the Russian Federation in 
another statement: 
Churkin said his country was “satisfied” by the unanimous adoption of the resolution 
against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK. He said the Russians 
made sure that the provisions for checking ships on the high seas would not set a 
precedent, and that he hoped the resolution would steer North Korea back to six-party 
nuclear disarmament talks. 
416
 
 
 As Churkin succinctly outlined, the sanctions were aimed at ending the nuclear 
development program and he did not attribute the resolution to any other motive.
417
 The 
central focus of this effort as the Russian Ambassador to the United Nations said was to 
bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, which Medvedev has repeatedly urged. 
418
 
Lavrov and Churkin’s liberalism would have surely dictated a return to the Six-Party Talks 
and their affinity for liberal institutionalism would have been satisfied. As diplomats of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this would be their institutional bias and their years of 
diplomatic service would surely influence them to support this effort. The Russian 
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President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acted in unison without any discernible 
friction. Medvedev’s closest bureaucrat in the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin, gave a strong view 
of the reasoning behind the decision to consent to sanctions by the Russian Federation.
419
 
Putin said: 
Yes, indeed. The situation is very worrisome and very acute. And we can't but be 
worried about that. Whatever happens there is happening in the very vicinity of our 
borders as it were. Having said that, we count a lot on the fact that the prudence will 
get the upper hand there. Emotions will be shelved. And the dialogue will be started. 
Without a dialogue, it is not possible to come to an agreement.
420
 
 
 Vladimir Putin’s role in this decision is apparent by his constant meetings and 
admitted private conversations on all issues pertaining to the Russian Federation with the 
Russian President, who considers Putin to be his mentor. The ‘tandem democracy’ by 
definition means that both men are equally important in presidential decisions and Putin’s 
input maintained a high priority in Medvedev’s response to the North Korean 
confrontation. Putin described the situation as ‘very worrisome’ and this was a rare 
admission of apprehension by the stern former KGB operative.
421
 The nuclear missiles 
would surely ignite his Silovik instincts and Putin’s desire to protect Russian security 
interests is inherent with his intelligence upbringing and formative years. The border issue 
between North Korea and Russia is of central importance to Putin because of his shrewd 
cognizance that the missiles are within reach of Vladivostok and other targets within the 
eastern Russian sphere.  
 A striking nuance in Putin’s response to the issue is that he fully supports the Six-
Party Talks when a hardliner would have supported multilateral military sanctions or even 
unilateral military intervention to quell the North Korean threat to the Russian border. The 
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discussions between Putin and the liberal-minded Medvedev, who technically outranked his 
mentor, made it clear that the Russian President supported a return to multilateral dialogue. 
Any of Putin’s Cold War instincts or hawkish posturing that may have led to him 
advocating using force would have been vanquished by the new President who possessed 
no affinity for using military force, unless the security of Russia was directly and severely 
threatened. The Kremlin did not treat the North Korean issue with the same seriousness as 
the Georgian crisis. This was a diplomatic issue, not a defence issue in the eyes of the 
Russian leadership. Medvedev commented: 
 Regarding North Korea, the situation there worries me more, because while Iran is 
still talking to the international community, North Korea has currently suspended 
almost all of its contacts. And the group engaged in the six-party talks concerning the 
problem of North Korea's nuclear programme is currently inactive. Meanwhile North 
Korea continues to carry out nuclear tests and launches of short-, medium- and higher 
than medium-range missiles. The missiles that North Korea is using have tremendous 
range. This has to be of concern for us. We are located in close proximity to this 
country.
422
 
  
 Medvedev’s handling of this issue is a stark episode in exercising the powerful 
Yeltsonian forces that have empowered him to sway unusual control over the mechanisms 
of his foreign policy decision-making. Medvedev did not use the Russian Security Council 
for the purpose of formulating a decision in the immediate aftermath of the North Korean 
nuclear testing in May 2009 and he chose not to include his Minister of Defence in an 
official capacity. The Russian Constitution of 1993 firmly and unquestionably places all 
power within the office of the Russian presidency. There is no viable method for the 
members of the President’s foreign policy apparatus to rebel against him and successfully 
challenge a presidential decision. As the 1993 Russian Constitution was authored to give 
the President every right and privilege to respond to crises affecting Russian security, the 
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North Korean issue is fully within the scope of the Yeltsonian constitutional forces. Neither 
the judiciary, nor legislative body of the Russian Federation can successfully obstruct or 
prosecute the President for any decision he has made in the event of foreign policy crises.  
Medvedev emphasizes that a shared border and nuclear activity on the Korean peninsula 
are of serious concern to his country and his citizens.
423
 This gives the President the 
complete legal and constitutional authority to formulate and implement the decision 
however the occupant of the office of the Russian presidency wishes. The Minister of 
Defence’s absence and the delay of convening the Russian Security Council are clear signs 
that the Russian Constitution has emboldened President Medvedev to orchestrate and 
conduct foreign affairs to accommodate his will. The handling of the crisis was enabled by 
the 1993 Yeltsin-authored constitution.  
 Public legitimacy for this issue was questionable and difficult to ascertain. Namely, 
the Russian public does not possess the same level of passion against North Korean nuclear 
activity as it does against NATO enlargement. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva noted, ‘North Korea 
is not a concern of the Russian public. It’s the West that the Russians worry about. North 
Korean and Russia are close.’424 The NATO Missile Defence Shield and the increasing 
membership of NATO stir passion far more than any nuclear activity on the Korean 
peninsula among Russian constituents.
425
  The Russian public was ambivalent and 
indifferent to the issue. The border shared with North Korea was small and the population 
is centred in Western Russia. The relevance to the majority of the Russian public was weak 
and the roots of Russian antipathy were not ignited. The Russian public linked Georgian 
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‘aggression’ to NATO enlargement and the Russian citizenry overwhelmingly supported 
military action against Georgia and Saakashvili.
426
 When compared with this crisis, the 
Kremlin was faced with a general public that had no definite feelings regarding North 
Korea. This was not a NATO confrontation, which is evident by Serdyukov’s absence in 
the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear test, and the Russian public was indifferent to all 
the options in the situation.  
 Medvedev took this opportunity of being constitutionally enabled and not facing 
any opposition from an indifferent public to vote in support of United Nations sanctions 
against North Korea. The Moscow Times noted that Medvedev’s support from the Russian 
public is a direct result of his close relationship with Vladimir Putin, whom the Russian 
public trusts and respects in a majority sense.
427
 The man seen as ‘the saviour of Mother 
Russia’ after the Yeltsin years is a constant presence around Medvedev and repeatedly 
voices his support for presidential decisions. Medvedev, empowered by his close 
association to Putin, was able to bypass an indifferent public in relation to the North Korean 
issue. This was done because the general public considered the Putin-Medvedev duo 
trustworthy as indicated by polls.
428
 Dr. Nina Khrushcheva commented, ‘At least 60% of 
Russia still supports Putin because Russians believe he is standing up for Russia and 
defending Russia’s friends and interests.’429 Medvedev’s actions are bolstered by public 
support because his Prime Minister is a constant source of reassurance and continuity. It is 
for these reasons that Medvedev was able to use his authority, even though the Russian 
public did not particularly support or oppose sanctions against North Korea. 
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 The confluence of constitutional entitlement and a lacklustre response by the 
general public to the North Korean crisis created a viable opportunity for Medvedev to 
support Western-led sanctions against a country that did not pose a significant threat to the 
Russian Federation. Medvedev’s persistent closeness with Putin provided him with the 
legitimacy among constituents that satisfied the Gorbachovian forces of democratization. 
Putin’s standing among the Russian people was so high during this period that his closeness 
to Medvedev was tantamount to achieving support and legitimacy from a Russian public 
that was indifferent to nuclear activity on the Korean peninsula.  
 In September of 2009, Putin congratulated North Korea on one of its public 
holidays and urged for cooperation and friendship between the two countries.
430
 Putin did 
not view North Korea with the same animosity as he did NATO or Georgia; his views are 
important in terms of establishing Russian public opinion. His lack of antipathy toward 
North Korea was a prime reason the Russian public that holds him in such high regard did 
not exhibit the same passion it did in response to Georgian military operations, which was 
linked by Russian constituents to Saakashvili’s warm relationship with NATO. The 
Gorbachovian forces empowered Medvedev, whose legitimacy stems from his relationship 
with his popular Prime Minister, to make this decision without any opposition from his 
constituents. It would be difficult to imagine Medvedev acting either diplomatically by 
sanctions or militarily by force if Putin publicly warned against the President’s impending 
decision. Putin’s standing among the people would have most certainly created an 
impediment for Medvedev had his Prime Minister publicly disagreed with the presidential 
decision before the order was given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Putin remains a 
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potent tool for Medvedev’s efforts to satisfy the need for public legitimacy before any 
serious action is taken on the world stage by the Russian Federation. 
Reflections: 
 The decision to support sanctions against North Korea was subsequently supported 
twice in two United Nations Resolutions that prolonged United Nations Resolution 1874. 
The Medvedev presidency continued the ‘diplomatic but assertive’ stance against North 
Korea that had been initiated by Putin’s support in 2006 to force the rogue state to comply 
with international norms after detonating nuclear armaments. The overarching policy of the 
Russian Federation is to support measures that will curb the nuclear security dilemma on 
the Korean peninsula.  
 In the immediate aftermath of the nuclear confrontation, the Russian government 
now operated with the passage of the new National Security Concept document that 
theoretically strengthened the role of the institution controlled by the Siloviki and chaired 
by Nikolai Patrushev, a like-minded colleague of Vladimir Putin. Medvedev chose not to 
use this advisory board and allow it to exercise its new privileges and entitlements 
authorized by presidential decree. Medvedev is prone to delaying the usage of this advisory 
board because of the Silovik tendencies it would seek to insert in policy formulation. 
Medvedev’s relationship with Silovik faction leader Vladimir Putin is close, but Medvedev 
does not possess an affinity for the military traditionalists or former KGB operatives who 
were brought into power by Putin. Medvedev’s early foreign policy decisions illustrate that 
the Russian President is not keen on allowing the hawkish elements of the government to 
forcefully sway his decisions. The relationship with Putin is cordial, private, and integral in 
the early years of Medvedev’s presidency. The Russian Security Council’s document is 
ultimately able to empower the institution that authored it only at the behest of the 
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President. Medvedev’s power stemming from his office is not infringed or blunted by this 
new document that gives Siloviki the opportunity to insert themselves to a greater extent 
into the foreign policy dialogue of the new liberal-minded President. Furthermore, the 
personal relationships between Medvedev and the two men controlling the advisory 
mechanism, Patrushev and Baluyevsky, the latter of whom Medvedev removed from the 
defence apparatus after ideological clashes, are not nearly as close as his relationships with 
Putin, Serdyukov, or even Lavrov. Medvedev’s ideological differences and personal 
disdain for the Russian Security Council’s chief leaders have led to the institution’s 
marginalization. The National Security Concept document has yet to produce any 
empowerment for the institution that authored it.  
 The Putin-Medvedev duo responsible for the Russian government’s foreign policy 
decisions differ in ideology and temperament, and the product of their deliberations 
ultimately results in a compromised decision that can be described as ‘diplomatic but 
assertive.’ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Lavrov has maintained a diplomatic 
agenda with an assertive tone in relation to Russian interests and prestige. This concurrence 
of the Putin-Medvedev duo and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its chief minister 
reacting to world events in the same manner has allowed for smooth relations between the 
Kremlin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the diplomatic arm of the 
government acting in unison with presidential decisions. While the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is not composed of insiders from Putin’s inner circle, the Yeltsin Liberals have 
adopted the new tone established by Putin in 2000. The new predisposition for ‘diplomatic 
but assertive’ posturing by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coincides with the policy 
predispositions of the ruling tandem composed of a staunch Silovik Prime Minister and a 
liberal-minded Technocrat President.  
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 As with the Georgian episode, Medvedev resisted reacting to the ‘aggression’ on the 
Russian-Georgian border with a jingoistic truculence that would have made it necessary to 
act instantly, severely, and disproportionately. Action did follow by Medvedev ordering 
military operations against Georgia, but only after deliberating and choosing a suitable 
military course did the President give the order, even though the hardline elements of the 
government were urging a sudden and disproportionate response that would satisfy 
jingoistic, hawkish tendencies. The support for sanctions against North Korea resulted after 
the resolution was deemed to be effective, but not devastating to the civilians and their way 
of life. This support for moderately severe sanctions is the result of liberal-minded 
Medvedev and hawkish Putin reaching a consensus between their respective array of 
ideological tendencies and worldviews.  
 Serdyukov’s absence from the Russian Security Council meeting in the aftermath of 
the nuclear confrontation reveals three important facets of the Kremlin’s handling of the 
issue. First, Medvedev and like-minded Serdyukov were ideologically compatible and 
personally comfortable with each other. Similar to the Georgian episode, the 
communication between the Russian President and the Minister of Defence is healthy, 
amiable, and productive. Serdyukov’s presence at the meeting was unnecessary because he 
was not an individual who would advocate his views or urge the President to take a course 
incompatible with a Technocrat’s inclinations. Second, the Kremlin did not believe that this 
was an issue of serious importance that affected the security of the Russian Federation. This 
issue did not stir the same level of passion as NATO enlargement or Georgian involvement 
in its breakaway regions. This was treated as a diplomatic issue with relevance at the 
United Nations, not national importance. While support for Medvedev was strong because 
of his close association with Putin, the general public was indifferent to North Korea. 
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Therefore, the Kremlin did not face any public opposition to its support for sanctions 
against the rogue state. The Gorbachovian forces of democratization did not pose as an 
obstacle to the course chosen by the Kremlin, but instead allowed Medvedev the public 
legitimacy he needed because of his close association with popular Vladimir Putin. 
Furthermore, it also reveals a major point in relation to the President’s powerful 
constitutional entitlements. Medvedev nullified the Russian Security Council’s document 
by delaying the employment of the advisory board again and choosing to leave the defence 
arm of the government out of reach from it. This was a subtle, but important reminder that 
the President by virtue of the Yeltsonian constitutional entitlements controls all the levers 
of power regardless of any new document that theoretically strengthens mechanisms within 
the foreign policy apparatus. The Russian President does not need the consent or 
involvement of any of his ministers or advisors when deliberating and formulating a foreign 
policy decision. The 1993 Russian Constitution authored by Boris Yeltsin solidified 
Medvedev’s control over his government’s ministers and advisors; the handling of the 
North Korean issue exemplified this fact. The Putin-Medvedev regime’s approach to its 
next major foreign policy episode in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 is examined in the following 
chapter by also utilizing the Governmental Politics Model and assessing the Yeltsonian and 
Gorbachovian forces in the decision-making process. 
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Chapter 4: A Confluence of Two Inconsequential Foreign Policy Issues and One 
Important Foreign Policy Event 
 
Introduction: 
 The Russian Federation experienced a confluence of two foreign policy issues of 
secondary importance and one consequential event during the same time period. The 
confluence and resulting effects on the Kremlin must be examined in order to fully assess 
the impact on the foreign policy-making apparatus. After a serious conflict with Georgia, 
which was an extension of Russia’s antipathy toward NATO enlargement, and the consent 
to sanctions against a rogue regime, North Korea, which saw the Kremlin sway in the 
direction of acting for the sake of international security as well as its own, the Russian 
Federation was emboldened as a protector of its territorial security with respect to borders 
shared with Georgia and North Korea. The Russian Federation now exercised its right to 
enact measures to obstruct any encroachment of its security, and the North Korean situation 
further solidified Russia’s important role on the United Nations Security Council. Russia 
was a firm protector of its territorial boundaries, as well as a key player to ensure security 
in the international community. Despite the political implications of the Georgian conflict 
and Russia’s consent to sanctions against its neighbour, North Korea, the foreign policy of 
the Russian Federation was independent and vital in the eyes of the world. The Russian 
Federation was acting in what it saw as a new age of multipolarity without the ‘capitulation 
or sense of defeat to the West and the United States seen during the Yeltsin years.’431 
Russia was returning to the game of great power politics and the Putinist vision of an 
independent, powerful Russian Federation was coming to fruition during the Medvedev 
years. Dr. Alexander Cooley, renowned expert on Central Asia and professor at Columbia 
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University, noted: ‘Russia still believes the post-Soviet territory belongs to the Kremlin. 
That’s what makes Russia a great power because it controls these parts and speaks for those 
countries.’432 Even though a liberal-minded President now held the reins of power, the 
Putinist vision was not lost on the new international and geopolitical opportunities for the 
Russian Federation to increase its leverage in world affairs.  
 Early 2010 saw the Russian Federation experience two inconsequential foreign 
policy issues, and one vital foreign policy event in the post-Soviet territory. The first was 
an adoption of a new military doctrine in February 2010 that reflected a more confident and 
aggressive defence imperative as authored by those who occupied the Kremlin. The second 
was a conclusion to the long process of mediation between the Obama Administration in 
the United States and Medvedev Administration in the Russian Federation that resulted in 
The New START Treaty, which was ratified in the United States Congress and the Russian 
Duma by the end of the year. The third issue was not entirely dissimilar to the Georgian 
episode; Kyrgyzstan, an important country for allocating military bases, was in the midst of 
a civil war, which saw the ousting of President Bakiyev. Dr. Alexander Cooley notes, ‘It’s 
the only country in the world with both American and Russian military bases.’433This fact 
has placed Kyrgyzstan high on the priority list of the United States and the Kremlin for 
strategic purposes. The Russian Federation faced these three issues simultaneously and 
facilitated a response in the context of the complementing forces that resulted from the 
confluence of events. No serious transformation of the Russian Federation or its leadership 
occurred, but the series of changes occurring simultaneously must be analyzed in order to 
understand the subsequent foreign policy decisions during the Medvedev presidency. 
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  The new Russian military doctrine authorized by President Medvedev and The New 
START Treaty, which took over a year to be ratified at the executive level and then several 
months to pass through respective legislative bodies, was facilitated in the context of a 
resurgent Russia asserting itself in world affairs simultaneously with a new American 
President whose rhetoric suggested he sought equitable bilateral relations with a former foe 
of the United States. The new military doctrine and treaty coincided with a Russia that 
sought equal, strategic partnership with the United States and leverage with regards to 
NATO’s increasing membership, which was a security concern among Kremlin policy-
makers. The factors provided by the new military doctrine and rapprochement with the 
United States must be considered in relation to the Russian response to the civil war of a 
strategically important country in Central Asia.  
 All three issues were susceptible to the Yeltsonian and Gorbachovian forces in 
which the Kremlin operates. The presidential prerogative was exercised within the 
constitutional forces that allow the office of the presidency to make such decisions. The 
modus operandi of President Medvedev and his decisions were executed by virtue of the 
1993 Russian Constitution, and each decision was watched and analyzed by the 
constituents over whom he held authority. Legitimacy from the governed and the 
presidential powers involved in decision-making will maintain an important priority in this 
analysis. The confluence of events provided a gripping period that illuminates the personal 
dynamics within the Kremlin, as well as the forces that shape it externally.  
 The first two events, specifically the authorization of the new military doctrine and 
The New START Treaty, provided the Medvedev presidency with its first major 
opportunity to recalibrate the military to the new assertive era after the dismal Yeltsin 
years. It provided a new encompassing treaty with its former Cold War adversary that gave 
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Medvedev the opportunity to shape new security architecture with the United States based 
on mutual respect and equality. This recognition further ingrained the importance of the 
Russian Federation in world affairs. The American hegemon recognized its former 
adversary as an equal. This emboldened the Russian Federation in terms of sense of pride, 
resurgence, and self-worth.
434
 Hence, ‘The principles of equality, parity, equal and 
undivided security lay a solid foundation for the modern Russian-American cooperation in 
various spheres,’ Lavrov said when asked about The New START Treaty.435 Dmitry 
Medvedev ultimately made these decisions within the system he inherited that was 
transformed by the lasting legacies of Boris Yeltsin’s superior presidential powers and the 
Gorbachovian democratization that emboldened the constituents who had once been a non-
factor in the foreign policy decision-making equation. Even though the external forces 
affected the chief executive in his decision-making, the key players under scrutiny in this 
body of research are completely impervious to the public legitimacy requirement. 
Therefore, the Gorbachovian forces directly and solely affect the President, while the 
Yeltsonian forces shape the methods with which the President manages and convenes his 
key players. 
The Russian Military Doctrine of 2010: 
 A new military doctrine during a post-Putin presidency may have been viewed as an 
important event, but the fundamentals of the internal dynamics of the Kremlin precluded 
this ‘important’ document to alter the substance and protocol of the Russian Federation’s 
military in relation to the office of the President or any other agency within the executive 
branch of government. As the Kremlin officially stated: ‘“The President informed the 
members of Russia's Security Council on Friday that he has approved two documents - the 
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military doctrine and the Fundamentals of the state policy on nuclear deterrence until 
2020,” said presidential press secretary Natalia Timakova.’436 Dmitry Medvedev’s consent 
has fully authorized the new military doctrine, but the new principles are translated into 
practice by individuals with certain impulses and bureaucratic arrangements that make it 
virtually impossible for the Russian Ministry of Defence to have a transformational role in 
the foreign policy-making apparatus. Serdyukov’s reforms and temperament fully empower 
the Russian President to control the defence apparatus and neutralize it in a manner that 
creates a solid connection between these two mechanisms of power. Serdyukov’s reforms 
have effectively centralized all defence power within his office and created a buffer 
between the Russian generals and Medvedev.  
 Medvedev’s feud with General Baluyevsky is a testament to this alienation and 
marginalization of the Russian generals. General Baluyevsky has remained an ardent critic 
of these reforms and Medvedev’s tenure since the demotion of the Chief of General Staff 
position that was formerly much more independent and vital within the defence apparatus, 
but now is a relatively nominal position when compared with the Minister of Defence who 
is privy to undeniable and close access to the office of the Russian President. In addition to 
this, Serdyukov, the pragmatic and dutiful Technocrat with no discernible ideology, 
maintains his loyal and non-controversial tenure without ever openly defying or 
questioning Russian foreign policy. As the foreign policy episode with Georgia had made 
clear, the Minister of Defence was the ultimate contact point with which Medvedev 
engaged to commence military operations. Regardless of the issue, the Minister of 
Defence’s powerful position and personal relationship with the President has enabled 
Medvedev to depend on Serdyukov to implement orders without fear of ideological reprisal 
                                                 
436 RIA Novosti, ‘Russian president approves new military doctrine’, RIA Novosti [web page] (2010) 
<http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20100205/157785368.html >, accessed 1 June 2012. 
167 
 
or sabotage.
437
 In spite of what the military doctrine entails, Medvedev’s use of the defence 
mechanism will be accessible and free of obstruction because of the reforms, unchallenged 
by his fellow Technocrat, and bureaucratically compatible because of the power structure 
between the respective positions.  
 The Russian Security Council still maintains an advisory role within the Kremlin 
and this was solidified by the adoption of the National Security Concept document in 2009. 
The new role of the Russian Security Council was theoretically wider in scope. The 
Georgian conflict and the North Korean confrontation illuminated the role of the advisory 
forum and evidently it was not used as an emergency mechanism to respond to foreign 
policy events as the primary players on the council had hoped. The National Security 
Concept document had proposed an important role in terms of the formulation of policy by 
the Russian Security Council advising the various mechanisms within the foreign policy 
apparatus. Nikolai Patrushev, Russian Security Council Secretary said:                  
Today, on February 5, President Medvedev approved the Military Doctrine. First of 
all, I would like to say that in May of last year the President adopted the national 
security strategy up to 2020, where the national defence is determined as one of the 
strategic national priorities. We should continue to work on the strategy, and the 
Military Doctrine is one of the results of this work.
438
  
 
 Patrushev’s persistent marginalization in the policy debates as evident by the 
Georgian conflict and North Korean confrontation is now at a point where his advisory 
mechanism has the full authority to insert itself into the policy formulation. The National 
Security Concept document in 2009 was decreed by the President and gives Patrushev the 
opportunity to recalibrate or revise military doctrine, an important facet in decision-making. 
While the Russian Security Council’s role in emergency situations is murky and unresolved 
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by the choice of Dmitry Medvedev, the document authored by Patrushev in 2009 
preconceived such an opportunity in which future doctrinal principles would have to be 
applied to foreign policy events.
439
 Medvedev’s habitual hesitation to employ the Russian 
Security Council during emergency foreign policy events cannot be affected because it is 
fully within the presidential prerogative to manoeuvre the mechanisms of power in this 
fashion. A preconceived doctrine is an abundant endeavour for the Russian Security 
Council to insert its worldview and influence the mechanisms of the foreign policy 
apparatus. There can be little doubt that Secretary Patrushev and General Baluyevsky, who 
had been marginalized thus far, would take this opportunity to sway the bureaucratic 
debates in the favour of a Silovik worldview that is also compatible with the military 
traditionalist ideology characterized by a Cold War era mentality.  
 The timing of the new doctrine could not have come at a better time to reflect the 
political and ideological fixation on NATO enlargement and the ongoing conflict with 
Georgia. The Silovik base’s affinity for security against multilateral organizations of 
Western origin is apparent throughout the new military document. The ideological 
underpinning of the military doctrine is not dissimilar from the Putinist version in 2000. 
There were fundamentally few differences between Putin’s military doctrine document and 
Medvedev’s. It would be difficult to assume that security-obsessed Silovik Putin would 
allow the new military doctrine to be authored without his input. The personal relationship 
between the two is close and Putin’s input, as well as the Russian Security Council’s 
participation in drafting this document reflected an ideological affinity for the Silovik 
worldview of an aggressive approach to ensuring Russian security and absolute antipathy 
toward NATO. ‘Despite the decrease in the possibility of unleashing a large-scale 
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aggression using conventional arms and nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation, 
military threats to the Russian Federation have increased in a number of areas,’ the 
document states.
440
 According to the new military doctrine, Russia views the expansion of 
NATO as a primary threat to its security, as well as the international security sphere 
primarily depending on NATO and not sovereign states.
441
 Another threat mentioned is ‘the 
deployment of the strategic missile defence system that undermines international stability 
and violates the established balance of forces.’442 The Putinist and Silovik aversion to the 
international security architecture remains persistent throughout the document.  
 Despite the ongoing presence of the Putin-appointed Siloviki, the military doctrine 
during the Medvedev presidency became more ‘dovish’ in one distinguishable aspect. 
Namely, the debate over nuclear capabilities in the military doctrine was subjected to 
various forms of analysis and inquiry by bureaucrats, but the outcome suggested that the 
Silovik control of this facet was not absolute. Nikolai Patrushev boasted that the Russian 
Security Council’s new role in drafting military doctrine would most certainly signify an 
expansion of nuclear military doctrine in a formal document that was being authored, which 
eventually became the 2010 Russian Federation’s military doctrine.443 Patrushev’s Silovik 
instincts were certainly ignited because of the Georgian conflict and his assessment of the 
threat of NATO’s increasing membership; therefore, there can be little doubt that 
Patrushev’s hawkish worldview would seek to formulate the new doctrine in a fashion that 
would solidify Russian foreign policy principles in favour of enabling the Kremlin to easily 
order nuclear strikes when Russian security is threatened. The Georgian conflict was the 
Kremlin’s hawkish faction’s opportunity to guide the debate toward a more aggressive 
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formal policy in foreign affairs. Oddly, the document does not reflect such a jingoistic, 
hawkish truculence that a Silovik controlled Russian Security Council would have 
envisioned. There are fewer paragraphs on nuclear protocol and many more details on 
modernizing conventional forces than in the 2000 military doctrine.
444
 According to 
defence expert Nikolai Sokov, ‘This shift of emphasis probably reflected the focus of the 
current political and military leadership on the undergoing military reform as well as the 
provision, contained in the 2000 National Security Concept, which regarded reliance on 
nuclear weapons as a stop-gap measure until thorough modernization of the Armed Forces 
is complete.’445 The Serdyukov reforms of modernization and Medvedev’s liberal 
predisposition serve as counterweights to the hardline elements of the Kremlin trying to 
sway foreign policy doctrine to become compatible with the Silovik worldview. In 
theoretical terms, the Technocrats did not view nuclear doctrine as a major necessity as 
opposed to the Siloviki who, as Patrushev loudly proclaimed, believed in a vigorous and 
aggressive foreign policy in relation to nuclear strike capability. The collective dread of the 
hawkish faction of the Kremlin is motivated by the desire to never return to the state of 
dismal capitulation that characterized the Yeltsin foreign policy in the minds of these 
bureaucrats.
446
 Medvedev and Serdyukov’s military reform agenda served to blunt this very 
desire by the Siloviki and the doctrine stands as a testament to the powerful technocratic 
operatives that present a serious obstacle for Silovik control of the foreign policy apparatus.  
 Regardless of the new military doctrine’s de-emphasis of nuclear strike capability, 
the Siloviki and military traditionalists did not simply allow the entire doctrine to be an 
overture to the Technocrats who possessed leverage over their hawkish colleagues by virtue 
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of the presidency and Minister of Defence position. NATO enlargement has maintained its 
relevance as the Kremlin’s primary point of contention with respect to international 
security.
447
 This fundamental grievance maintains its top priority by members of the foreign 
policy apparatus and the 2000 version of the military doctrine echoed these very sentiments 
after the disastrous Russian ‘Partnership for Peace’ with NATO initiated by the Yeltsin 
Administration. A collective contemptuous view of NATO never left the core of the 
Kremlin and the Putin era began by setting strict guidelines with NATO and its 
‘encroachment’ against Russia. These very anti-NATO trends have continued unabated and 
the 2010 military doctrine further crystallizes and cements Russian aversion to this 
collective security organization of Western origin, which was historically anti-Soviet 
Union. It would be difficult for the Siloviki, Technocrats, and Yeltsin Liberals who spent 
their formative years schooled in the Soviet mentality and worldview to suddenly develop a 
trusting and binding relationship with an organization that was dreaded and feared 
throughout the years when the current leaders were children, adolescents, and young 
professionals undergoing the crucible of reaching adulthood. The Russian antipathy toward 
NATO by the Kremlin elite remains vigorous. 
 The new doctrine contained striking nuances that illuminate the Kremlin machinery 
and its production of the document. First, the Russian Security Council’s 2009 document 
gave it the role and access to influence the military doctrine. The new Defence Doctrine 
document has telltale signs of the Silovik paranoia of NATO. Instead of focusing on other 
possible existential threats to the Russian Federation, the document maintains the Silovik 
fixation on NATO enlargement.
448
 The fundamental motivation behind the authorship of 
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this document was the Georgian conflict and geopolitical and international ramifications 
that followed it. The Kremlin views NATO empowerment of Georgia as a key factor in the 
ongoing Georgian conflict. The shift from nuclear strike options to a further subversive 
attitude toward NATO is the Kremlin’s retaliatory stance against NATO’s increasing 
membership and Western support for Georgia, which the Russian Federation’s government 
has vilified and its leader was determined persona non grata in Moscow. NATO leadership 
has persistently objected to Russian accusations that its security architecture on the world 
stage is a threat to Russia and its borders.
449
 The rift between Russia and NATO has 
returned to a Soviet status quo after Russia’s perceived embarrassment and marginalization 
during the Partnership for Peace agreement. Even though Medvedev is a Technocrat whose 
dutiful and liberal temperament are beyond reproach, the Putinist stance against NATO 
enlargement or any productive relations with the organization continues. The strong link 
between the Prime Minister and President has led to the continuation of many foreign 
policy trends started after Putin’s inauguration in 2000. The Silovik controlled Russian 
Security Council, Vladimir Putin, and the other Siloviki in government have successfully 
swayed Medvedev’s rhetoric in the Defence Doctrine document to outline that the Russian 
Federation vehemently opposes NATO and its enlargement.  
The New START Treaty: 
 Both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation have a history of signing treaties 
with the United States. Ever since Lyndon Johnson and Alexei Kosygin signed agreements 
to bolster cooperation and communication between their respective countries in 1967, there 
have been updates to this essential rapprochement by signing newer treaties every few 
years under different leaders. The New START Treaty was not exactly ‘new,’ and previous 
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START Treaties and SALT Agreements provided the foundation for improving past 
treaties and facilitating better ones. President Barack Obama of the United States 
campaigned for the presidency during what may be described as the lowest point in 
American-Russian relations since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The conflict with Georgia 
served as a serious obstacle for the Bush Administration to continue peaceful and 
prosperous relations with the former Cold War nemesis of the United States. It comes as no 
surprise that a focal point of Obama’s foreign policy was to facilitate better relations with 
the Russian Federation, which culminated in The New START Treaty. The Washington 
Post noted, ‘The treaty, called New START, imposes new limits on ready-to-use, long-
range nuclear weapons and pledges to reduce the two biggest nuclear arsenals on the globe. 
Both countries will be limited to 1,550 ready-to-use, long-range nuclear weapons in 
addition to the other parts of their nuclear stockpile.’450A ‘Reset’ policy was established by 
President Obama and its main architect, Michael McFaul. The Russian Federation was now 
theoretically striving to overcome the political ramifications of its war against Georgia by 
signing a treaty that starts a chapter of peaceful relations with a new American President.  
 American newspapers of record, such as The New York Times and The Washington 
Post, emphasized the historical importance of the signing of this new treaty in April 2010. 
The New York Times noted, ‘The United States and Russia opened what they called a new 
era in their tumultuous relationship on Thursday as they signed an arms control treaty and 
presented a largely united front against Iran’s nuclear program, marking a sharp change 
since they broke over the Georgia war two years ago.’451 The primary issues of nuclear 
arms control were significantly discussed and negotiated to ensure a comprehensive treaty 
                                                 
450 Michael D. Shear, ‘Obama, Medvedev sign treaty to reduce nuclear weapons’, The Washington Post, 8 Apr. 2010, Google News 
Archive [online database], accessed 1 June 2012. 
451Peter Baker and Dan Bilefsky, ‘Russia and U.S. Sign Nuclear Arms Reduction Pact’, The New York Times, 8 Apr. 2010, Google News 
Archive [online database], accessed 1 June 2012.  
174 
 
that ensured mutual safety and cooperation.
452
 According to The Washington Post, arms 
control experts were not wholly satisfied as this did not severely deter nuclear strike 
capabilities on either side and that it was not significantly different from past treaties and 
agreements.
453
 David Speedie commented, ‘New START is a good metaphor, but if one 
looks upon it as a harbinger on good things to come on arms control, it did not come about. 
There were different expectations on both sides.’ 454 The New START Treaty did not 
practically achieve ‘world peace’ as its advocates claim. Furthermore, The New START 
Treaty was not official until both the American and Russian legislative bodies ratified it. 
Therefore, this event was a long process of mediation, negotiation, summitry, and then 
legislative ratification. The resounding success was muted by the realities of consensus-
building and bureaucratic processes necessary for the adoption and authorization of the 
agreement signed by Obama and Medvedev. The signing ceremony was the epitome of 
summit diplomacy, which is viewed as definitive of success, but in realistic terms is one 
stage in the crucible of foreign policy-making.  
 Two blights on the process in the Russian foreign policy decision-making apparatus 
existed during this signing period, and in essence, these two outweighed the importance of 
the treaty in relation to the other issues not included in the American-Russian mediation 
and negotiation during the period from 2009 to 2010. The two issues were certainly 
motivating factors by the Kremlin elite who vigorously participated in the formulation of 
the new treaty. The first was the perceived security threat by the installation of the United 
States & NATO Missile Defence Shield in the Czech Republic. The second was building a 
consensus between Russia and the United States in regards to United Nations imposed 
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sanctions against Iran by the United Nations Security Council, which both countries are 
permanent members of.  
 Obama’s first act of good will toward the Russian Federation was his announcement 
of a decision to cancel plans for the proposed Missile Defence Shield system in Poland.
455
 
This act promoted a new era of relations between the two countries, but because of the 
likelihood of a nuclear-armed Iran, Obama demurred on announcing any changes to the 
Missile Defence Shield system in the Czech Republic. The Obama Administration has 
continued the same argument for the existence of the missile system as proposed by the 
Bush Administration: Iran’s nuclear development program is a threat to international 
security. According to the American argument, the Missile Defence Shield severely alters 
the security balance on the world stage in favour of any countries that Iran may strike in a 
nuclear capacity. The United States has approached these issues in an interconnected 
fashion by urging the international community to support sanctions against Iran’s nuclear 
development program and supporting the Missile Defence Shield system that would ensure 
a certain level of security against the regime of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei in the event he would order nuclear strikes if or when his government achieves 
the completion of a full nuclear arsenal. The Russian Federation is not convinced of the 
necessity of the United States & NATO Missile Defence System in the Czech Republic, 
which is perceived by the Russian foreign policy apparatus as a threat to its own security. 
According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative non-profit organization: ‘On 7 April, the Russian 
Federation released a unilateral statement on missile defence, in which it stated its view that 
the Treaty “may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative and 
quantitative build-up in the missile defence system capabilities of the United States of 
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America.”’456 The Russian Federation’s government resisted any attempt to ignore this 
issue, which the Siloviki would have vociferously pointed out to the President. Medvedev’s 
hawkish advisors, especially Vladimir Putin who expressed his disapproval of the missile 
system while he was President, would surely have spoken directly and bluntly with his 
hand-picked successor about this alarming issue. The statement on April 7 is a testament to 
The New START Treaty not significantly altering relations between the two countries; this 
issue is still a heated topic of discussion at the time of this writing.  
 Medvedev was certainly prone to the temptation of summit diplomacy and its 
majestic elevation of his leadership. Medvedev, now the President, was aware of the power 
it would add to his image as Russia’s skilled and pragmatic leader. Medvedev publicly 
declared the summit in 2010 as a milestone in American-Russian relations.
457
 ‘Mr. 
Medvedev called the treaty “a truly historic event” that would “open a new page” in 
Russian-American relations.’458 The New York Times also noted: ‘What matters most is that 
this is a win-win situation, “the Russian President said.” No one stands to lose from this 
agreement. I believe that this is a typical feature of our cooperation. Both parties have 
won.’459 According to Medvedev, the agreement elevates Russia to American hegemony as 
an equal. This surely posed as a political and international victory for the Russian President, 
who was certainly popular because of his association with Putin but not seen as a separate 
entity because of the ‘tandem democracy’ agreement. The implication of his statement is 
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that ‘the win-win situation’ is the result of his presidential leadership and this has 
emboldened him to confidently make future decisions.  
 Medvedev spoke at length about the Iranian nuclear crisis when questioned 
immediately after The New START Treaty signing ceremony in 2010.
460
 In the spirit of 
rapprochement, Medvedev did not object to American accusations of an inevitable nuclear 
crisis by the theocratic Iranian regime.
461
 President Medvedev conveyed:  
The Russian signalled support for the American-led drive to impose new sanctions on 
Iran, saying that Tehran’s nuclear program had flouted international rules. “We 
cannot turn a blind eye to this,” Mr. Medvedev said, while adding that sanctions 
“should be smart” and avoid hardship for the Iranian people.462  
 
 Medvedev intentionally neglected to mention any concessions on the part of the 
Russian Federation in terms of the United States & NATO Missile Defence Shield. Support 
for sanctions against Iran was negotiable according to Medvedev, but the missile system in 
Europe, which the Kremlin believed infringed the Russian Federation’s security, was non-
negotiable. Medvedev obfuscated the post-ceremony discussion with journalists to focus on 
possible sanctions against Iran because of its unlawful nuclear development program. 
463
 
Medvedev foreshadowed Russia’s eventual decision to support sanctions:  
Mr. Medvedev said he “outlined our limits for such sanctions” to Mr. Obama in their 
private talks, without elaborating. Sergei Ryabkov, the deputy Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, said later that Mr. Medvedev supported sanctions “that are targeted, 
that are tailored,” and opposed an embargo on refined oil products because it would 
be “a huge shock for the whole society.464  
 
 The statement clearly reflects that the Iranian issue was monitored and discussed in 
the Kremlin beforehand. It would be difficult to imagine security-obsessed Siloviki 
ignoring a looming nuclear confrontation in the ‘near East.’ In addition to this, Lavrov, 
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Serdyukov, Patrushev, and Putin who are key players in Russia’s foreign policy could not 
wilfully neglect the issue when their childhoods experienced a near nuclear holocaust in 
October 1962. The lessons of history that mired their upbringing would preclude an 
intentional abandonment of the Iranian issue. The current key players around Medvedev 
would not allow his presidency to be derelict in duty by being abysmally poor in assessing 
pressing dangers on the world stage. The Kremlin was fully engaged in the Iranian nuclear 
development program from the latter’s inception during Vladimir Putin’s first 
presidency.
465
  
 As jubilant as both Obama and Medvedev were during the signing of The New 
START Treaty, the summit diplomacy was not as effective as one would assume by 
reading newspapers or watching news reports. The treaty was not ratified by both 
governments until the end of the year, and even before that the Russian side did not hide its 
contempt for the lack of change in the Missile Defence Shield issue.
466
 Mr. Richard Perle, 
Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and former Assistant Secretary of 
Defence for the Reagan Administration, when interviewed commented: ‘The Russians 
complain about it endlessly. It is not clear why. It does not pose a challenge to their 
deterrent requirements. They do not like the idea that we (the United States) have effective 
missile defence when they do not. It conflicts with their perception of themselves as a great 
power.’467 Medvedev’s liberal temperament was noticeably missing in November 2010 
when he threatened an arms race and abrogation of the treaty if the United States’ missile 
                                                 
465 Michael Wines, ‘Putin to Sell Arms and Nuclear Help to Iran’, The New York Times, 13 Mar. 2001, The New York Times Archive 
[online database], accessed 2 June 2012. 
466 Steve Gutterman, ‘Russia's Medvedev warns of new arms race’, Reuters, 30 Nov. 2010, Google News Archive [online database], 2 
June 2012. 
467 R. Perle, ‘Russia’s Security Fears’ [interviewed by Julian Reder], 7 January 2013, American Enterprise Institute, Chevy Chase, 
Maryland. 
179 
 
system issue were not properly rectified.
468
 The hawkish elements of the Russian 
government certainly pressed hard on the President to abandon the warm dialogue and 
utilize an aggressive, direct tone that would surely arouse the American government’s 
complete attention. Returning to a tone reminiscent of the Cold War would certainly evoke 
attention from the news media and American foreign policy-makers. This tactic was 
employed to convey that the Russian Federation steadfastly opposed the Missile Defence 
Shield system and would continue its campaign to find an equitable solution.  
 To consolidate and further convey the opposition to the West’s Missile Defence 
Shield system by the Russian Federation, Medvedev outlined new plans to counter the 
threat it poses. ‘These measures will be adequate, effective and low cost, “Medvedev said 
during a speech in 2010.” If the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation 
will deploy modern offensive weapons in the west and south of the country ensuring our 
ability to take out any part of the U.S. missile defence system in Europe.’469 The military 
traditionalists and Siloviki were certainly a powerful voice in facilitating these plans and 
influencing Medvedev’s posturing in relation to the issue. Medvedev’s liberal temperament 
did not preclude his pragmatism and he did leave options for the American government. 
Medvedev said that the Kremlin will continue its dialogue with Washington on the issue.
470
 
‘There is still time to reach an understanding,’ Medvedev stated.471 
 The Putin-Medvedev duo is a microcosm of the inner sanctum of the Kremlin elite, 
which is comprised of a mixture of Technocrat and Silovik inspired rhetoric and ideologies. 
Therefore, the response is a reflection of this. Even though Medvedev is seen as 
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aggressively touting Russia being the catalyst of a new arms race with the United States if 
the American and NATO missile system in the Czech Republic were not removed, he still 
leaves the opportunity for further dialogue to reach a consensus that will appease both 
sides. The inner sanctum within the Kremlin has these two political factions, the Siloviki 
and Technocrats, who respond to such issues differently because of different priorities and 
perceptions. The ultimate product of the clash of these two groups is an aggressive, 
concerted effort with a diplomatic but assertive posture. This is evident by Medvedev’s 
hawkish threats of starting a new arms race, while claiming that negotiations for a proper 
settlement in relation to the Missile Defence Shield issue is still possible. The combination 
of Silovik tendencies and technocratic liberal temperament are apparent. This hybrid asserts 
itself during this period in relation to an issue of a simmering conflict in Kyrgyzstan during 
the events previously mentioned in this chapter. 
Kyrgyzstan: 
 During the signing of The New START Treaty, The New York Times deftly noted 
that the unrest in Kyrgyzstan poses as a threat to the new bond forged between the Russian 
Federation and the United States.
472
 The article reported that when asked Medvedev 
promptly voiced support for the new regime that had taken over after President Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev’s ousting and called for the removal of an American military base in 
Kyrgyzstan.
473
 Kyrgyzstan’s importance for strategic military purposes is an understated 
fact that foreign policy-makers have not fully acknowledged in public. Kyrgyzstan’s 
proximity to Russia and aerial accessibility for the United States to continue its anti-
terrorism efforts in the Middle East make it an important country in terms of geopolitics 
and international security. The London Telegraph noted that the American military base in 
                                                 
472 Peter Baker and Dan Bilefsky, ‘Russia and U.S. Sign Nuclear Arms Reduction Pact’, The New York Times, 8 Apr. 2010, Google News 
Archive [online database], accessed 1 June 2012. 
473 Ibid. 
181 
 
Kyrgyzstan commenced operations three months after the September 11 attacks and this 
fomented anti-American posturing by the Russian Federation.
474
 The American military 
base was a threat to the Russian Federation in the eyes of the Kremlin elite.  
 The Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, was quickly asked by journalists whether he 
was involved in Bakiyev’s ousting and whether he supported the new regime.475 ‘“Neither 
Russia nor your humble servant nor Russian officials have anything to do with these 
events,” he said at a news conference.’476 This statement was clearly not compatible with 
what the opposition leaders who swept to power had claimed in the aftermath of Bakiyev’s 
ousting and escape to Belarus.
477
 RIA Novosti pointed out that the opposition leaders 
claimed that Putin did in fact support them and was allied with the anti-Bakiyev forces.
478
 
Australia’s Sydney Morning Herald reported a similar account of opposition leaders 
claiming they were bolstered by Putin’s support and this was the enabling factor that ousted 
the Bakiyev regime.
479
 ‘Omurbek Tekebayev, who is in charge of constitutional matters in 
the new government, said: “Russia played its role in ousting Bakiyev. You've seen the level 
of Russia's joy when they saw Bakiyev gone.”’480 Putin’s Silovik instincts would not have 
allowed an American military base in Kyrgyzstan, a country in the post-Soviet space, to 
exist unnoticed. Putin’s fixation on Russian security was a motivating factor in the 
immediate support for the new regime and lack of support for Bakiyev. In 2009, the Kyrgyz 
government voted overwhelmingly to not renew a lease for the American military base and 
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effectively evict American forces.
481
 This was welcomed by the Kremlin and a collective 
sigh of relief was breathed by the Kremlin elite who favoured one more country free of 
American military presence. Moscow announced a generous financial aid package that 
possessed the potential to produce a viable rehabilitation and transformation of 
Kyrgyzstan’s infrastructure.482 Russian foreign policy-makers were clearly satisfied with 
the Kyrgyz leadership’s cold relations with the United States. The Kremlin could only 
envision benefits for the lessening of Western influence in the post-Soviet sphere.  
 President Bakiyev’s rhetoric and the legislation passed against the American 
military base portended a future with Kyrgyzstan removing the American presence in its 
country. The New York Times noted that the Obama Administration painstakingly ‘courted’ 
the Bakiyev regime and offered to pay a much higher sum than agreed to previously for use 
of the base.
483
 Bakiyev reversed his decision and happily accepted American incentives for 
prolonging the American military base.
484
 The Russian foreign policy apparatus decided to 
reward Bakiyev for his anti-Western stance prior to his policy reversal with respect to the 
Manas base and now the Kremlin was left with the possibility of the presence of the 
American military in Kyrgyzstan being prolonged indefinitely.
485
 The absolute disdain and 
shock experienced by the main players of the Kremlin must have been tremendous. Dr. 
Alexander Cooley has commented, ‘The fundamental thing that Bakiyev did was promise 
to close the base at Manas and didn’t. That was the main issue. He took a financial package 
from Russia with the understanding that he would shut down Manas. He takes the money 
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and made deals with the US. He was playing both sides.’486 The Putin-Medvedev regime 
felt that it was deceived and manipulated into providing generous aid for the developing 
country.  
 The Kremlin saw this issue as a battle of wills and influence in a country that was 
strategically important for security reasons. The United States and the Russian Federation 
were locked in a battle over ‘the hearts and minds’ of the Bakiyev regime. It seemed at first 
in 2009 that the United States had lost a vital geographic point in Central Asia that served 
its foreign policy and defence objectives. The Bakiyev regime proclaimed that the United 
States would no longer have the base for its military purposes, but American diplomatic 
posturing by virtue of offering generous incentives eventually reshaped Bakiyev’s policy 
toward Manas.
487
 The Russian Federation was still seething over the presence of the Missile 
Defence Shield system in Europe and Bakiyev’s proclamation that the American military 
base would soon be evicted provided a form of catharsis for the Kremlin’s security-
obsessed bureaucrats. Bakiyev’s reversal of policy hastened the Russian foreign policy 
apparatus to oppose him and his entire regime. The New York Times noted: 
Whatever happens domestically, a new government will have to decide how to 
balance the interests of the United States and Russia, which both have military bases 
in Kyrgyzstan and want to maintain a presence in the region. Paul Quinn-Judge, 
Central Asia project director for International Crisis Group, a research organization, 
said Russia had stoked anti-American sentiment in Kyrgyzstan in recent months, 
often over the issue of the base.
488
  
 
 The new regime headed by Rosa Otunbayeva was a new opportunity for the Russian 
Federation to forge a more secure post-Soviet space with lessened Western influence. The 
political obfuscation and denials on the part of the Russian Federation and its alleged non-
role in the political unrest that led to Bakiyev’s ousting are preposterous. The Russian 
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Federation had much to gain and was seeking to consolidate its control over a strategically 
important country in terms of Russian security. The Russian Federation’s ‘fingerprints’ are 
easily discernible in this foreign policy event and the full support they offered to the new 
leaders after Bakiyev’s ousting further proves this. The Kremlin’s foreign policy apparatus 
moved in favour of bringing in a new Kyrgyz regime in order to return the balance of 
security to Russia’s advantage. Dr. Alexander Cooley noted, ‘For Russia, military bases 
equate to power and prestige. The Russians see Manas as an infringement of their influence 
in the region. It’s a counter-reaction to the US.’489 
 The Russian Security Council’s involvement in these events in relation to 
Kyrgyzstan is best described as ‘marginal.’ The Russian Security Council did not play a 
major role publicly in the response to these events in the post-Soviet sphere. Several 
reasons for this exist and for the purpose of understanding the Russian foreign policy 
apparatus during the Medvedev presidency, a thorough examination of these reasons will 
provide a detailed explanation of the Russian Security Council’s persistent non-usage in the 
event of emergency foreign policy matters. Nikolai Patrushev’s control of the advisory 
forum and its role in Russian foreign policy will be analyzed by virtue of the official and 
certified involvement of its mechanistic policy formulation or lack thereof.  
 Shortly before the uprising in Kyrgyzstan and Bakiyev’s ousting, there were 
terrorist attacks on trains in Moscow that took the Russian Security Council’s attention 
away from pressing foreign policy matters.
490
 Patrushev’s role as head of an advisory 
committee did not relegate his position in the Russian government’s response to the 
domestic terrorist attacks by Islamic separatists. Patrushev was interviewed repeatedly in 
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the days after the attacks and fully recognized the potential dangers and tactics that caused 
Russia to be on high alert. 
491
 A ‘civil war’ or ‘coup’ in a small country in the post-Soviet 
space was not vital enough to demand his attention when terrorist attacks crippled the 
Russian capital’s public transportation and ignited fear among Russian citizens across the 
country. Nikolai Patrushev, the Russian Security Council Secretary, commented:  
Following the tragic terrorist attacks in the Moscow metro important new thinking on 
counter-terrorism.  In particular, the protection of crowded places, especially on 
public transport.  Another important aspect.  After the explosions, for some time, the 
population reacts by providing law enforcement information that is worrying them.  
May take a while, and this reaction is markedly reduced.  And, perhaps, the police do 
not get the data to it.  However, to increase operational and preventive work to 
prevent terrorist attacks.  In general, we have built a system to prevent the attacks.  A 
National Anti-Terrorism Committee, the Federal Emergency Headquarters, anti-
terrorism committee and operational headquarters in the Russian regions.
492
  
 
 Patrushev’s role in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks was to mollify public 
opinion and attempt to boost morale by presenting a strong, united front in response to the 
heinous crimes against innocent Russian citizens. The Kremlin allocated these duties to 
Patrushev and his role in relation to Bakiyev’s ouster is not easy to discern because he 
neither made any memorable public statements regarding Kyrgyzstan, nor was there a 
Russian Security Council meeting convened for this important issue in the post-Soviet 
space. The importance of Kyrgyzstan did not reach the same level of priority as Georgia 
did, and the Kremlin was hesitant to magnify this issue by public pronouncements or media 
interviews. Even though links to Georgia’s role in the terrorist attacks were not evident, 
Patrushev repeatedly accused Saakashvili and his regime of either fomenting or organizing 
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these terrorist attacks.
493
 Even while Kyrgyzstan was undergoing a momentous 
transformation, Patrushev’s fixation on Georgia remained abundant and uninterrupted to 
the point of implicating Georgian leadership in a terrorist conspiracy when evidence of this 
was non-existent. 
 The Russian Security Council held no meetings on Kyrgyzstan and was preoccupied 
with the terrorist attacks, the investigation, and recalibration of counter-terrorism resources 
in order to prevent additional attacks. One meeting worthy of note was a public discussion 
by the Russian Security Council of: ‘Results of the public discussion of the project of state 
policy in the field of cultural and moral values, the strengthening of the spiritual unity of 
the Russian people.’ 494 This may have not dealt specifically with the terrorist attacks but 
the objective to bolster national morale was clear. The Russian Security Council was 
assigned the role of providing the Russian people with the assurance they needed to move 
forward and return to a prosperous way of life after the attacks. The Kremlin also noted 
Patrushev’s meeting with officials from the Volga District during this time in the following 
terms: ‘This meeting is part of the work for the National Security Strategy of the Russian 
Federation until 2020, and the strategic planning process in the Russian Federation, more 
efficient use of the potential of the Russian Presidential representatives in federal districts 
in meeting the challenges faced by the Security Council of the Russian Federation.’495 The 
Russian Security Council’s document that passed in 2009 by presidential authority 
encompassed this new role as ‘protector’ and strengthened protocol in ‘the security 
apparatus,’ but its responsibilities vary and are related to objectives regarding the prosperity 
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of the Russian Federation.
496
 Prosperity is severely threatened by terrorist attacks in the 
social, economic, and security senses. Terrorism was now a major issue for the Russian 
Security Council’s strengthened protocols since the authorization of the National Security 
Concept document in 2009. This provided the Russian Security Council with new duties 
and imperatives. Silovik Patrushev’s impulses were a motivating factor behind the 
document and his new importance in security matters was welcomed by him and the 
hawkish bureaucrats on the Russian Security Council. 
  In the same vein, presidential authority by the conduct of Dmitry Medvedev 
precluded the Russian Security Council from exerting its influence in the decision to 
support Bakiyev’s ouster and recognize the interim government. The Yeltsonian forces of 
the presidential system in the Russian Federation obstruct and neutralize any document or 
mechanism from asserting itself against the presidential prerogative. Patrushev was 
effectively marginalized in the events occurring in Kyrgyzstan and any policy input he 
would have offered was stymied. The 1993 Russian Constitution empowered Medvedev to 
exercise his control over the Russian Security Council by not convening the mechanism, 
even though the Russian Security Council Secretary may have attempted to insert himself 
and his advisory forum into the presidential decision-making. Medvedev’s constitutional 
authority was unchallengeable and Patrushev was relegated to minor importance by the will 
of the Russian President. The Yeltsonian constitutional entitlements that create an 
exceptionally powerful presidency remain a guiding force in policy formation that allows 
the Russian President to employ or marginalize any ministry, agency, or department as he 
or she believes is necessary. In this case, Medvedev’s continued marginalization of the 
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Russian Security Council during Bakiyev’s ouster was exercised fully within the scope of 
the office of the Russian presidency.  
 Patrushev was not the only key player in the Russian government to be 
marginalized. Sergei Lavrov, a Yeltsin Liberal, who has been a chief diplomat in the 
Russian government throughout the Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev years was not engaged in 
this issue or consulted by Medvedev or Putin in any noteworthy way. The Putin-Medvedev 
duo has maintained the persistent presence of Yeltsin Liberals in the foreign affairs branch 
of the Russian government, but they refuse to enlarge their role in the foreign policy 
formulation. The Kyrgyz issue was dealt with by the top level of the Russian governmental 
hierarchy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not engaged in this issue. No important 
speech or interview regarding Bakiyev’s ouster or the new interim government was given 
by Lavrov. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was simply not instructed to assert his views on 
the matter and with the terrorist attacks in Moscow and a myriad of foreign policy issues on 
the world stage, Lavrov was not questioned about the issue in detail by the news media, nor 
did he instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to publicly address it. Any involvement in 
the Kyrgyz issue by Lavrov was minimal at best.  
 To reiterate, Sergei Lavrov’s obstacles to exerting powerful influence in the 
Kremlin’s foreign policy decisions are effective. Lavrov does not enjoy a longstanding 
rapport with anyone from Putin’s inner sanctum. Lavrov is a diplomat whose career was 
forged and defined by the Yeltsin years. The Siloviki and Technocrats brought into 
government by Putin in 2000 to address grievances against the Yeltsin Administration 
provided the new operatives in government with a dismal assessment of the Yeltsin 
bureaucrats, even if some did remain in government positions. Medvedev and Putin have 
kept Lavrov in this position because he is a consummate and loyal diplomat, but his input 
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in foreign policy decisions is not sought by the Siloviki or Technocrats because of the 
collective dread of the Yeltsin years. Lavrov rarely attends Russian Security Council 
meetings or meetings with the President or Prime Minister. His role has been stifled for his 
lack of rapport with members of Putin’s inner sanctum and the taint of a presidential 
administration remembered for corruption and inefficiency. Lavrov’s perfunctory role in 
government is that of a chief diplomat whose career has been stifled by the past and poor 
personal relations with the new powers in the post-Yeltsin Russia. Lavrov’s unfortunate 
situation in which he is marginalized by the security-obsessed Siloviki and dutiful, 
pragmatic Technocrats is an extension of the anti-Yeltsin collective dread that caused the 
Yeltsin Administration to leave power prematurely. The ‘guilt by association’ and the 
‘outsider status’ have proven to be difficult for Lavrov to overcome. Ambassador Stephen 
Sestanovich, former Ambassador-at-Large to the former Soviet Republics and professor at 
Columbia University, commented: ‘Neither Lavrov or Churkin is a power player in palace 
politics. They’re bureaucrats.’497 Neither Medvedev or Putin properly consulted Russia’s 
chief diplomat on the momentous and possibly dangerous situation in Kyrgyzstan; his lack 
of a public role in addressing this and absence as a chief interlocutor in this issue are a 
testament to this very fact.   
 Serdyukov’s role in this was not dissimilar to Lavrov, even though Serdyukov was 
clearly a member of Putin’s inner sanctum. Serdyukov was a dutiful, pragmatic Technocrat 
who never openly objected to the Medvedev presidency or offered independent or 
conflicting stances on pressing issues. Serdyukov was a loyal member of the Medvedev 
government. His actions in the conflict with Georgia and government service have never 
been within reproach. Serdyukov came to the Minister of Defence position with no 
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discernible political ideology and his relations with fellow Technocrat Medvedev have been 
cordial and not problematic. Serdyukov, similar to Lavrov, never made any serious public 
announcements or gave any significant interviews about the events in Kyrgyzstan. The 
issue was left out of the scope of the Minister of Defence and the Putin-Medvedev duo 
dealt with the specifics entirely out of view of the news media, which was focusing on the 
domestic terrorist attacks. The reasons why only the Russian President and Prime Minister 
formulated a response to the Kyrgyz issue merits investigation. Even an insider like 
Serdyukov whose loyalty and background are beyond reproach was marginalized by the 
Putin-Medvedev duo. The issue in Kyrgyzstan posed a serious risk to Russian defence and 
security and the Minister of Defence would have readily acknowledged this issue, but his 
involvement was not noteworthy. Serdyukov was left out of the policy formulation that 
occurred at the highest level of government. Similar to Lavrov, Serdyukov’s only 
meaningful role in this issue was well after the outcome of Bakiyev’s ouster and instalment 
of the new interim government headed by Rosa Otunbayeva. In late June of 2010, The 
London Telegraph reported the following:  
According to military sources quoted in authoritative Russian daily newspaper 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, President Medvedev has already ordered Anatoliy Serdyukov, 
the Russian Minister of Defence, to ensure that the new base, which it is estimated 
will cost Russia at least $250 million (£167 million) and house a minimum of one 
thousand troops, becomes a reality.
498
  
 
 The centrality of Serdyukov’s role was to attend to military matters after the Kyrgyz 
issue quelled and the new leadership was firmly in power. The surreptitious method by 
which Serdyukov and Lavrov were employed by their superiors suggests that the Kremlin 
had already desired a certain outcome and bided its time while everything was set in place 
for it to establish and implement its plans. The Kremlin’s longstanding opposition to 
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Western influence and NATO in the post-Soviet sphere is unquestionable. In addition to 
this, the method by which it handled this issue suggests a quiet, calculated response to the 
crisis in which it did not hastily intervene, nor did it seek to ignite by promoting bloodshed. 
The Russian military did not invade or increase its presence, but plans for a stronger 
Russian defence role in Kyrgyzstan were preconceived well before the crisis erupted. The 
Putin-Medvedev’s marginal use of the Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
suggests that plans to effectively increase the potency of its military base were planned well 
in advance on the presidential level and that the security balance in Russia’s favour was 
now being achieved in a calculated and systematic manner.  
 The New START Treaty however did not stop Medvedev from threatening to 
commence a ‘new arms race’ if the Missile Defence Shield in the Czech Republic were not 
removed. NATO enlargement had been a perennial point of contention with Vladimir Putin 
during his presidency. The new Defence Doctrine adopted in 2010 did not alter the rhetoric 
of Russia’s anti-NATO stance.499 The Putin-Medvedev duo were not going to accept an 
American military base in Kyrgyzstan, which was close to its borders, if they had a role in 
influencing this perceived ‘security imbalance’ that threatened the Russian Federation. Dr. 
Alexander Cooley noted, ‘During New START, Manas was an important issue. New 
START had no effect on the issue, however. There were no tangible gains for either, 
especially regarding Manas.’500 Medvedev was entitled to marginalize any agencies or 
ministers as he believed necessary by virtue of the 1993 Russian Constitution that 
centralized power in the office of the presidency. The Yeltsonian forces precluded 
government ministers from effectively rebelling against the President in the event that 
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Medvedev did not consult or involve them in decision-making. The Russian presidency did 
not operate in a government that required the consent of chief ministers. Yeltsin ensured 
that the government not resemble a parliamentary cabinet or collective leadership regime 
similar to the Soviet years. Medvedev’s decision was his to make alone in regards to the 
Kyrgyz issue.  
 Medvedev never suggested his definite position on this issue, but hinted that change 
was necessary.
501
 Medvedev argued, ‘“Our task is to help the Kyrgyz people find a calm 
way out of this crisis,” Medvedev said, suggesting Bakiyev should formally step down to 
defuse a crisis he said could develop into a “second Afghanistan.”’502 Medvedev’s 
‘innocuous’ statement aimed to distance himself from the issue while still stating his 
support for the anti-Bakiyev forces. Putin took a more direct approach by speaking directly 
with Rosa Otunbayeva, the leader of the new interim government on April 8, and tacitly 
endorsing her and offering incentives for cooperation with Russia.
503
 The support was 
appreciated to such a magnitude by the new government in Bishkek that a motion to name a 
mountain after Putin developed.
504
 The outcome was clearly something the Putin-
Medvedev duo desired but their surreptitious approach to the issue by not engaging chief 
government ministers or directly associating themselves with Bakiyev’s ouster leads one to 
wonder why exactly this approach was taken.  
 The New START Treaty and Obama’s decision to cancel missile installation plans 
in Poland was the beginning of the ‘Reset’ of relations. Accusations of fostering rebellion 
and insurrection in Kyrgyzstan would have damaged the Kremlin’s credibility in the new 
                                                 
501‘US says it is prepared to help new Kyrgyz rulers’, Todays Zaman, 15 Apr. 2010, Google News Archive, accessed 4 June 2012. 
502 Ibid. 
503 RIA Novosti, ‘Putin speaks on phone with Kyrgyz opposition-nominated premier’, RIA Novosti [web page] (2010) 
<http://en.ria.ru/world/20100408/158479220.html >, accessed 5 June 2010. 
504 Richard Orange, ‘Kyrgyzstan to name mountain after Vladimir Putin’, The London Telegraph, 4 Jan. 2011, Google News Archive 
[online database], accessed 5 June 2012. 
193 
 
rapprochement that started in 2009 after Obama’s inauguration. The Putin-Medvedev duo 
needed a more covert method to foster change in Kyrgyzstan after Bakiyev failed or chose 
not to implement his government’s decision to evict the American military base. Russia’s 
generous financial aid package in the aftermath of Bakiyev’s announcement that the 
American military base would be evicted was given in vain. The Kremlin’s generosity was 
unrewarded and Russia sought to regain its control of its post-Soviet neighbour of great 
strategic importance. Stratfor’s Intelligence Analysis published a report during the crisis 
and noted that: ‘Given its strategic location, control of Kyrgyzstan offers the ability to 
pressure Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China. Kyrgyzstan is thus a critical piece 
in Russia's overall plan to resurge into its former Soviet sphere.’505  The London Telegraph 
reported in June 2010 that Russia planned to build a second military base in Kyrgyzstan, 
which Nezavisimaya Gazeta had reported Serdyukov was in charge of those military 
preparations and had already commenced.
506
 The Kremlin’s desire to secure this country 
for its own purposes is evident, but its indirect method cements its inherent involvement in 
the events that led to Bakiyev’s ouster.  
 On April 1, 2010, shortly before Bakiyev’s ouster The Jamestown Foundation 
assessed the Russian-controlled media campaign against Bakiyev and concluded that the 
Kremlin had made a decision that Bakiyev’s regime was threatening Russian interests.507 
Dr. Alexander Cooley stated, ‘Russians perpetuated anti-Bakiyev media exposés in 
newspapers and news reports of corruption. The timing was interesting. It started in the 
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months before the ouster. The soft power barrage began.’508 The Kremlin owns a vast 
portion of the media in Russia and Kyrgyzstan.
509
 The potency to stoke anti-Bakiyev 
fervour in Russia and Kyrgyzstan was fully within the grasp of the Kremlin. Eric Marat, 
analyst for The Jamestown Foundation, opined on the media campaign against Bakiyev:  
In the past two weeks, the Russian media has fiercely criticized the Kyrgyz President, 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s, regime. Newspapers and TV programs have sought to reveal 
the President’s corruption and nepotism, with some newspapers alleging the regime’s 
involvement in the killing of journalist Gennady Pavluk last December. The role of 
the President’s son, Maksim, in corruption was also scrutinized.510  
 
 Medvedev and Putin recognized the Gorbachovian forces of democratization and 
empowerment of the former Soviet citizens in relation to their governments. The media 
campaign sought to change public opinion against Bakiyev within his own country and the 
Russian Federation, which was accomplished and effectively achieved his ouster. The 
Jamestown Foundation’s article further asserts that the media campaign to alter public 
opinion illuminates a key facet in how the Kremlin seeks to foster change in the post-Soviet 
sphere.
511
 Medvedev and Putin manipulated the Gorbachovian forces of democratization to 
influence the masses. In Russia, the media campaign to garner support for Medvedev’s 
decision to endorse the post-Bakiyev government seeks to grant him the legitimacy needed 
to operate in the new political environment created by the reforms enacted by Gorbachev. 
In Kyrgyzstan, the Tulip Revolution in 2005 showed the world that the post-Soviet sphere 
was not impervious to the power of the Gorbachovian forces of democratization, which 
empowered the average citizen to enact change. Kyrgyzstan was prone to regime change as 
seen by the ouster of President Askar Akayev in 2005. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva opined, ‘The 
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people of Kyrgyzstan have a tendency of ousting people who fall in the court of public 
opinion.’512 Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev’s tandem democracy was now working 
in a surreptitious manner to manipulate the forces of democratization by authorizing a 
campaign of propaganda against a leader who had reneged on his promise to remove an 
American military base. The potency of the Gorbachovian democratization is clear by the 
quick and effective coup that ended Bakiyev’s regime. The Putin-Medvedev regime 
governed in a country where Gorbachev’s reforms were enacted for the benefit of the 
average citizen, but in this instance public legitimacy was denied to Bakiyev for a motive 
that served the interests of the Kremlin, not the citizens of Kyrgyzstan.  
Reflections: 
 The system in which the Kremlin is operating manoeuvred its foreign policy 
mechanisms to surreptitiously enact regime change in a post-Soviet country where there 
was a competition for influence. Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the world with both 
American and Russian military bases.
513
 Vladimir Putin spent his entire presidency 
advocating against NATO enlargement and Western influence in the post-Soviet space. 
Kyrgyzstan’s strategic importance made it an important issue for the Kremlin. Dmitry 
Medvedev acted in a covert manner to oust President Bakiyev, who had reneged on a 
promise to evict the American military base. The Kremlin’s lavish financial aid incentives 
reaped no rewards for the Russian Federation and because of this it was determined at the 
highest level of government that Bakiyev must be removed from the presidency.  
 This decision was made in the context of issues and events occurring 
simultaneously during the spring of 2010. A new treaty between the United States and 
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Russia was signed on the executive level; the Missile Defence Shield system installed by 
the United States and NATO in the Czech Republic caused Medvedev, a man of a mild 
temperament, to threaten the West with a new arms race if the missile system were not 
removed.
514
 The new military doctrine in 2010 was not original and the anti-NATO rhetoric 
continued unabated and was vociferous in nature. The Russian Federation was being dovish 
and hawkish at the same time and a delicate balancing act ensued while still maintaining 
policies in the interests of the Kremlin and its goals. Medvedev’s liberal temperament and 
Putin’s hawkish tendencies were fully responsible for the array of events and responses 
during this period. There was bilateral cooperation and sharp posturing that reminded both 
former Cold War adversaries that the game of geopolitics and international security is not 
yet over.  
 Medvedev exercised his presidential powers fully within the Yeltsonian forces that 
empowered his office to lead the government as he sees necessary without needing to build 
a consensus among policy-makers. The Russian Security Council was not convened for the 
purpose of discussing the events in Kyrgyzstan and whether Russia should support Bakiyev 
or his opposition. The Minister of Defence was instructed to implement plans for increasing 
Russian military presence in Kyrgyzstan and his policy input regarding the ouster was not 
sought. Lavrov’s role in the concerted effort to oust Bakiyev by the Russian Federation is 
difficult to assert because the Minister of Foreign Affairs kept unusually quiet on the 
subject or may have been excluded from these discussions altogether. Neither Lavrov, nor 
Serdyukov played an important role in this foreign policy decision.  
 The Putin-Medvedev duo decided to foster an insurrection by virtue of the order to 
perpetuate anti-Bakiyev news media and fully support the opposition. Dr. Alexander 
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Cooley noted, ‘The effects of Georgia crystallized Russia’s idea of the sphere of influence. 
The doctrine became formalized during the Medvedev presidency. The same grand strategy 
during Putin continued during Medvedev. If Putin had been in power, nothing would have 
been different.’515 The media campaign against Bakiyev was effective, and the opposition 
leaders claim that Russian support helped them achieve the coup and install a new 
government.
516
 Putin was among the first statesmen to publicly recognize Rosa Otunbayeva 
as the new leader and the new government publicly stated its intentions to name a mountain 
in Vladimir Putin’s honour in 2010.517 Dr. Alexander Cooley notes that the leader of the 
interim government after Bakiyev’s ouster, ‘Rosa Otunbayeva is pro-Russian and Moscow 
supports her. She immediately visits Russia and the CIS.’518 It would be difficult to claim 
that Russia was not responsible for this foreign policy event. In the aftermath of Bakiyev’s 
ouster, Russia was enabled to successfully enlarge its military presence and impede the 
American military base’s efforts to negotiate a new deal with new post-Bakiyev leaders to 
prolong its presence. The battle over strategic control was won in Russia’s favour. 
 This foreign policy event is a testament to the powerful impact of Gorbachev’s 
democratization both in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Putin and Medvedev remembered well 
how the Tulip Revolution in 2005 ousted a leader who had fallen in the court of public 
opinion in Kyrgyzstan. The lessons of history did not elude the top of the Russian foreign 
policy apparatus hierarchy. The Kremlin sought to regain control in the post-Soviet space in 
spite of the Missile Defence Shield in the Czech Republic and regardless of the new treaty 
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that called for a renewed rapprochement between the former Cold War adversaries. The 
Russian media control ignited an insurrection that granted the new post-Bakiyev leadership 
legitimacy from the citizens in Kyrgyzstan, and granted the Putin-Medvedev duo 
legitimacy from Russian constituents in its decision to support the new government in 
Bishkek after Bakiyev’s ouster. The Kremlin manipulated the forces of democratization to 
fulfil its own pragmatic objectives that it felt would ensure Russian security against NATO 
and the West. The Kremlin’s objectives were achieved. Russian military presence is 
increasing in Kyrgyzstan, while that of the United States is precarious and unable to follow 
the same trend as the Russian Federation. After the interim government left power in 
Kyrgyzstan and a government elected by the Kyrgyz people for a full term was 
inaugurated, President Almazbek Atambayev announced that the American military base 
would be turned into a transportation centre for civilian purposes by 2014.
519
 Dr. Alexander 
Cooley noted, ‘The new President Atambayev has moved to join Russia’s customs union. 
He has moved his country closer to Russia. He has pledged to close Manas by 2014.’520 
The United States will lose its military base in a country that it and the Russian Federation 
believe is of vital strategic importance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
519 Michael Schwirtz, ‘New Leader Says U.S. Base in Kyrgyzstan Will Be Shut’, The New York Times, 1 Nov. 2011, The New York 
Times Archive [online database], accessed 5 June 2012. 
520 A. Cooley, ‘The ouster of President Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan’ [interviewed by Julian Reder], 14 December 2012, Barnard College, 
Columbia University, New York, New York. 
199 
 
Chapter 5: Russia’s Response to the Iranian Nuclear Threat 
Introduction: 
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 that passed in June 2010 against 
Iran for failure to comply with international nuclear protocol was the most stringent and 
binding set of sanctions against the country.
521
 The Russian Federation ultimately 
consented to the resolution amidst a renewed rapprochement with the United States, even 
though contention with NATO’s Missile Defence Shield system in the Czech Republic as 
well as a covert proxy battle over the strategic control of Kyrgyzstan were evident during 
2010. The relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation was publicly 
closer after the signing of The New START Treaty. The disagreement over the missile 
shield issue between Russia and primarily the U.S. was an obstacle for peaceful, productive 
relations, but the United States led the call for sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear 
weapons development. The Russian Federation joined the cause.
522
 The decision by the 
Russian Federation to consent to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 against 
Iran will be examined in the context of its relations with the West and its aversion to 
nuclear development in Iran. The Kremlin’s decision to support sanctions in the interests of 
international security ranks among the most important Russian foreign policy decisions. Dr. 
Mark Galeotti noted the Russian response to the Iranian crisis as: ‘Russia’s interests require 
it to work in the framework of international structures. A nuclear Iran was not in Russia’s 
best interests.’523 Rogue regimes with nuclear development ambitions were not the primary 
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concern of Russian policy-makers so the Iranian issue deserves proper scrutiny to 
extrapolate the nuances and mechanisms of the Kremlin’s foreign policy-making. 
 The current academic literature on the Russian Federation and its foreign policy has 
collectively neglected to examine the importance of the Russian Foreign Affairs Doctrine 
established in 2008 during the early days of the Medvedev presidency because of the 
collective dismissal of the merits of the foreign affairs arms of the Russian government in 
the policy formulation process. The Yeltsin Liberals, who occupy the foreign affairs branch 
of the government, have been marginalized by Putin’s inner circle. This trend continued 
unabated during the Medvedev years. Sergei Lavrov’s ‘diplomatic but assertive’ posturing 
was not ideologically or stylistically incompatible with the Kremlin, but the taint of the 
Yeltsin years and a general collective aversion to ‘Yeltsin’s bureaucratic mafia’ precluded 
Lavrov and Ambassador Vitaly Churkin from guiding or affecting the foreign policy 
debates in the upper echelons of the government’s  hierarchy. There is a fascinating facet to 
the sanctions against Iran for the Kremlin; this issue was more of a diplomatic dilemma 
than an issue of defence for Russia. The decision was implemented within the United 
Nations machinery. The Security Council of the United Nations requires a unanimous vote, 
which includes the Russian Federation to consent to sanctions or abstain from a vote. 
 The issue was similar to the North Korean nuclear confrontation that required the 
consent of the Russian Federation for United Nations Security Council sanctions. Iran 
posed a similar threat to its region and invoked its sovereignty as the motivating factor in 
defying the will of the international community. The United States was heavily involved in 
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the Iranian issue to the same degree as it was with the North Korean nuclear 
confrontation.
524
  
 There were, however, three key differences with the Iranian crisis of 2010. The first 
is that by the middle of 2010 both the United States and the Russian Federation were seeing 
a reversal of the tensions that had escalated since the war with Georgia in 2008. The New 
START Treaty was in the process of being ratified in the respective legislatures after being 
signed on the executive level by both the American and Russian Presidents. Second, the 
United States and NATO had installed a Missile Defence Shield system in the Czech 
Republic because of what they perceived was a looming danger from Iran’s nuclear 
weapons program. According to David Speedie, ‘Putin proposed a joint-missile defence 
employment in Uzbekistan, but the United States wanted it in the Czech Republic, which is 
close to the target, Iran.’525 This effort to enforce sanctions against Iran occurred shortly 
after the ousting of Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan, which was facilitated by the Kremlin. The 
desired goal by the Putin-Medvedev regime was achieved after it decided it was necessary 
to support ousting a leader who had no qualms about extending the lease of an American 
military base in Kyrgyzstan, which is part of the post-Soviet space. The ensuing revolution 
in Kyrgyzstan resulted in the United States losing a strategic position for waging its 
military operations in the Middle East, a feature of US policy which had begun after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 
526
 
 Earlier in this body of research, the Minister of Defence and the defence apparatus 
were not intricately involved with the North Korean issue. The issue played out within the 
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confines of the United Nations Security Council and within the Kremlin. The essential  
issues arising with the Iranian episode are how the presidential leadership responded to the 
crisis, what mechanisms within the Kremlin’s foreign policy machinery were utilized, and 
how the clashes and contentions as well as the rapprochement with the West weighed on 
the ultimate decision to support the international consensus against Iran’s increasing 
nuclear capabilities.  
 The Putin-Medvedev duo and the Kremlin elite were faced with a daunting task of 
reining in a rogue regime from pursuing nuclear weapons capability. The support for 
sanctions came at a time of contradictory relations for the Kremlin with the West; the time 
period can be described as one of productive, peaceful relations and diplomatic tension 
between former Cold War adversaries. Sanctions against rogue regimes with Russia’s 
support were not unprecedented. The Putin presidency supported sanctions against Iran and 
North Korea multiple times.
527
 Therefore, there is a collective, conscious effort by those in 
power in the Kremlin to support sanctions in order to safeguard international security. The 
justifications behind this foreign policy trend are examined to illuminate the approach to 
nuclear proliferation and rogue regimes by the Kremlin. The era of pragmatism has made 
the Russian Federation a seemingly assertive ally in an alliance to deal with potential 
threats that may result in large-scale nuclear catastrophes.  
 The Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Document must be examined to fully 
understand the Russian response to Iran’s illegal nuclear activity. Furthermore, the Foreign 
Policy Document establishes principles for Russian diplomacy in the international arena. 
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Foreign Policy Document: 
 The Foreign Policy Document reflected the new Russian view of itself since the end 
of the Yeltsin presidency.
528
 ‘To promote an objective image of the Russian Federation 
globally as a democratic state committed to a socially oriented market economy and an 
independent foreign policy.’529 
 The Russian Foreign Policy Document was continuing the Putin era of projecting a 
new, vibrant Russia with a free market economy and a foreign policy guided by its own 
national interests.
530
 Namely, the Partnership for Peace and Yeltsin’s inhibited approach to 
dealing effectively with NATO to safeguard Russian security interests are inherent 
aversions in this statement.  These principles are highly important as they are stated in the 
beginning of the document.
531
 The document proceeds to grapple and solidify Russia’s 
approach to world affairs and the grievances it has.
532
 The Foreign Policy Document states: 
Russia, being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, participant in the G8 
and other authoritative international and regional organizations, intergovernmental 
dialogue and cooperation mechanisms, and as a country possessing a major potential 
and significant resources in all spheres of human activities, vigorously developing 
relations with leading States and associations throughout the world and integrating 
consistently into the world economy and politics, exerts a substantial influence upon 
the development of a new architecture of international relations.
533
 
 
 The Russian Federation’s foreign policy will now require the country to take a 
fundamental role in navigating the international arena in which states come together to 
coalesce alliances and formulate solutions for problems concerning the world stage. The 
elementary impulse of the Foreign Policy Document is to further distance itself from the 
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Yeltsin years, a time when Russia was marginalized and manipulated in the minds of those 
who occupied important positions in the Kremlin during the Medvedev presidency. The 
text emphasizes the important role the Russian Federation has as a permanent member of 
the United Nations Security Council and the Silovik controlled Kremlin would relish this 
importance as security is the theoretical underpinning of any like-minded Putinist 
individual who acts to thwart any developments or architecture on the world stage that may 
threaten Russia. The language was delicately tailored to be compatible with the Silovik 
worldview.
534
 It would be nearly impossible to imagine that the influential Prime Minister 
did not heavily influence this document over any objection by Lavrov, the stalwart Yeltsin 
Liberal whose influence is marginal at best because of his ideology and past association.
535
 
The ultimate sin of Yeltsin’s tenure for the current Kremlin elite was that NATO expansion 
was not thwarted or even impeded. The perceived capitulation during the 1990’s was 
blamed for NATO’s current emboldened position on the world stage and its encroachment 
on Russian security by the leaders in the Kremlin.
536
 Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000 
with the intention to bring the Russian Federation back to its status as a great power after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, which he has described as a terrible event in history.
537
 The 
following text from the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Document illustrates that the 
post-Yeltsin Russia will not allow NATO to gain strategically if Russian security is 
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compromised.
538
 This text is the fundamental mindset of the post-Yeltsin operatives who 
occupy powerful positions in the Kremlin: 
Russia will build its relationship with NATO taking into consideration the degree of 
the alliance's readiness for equal partnership, unswerving compliance with the 
principles and standards of international law, the implementation by all its members 
of the obligations, assumed within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council, not 
to ensure one's security at the expense of security of the Russian Federation, as well 
as the obligation to display military restraint. Russia maintains its negative attitude 
toward the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and 
Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military 
infrastructure closer to the Russian borders on the whole, which violates the principle 
of equal security, leads to new dividing lines in Europe and runs counter to the tasks 
of increasing the effectiveness of joint work in search for responses to real challenges 
of our time.
539
 
 
 The title of the clause ‘Strengthening international security’ is the main ideological 
premise of the Silovik worldview evident in the document.
540
 The Yeltsin Liberals in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs were, by virtue of the obvious Silovik-inspired rhetoric of the 
document, excluded from formulating a foreign policy guideline that is compatible with the 
liberal ideology of conceding to the West in the interests of rectifying past inequities. The 
Foreign Policy Concept contains no sense of loss over the Cold War and instead aims to 
resurrect the ‘great power status’ Russia once enjoyed.541  
 The previous text of the Foreign Policy Concept that was included in this chapter 
does noticeably include three important points of contention that it overtly mentions.
542
 
‘Equal partnership’ in no uncertain terms reflects the foreign policy apparatus’ belief that 
Russia should not and will not capitulate to NATO or any other Western-dominated 
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collective organization.
543
 The ‘Partnership for Peace fiasco’ in which Russia ended up 
with no diplomatic or defence gains lowered its position on the world stage even further. 
This was a primary characteristic of Boris Yeltsin’s foreign policy.544 The foreign policy 
guidelines insinuated that only equal, bilateral relations between Russia and Western 
security architecture will occur.
545
 Furthermore, it states that NATO enlargement is a threat 
and that Ukraine and Georgia moving closer to NATO will only inflame the security 
dilemma and will not result in peaceful coexistence.
546
 Yeltsin’s lack of advocacy against 
NATO enlargement was believed to be another failure on his part by Putin’s Siloviki and 
military traditionalists, who now occupy important positions in the Russian government.  
 The Iranian issue and the Missile Defence Shield in the Czech Republic were 
therefore interwoven. The phrase that objects to the NATO Missile Defence Shield 
installed to protect security interests against a possible Iranian nuclear strike is stated: ‘to 
bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders on the whole, 
which violates the principle of equal security.’547 While this does not explicitly describe the 
Missile Defence Shield, there can be no doubt that this was a veiled reference to what was 
believed to infringe on Russian security because of the proximity of the Western security 
architecture to its borders.
548
 The new President of the United States, Barack Obama, 
cancelled plans for another Missile Defence Shield system in Poland but refused to make 
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any decision that would have involved removing the system installed in the Czech 
Republic.
549
  
 While Sergei Lavrov never maintained an influential position within the foreign 
policy apparatus, his role as perennial interviewee remained persistent throughout the 
Medvedev presidency. The Council on Foreign Relations interviewed him in 2008 to ask 
detailed questions about the new Foreign Policy Concept document and his answers 
continued to reflect the ‘diplomatic but assertive’ posturing that he began to utilize with the 
inauguration of Vladimir Putin in 2000.
550
  
 Lavrov answered his questions effectively. His responses on NATO made it 
abundantly clear that Russia would not permit an infringement of its security by any 
security architecture.
551
 Lavrov said: ‘We agreed in Russia-NATO Council, for example -- 
and this is the key issue for what we are discussing -- that security is indivisible and that no 
one should ensure his security at the expense of security of others.’552 The phrase ‘No one 
should ensure his security at the expense of security of others’ is a veiled reference to the 
Missile Defence Shield system now in Europe that could potentially be used against 
Russia.
553
 The Silovik advocacy found a new role for Sergei Lavrov and his status as 
perennial interviewee who could communicate Russian concerns to the news media. 
Lavrov, the Yeltsin Liberal who once was a chief diplomat in conducting perceived 
capitulation to the West by the Russian Federation, now played the role of spokesman for 
the Silovik worldview that precluded any collective organization or agreement from taking 
measures that may pose a threat to his country or its borders. NATO was Lavrov’s main 
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point of contention with the West and this could not be further from the diplomacy of 
‘capitulation’ that characterized the foreign affairs arm of the Russian government during 
the 1990’s in the minds of the Russian citizenry. Dr. Mark Galeotti explains the non-
obstructive role of the Yeltsin Liberals in the Putin-Medvedev regime by saying, 
‘Diplomats are very adept at adopting new rhetoric.’554 Lavrov remained a dependable 
spokesman who clearly reflected the Putin-Medvedev sentiment in the Kremlin. 
 ‘Privileged interests’ is a phrase implying that Russia will intervene when its 
security is threatened in any way regardless of whether it is a missile system or increasing 
membership of its neighbours in a Western security organization.
555
 This phrase gave the 
Russian Federation the moral and geopolitical justifications to invade, attack, or sever 
relations with any country it believes is helping NATO tip the security balance against 
Russia. Lavrov has stated: 
Russia has areas where it has privileged interests, not privileged areas, but some areas 
are the areas of privileged interest of Russia. The Foreign Policy Concept says that 
we will -- you want to get an answer from Vitaly (Churkin) or -- (laughter) -- the 
Foreign Policy Concept said that we, Russia, will develop friendly, mutually 
beneficial relations with all those who are prepared to do the same on the equal and 
mutually beneficial basis, paying particular attention to the traditional partners of the 
Russian Federation.
556
  
 
 Lavrov’s primary message is that the Foreign Policy Concept will enhance Russia’s 
ability to act independently and for its own interests, especially when security is concerned. 
The interview reflects a Yeltsin Liberal who now advocates a very different message; one 
that is compatible with the wishes of the Kremlin elite. Lavrov has yet to challenge this line 
of Silovik thinking and there is no evidence to suggest that he has tried to do so. Dr. Sergei 
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Khrushchev commented on the Yeltsin Liberals, ‘They have no ideology. Maybe they have 
their own opinion, but they do not challenge anyone.’557 Lavrov’s chameleon-like qualities 
have allowed him to remain in a high-ranking position within the foreign policy apparatus, 
but his influence in the policy debates does not suggest his diplomatic upbringing or 
liberalism had any impact on the decisions made on the presidential level.  
 It is apparent that Lavrov, an outsider of the inner circle, did not channel his liberal 
views to the Kremlin. His influence has never been an overwhelming factor in the 
formulation of doctrines by the Russian government. The foreign policy doctrine reflects 
the Silovik worldview with its refusal to allow Western security architecture to interfere in 
its sphere of influence or allow any country to lessen Russian clout in collective 
organizations operated by principles of liberal institutionalism. The Yeltsin Liberals who 
still occupy important positions in the foreign affairs arm of the Russian government have 
not effectively swayed the foreign policy decisions to negate the Silovik tendencies that are 
apparent in every decision and doctrine implemented by the government. Ultimately, there 
is an inability for Lavrov to channel his concerns and beliefs to the ears of the President, 
Prime Minister, or Russian Security Council. Lavrov’s lack of a personal relationship with 
members of Putin’s inner sanctum and reluctance to credit liberal foreign policies with any 
successes during the 1990’s have precluded him from being a powerful voice in the debates 
and deliberations within the bureaucracy. The crux of this situation is that the anti-Yeltsin 
vigour of the Kremlin elite is non-negotiable and refuses to concede to any foreign policy 
move that would allow a repetition of the 1990’s. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva noted that, 
‘Yeltsin Liberals are not feared or respected because of their association with Yeltsin.’558 
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 This fundamental stance of impeding Western security engagement runs counter to 
the spirit of The New START Treaty that brought a new period of rapprochement. The 
penultimate act between the two governments that ratified the agreement later in 2010, the 
signing ceremony, was a vibrant, cohesive act of summit diplomacy. Obama and Medvedev 
were in unison during the meeting and the Foreign Policy Concept would never have been 
considered reflective of the reality on the world stage at the time. However, summit 
diplomacy excluded the many problems that remain and the conflicts did not end with the 
signing of The New START Treaty by chief executives of the respective countries. 
Medvedev’s threat of starting a new arms race would continue the contradictory relations 
between the United States and the Russian Federation.
559
 The treaty was signed, but the 
Missile Defence Shield issue remained with no significant change. The events in 
Kyrgyzstan pointed to a Russia that may act diplomatically in a summit environment, but 
still employed tactics to alter the Western influence and security control in the post-Soviet 
space. The Foreign Policy Concept was much more accurate of Russian intentions and 
positions than any diplomatic summit would suggest, while the Iranian issue still had to be 
addressed.  
US-Russian Rapprochement?  
 The New START Treaty was signed during a contentious episode over the Missile 
Defence Shield in Prague; both parties signalled that with the signing of the treaty a closer 
relationship with more communication and cooperation was possible.
560
 The United States’ 
mission against the Iranian regime and its nuclear ambitions started during the George W. 
Bush years and continued during the Obama Administration’s tenure. The prospects of a 
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nuclear-armed Iran that is governed by an Islamic theocracy made the American foreign 
policy apparatus concerned about the destabilizing consequences in the region and possible 
impediments to military operations by the United States stemming from the September 11 
attacks.
561
 The United States needed to forge alliances to thwart the Iranian nuclear 
development and The New START Treaty was an opportunity to solidify diplomatic 
relations with the Russian Federation after a cooling of ties after the Georgian conflict and 
installation of the Missile Defence Shield. Iran was a rogue regime fixated on developing 
nuclear capabilities to increase its power in the international community, and the United 
States reconnected with its former Cold War adversary with the intention to court a 
permanent member on the United Nations Security Council in the event Iran violates 
international norms and becomes a nuclear state with sadistic ambitions. Furthermore, 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a figurehead representative of the Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, never relented in his powerful anti-Israel rhetoric. The constant 
threats by Ahmadinejad echoed across the news media and only further alarmed American 
foreign policy-makers, as well as Israel, a stalwart ally of the West and the United States. It 
was in the United States’ interests to do all it could to court the Russian Federation into 
beginning a new chapter of warmer relations in order to severely deter Iran’s nuclear 
capabilities and its widely publicized ambitions to attack Israel. The Russian Federation’s 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council is a direct reason for this. The New 
START Treaty was an effort to tilt the power balance against Iran by gaining the support of 
the Russian Federation. The Missile Defence Shield and Russia’s concerns were 
interrelated with these strategic issues on the world stage. The New START Treaty allowed 
for discussion regarding the Missile Defence Shield and the possible Iranian threat. A 
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confluence of interests forged a new path for both the United States and the Russian 
Federation, and the new treaty was a step toward ameliorating concerns in the global 
community.  
 Regardless of the fact that The New START Treaty was signed in early 2010 and 
was not officially authorized until early 2011 after respective legislatures consented to the 
agreement, the convergence of interests and willingness to work together by Obama and 
Medvedev signalled that ‘anything was on the table’ for discussion.562 The two leaders 
were now diplomatic ‘friends’ and both Presidents were able to convey mutual and 
personal concerns stemming from respective presidential vantage points. Max Bergmann, 
Nuclear Security expert at the Centre for American progress, said: ‘This is a pivotal 
moment in not just U.S.-Russia relations, but also in Iranian-Russian relations.’563 Russia as 
a result of signing the treaty undoubtedly had to recalibrate its relations with Iran to assuage 
the concerns of the United States, and the Kremlin would surely request for negotiations 
regarding the Missile Defence Shield in the Czech Republic, which was installed as a direct 
result of Iran’s nuclear development according to American foreign policy-makers. The 
political wrangling in both countries died down as a result of the power of the presidential 
prerogative and superiority in conducting foreign relations. Both the Russian and American 
Presidents are primarily responsible for the shaping of foreign policy with minimal 
involvement of respective legislative branches in their governments. The possible outcomes 
of productive cooperation outweighed any political calls for an abrogation of the treaty; the 
‘Reset’ as engineered by Obama and Michael McFaul was an American initiative that took 
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nearly two years of mediation and negotiation. The Kremlin did not hastily dismiss this 
opportunity to fundamentally alter any strategic issues that were against Russian interests.  
 Iran understood world politics to the extent that any sanctions enacted against it 
would necessitate a United Nations Security Council Resolution that requires a unanimous 
vote by permanent members. This integral mechanism for global governance established 
the importance of both Russia and China as non-Western states that are not always in 
agreement with the West and at times refuse to join the concert of powers in moves against 
rogue regimes. The New START Treaty posed a significant threat to any possible nuclear 
development deemed by the international community as endangering global security. The 
primary attribute of  The New START Treaty is that the Obama and Medvedev 
Administrations now had a continuous dialogue that began with these negotiations and will 
continue in the event that a nuclear-armed Iran poses a threat anywhere on the world stage. 
The Guardian noted: 
In other words, New Start undercuts Iranian efforts to drive a wedge between Russia 
and the west. Historically Iran's policy shifts on its nuclear programme have 
correlated with upticks in US-Russia relations. Moscow is widely seen as perhaps the 
critical vote for a sanctions resolution, since most analysts predict that China would 
likely choose to abstain rather than exercise a veto – although there are some signs 
that even the Chinese position is softening.
564
 
  
 The international politics of agreeing to sanctions against rogue regimes is guided 
by principles of treaties or even executive-level agreements. The United States now had a 
closer bilateral relationship with Russia. The power balance in the diplomatic arena was 
becoming increasingly troublesome for Iran. The Iranian leadership would have a difficult 
mission to assuage Russian concerns when its newfound ally the United States is rallying 
the world to its cause to deny Iran the opportunity to continue its illegal nuclear 
                                                 
564 Max Bergmann, Samuel Charap, Peter Juul, ‘New Start to rein in Iran's ambitions.’ The Guardian, 9 Apr. 2010, Google News Archive 
[online database], accessed 13 Sep. 2012. 
214 
 
development. Steven Pifer, director of the Arms Control Initiative at the Brookings 
Institution, commented: ‘The treaty’s ratification will reaffirm US leadership in reducing 
the global threat of nuclear weapons.’565 The American hegemony now has one more ally 
in its mission to rid the world of rogue regimes that pose nuclear threats. The Obama 
Administration engaged with the Medvedev Administration to agree to a treaty and further 
open diplomatic channels. The Medvedev Administration’s primary concern at the time 
was the American and NATO Missile Defence Shield, which the United States claimed was 
not installed to threaten Russia’s strategic capabilities but to deter the Iranian leadership 
from launching nuclear armaments. The Russian foreign policy doctrine passed in 2008 
made it abundantly clear that NATO and its security infrastructure must not infringe on 
Russian security.
566
 The long-term Russian dread of NATO is historically and 
fundamentally unchanged since the end of the Cold War, and therefore, the Russian foreign 
policy doctrine during the Medvedev presidency officially recognizes NATO as an 
undesirable factor in regional and international security. The issue of Iranian nuclear 
development was a ripe opportunity for a ‘meeting of the minds’ and caused a convergence 
of concerns and interests by both the United States and the Russian Federation. 
 The American interests in signing The New START Treaty are indivisible with its  
 
goal to eradicate rogue regimes with increasing nuclear capabilities. The Christian Science  
 
Monitor noted:     
 
Some nuclear-non-proliferation advocates maintain that the issue of Iran, and how 
successful the US and other world powers are at stopping it from developing a 
nuclear weapon, will determine future steps at arms control. Indeed, one of the 
administration’s arguments in favour of New START was that it would further the 
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good relations with Russia that have been crucial to Moscow’s cooperation in 
pressuring Tehran.
567
  
  
 The focal point of the 2010 Iranian security dilemma involved a rogue state that 
flouts international law and poses a threat to its neighbouring countries. The Russian 
Federation fully understood the perilous consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran in the region 
and this concerned Russia equally as it did the United States according to Dmitry Trenin, 
the preeminent expert on NATO-Russian relations in the United States.
568
 There was 
however a serious issue that still did not elude the Russian President when he threatened a 
‘new arms race;’ the United States and NATO have not altered their security architecture, 
specifically the Missile Defence Shield.
569
     
 Important statements were made on the day of the signing of The New START 
Treaty. Both Presidents were given the opportunity to engage in summit diplomacy and 
convey respective viewpoints that provided deep insights into the thinking of respective 
foreign policy apparatuses. President Barack Obama stated:                                                                                              
That includes accountability for those that break the rules - otherwise the NPT is just 
words on a page. That is why the United States and Russia are part of a coalition of 
nations insisting that the Islamic Republic of Iran face consequences, because they 
have continually failed to meet their obligations. We are working together at the UN 
Security Council to pass strong sanctions on Iran. And we will not tolerate actions 
that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of 
the international community and our collective security.
570
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 President Dmitry Medvedev stated:   
 
Of course, we would not omit the Iranian nuclear problem. Regrettably, Iran is not 
responding to the many constructive proposals that have been made and we cannot 
turn a blind eye to this. Therefore I do not rule out the possibility of the Security 
Council of the United Nations will have to review this issue once again. 
571
  
             
 President Dmitry Medvedev also commented: 
 
On that basis we will implement the newly signed treaty. It matters to us what will 
happen to missile defence. It is related to the configuration of our potential and our 
capacities, and we will watch how these processes develop. And the preamble has a 
language that, to a certain extent, replicates a legal principle of the unchangeability of 
circumstances that were basis for the treaty. But this is a flexible process, and we are 
interested in close cooperation over it with our American partners.
572
  
  
 For Obama, the issue of addressing Iran’s nuclear development was paramount to 
achieving strategic objectives, including ensuring global security and lessening the 
potential of an attack on a close ally, Israel. 
573
 For political reasons within his country, 
specifically to decrease the security dilemma felt by the United States in confrontation with 
an increasingly alarming nuclear situation in the Middle East and for the mission of 
continuing America’s safeguarding of international security, The New START Treaty was 
initiated and signed by the American President to thwart Iran by moving closer with Russia. 
Russia was simultaneously dealing with the prospect of a rogue state with nuclear weapons 
close in proximity, while also addressing the strategic and security implications of NATO’s 
Missile Defence Shield in the Czech Republic. Medvedev made no attempt to hide the fact 
that cooperation on nuclear weapons between the two countries will lead to a strong 
consideration of the Iranian threat, but the Missile Defence Shield system in Prague was 
vital enough to be addressed as a high priority. This was Medvedev’s express view and he 
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was echoing much of what the Russian political community had felt was a legitimate 
grievance.
574
  
 The summit diplomacy and the treaty were relevant avenues that both Presidents 
believed should be the path to empathizing respective viewpoints and achieving objectives. 
The intended quid pro quo resulting from the signing was that dialogue between Russia and 
the United States would be enhanced to build support against Iran and eventually remove 
the Missile Defence Shield, since its sole stated purpose by NATO and the United States 
was to thwart the Iranian nuclear danger. A convergence of interests mired the Russian 
foreign policy decision to consider enforcing United Nations sanctions against Iran in 2010.  
United Nations Resolution 1929: 
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 against Iran was not passed as a 
result of sudden provocation. It represented an increasing consensus that Iran’s nuclear 
development program violated international norms and posed a risk to international 
security.  The United States and the West had been on a campaign to deter the Iranian 
nuclear program for several years and now United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1929 was the most stringent set of sanctions against Iran in modern history. The Russian 
Federation’s Security Council and its chief, Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, were involved in 
this matter to the extent of carrying out the necessary protocol.
575
 On May 21, 2010, the 
Russian Security Council was assembled for an ‘operational meeting’ with both the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence, but Prime Minister Putin was 
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conspicuously absent.
576
 The presence of the Director of Intelligence was confirmed, 
however.
577
 Patrushev’s control of the Russian Security Council would not hinder any 
attempt by the Director of Intelligence to insert his knowledge and viewpoint regarding the 
ongoing Iranian nuclear issue. Patrushev’s intelligence background and hawkish worldview 
would have made it viable for the Director of Intelligence, Mikhail Fradkov who is a 
member of the Silovik faction, to warn his fellow bureaucrats that Iran will become a lethal 
nuclear state in the near future, despite public objections and omissions by the Iranian 
leadership. Fareed Zakaria, a world affairs expert was interviewed and explained the 
situation thus: 
CNN: Why has Russia not been more supportive in helping address Iran's nuclear 
program? 
Fareed Zakaria: Actually, over the last six months, there have been signs that 
Russia is frustrated with Iran and is actually willing to go along with some sanctions. 
This is mostly because of Iran's stupidity. It has lied to almost everyone, including the 
Russians, hid the Qom reactor from them, and has proved a very erratic negotiating 
partner. 
578
 
  
 Putin’s absence from the ‘operational meeting’ does not necessarily signify a 
lessening of influence or involvement, but it was indicative that Putin was Medvedev’s 
‘other half’ and carried out duties relevant to Russian affairs while Medvedev was 
entangled in the protocol and bureaucracy of formal meetings. Similar to the Georgian 
confrontation when Putin was Medvedev’s chief interlocutor with the Americans when 
engaged in face-to-face discussion with George W. Bush in Beijing, Putin, considering his 
eight years as President and possible return in 2012, was Medvedev’s partner engaged in 
presidential duties that allowed for Medvedev to be the public face of Russian leadership.
579
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Putin’s presence at the Russian Security Council meetings was just a formality, not a 
necessity, because of the close bond between the two men. Dr. Kimberly Marten 
characterized the relationship within the Putin-Medvedev duo as, ‘They have a relatively 
comfortable relationship.’580 
 In addition to this, Putin’s intelligence officer’s worldview and hawkish instincts 
characteristic of the Silovik faction would clearly have led to his deep and unwavering 
monitoring of the nuclear development in Iran and the related Missile Defence Shield. It 
would be impossible for Putin who has spent his career as President and Prime Minister 
advocating against NATO encroachment of security to ignore the Missile Defence Shield 
that was installed in the Czech Republic because of the Iranian nuclear development. It was 
simply not in Russia’s security interests to allow Iran to continue nuclear development and 
give NATO, the United States, and the West further opportunity to intervene in the region. 
Iran is the link that sparked the security dilemma between the West and Russia. The 
Kremlin would act in concert with the United States if it meant that a key reason for the 
Missile Defence Shield would now disappear. Putin’s anti-Iranian nuclear development 
stance was a foregone conclusion.  
 The Kremlin officially posted an announcement on the internet stating that 
Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev spoke on the telephone with 
the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Saeed Jalili.
581
 The two 
National Security Council secretaries engaged in bilateral discussions that could have 
hardly altered the course of events in either country. Neither secretary possessed powerful 
                                                 
580 K. Marten, ‘Russian Foreign Policy’ [interviewed by Julian Reder], 7 December 2012, Harriman Institute, Columbia University, New 
York, New York. 
581 The Security Council of the Russian Federation, ‘A telephone conversation the Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai 
Patrushev with Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of Iran Saeed Jalili’, The Kremlin Archive [web document ] (2010) 
<http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&prev=/search%3Fq%3DSecurity%2BCouncil%2Bof%2Bthe%2BRussian%2
BFederation%26hl%3Den%26biw%3D1024%26bih%3D743%26prmd%3Dimvns&rurl=translate.google.co.uk&sl=ru&u=http://www.scr
f.gov.ru/news/584.html&usg=ALkJrhjKHFWQQxVjbPXv95ZkAsBv3WbpPg> , accessed 18 October 2012. 
220 
 
influence within the respective decision-making of their governments. Patrushev served at 
the behest of a President whose ideological faction was in a constant clash with his own. 
Secretary Jalili served the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose authority is 
considered second only to God. Both individuals serve leaders with whom they have 
questionable ties and influence. The Kremlin’s announcement noted the following in 
relation to the telephone conversation: that ‘The Russian side expressed readiness to 
actively promote negotiations on the settlement of the situation around the INP and felt the 
need to rapidly search for mutually acceptable political and diplomatic solutions.’582 
 This telephone conversation can be directly attributed as arising from the foreign 
policy doctrine of the Russian Federation passed in 2008. Namely, Russia clearly and 
abundantly states in the document that it will exercise a cohesive, independent foreign 
policy.
583
 This has been Putin’s ideological fixation since the day he became President in 
2000. The Russian Federation will not kowtow to the West or align itself against any state 
on the world stage because of American or Western pressure. The telephone conversation 
did not accomplish much diplomatically. Russia consented to sanctions and the Iranian 
concerns were ignored by the Kremlin, but the signal of Russia speaking to a country facing 
imminent sanctions speaks volumes about the length Russia will go to solidify its status as 
an independent country with no resemblance to the ‘Yeltsinist capitulation’ of the 1990’s. 
The West, the United States, and permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council closely observed Russian behaviour and did question whether the effort to deter the 
Iranian nuclear crisis would be successful. The telephone conversation was the Kremlin’s 
stance that no country would influence its decisions, especially the United States that was 
leading the effort to impose sanctions against Iran. The Russian Federation would act 
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independently and the Kremlin used Secretary Patrushev to display this very fact. Mr. 
Richard Perle, during an interview with the author, commented, ‘Are we together on Iran? 
They (the Russian Federation) reluctantly agreed to sanctions that are watered down. They 
are not predisposed to be cooperative. They grudgingly will make concessions.’584 
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its chief diplomat Sergei Lavrov, and United 
Nations Ambassador Vitaly Churkin continued the diplomatic posturing and advocacy 
compatible with the Kremlin’s wishes. However, Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov’s 
role in the lead up to Resolution 1929 was marginal at best. Similar to the North Korean 
confrontation, this event was entirely played out in the diplomatic arena. Serdyukov’s role 
as defence chief and his inherent objectives were related to the Iranian nuclear crisis to the 
extent that it would change the situation with regards to the Missile Defence Shield in the 
Czech Republic. Serdyukov’s role in the aftermath of the sanctions will be examined later 
in this chapter. However, his role in the months prior to United Nations Resolution 1929 
was wholly dependent on the prerogatives of the foreign policy apparatus, which repeated 
its inclination to not involve the Ministry of Defence in decisions made on the United 
Nations Security Council. 
 Sergei Lavrov’s role in this diplomatic situation was vital for engaging the West and 
conveying concerns over possible sanctions. In March 2010, Lavrov’s bilateral meeting 
with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was his venue to publicly and personally 
communicate to Hillary Clinton and the United States government that sanctions had to be 
“smart;” the same article quoted President Medvedev claiming that ‘sanctions are usually 
pointless but may sometimes be necessary.’585 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
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the foreign policy doctrine of 2008 envision and advocate a ‘diplomatic but assertive’ 
posturing. Neither Putin, nor Medvedev has ever advocated a foreign policy that was 
isolationist or overly hawkish, but simultaneously resisted any reversal to the ‘Yeltsinist 
foreign policy of capitulation.’ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Yeltsin Liberals 
were now more assertive but remained steadfast to the central principles of peaceful and 
cooperative relations with the West. They acted in perfect unison with the post-Yeltsin 
leaders, despite not being members of the ‘inner circle.’ Dr. Mark Galeotti noted, ‘If the 
Foreign Ministry had been recalcitrant, there would have been a purge. They have not done 
this, so there was no need to remove the Yeltsin Liberals.’586 
 The United Nations Security Council vote passed with no opposition by the Russian 
Federation. Ambassador Churkin was noted by the United Nations as follows:  
VITALY CHURKIN (Russian Federation): said his vote in favour had been guided 
by his country’s consistent position on the need for to resolve through dialogue all 
questions involving Iran’s nuclear programme. Hopefully Iran would see the 
resolution as an appeal to launch substantial negotiations to clarify all issues and to 
fulfil its responsibilities toward IAEA and the Security Council. The Russian 
Federation would continue to make significant efforts to promote dialogue and the 
resolution of all such problems.
587
 
 
 The Russian Federation has consented to the most stringent set of sanctions against 
Iran in the history of the United Nations Security Council, but the phrasing and 
nonchalance of the Russian Ambassador’s response signifies important elements of the 
central underpinning of the Russian decision. First, the decision was motivated by the belief 
that resolving this issue through ‘dialogue’ implied that American and NATO military 
presence, especially the Missile Defence Shield, was no longer needed as the result of 
passage of this resolution. Second, the fundamental belief was that the vote will lead to Iran 
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complying with the IAEA and international norms. This did not necessarily mean that 
NATO and the United States will achieve its goal of removing nuclear capabilities from 
Iran. The Kremlin would not want this vote to reflect any hallmarks of the perceived 
‘Yeltsinist capitulation’ to the West of the 1990’s. Even when the Russian Federation 
aligns itself with the West, it is presenting itself as assertive and independent. This 
diplomatic approach is the Putinist foreign policy that has been the persistent doctrine since 
2000. The Foreign Policy Concept has been officially authorized in doctrinal form in 2000 
and 2008. The foreign policy doctrine has been this strategic and diplomatic arsenal of 
tactics to ensure Russian interests and prestige remain protected.   
 Lavrov played the ‘diplomatic but assertive’ role well in the sense that he did not 
ultimately align himself with the United States after the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution passed. ‘Assertive’ in the Russian context means to be independent and assert 
Russian interests before those of the West or international community. Immediately after 
the resolution passed Lavrov stated that: ‘absolute protection for all significant channels of 
trade and economic cooperation existing between Russia and Iran.’588 
 Lavrov was the voice of an independent Russia that will continue relations with a 
state classified as a ‘rogue regime’ that was struck with sanctions by the international 
community. Russia’s nonchalance and ignorance of the Western and American security and 
political objectives remain unabated. Even though sanctions were unanimously agreed upon 
by Russia and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Russia 
resisted the efforts by others to infringe upon Russian-Iranian relations. Furthermore, on the 
same day the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a sale of Russian surface-
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to-air missiles to Iran would proceed.
589
 The Russian Federation was simultaneously 
cooperating with the West but choosing its own path and approach to dealing with Iran that 
runs counter to the wishes of the international community. The foreign affairs arm of the 
Kremlin is continuing the new foreign policy era that started with Yeltsin’s resignation. The 
Russian Federation would not be marginalized or be a capitulator.  
 Russia’s independence would not be impeded or entangled because of any country 
or multilateral agreement, even a United Nations Security Council Resolution. In the 
aftermath of Resolution 1929, RIA Novosti reported Lavrov as saying that Russia would 
still cooperate with Iran’s nuclear plant regardless of anything.590 Russia was ‘playing both 
sides.’ Its diplomatic posturing was self-serving to both embolden its position on the world 
stage and its importance to the West and the United States in achieving objectives to 
safeguard international security. 
 When asked whether Russia would continue its role in supporting sanctions against 
Iran only a few months later, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that: ‘Further 
sanctions would mean the suppression of the Iranian economy and creation of social 
problems for the population. We will not be able to support this, I really mean it.’591 Russia 
was adamant that it would respond and deal with international issues on its own terms and 
its loyalties were tied to its own interests. Russia was truly independent and Russian 
diplomacy in the Iranian crisis is a testament to this.  
 While the United Nations Security Council was formally deciding whether to pass 
sanctions against Iran on June 9, 2010, the Russian Security Council was engaged in a 
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meaningless and redundant meeting about ‘domestic shipbuilding’592 The keynote address 
at this meeting was by Igor Sechin, known to be the most hawkish Silovik in the Russian 
government.
593
 Medvedev’s persistent marginalization of the Russian Security Council has 
made it difficult for the forum to exert the influence it sought with the passage of the 2009 
National Security Concept document. Igor Sechin and Nikolai Patrushev are ardent Siloviki 
whose ideological fixation and intelligence officer’s methodology clash with the liberal-
minded, technocratic President. The Yeltsonian forces of a powerful constitution that 
enable the President to manoeuvre the levers of power to his or her liking are apparent. It is 
because of the Yeltsonian forces that embolden Medvedev that he is using his foreign 
policy mechanisms in a manner that suggests that the Silovik controlled advisory forum, 
the Russian Security Council, will not impede or accelerate his decisions. The Siloviki and 
military traditionalists on the Russian Security Council have been alienated from the 
presidential decision-making, despite the Russian Security Council’s document passed in 
2009 that theoretically strengthened it as an institution.  
 The Russian Security Council’s ultimate objective was to be a forum for foreign 
policy deliberation and formulation, but the practical elements of the Kremlin’s 
governmental machinery have precluded this from occurring. Medvedev’s temperament is 
not compatible with the military traditionalists, such as General Baluyevsky, or Siloviki, 
such as Secretary Patrushev, who continue to control the Russian Security Council. Dr. 
Mark Galeotti commented on the difficult relationship between Medvedev and Patrushev, 
‘Patrushev acted as Putin’s inside view of presidential and defence briefings. He was the 
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Prime Minister’s spy.’594 It can be easy to conclude that Medvedev’s preference would be 
to engage with the Yeltsin Liberals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who would not 
openly voice jingoistic truculence or any systematic approach toward beginning a military 
offensive that clashes with Medvedev’s dovish outlook and methodical style. The advice 
Medvedev sought was not emanating from the Silovik faction, but rather from the dovish 
factions and bureaucrats in government. The Russian Security Council contained the 
powerful voices of the countervailing ideology that was incompatible with liberal-minded 
Medvedev. Therefore, the Russian Security Council’s marginalization has continued 
unabated during the Medvedev years.  
 The Russian Security Council and its security-obsessed ideologues would have 
surely sought to be involved in the Iranian nuclear crisis. Iran’s nuclear development 
program and the decision over whether to support sanctions was a consequential foreign 
policy debate that affected the world stage in a myriad of forms in terms of security, which 
is a Silovik’s theoretical underpinning. ‘Domestic shipbuilding’ in the age of military 
warfare by airpower does not in any conceivable way outweigh the importance of placing 
sanctions against a country pursuing nuclear weapons capability. Igor Sechin, Nikolai 
Patrushev, and General Baluyevsky were impeded from advising Medvedev on what to do 
in regards to the United Nations multilateral effort to impose sanctions against Iran. The 
Yeltsonian forces of obstructing mechanisms of decision-making by using the powers of 
the presidency as envisaged by the 1993 Russian Constitution allowed this to happen. 
Medvedev has successfully used the Yeltsonian forces to preclude the Russian Security 
Council from having a proper platform on which the advice formulated in the forum could 
potentially influence presidential decision-making. The Yeltsonian legacy of an empowered 
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presidency has continued under Medvedev, and his alienation of the Russian Security 
Council exemplifies this very fact of the Kremlin’s responses to foreign policy issues. 
 As Dr. Sergei Khrushchev noted earlier, there may be competition between the 
Technocrats and Siloviki, but the relationship between Medvedev and Putin is untainted by 
political rivalries.
595
 Throughout the Medvedev presidency to this point in 2010, the public 
relationship between the Russian President and his Prime Minister was always a close one. 
There were few public disagreements and never any words of criticism between the two. 
The Medvedev presidency was considered legitimate because ‘the saviour’ Vladimir Putin 
had personally handpicked his successor and supported the government completely. The 
Gorbachovian forces of democratization would dictate that Medvedev keep his close 
relationship with Prime Minister Putin vibrant and uninterrupted.  The independent Levada 
Centre has polled the popularity of the high-ranking leaders in government and has always 
found that Vladimir Putin’s popularity has made him the most respected and honoured 
member of government, while Dmitry Medvedev’s popularity has never surpassed 
Putin’s.596 This polling was carried out in 2010 and the actions taken by the Kremlin must 
be seen in this context. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva stated: ‘Putin is the most popular politician 
in Russia. Absolutely. Definitely.’597 The polling asked participants whether the two men 
were trusted and supported by the Russian citizens.
598
 Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir 
Putin were popular with the overwhelming majority of participants.
599
 Medvedev’s 
legitimacy hinged on his relationship with his mentor, and any decision of the magnitude 
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that the Iranian nuclear crisis entailed would have to be formulated harmoniously and 
closely with his popular Prime Minister.   
 Russian public opinion polling on Iran does not sufficiently exist for any research 
purposes for similar reasons in the case of the North Korean nuclear confrontation. This 
issue is not relevant to the daily lives of Russian citizens. A nuclear development program 
in the Middle East does not ignite the same passions as does NATO enlargement or 
Georgian provocation. The Russian people are concerned more with geopolitical issues of 
relevance to the security and prosperity of their country, not the possible existential threat 
the Iranian nuclear development poses to Iran’s regional adversaries. In February 2012 
toward the end of the Medvedev presidency, Dmitry Trenin an expert on Russian security 
issues assessed the Russian attitude with regards to Iran from historical and security 
perspectives.
600
 Trenin opined that Russia as a collective whole views Iran as a respectable 
country that seeks to further its capabilities but is wary of Iran acquiring nuclear weapon 
potential.
601
 It supports Iran’s efforts for nuclear development for civil purposes, but it has 
also aligned with states concerned with the possible nuclear crisis as a result of this.
602
 The 
positions and views regarding Iran are mixed and have varied among Russian constituents. 
The Russian people have contradictory and mild feelings toward the Iranian nuclear 
development, and it is for these reasons that sanctions were not wholly supported or 
opposed by the Russian citizens. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva characterized the Russian public’s 
perception of Iran as follows: ‘The Russian public was not sensitive to Iran. Russians don’t 
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believe Iran is a threat.’603 There was a mix of apathy and consternation with Iran and the 
legitimacy for any action against it by Russia rested on the cohesion of the Putin-Medvedev 
duo that needed to explain their reasoning for the consent of sanctions. The Gorbachovian 
forces that empowered the Russian citizens to either grant or deny political capital was the 
fundamental factor in allowing Medvedev to consent to Resolution 1929 and this 
legitimacy was granted as a result of Putin’s favourable public image in the eyes of the 
Russian denizens. 
 The hybrid of a Silovik and Technocrat in the form of the Putin-Medvedev duo has 
resulted in mildly hawkish foreign policy decision-making that results in decisions that are 
assertive and independent, but are open to the opportunity of multilateral diplomacy. Putin 
and Medvedev were both questioned about Russian intentions with regards to Iran and the 
statements are illustrative of the independent jousting and balancing between being 
assertive and conciliatory simultaneously. When asked by CNN to assess the Iranian 
nuclear situation, Dmitry Medvedev commented:  
Iran is ignoring questions from the international community about its nuclear 
program, using “small phrases” to make “small suggestions,” Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev said Tuesday. Medvedev said he does not support crippling 
sanctions that can hurt the people of Iran, “but if nothing happens, we will have to use 
sanctions.”604 
 
 Medvedev in his statement to CNN emphasizes that Iran has to fulfil its obligations 
to the international community.
605
 This would hardly appease the hawkish faction within 
the Kremlin. Neither the Security Council Secretary, nor any other member of the Silovik 
faction would push for Russia to influence Iran to subjugate itself and suspend its 
sovereignty in these exceptional circumstances. The Siloviki and military traditionalists 
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would have argued that the West must stay out of this issue, which is a matter of 
sovereignty, not security. Putin’s statement on the same issue reveals the contradictory 
viewpoints between the Siloviki and Technocrats. Putin made a public statement, which 
served as both an endorsement of Medvedev’s decision and the Russian justification for the 
consent to sanctions:  
We have worked a great deal and we believe that the resolution has been practically 
agreed on. We maintain that the forthcoming decisions must not be excessive ones. 
Nor must they put the Iranian people in a dubious position, make them faced with 
obstructions on the way toward civilian nuclear power.
606
 
 
 Putin flexed his independence in the face of the international community by 
insisting that Iran should not develop nuclear weapons, but nuclear development for civil 
purposes in Iran is welcomed by the Russian Federation.
607
 This dualistic approach to 
international affairs represents the hybrid of Technocrat and Silovik tendencies. The 
leadership duo sought to ensure that Iran would comply with international norms, but it 
refused to allow the West to intervene in Iran and deny its sovereignty, which would result 
in an increase of Western dominance in the Eastern hemisphere. Dr. Kimberly Marten 
noted, ‘One Russian fear is that the US is trying to create a revolution in Iran.’608 
 Russia’s ultimate decision was to support sanctions expressly against the 
development of nuclear weapons in Iran. ‘Medvedev said Thursday that “Iran must find 
courage and start fully fledged cooperation with the international community even if it 
dislikes some of the issues it faces.”’609 The decision was made with the intention to deter 
the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, but Russia’s behaviour suggests it was playing a 
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diplomatic balancing act between satisfying the will of the international community and 
ensuring that Iran’s civil nuclear capabilities remain undeterred. The hybrid interests of 
Silovik Putin and Technocrat Medvedev would have predicted a foreign policy decision 
with regards to Iran that would entail curbing the nuclear crisis but ensuring that Iran’s 
sovereignty and citizens were unaffected. The decision-making apparatus denied the 
Russian Security Council the opportunity to interject in the deliberations and utilized the 
foreign affairs arm of the government to implement a ‘diplomatic but assertive’ decision. 
The foreign affairs arm of the government and the Putin-Medvedev duo act in absolute 
unison because of a predilection for multilateral, but assertive diplomacy.   
 The West and the United States spent several years using public platforms to 
convey to the world that Iran must be stopped and its nuclear program would be a danger to 
innocent people. Russia remained steadfast in its opposition to any wars by the United 
States in ‘the interests of international security.’ Putin famously opposed the Iraq War and 
insisted that American and international forces not start another war that will lead to a 
serious military escalation with no achievable outcome in sight.
610
  As evident with the 
foreign policy episode in Kyrgyzstan, Russia was keen to remove American military 
presence during the Medvedev presidency. The Missile Defence Shield further aggravated 
Russian-Western tensions. The Russian foreign policy apparatus dreaded the possibility of 
another war and strategic opportunity for NATO and the United States to continue their 
involvement in Russia’s proximity. According to International Affairs expert, Dmitry 
Babich: 
Actually, the logic is very simple: Russia is concerned about Iran’s nuclear 
programme. It has no sympathy for Islamist fundamentalism but, considering Iran is 
right next to Russia’s border and to the borders of Azerbaijan, a former Soviet 
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republic with a several million-strong Azeri minority in Iran, it is extremely keen to 
avoid a war breaking out on its doorstep. 
611
 
  
 The security-obsessed Putin would never allow an escalation of a nuclear crisis that 
posed the risk of igniting a war that would certainly involve NATO and the United States. 
Russia’s objectives with regards to Iran are to curb its nuclear program, but not to 
completely submit to Western ambitions of reining in the Iranian regime at any cost. The 
prospects of escalation so close to the Russian borders did not evade Putin whose 
intelligence officer’s worldview would have created a fixation on Western intentions of 
how to deal with the alarming nuclear crisis. The possibility of American or NATO military 
intervention in Iran was non-negotiable for a Silovik. Putin and Medvedev agreed to 
sanctions for the primary reason of ensuring that a war does not erupt near its borders so 
that the United States and NATO do not gain another strategic military stronghold. The 
consent to sanctions was a pragmatic exercise in containing the American-NATO military 
forces from inserting themselves in Iran by Russia acting independently and assertively on 
the world stage. This diplomatic posturing is compatible with the foreign policy doctrine of 
2008, which was ultimately conceived with the inauguration of Vladimir Putin in 2000. 
Reflections: 
  The Iranian crisis served as an important test for Russian diplomacy. The West and 
the United States summoned the international community in order to place stringent 
sanctions against Iran to deter its nuclear weapons development. The Russian Federation 
was in a period of somewhat contradictory relations with the United States; the aftermath in 
Kyrgyzstan proved that Russia would not allow the continuing presence of American 
military bases in the post-Soviet space. It simultaneously signed The New START Treaty 
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that assured the United States that the Russian Federation would comply with limiting its 
nuclear stockpile and would further seek to solidify peaceful and productive relations with 
its former Cold War adversary. The Missile Defence Shield installed in the Czech Republic 
proved to be the starting point for the Iranian nuclear crisis. The United States and NATO 
claimed that the missile system was installed in the event that Iran obtained nuclear weapon 
capability. The New START Treaty provided the opportunity for more communication 
between Medvedev and Obama, and this was clearly a benefit for both Presidents who 
could easily convey concerns to each other. The quid pro quo for effective resolution would 
have been Medvedev’s consent to sanctions against Iran and Obama’s removal of the 
Missile Defence Shield. Sanctions were passed with the Russian Federation striving for a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution that impeded dangerous nuclear development, 
but refrained from affecting nuclear development for civil purposes in Iran.
612
  
 The ‘diplomatic but assertive’ posturing is a result of the hybrid of Technocrat 
Medvedev and influential Silovik Prime Minister Putin. The Putin-Medvedev duo projected 
a mildly hawkish and openly diplomatic foreign policy stance that resulted in engaging the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in implementing this brand of 
diplomacy. The Security Council of the Russian Federation and its Silovik and military 
traditionalist occupants are marginalized by Technocrat Medvedev as a means to blunt the 
voices of the hawkish faction within the government that would try to force the Russian 
Federation’s decision in favour of an unrelenting security-based approach to maximizing 
Russian power, specifically in favour of Russia’s security interests in the Eastern 
hemisphere. The Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 is an accurate reflection of a foreign 
policy that is diplomatic, assertive, and independent. The Putin and Medvedev co- 
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leadership acted cohesively and in ideological bliss with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Similar to the North Korean issue, Putin and Medvedev did not choose to utilize the 
technocratic Minister of Defence Serdyukov, even though his style and temperament have 
proven him to be a loyal and dutiful minister to implement foreign policy decisions. It is 
clear that when issues pertaining to the United Nations Security Council arise, the Putin-
Medvedev duo choose to only engage the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sergei Lavrov has 
played the role of chief diplomat on the world stage projecting the Putinist image of an 
independent, but diplomatic Russian Federation without any discernible friction with his 
superiors. Serdyukov is known for voicing his concerns and involvement with issues 
regarding NATO enlargement and security in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The Iranian 
nuclear crisis, as well as the North Korean nuclear confrontation continued to evade his 
priority list. The Minister of Foreign Affairs dealt with issues of security that were decided 
by the international community, even when the issues were related to defence and security 
interests. 
 While Putin and Medvedev’s decision-making led to a fluid implementation by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the approval of sanctions by the United Nations Security 
Council, the decision was still made in the context of the political environment inherited 
from Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. The personal dynamics played out in the new 
Russia in which a powerful presidency made decisions based on public legitimacy. Putin’s 
popularity was high and his public image was that of a saviour. Medvedev’s close 
relationship with Putin enabled the President to rise in popularity during this time period. 
Being handpicked by ‘the saviour of Mother Russia’ and enjoying a close public friendship 
with Putin granted Medvedev legitimacy in spite of issues that did not particularly concern 
the Russian public. Iran paled in comparison with the importance that the Russian public 
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regarded NATO enlargement or the Georgian confrontation. The Iranian issue did not stir 
any passions in the minds of the Russian citizenry.
613
  The powerful Gorbachovian forces 
allowed the Kremlin leadership to make a decision about an issue that did not concern the 
Russian citizens, but the public legitimacy based on Putin’s popularity and Medvedev’s 
close association with him allowed them to manoeuvre the decision with the full knowledge 
of the Russian constituents they governed. The issue did not concern the Russian public, 
but the trust in the Putin-Medvedev duo and their political party was unwavering. It was for 
these reasons Putin and Medvedev aligned themselves with the will of the West and the 
international community. 
 The Iranian issue however deeply concerns the Siloviki who as a unified voice on 
the Security Council of the Russian Federation would have sought for quick and decisive 
action that was incompatible with the liberal-minded and methodical Dmitry Medvedev, 
whose only loyalty was to Putin, but not other Siloviki and hawkish members of 
government. The powerful Yeltsonian forces that created a superior presidential system 
precluded any member or agency of government to force the President’s decision in any 
manner adverse to Medvedev’s preferences. The office of the Russian presidency was 
granted nearly unlimited power over agencies within the executive branch, as well as the 
other branches of government. Medvedev bypassed the Russian Security Council and did 
not engage with the Minister of Defence, even though the military reforms prior to this 
issue centralized all defence capabilities and protocol in the office of the Minister of 
Defence. Therefore, the reforms made the Minister of Defence a powerful position in the 
Russian defence apparatus, but the Kremlin treated this issue as a matter of diplomacy. 
Medvedev’s presidential powers overrode any other mechanisms of the government as 
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envisioned by the Yeltsonian constitutional entitlements of the Russian President that 
legally and mechanistically made it impossible for collective leadership to exist. All power 
was vested in the office of the Russian presidency, and Medvedev, who was granted public 
legitimacy because of his relationship with Putin, was able to formulate and implement a 
decision that was ‘diplomatic but assertive’ without interference from the defence apparatus 
or the Russian Security Council. 
 The sanctions agreed to upon by the Russian Federation against North Korea and 
Iran were similarly passed during Putin’s presidency by the United Nations Security 
Council, and Russia’s involvement in the breakaway regions of Georgia and the affairs of 
the Bakiyev regime in Kyrgyzstan were well-rooted. Libya, a sovereign country with an 
autocratic regime, was experiencing tremendous political tremors from within. The 
Khadafy regime in Libya reacted to the mass uprisings within its borders with force and the 
international community sought to rectify this situation. This completely unprecedented 
foreign policy issue tested the personal dynamics and political forces that characterized the 
Kremlin during the Medvedev presidency. Once again, the author of this thesis has utilized 
the fundamental principles of Graham Allison’s Governmental Politics Model to examine 
the personal dynamics of the Kremlin’s decision-making within the Russian political 
atmosphere as moulded by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin respectively. The next 
chapter examines the Russian Federation’s response to the Libyan crisis in 2011. 
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Chapter 6: The Decision to Support Sanctions against the Khadafy Regime 
Introduction: 
 The foreign policy episode in Libya provides an abundant source of analysis for 
understanding the Kremlin during the Medvedev presidency by using Graham Allison’s 
Governmental Politics Model. The Libyan crisis took the world by surprise at a time when 
Dmitry Medvedev had become fully accustomed to the presidential mechanisms and 
trappings of power. This was the beginning of the fourth year of his presidency, and the 
response to the Libyan foreign policy episode was an act of the Kremlin exercising foreign 
policy formulation when the Medvedev Administration and the various doctrines and 
protocols of the period were well into fruition. 2011 was a year of momentous change for 
the Middle East because of the Arab Spring, a series of uprisings in countries controlled by 
dictatorial or pseudo-democratic regimes. The Medvedev presidency was forced to confront 
the ongoing ousters of regimes that were incompatible with the wishes of their respective 
citizens. The fundamental issue for the Russian Federation was how to intervene in these 
uprisings and whether to support the United States and the West in enforcing sanctions 
against regimes that violently refused to leave power. United Nations Resolution 1970 in 
February 2011, which the Russian Federation voted in favour of, and United Nations 
Resolution 1973 in March 2011, which the Russian Federation abstained from, are the most 
important actions taken by the international community in relation to the Arab Spring. 
Muammar Khadafy’s regime had been considered a repressive and undemocratic 
government for decades. It can be said that the Russian Federation and its previous 
incarnation, the Soviet Union, enjoyed favourable relations with the Khadafy regime in 
spite of the Western sentiment against Libya and its government’s perpetual abuse of 
human rights. The Russian Federation during the Medvedev presidency consented to 
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sanctions that condemned and aimed to deter Khadafy’s lethal response to the Libyan 
uprising in the form of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, but chose to 
abstain in subsequent Resolution 1973 that ultimately led to the demise of the regime. The 
Russian Federation’s decisions must be analyzed in the context of its behaviour on the 
United Nations Security Council in response to the Libyan Civil War in 2011. Libya was 
the only country affected by the Arab Spring that the Russian Federation agreed to impose 
sanctions against during the Medvedev presidency. It did not inhibit the implementation of 
a ‘no-fly zone’ by NATO in 2011. These actions are analyzed in a foreign policy 
framework to understand the decisions that led to the demise of the Khadafy regime. 
 The 2011 decisions with respect to Libya occurred at a time when the Medvedev 
presidency and its foreign policy apparatus had fully matured. The defence reforms and 
military doctrine were finalized. In addition to this, the foreign policy doctrine of 2008 and 
the National Security Concept document were well ingrained in the Medvedev government. 
The decisions taken were reflective of the essence of the Medvedev foreign policy, and 
these decisions merit examination to illuminate the Russian decision-making with regards 
to looming international issues. The Libyan issue was a sudden and alarming event that did 
not allow the foreign policy-makers to formulate a plan of action well in advance; this was 
a reaction to momentous changes on the world stage. The Putin-Medvedev duo, Siloviki, 
Technocrats, and Yeltsin Liberals were now faced with the challenge of exercising Russian 
foreign policy with the independence and vigour that characterized the post-Yeltsin Russian 
Federation. Previous decisions on the United Nations Security Council involved the 
Russian Federation and the prevention of further Libyan bloodshed required Russian 
consent for sanctions. Russia chose to support sanctions for United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1970, but not impede Resolution 1973, which ousted Khadafy and his 
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regime. The defining principles and tendencies of the new Russian Federation can be 
investigated and extracted by examining the Kremlin’s decisions with respect to the 
international community and its diplomatic arena.  
 Dmitry Medvedev’s tenure was by this stage in its maturity. Medvedev’s mastery of 
the presidential and foreign policy mechanisms was well into fruition. The exercise of 
formulating foreign policy decisions reached the point of his presidency where Russia with 
its well-defined foreign policy, defence policy, and national security policy was now a 
complete reflection of the Medvedev era. There were no more institutional changes or 
mechanistic recalibrations. Russia was now exercising and projecting the new Russian 
foreign policy. The transformations were complete and the decision-making was the 
inherent exercise of these doctrines translated into practice by the intertwinement of 
factions within the Kremlin in the new Russian political environment. The Libyan Civil 
War and sanctions against the Khadafy regime were momentous events on the world stage. 
Russia’s involvement in these events therefore provides ample understanding of the 
Kremlin’s positioning and entanglement in world affairs.  
 The Arab Spring preoccupied the minds of foreign policy-makers around the world 
in 2011. The sudden eruption of change within the Middle Eastern countries became the 
fixation of the international community.
614
 The ultimate multilateral decision-making for 
the international community occurred on the United Nations Security Council on which 
Russia holds a permanent seat and therefore an important role in passing sanctions. The 
issue of the abuse of human rights in Libya and the cessation of the catastrophic violence 
became the United Nations Security Council’s primary goal in 2011. The Kremlin’s 
decisions regarding these two United Nations Security Council Resolutions provide the 
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necessary foreign policy cases for understanding how the Medvedev presidency reacted to 
these events on the world stage that now involved the reformed and rehabilitated agencies 
of government that began to evolve with Medvedev’s ascension to the presidency.615 
 The Libyan regime is also the only government in the series of Arab Spring 
uprisings that received global attention that led to a response from the international 
diplomatic arena. The outcome of the multilateral actions taken heralds a powerful 
precedent in enforcing sanctions against other countries with similar human rights abuses as 
a result of uprisings by citizens. Khadafy’s regime collapsed under the pressure of the 
United Nations sanctioned no-fly zone because of the multilateral efforts agreed upon on 
the United Nations Security Council.
616
 Russia’s role in these events is considered of 
primary importance during the Medvedev presidency and the outcome serves as an  
ideological and practical influence on whether similar actions against countries considered 
‘rogue regimes’ could be taken again in the future. Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev 
were considered allies of Muammar Khadafy and his regime, but now the responsibilities 
and international norms that the Russian Federation is obligated to fulfil will be tested. The 
Kremlin’s decisions regarding Libya have had wide-scope implications on the world stage 
and the foreign policy episode ranks as one of the most important during the Medvedev 
presidency. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 against Libya was the 
first of two sets of sanctions that were passed against the Khadafy regime during the Arab 
Spring.
617
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United Nations Resolution 1970: 
 The Russian Federation ultimately consented to United Nations Resolution 1970 
after international attention was aroused by Khadafy’s violent response to protestors. The 
Russian Federation’s role on the United Nations Security Council ranks as highly important 
because of its historic role as the countervailing force against Western calls for 
international action. The Putin-Medvedev duo and the government they lead were now 
responsible for providing a vote that would seemingly align their country with the United 
States and the West. The Foreign Policy Concept in 2008 dictated foreign policy decisions 
that are compatible with Russia’s interests in spite of Western proposals for taking action 
on the world stage.
618
  Resolution 1970 entailed an arms embargo, an asset freeze, and a 
travel ban on Khadafy and his inner circle.
619
 The sanctions did not deny or infringe on 
Libyan sovereignty in any powerful way and did not provide effective impediments to 
Khadafy’s disproportionate violence against his own citizens as evident in the exponential 
increase in deaths of innocent civilians after United Nations Resolution 1970 was passed.
620
  
 Medvedev has asserted that the orders were directly from him regarding the consent 
to Resolution 1970 and he conveyed this to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 
promptly followed orders by virtue of its United Nations Ambassador Vitaly Churkin 
voting in favour of sanctions.
621
 Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin 
was noted as follows:         
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VITALY CHURKIN (Russian Federation) said he supported the resolution because 
of his country’s deep concern over the situation, its sorrow over the lives lost and its 
condemnation of the Libyan Government’s actions. He opposed counterproductive 
interventions, but he said that the purpose of the resolution was to end the violence 
and to preserve the united sovereign State of Libya with its territorial integrity. 
Security for foreign citizens, including Russian citizens, must be ensured.
622
 
 
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been a useful tool for the Medvedev presidency 
in asserting a diplomatic, assertive, and independent foreign policy. The Yeltsin Liberals 
believe in fruitful multilateral diplomacy with a tough, assertive projection of power and 
interests. The Medvedev decision was utterly compatible with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ institutional predispositions, as well as its chief diplomats, Lavrov and Churkin. 
Both men were not hawkish Siloviki or military traditionalists with Cold War views of the 
world. Medvedev’s decision-making was promptly supported and implemented by his chief 
diplomats because of the common liberal temperament and pragmatic approach to world 
affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not obstruct any decision made by the Kremlin 
and it has continued to execute orders efficiently and loyally.  
 Medvedev’s utilization of the Russian Security Council continued a trend of 
marginalization that started with the episode with Georgia. On January 28, 2011 with the 
Libyan situation spiralling out of control, Medvedev chose to communicate the passage and 
authorization of The New START Treaty, a treaty in which the Russian Security Council 
had no discernible role. The Russian Security Council under the Medvedev leadership was 
a forum used for announcements of policy decisions by the President, rather than a body for 
consultation and deliberation. In addition to this, Medvedev has never sought to use 
Russian Security Council Secretary Patrushev as a tool for exercising foreign policy. For 
example, during the momentous change sweeping the Middle East, Patrushev never dealt 
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directly with any of the leaders of countries with uprisings against the regimes in power. 
Patrushev, a Silovik, and his primary deputy, General Baluyevsky, the military 
traditionalist with Cold War notions of the world were never compatible with Medvedev’s 
temperament or methodical approaches to world affairs. The quick and decisive actions 
taken by a Silovik or military traditionalist were not seen during the Medvedev presidency. 
The tandem democracy was led by a Technocrat in the official top position of government. 
The foreign policy apparatus served Medvedev, not Putin.  
 On February 1 of that year, Patrushev attended a meeting in Poland to discuss issues 
regarding NATO’s security architecture.623 The Kremlin noted that nothing of actual 
substance was discussed, however.
624
 The meeting occurred to make mutual assurances that 
future summits will occur and that the dialogue will continue.
625
 The term ‘meaningless 
diplomacy’ could be accurate in this instance. The Russian Security Council Secretary was 
utilized as a simple and unimportant representative to convey the general sentiments of the 
Kremlin during a meeting in which nothing constructive was discussed. The Russian 
Security Council was convened for three ‘operational meetings’ during February 2011.626 
The Kremlin has not noted that any of these three meetings were convened to discuss the 
uprisings in the Middle East, but rather note that Medvedev used these three ‘operational 
meetings’ to convey his thoughts and wishes to the forum.627 The platform for the President 
was not a necessary one and provided superfluous resolution in the context of the 
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marginally important issues Medvedev chose to speak about, rather than discuss anything 
of major importance with the advisors comprising the Russian Security Council.  
 The Russian Security Council did not have a meaningful role in the formulation of 
the decision to enforce sanctions against Libya in the form of United Nations Resolution 
1970. The Russian Security Council’s marginalization in important decisions has become a 
hallmark of the Medvedev-led foreign policy apparatus. There was only one Russian 
Security Council event of note that took place immediately prior to the resolution being 
passed by the United Nations Security Council.
628
 A meeting between the Russian Security 
Council and a United States representative entitled: ‘Bilateral Russian-American 
consultations on issues of international security’ occurred two days prior to the passage of 
United Nations Resolution 1970 against Libya.
629
 However, neither Patrushev, nor any 
high-ranking member of the American government attended this meeting.
630
 Instead, one of 
Patrushev’s underlings on the Russian Security Council and a special assistant to the 
American President attended.
631
 This clearly denotes a mutual neglect for placing 
importance on this meeting by choosing not to engage on higher levels between the foreign 
policy apparatuses of the United States and the Russian Federation, respectively. 
Furthermore, the meeting convened for issues related to ‘cyber terrorism.’632 Any 
meaningful role for the Russian Security Council to have considerable influence in the 
debate over Libya was kept out of reach by presidential prerogative. Medvedev’s response 
to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 clearly indicates that the Russian 
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Security Council was intentionally marginalized in order to not become part of the policy 
formulation in terms of deciding whether sanctions against Libya were necessary. 
 Minister of Defence Serdyukov’s role in the United Nations Resolution continued 
his role as the country’s leading advocate against issues that are relevant to Russian security 
in the eyes of the Russian public and foreign policy community. Namely, Russian defence 
revolves closely around Russian perceptions of what breaches its security. NATO 
enlargement, the Missile Defence Shield, and countries that allow the West to gain strategic 
footholds in Eastern Europe or Central Asia maintain the highest priority for the Russian 
Ministry of Defence. Serdyukov’s primary role is the chief minister for implementing 
defence capabilities at the presidential behest, but the daily issues that require Serdyukov’s 
attention are not ones dealt with in the diplomatic arena. Serdyukov, by virtue of his 
defence position, is unconcerned with multilateral diplomacy at the United Nations, unless 
it were to affect the strategic battles between NATO and Russia in the region. Serdyukov 
similarly did not play an important role in the decisions with regards to the North Korean 
confrontation or the Iranian nuclear crisis. The diplomatic arena was not Serdyukov’s 
primary concern and the defence capabilities, as well as NATO encroachment of Russian 
security, were paramount to the Minister of Defence’s role and daily objectives. 
 Furthermore, Serdyukov was not a Silovik whose fixation on security would 
motivate him to intervene in every facet of decision-making similar to Putin. The defence 
arm of the government was led by a Technocrat whose loyalty and dutifulness were never 
questioned, as he always performed the functions of his position without politicizing any 
possible disagreements. Serdyukov was a loyal member of the inner circle operating in the 
Kremlin since Putin’s inauguration in 2000. He was the Putin-Medvedev duo’s dependable 
Minister of Defence, who happened to be a loyal bureaucrat and not a politician full of 
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ambition who clashed with his superiors. Serdyukov was not an ideological minister and 
did not seek to win political battles for his faction within the Kremlin, the Technocrats. The 
Minister of Defence served Medvedev and Putin as they instructed him without any of his 
personal feelings or beliefs seeking to change the decisions made by the Kremlin’s 
leadership.  
 With the Russian Security Council marginalized and the Minister of Defence a non-
entity in this foreign policy episode, the office of the Russian President conveyed its wishes 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a United Nations Security Council vote that would 
pass sanctions against the Khadafy regime. Medvedev’s legal upbringing and methodical 
approach to issues led him to be completely direct when he explained the logical rationale 
behind his support for sanctions against the Libyan authorities because of their behaviour in 
response to the mass uprisings. Unlike Putin, Medvedev’s mind always focused on the legal 
and moral justifications for action and rarely did he invoke Russian prestige or honour. For 
Medvedev, sanctions meant rectifying wrongs on the world stage, rather than exercising 
Russia’s dominance in global politics. Medvedev said the following regarding his decisions 
for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973: 
At the same time, let us not forget what motivated the Security Council resolutions in 
the first place. These resolutions were passed in response to the Libyan authorities’ 
actions. This was why we took these decisions. I think these are balanced decisions 
that were very carefully thought through. We gave our support to the first Security 
Council resolution and abstained on the second. We made these decisions consciously 
in the aim of preventing an escalation of violence.
633
 
  
 Medvedev did not possess Putin’s intelligence officer’s worldview or nonchalance 
to violence against innocent civilians.
634
 Medvedev was not a KGB operative during his 
formative years, but rather a highly successful legal professional whose battles were waged 
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within a courtroom and the justice system.
635
 The Russian President was sensitive to the 
plight of Libyan civilians who were brutally attacked and murdered by the Khadafy 
regime.
636
 Medvedev persisted in objecting to the violence and condemned Muammar 
Khadafy and his violent tactics.
637
 Putin, on the other hand, did not vocally protest against 
the bloodshed in Libya. For Putin, sovereignty was paramount and these were not 
exceptional circumstances that for him and his Silovik mentality justified Western 
interference in Libya. There can be little doubt that Putin was intricately involved in the 
decision, but Medvedev’s liberal temperament and sensibilities precluded Russia’s veto for 
sanctions against Libya. The United Nations Security Council sought to prevent future 
bloodshed in Libya, and United Nations Resolution 1970 did not directly impact civilians, 
but rather affected Khadafy, his regime, and their ability to perpetuate violent activities 
against civilians.
638
 Resolution 1970 banned travel, access to assets, and the ability to 
receive arms for Khadafy and his regime.
639
 Medvedev’s public pronouncement that 
Khadafy and his regime must be prevented from ‘an escalation of violence’ was going to be  
theoretically administered. 
 Lavrov and Churkin have throughout the Medvedev presidency acted as systematic 
mechanisms for implementing foreign policy decisions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
which is controlled by Yeltsin Liberals, and Medvedev were compatible with one another 
in their liberal temperament and aversion to the Cold War truculence and hawkishness that 
still pervades the Silovik faction within the Kremlin. ‘Russia condemns such violence, 
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requires its immediate ending and calls for respect of international humanitarian law,’ 
Sergei Lavrov was quoted as saying.
640
 Lavrov channelled Medvedev’s worldview that the 
international community must insist on the observance and enforcement of international 
law. The Khadafy regime violated central tenets of international law that forbid 
disproportionate violence against innocent civilians.
641
 United Nations Resolution 1970 
effectively punished Khadafy and his regime for violating international norms, but it did 
not alter the course of events in Libya.
642
 The ‘diplomatic but assertive’ foreign policy by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is completely compatible with the hybrid of the Putin-
Medvedev duo. While Medvedev believed that the Libyan regime must be held accountable 
for its actions, which Resolution 1970 calls for an investigation by the International 
Criminal Court, the Silovik tendencies would prevent Russia’s cooperation for a resolution 
that may have necessitated NATO or American military intervention. Indeed, the West 
gaining another strategic foothold in the Eastern hemisphere would have clashed with 
Putin’s Silovik instincts. Therefore, Medvedev’s consent to a resolution that did not involve 
Western intervention was ‘diplomatic but assertive’ in nature and did not clash with his 
senior mentor. The resolution aimed to force the Khadafy regime to comply with 
international norms to prevent further violence and the possibility of foreign military 
intervention if the situation continued. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs dutifully 
implemented this decision because of its affinity for international principles of human 
rights, and Medvedev’s decision to agree to the resolution did not disturb the other half of 
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the tandem democracy because this resolution would likely prevent the possibility of the 
United States or NATO intervening militarily. 
 The Gorbachovian forces of democratization enabled the Libyan crisis to be 
reported accurately and transparently without the government being able to effectively 
censor information or deny the Russian citizens to become fully informed about the actions 
of the Khadafy regime. The Russian public had a ‘right to know’ and the internet and 
television news media created an enhanced flow of information that led to the Kremlin 
taking calculated steps not to foment domestic opposition to foreign policy decisions. The 
24 hour a day news cycle via a myriad of television channels and websites was unstoppable 
in terms of providing Russian citizens the pertinent information about developments in 
Libya. The Kremlin was forced to grapple with the public’s views on foreign policy 
situations or risk public protests and a loss of legitimacy. 
 The Khadafy regime and Libya were not prominent factors in the perceptions of the 
Russian public. Libya, a country in the Middle East with a lukewarm relationship with the 
Kremlin, did not evoke the passions of the Russian intelligentsia or citizens. The Russian 
Federation’s preoccupation with NATO and Western influence far outranked any internal 
strife in a country not within the post-Soviet space or European continent. Furthermore, 
there was no cultural or religious link between the Russian Federation and Libya. 
Historically, the two countries were allies with no discernible special relationship. The 
Russian public’s perceptions of Libya were similar to the historical relationship between 
the two countries: mildly important. The Russian-Libyan historical legacy is unremarkable. 
The Russian public was far more concerned with the ongoing tension with Georgia and the 
Missile Defence Shield in the Czech Republic.  
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 Furthermore, Libya was not the only country experiencing momentous change in 
the form of public uprisings against unpopular regimes. Several countries were 
experiencing the same issues and violence erupting in a manner similar to Libya.
643
 The 
news media had been overwhelmed with reports of uprisings and violence against 
protestors in several countries in addition to Libya.
644
 The international community decided 
to respond to Libya, while other countries were experiencing similar events in this period of 
revolution. The Russian public was inundated with news reports regarding issues important 
to Russia in addition to the Arab Spring uprisings. The confluence of uprisings neutralized 
any possible public response from Russian citizens because of the myriad of similar events 
occurring simultaneously. The Russian public’s response to this issue did not evoke any 
serious protests because the Libyan crisis was not relevant to Russia’s security or 
prosperity, and the public was inundated with news reports from several countries with 
uprisings of their own. The Russian public remained informed but uninvolved for these 
reasons. 
 Public legitimacy rested on the trust in the top leaders of government. Vladimir 
Putin remained the most popular politician in the Russian Federation and was known as 
‘the saviour.’ Medvedev by all accounts did have a respectful and congenial relationship 
with his mentor, but the relationship was also politically convenient and required for 
Medvedev’s legitimacy in governing and making foreign policy decisions. Medvedev’s 
foreign policy decisions were seen through the prism of his relationship with Putin by the 
Russian public. Every major foreign policy decision by Medvedev was intricately 
formulated with and endorsed by Putin. The Prime Minister was nearly always present at 
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Russian Security Council meetings where Medvedev announced, rather than deliberated, 
decisions pertaining to world affairs. The tandem democracy was politically necessary for 
Medvedev to continue his tenure with the legitimacy granted by constituents. Being 
handpicked by Putin and enjoying a close public relationship with him enabled Medvedev 
to make foreign policy decisions when the Russian public was indifferent or ambivalent. 
Medvedev made foreign policy decisions in concert with Russian public opinion or the lack 
of public opinion when the issues were of marginal importance to Russian security and 
prosperity. The Putin-Medvedev duo were operating on the popularity of Putin’s reputation 
and political party that was seen as a guiding light that rehabilitated Russia after the 
disastrous Yeltsin years. 
 Putin’s public persona during the Medvedev presidency has been that of an 
undisputed leader who publicly steps away from quarrelling or objecting to any actions 
taken by the Russian government. A multitude of photo-ops, newspaper articles, and public 
pronouncements by both men have reinforced the Russian public’s perception that the two 
men are a cohesive team acting in the best interests of the Russian Federation. The political 
theatre perpetuated by the Putin-Medvedev duo has ingrained the Russian public with the 
certainty that Medvedev’s actions are at least partly guided by Putin’s pragmatic and 
successful approach to decision-making. Dr. Sergei Khrushchev has asserted that the 
relationship between the two men is unquestionably close and respectful.
645
 The factions 
within the Kremlin however are constantly competing for influence and political victories 
according to Dr. Sergei Khrushchev.
646
 This conflict between factions is not evident in 
Putin and Medvedev’s relationship. There is no evidence that either man acts for the 
empowerment of his respective faction.  
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 Medvedev’s foreign policy decisions from the beginning of his presidency to the 
decision of whether to consent to United Nations Resolution 1970 suggest that the two men 
have always acted in concert with each other and public opinion. In the event public 
opinion is lacklustre either way, the Putin-Medvedev duo is granted legitimacy by the 
Russian public because of Putin’s constant public support for his handpicked successor.647 
Putin’s popularity is Medvedev’s fundamental political tool to make foreign policy 
decisions without risk of evoking domestic opposition in the form of public protests. 
Medvedev’s presidency has depended on its close association with the influential Prime 
Minister for its legitimacy from constituents. It is for this express reason that Medvedev 
made the decision to consent to United Nations Resolution 1970 when the Russian public 
found the issue irrelevant to the Russian sphere. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva explains the lack of 
the Russian public’s concern, ‘The Russian public is constantly angered by the West. It is 
the United States. Putin made peace with Europe, but the US is still the enemy.’648 Libya 
was not considered important in the minds of the majority of Russian constituents. 
 The mild interest in the issue by the Russian public now gave Medvedev freedom to 
utilize the foreign policy mechanisms to make his decision. The Yeltsonian forces of a 
powerful presidency did not evade Medvedev. Throughout the Arab Spring and the Libyan 
crisis, Medvedev has been the voice of reason pointing out that exigent circumstances exist 
in Libya that require sanctions against the murderous regime. As quoted earlier, Medvedev 
was concerned for the loss of life and human rights abuses; the Russian President set the 
tone and agenda of the debate regarding Libya before any actions were taken.
649
 His liberal 
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temperament was sensitive to the plight of innocent civilians, and he could not ignore the 
international condemnations against the murder of Libyan protesters. The Russian Security 
Council would have surely resisted any attempts to enforce sanctions against the Libyan 
regime because it could potentially embolden the West. Patrushev, Baluyevsky, and the 
other Siloviki and military traditionalists would have been influenced by their hawkish 
worldview and opposed any measures against Libya. The Russian Security Council would 
have objected to intervening in this situation by claiming that Libyan sovereignty must 
remain uninhibited. Medvedev repeatedly marginalized the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation to blunt the calls of the hawkish elements within the Kremlin. Medvedev’s 
public statements all point to the fact that he was concerned deeply with the human rights 
abuses in Libya and did agree with international sentiments against the Khadafy regime.  
Medvedev used his powerful constitutional powers as authored by Yeltsin to calibrate his 
foreign policy mechanisms in a manner that suited his needs and desires. The National 
Security Concept of 2009 could not have competed against the presidential powers 
ingrained by Yeltsin after the 1993 coup. Medvedev’s marginalization of the Russian 
Security Council is a direct result of the superior presidential system inherited by Yeltsin’s 
successors. 
 In addition to this, Medvedev had been leading a rapprochement with the United 
States in the form of The New START Treaty, notwithstanding the ongoing Missile 
Defence Shield issue. Medvedev was diplomatically entangled with the West and in the 
nature of compromise and good faith could not simply ignore American concerns about 
Libya. The rapprochement was precarious and not a panacea for all diplomatic problems, 
but it did cement ties between Obama and Medvedev to the point that there was an open 
line of communication in the aftermath of the treaty signing and ratification. Medvedev was 
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responsible for carrying out a foreign policy decision based on his humanitarian intentions 
and productive dialogue with the United States. The Russian President was now going to 
align his country with the international community partly because of New START’s 
diplomatic links with the West. 
 It has been commonplace in Russian foreign policy episodes during the Medvedev 
presidency for the Minister of Defence to be a non-entity pertaining to issues in the 
diplomatic arena. The United Nations Security Council decisions have not included the 
Russian Minister of Defence in any meaningful fashion. Serdyukov, the dutiful Technocrat, 
has obediently performed his work functions and focused his efforts on regional security, 
NATO enlargement, and the Missile Defence Shield issue. The Kremlin has allocated 
certain duties and issues for the Minister of Defence and has not shown a predisposition to 
include Serdyukov in foreign policy decisions occurring in the diplomatic arena. The 
Minister of Defence has played a much more regional role in security and defence issues 
and the Putin-Medvedev duo have not changed this usage of the chief defence bureaucrat.  
For the Medvedev presidency, neither the Russian Security Council, nor the Minister of 
Defence is an important mechanism for grappling with issues on the United Nations 
Security Council or in the diplomatic arena in general. The Serdyukov reforms that started 
prior to Medvedev’s presidency began a centralization of all defence capabilities in the 
Minister of Defence position for the empowerment of the presidential levers of power.
650
 
The Russian Chief of General Staff and other high-ranking defence officials were 
neutralized by the reforms and this enabled the Russian presidency to fully control the 
defence apparatus by the link with the appointed Minister of Defence.
651
  The Ministry of 
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Defence’s doctrine of 2010 during the Medvedev presidency left the defence apparatus 
largely unchanged; this was Medvedev’s use of the Yeltsonian forces that allowed the 
Russian President to manoeuvre the foreign policy mechanism according to his preferences. 
 The powerful Russian presidency, which resulted from the 1993 Russian 
Constitution, is most certainly not a collective leadership. The Russian Constitution ensures 
that only one individual makes the decisions for the country and does not need the approval 
of any agency, minister, or mechanism within the Russian government.
652
  Medvedev and 
his most important advisor Prime Minister Vladimir Putin were the hybrid of a foreign 
policy hawk and dove. Medvedev did not have an affinity for hawkish truculence. The 
decisions made were always ‘diplomatic but assertive.’ United Nations Resolution 1970 
enforced sanctions against the regime in order to prevent it from murdering innocent 
civilians, but it did not have the potential for regime change or the infringement of Libyan 
sovereignty.
653
 Vladimir Putin has cautiously resisted any attempts by the West to intervene 
in a country for ‘humanitarian purposes.’ The mistrust of the West pervades the Siloviki 
and military traditionalists and Medvedev’s relationship with Putin would have entailed a 
detailed discussion about the concerns that a possible intervention could pose. Medvedev 
and Putin agreed to a United Nations Resolution that would leave the Khadafy regime in 
power but would enforce sanctions in the hopes to end the bloodshed. 
 The Yeltsonian forces of a powerful presidency have enabled Medvedev to allow 
the expansion of influence of the Russian Prime Minister, traditionally a sinecure, to 
become the most powerful advisory position in the Russian government. This emphasis of 
importance by Medvedev of Putin’s role in government has resulted in foreign policy 
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decisions that are ‘diplomatic but assertive.’ The Silovik and Technocrat agreed to United 
Nations Resolution 1970 as a compromise between an individual who was concerned with 
the humanitarian crisis and an individual opposed to the West empowering itself by 
intervening in a sovereign country. This hybrid as a result of the Yeltsonian forces that 
allow the Russian President to keep Putin in that position without any legislative or judicial 
means to block this appointment results in a decision that espouses Western liberal 
principles but insists that the West not deny the sovereignty of any country for its own 
purposes. The Yeltsonian forces allow Medvedev to implement this decision in his foreign 
policy apparatus by alienating individuals and mechanisms that would protest the decision 
or sabotage the policy formulation, and communicate the decision for its implementation to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is completely compatible with the decisions made 
by the ideological hybrid of Putin and Medvedev’s tandem democracy. The personal 
dynamics and political forces shaping the Kremlin were on a collision course with respect 
to United Nations Resolution 1973, which ended the Khadafy regime. 
United Nations Resolution 1973: 
 United Nations Resolution 1973 against Libya passed on March 17, 2011 with the 
Russian Federation abstaining from either consenting or vetoing the sanctions.
654
 
Ultimately, the Russian Federation chose to allow stringent sanctions that could have 
potentially ousted the Khadafy regime. The Russian Federation’s Security Council 
continued its trend of not being important in the foreign policy decision-making apparatus. 
 Medvedev used his presidential powers granted by Yeltsin’s 1993 constitution to 
exert complete control over the foreign policy-making apparatus. The Silovik controlled 
Russian Security Council was not compatible with his liberal temperament and methodical 
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approach to world affairs. In March 2011, two meetings of the Russian Federation’s 
Security Council were convened.
655
 United Nations Resolution 1973 was passed on March 
17, while the Russian Security Council meetings were held on March 9 and March 11.
656
 
The subject-matter of these meetings is not publicly known, but the timing between the 
actual passage of Resolution 1973 and the Russian Security Council meetings to discuss 
‘operational issues’ would equate to a lack of involvement in the presidential decision to 
instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to abstain from the vote.
657
 The effective decision 
was communicated by Medvedev to Lavrov and Churkin. The Russian Security Council did 
not possess any channels of communication to the top diplomats immediately prior to the 
decision. The several days between the meetings of the Russian Security Council prior to 
the vote on the United Nations Security Council posed a difficult task for the advisory 
board to insert itself into what was essentially a telephone call between the office of Dmitry 
Medvedev and the offices of Lavrov and Churkin. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
Medvedev’s singular tool for implementing his presidential decisions in the diplomatic 
arena. The Russian Security Council reconvened on March 18, which is one day after the 
Russian Federation abstained from vetoing United Nations Resolution 1973 against 
Libya.
658
 The March 18 meeting was Medvedev’s chance to discuss issues and mention the 
decision with regards to Libya in passing. The Russian Security Council by the powers of 
the Yeltsonian forces that Medvedev inherited was bypassed and marginalized in the 
decision to enforce severe sanctions against Libya and the Khadafy regime.  
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 The Russian Security Council was instructed by the Kremlin to engage in meetings 
pertaining to ‘domestic aircraft production.’659 Medvedev was continuing a trend and 
hallmark of his presidency of not using the Russian Security Council for any meaningful 
purpose. The Kremlin’s website notes the meetings with regards to aircraft production and 
domestic progress in aviation, but resists noting any opposition or disagreements with 
regards to the decision made to enforce stringent sanctions against Libya that had the 
potential to oust the Khadafy regime.
660
 The Medvedev presidency was alienating and 
muffling hawkish concerns and positions and ensuring that the presidential will pervades 
every facet of the government. The Yeltsonian forces of a powerful presidency precluded 
the Russian Security Council and its Siloviki and military traditionalists who disagree with 
Medvedev and the Technocrats from projecting their views. The Security Council of the 
Russian Federation was a meaningless mechanism used at the behest and to the preferences 
of the Russian President and no one else. The Russian Security Council Secretary was not 
chosen by Medvedev to be an important factor in the decision-making apparatus because of 
a lack of ideological compatibility and personal affinity.  
 The Kremlin’s website offered interviews of Russian Security Council Secretary 
Patrushev discussing issues of minor importance in the context of current events, such as 
domestic aviation products and bilateral meetings with low-ranking officials from other 
countries.
661
 Medvedev treated Patrushev and his office with the intention to blunt its 
possible interference in the decision-making process. Patrushev was a Silovik with an 
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extensive intelligence background and he did not find himself compatible with the views of 
Technocrat Medvedev. These men belonged to different factions within the Kremlin, and 
they did not share a personal connection. Medvedev chose to marginalize Silovik Patrushev 
and the advisory forum that he controlled. 
 When questioned by independent journalists from Russia Today, Patrushev 
described his quandary with the intervention in Libya as a result of United Nations 
Resolution 1973 in the following terms: 
The world is still far from acquiring universal rules that would legalize international 
interference into internal conflicts, and guarantee it lacks any bias and is efficient at 
the same time. Meanwhile, interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations is 
proceeding under various pretexts, such as “preventing mass casualties of peaceful 
civilians, rendering humanitarian relief aid, or promoting political settlement,” 
Patrushev said.  These lofty slogans are being used to “carry out unilateral or bloc-
backed interference with an aim to overthrow the ruling regime, provide access to 
natural resources, or win control of vital transportation routes, often by-passing the 
United Nations Security Council.”662 
  
 Patrushev echoed all of the Silovik concerns of the West intervening in a sovereign 
country under dubious pretexts.
663
 Patrushev believed that the West used any reason, 
humanitarian or otherwise, to flout international law and norms to expand its influence.
664
 
Patrushev’s security-obsessed ideology and predisposition would preclude his support for 
any intervention in which the West, the United States, or NATO may possibly gain another 
strategic foothold in the Eastern hemisphere. The Siloviki are fundamentally opposed to 
any security architecture or intervention from the West that may infringe on Russian 
security in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, or in any location in the Eastern hemisphere that 
poses a risk to the Russian Federation. Patrushev and the Silovik controlled Russian 
Security Council would have advised Medvedev against Resolution 1973. Medvedev chose 
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to alienate this mechanism in order to prevent an escalation of violence as he claimed, but 
the Siloviki were unconcerned with any humanitarian crisis if it led to intervention by the 
West and its security architecture.         
 The abstention on the United Nations Security Council was a tacit endorsement of 
enforcing a no-fly zone and shifting the balance of power within Libya against the Khadafy 
regime. The Russian Federation did not veto this resolution, and Medvedev publicly 
acknowledged that the resolution was the proper course of action against the murderous 
regime.
665
 The Minister of Defence played no discernible role in this decision, nor did he 
influence prior United Nations Security Council votes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
Medvedev’s key link to implementing decisions made in the upper echelons of power in the 
Kremlin when implementation occurred within the machinery of the United Nations. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the obedient Yeltsin Liberals and the Ministry of Defence 
with Technocrat Serdyukov were arms of the Kremlin that were effectively neutralized by 
having the organizations led by ministers whose ideologies and temperaments did not clash 
with the office of the Russian President. The decision to abstain from United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1973 is a direct result of the decision-making at the top of the 
Kremlin hierarchy. The Russian Security Council was marginalized as previously 
mentioned, and the decision to not veto the United Nations Security Resolution 1973 was a 
process between the two men comprising the Putin-Medvedev duo. Vladimir Putin’s 
reservations and outright disgust with the intervention in Libya are apparent in his 
statement on the matter:  
It resembles a medieval appeal for a crusade in which somebody calls upon 
somebody to go to a certain place and liberate it. This is becoming a persistent 
tendency in US policy, “mentioning the bombing of Belgrade during the 1999 
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Kosovo war, and subsequent US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Now it is Libya’s 
turn, under the pretext of protecting the peaceful population. But in bomb strikes it is 
precisely the civilian population that gets killed. Where is the logic and the 
conscience?
666
 
 
 Vladimir Putin was throughout his tenure as Prime Minister the most influential 
Silovik in the Russian government. His aversion to Western influence, NATO’s security 
architecture, and American intervention were integral to his presidency, as well as the 
guiding principles he used to approach foreign policy issues. Putin was absolutely outraged 
when NATO enforced the no-fly zone.
667
 Putin’s fundamental objection was that the 
enforcement of the no-fly zone not be another excuse for NATO enlargement or the 
emboldening of the West’s strategic footholds in the Eastern hemisphere.668 Putin was 
completely opposed to NATO, the Missile Defence Shield, or any Western security 
architecture pervading the post-Soviet space or anywhere else that can pose as an 
existential threat to the Russian Federation. Putin’s hawkish instincts and Silovik mentality 
led him to publicly disparage the outcome in Libya and Dmitry Medvedev responded by 
criticizing his mentor and influential Prime Minister by defending his decision: 
It is absolutely inexcusable to use expressions that, in effect, lead to a clash of 
civilizations, such as “crusades,” and so on. That is unacceptable. All that is now 
happening in Libya is the result of the appalling behaviour of the Libyan leadership 
and the crimes it committed against its own people. Russian diplomats did not veto 
the authorization of force resolution when it came before the Security Council 
because I do not consider this resolution to be wrong.
669
 
 
 Medvedev’s approach to the Libyan crisis was rooted in his concern for the civilians 
who were being murdered by Khadafy and his regime.
670
 Dr. Mark Galeotti has noted, ‘On 
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security, Medvedev was more focused on institutions and norms.’671 Medvedev, the 
Technocrat, was sensitive to the mass slaughter of innocent Libyans and his loyalty to Putin 
was tested against his concern for human rights. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva commented, ‘It 
(Libya) was one of those things that Medvedev presented he was on the right side of 
humanity.’672 Medvedev did not possess the Cold War hawkish worldview of Putin or the 
other Siloviki. Medvedev espoused liberal principles and felt no qualms by the possibility 
of NATO intervention if it meant that the Khadafy regime no longer possessed the 
capability to murder innocent civilians. Medvedev was a Technocrat who was not 
suspicious of the West to the same degree as the hardliners in the Kremlin.  Every public 
statement by Medvedev on the Libyan crisis urged international action to end the violence 
against innocent people.
673
 Medvedev believed that the Khadafy regime should be held 
accountable for its actions against its own people, and the first resolution against the 
Khadafy regime specifically demanded a thorough investigation by the International 
Criminal Court.
674
 The Libyan crisis was escalating and the violence against innocent 
civilians was increasing at an astonishing speed. Medvedev as evident by all public 
statements about the issue wanted the violence against civilians to end. Medvedev was a 
Technocrat who, unlike Putin, believed that human rights must be protected in foreign 
countries.  
 The Putin-Medvedev duo now had its first public rift. The hybrid of a Technocrat 
and Silovik worked harmoniously together until the Libyan crisis ignited Medvedev’s 
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technocratic concern for his fellow man and Putin’s disgust to Western security architecture 
toppling the Khadafy regime. Pavel Salin, an eminent academic working under the auspices 
of the Russian government, opined: 
But the issue of Libya, a client state of the former USSR, appears to have brought on 
a real split. Putin, given his past [KGB] experience, is inclined to a conspiratorial 
view and his remarks had a certain anti-American spin. Medvedev, on the other hand, 
does not think in cold war terms. He would like to see Russia on good terms with 
everybody and perhaps play the role of an intermediary in this situation.
675
  
 
 For Medvedev, the importance of international norms that safeguarded human  
 
rights outweighed Putin’s hawkish concerns about international security. The Russian  
 
President was now exercising his authority. The vote to abstain was a tacit endorsement of  
 
enforcing the no-fly zone and spoke volumes about the inner turmoil and logical rationale  
 
in the Kremlin with regards to this decision. The Russian Ambassador to the United  
 
Nations was noted by the United Nations as follows:     
                  
VITALY CHURKIN (Russian Federation) said he had abstained, although his 
country’s position opposing violence against civilians in Libya was clear. Work on 
the resolution was not in keeping with Security Council practice, with many 
questions having remained unanswered, including how it would be enforced and by 
whom, and what the limits of engagement would be. His country had not prevented 
the adoption of the resolution, but he was convinced that an immediate ceasefire was 
the best way to stop the loss of life. His country, in fact, had pressed earlier for a 
resolution calling for such a ceasefire, which could have saved many additional lives. 
Cautioning against unpredicted consequences, he stressed that there was a need to 
avoid further destabilization in the region.
676
 
  
 Churkin’s statement is an accurate reflection of the Medvedev presidency’s decision 
to abstain from vetoing the resolution. Churkin emphasized that the Russian Federation is 
deeply concerned about the violence against innocent civilians.
677
 Churkin did however 
note that the enforcement of the no-fly zone and the security measures taken were not 
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exactly planned, but the Russian Federation’s concerns with the crimes committed against 
innocent civilians in Libya outweigh all issues pertaining to this resolution.
678
 Churkin was 
directed by the Kremlin to carry out an act that would neither directly endorse a possible 
Western or NATO intervention, nor object to a resolution that would save the lives of 
innocent people.
679
 Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich opined that, ‘The President of the 
Russian Federation conducts diplomacy and can give instruction to his ambassadors to 
follow without Putin’s oversight.’680 The ‘diplomatic but assertive’ posturing by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation continued. Russia did not consent to 
Western calls for action overtly and it did not reject them directly. Russia, always keen on 
practicing an independent foreign policy on the world stage, chose to officially not block 
this resolution from being passed. The abstention was an act of an independent, assertive 
foreign policy, even though Medvedev was in agreement with the West that Khadafy and 
his regime must be stopped from perpetuating violence. The foreign policy doctrine of 2008 
and the new era in the post-Yeltsin years dictated a Russian Federation that would not 
capitulate to pressures from the West or the United States. Even though Medvedev wanted 
to commit the Russian Federation to this humanitarian-motivated resolution, the hardline 
elements in his government would have called for foreign policy posturing that would 
ensure that the Kremlin was independent. This intergovernmental bargaining between Putin 
and Medvedev led the latter to not fully enrage the many hardliners in government by 
choosing to abstain and not vote in favour of United Nations Resolution 1973 against 
Libya.  
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 The clash between Putin and Medvedev resulted in a ‘diplomatic but assertive’ 
posturing that favoured Medvedev’s technocratic leanings more than Putin’s Silovik 
tendencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Yeltsin Liberals who espoused liberal 
democratic principles, cooperation with the West, and an assertive foreign policy were 
ideologically and temperamentally compatible with Medvedev’s order to abstain from the 
vote. This made Russia look independent but willing to help safeguard international norms, 
especially with respect to human rights. Churkin and Lavrov, Yeltsin Liberals who adopted 
an assertive rhetoric with the inauguration of Putin, did not object or sabotage this vote by 
any means. The foreign affairs arm of the Kremlin favoured this recognition of 
international norms by not vetoing the Western-led calls for enforcing sanctions against the 
murderous Khadafy regime. The hybrid governing duo’s policy debate over this issue 
resulted in an intervention by the implementation of a no-fly zone to ensure that innocent 
civilians in Libya be protected from the murderous regime it no longer considered 
legitimate. Medvedev’s order was not a complete endorsement of the Western calls to 
action against the Khadafy regime, but it was a muted indirect endorsement that did not 
completely infuriate the Siloviki and military traditionalists on the same magnitude as a 
vote in favour of allowing Western security architecture to intervene. The hybrid of 
Technocrat Medvedev and Silovik Putin chose to risk the possibility of Western 
intervention for the sake of innocent Libyan civilians during a time the Russian public was 
mildly concerned with the situation. 
 The Russian public was fully engaged in the affairs sweeping the Middle East, 
including Libya. The Gorbachovian forces of democratization enabled the Russian public to 
be completely up to date and informed with the uprising in Libya and the Khadafy regime’s 
disproportionate violence against its own citizens. The Russian public was for the most part 
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still mired in the aftermath of the Georgian conflict, and all Russian eyes were on the 
Missile Defence Shield. The primary issues relevant to Russia were NATO and Western 
influence in the post-Soviet space and Eastern Europe. The Russian public had never 
protested Russian foreign policy because the foreign policy apparatus until this decision, 
United Nations Resolution 1973 against Libya, did not clash with the security perceptions 
of the constituents.  
 As the Libyan crisis was unfolding, Russian opinion was never wholly in favour or 
against sanctions in response to the Libyan crisis. Khadafy had been traditionally an ally of 
the Russian Federation and Putin’s relationship with the Libyan regime was always 
productive. The Russian public was also indifferent to the plight of the Libyans because of 
a lack of historical, cultural, or religious ties. For example, the Russian public’s opposition 
to military action against Serbia was a defining attribute of the 1990’s because of the ties 
between Russians and Serbians. The Russian Federation’s public during 2011 simply felt 
ambivalent and indifferent toward Libya. This gave Medvedev the opportunity to set the 
tone for the public debate over Libya and channel his beliefs in order to gain legitimacy 
among the masses. Putin was an influential advisor and a prominent and likely candidate 
for President in the 2012 election. However, Putin was throughout the Libyan crisis 
steadfastly cooperative and loyal to Medvedev. He chose not to publicly disparage his 
handpicked successor before the passage of United Nations Resolution 1973. 
 Putin’s actions of not publicly sabotaging the Russian President’s actions 
beforehand demonstrate that Putin is fully cognizant of the powerful Gorbachovian forces 
that could cripple the government’s ability to conduct foreign policy in the face of public 
opposition. All polls as previously mentioned in this body of research strongly suggest that 
Medvedev’s overall legitimacy rested on his close association with Russia’s most popular 
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politician in history, Vladimir Putin. Putin’s objections became publicly known by his own 
choosing after the decision was implemented in the form of an abstention on the United 
Nations Security Council. Putin was careful not to foment public opposition toward 
Medvedev and he chose to remain silent until after the fact in the event that the resolution 
proved to be against Russian interests. Putin simultaneously distanced himself from the 
United Nations Resolution that resulted in NATO intervention in Libya and remained a 
loyal member of the Kremlin who does not sabotage presidential decisions. The Silovik 
qualms about the resolution were present throughout the decision-making process, and 
Putin chose not to engage the public until after the resolution passed. Putin’s handling of 
this issue suggests that he did not risk destroying the legitimacy of the Putin-Medvedev 
regime before Resolution 1973 was passed by igniting public opposition, and that the 
Gorbachovian forces were a powerful tool for emboldening or crippling the Kremlin’s 
leadership. Putin’s refusal to publicly disagree with Medvedev before the abstention on the 
United Nations Security Council was proof of that. 
 Medvedev’s liberal temperament and technocratic leanings certainly did not 
preclude his utilization of the Yeltsonian forces inherited by the occupant of the office of 
the Russian presidency. Medvedev made decisions according to his own preferences and 
formulated and implemented them through the foreign policy apparatus in a manner that 
suited him. Medvedev exhibited little regard for the Russian Security Council that is 
controlled by Silovik Patrushev and his bitter enemy, military traditionalist General 
Baluyevsky. Medvedev does not possess the same hawkish truculence or tendencies that 
the Siloviki or military traditionalists possess. Medvedev has persistently blocked or 
blunted the Russian Security Council’s role as an advisory committee that seeks to set the 
tone and agenda for foreign policy deliberations. Both instances in which the Russian 
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Federation made a decision regarding a United Nations Security Council Resolution against 
Libya, Medvedev communicated his decision after the fact to the advisory mechanism’s 
forum. The Russian Security Council was Medvedev’s tool to convey his decisions, not 
openly discuss or debate them. The National Security Concept of 2009 could not counter 
the powerful Yeltsonian forces stemming from the 1993 Russian Constitution that gave the 
Russian President unlimited powers to control his decision-making apparatus, which is a 
perennial theme of this body of research. The 1993 Russian Constitution legally and 
constitutionally obstructs any government doctrine, agency, or department that seeks to 
forcefully influence or impede the Russian President’s decisions.681 This was not a 
government that needed a bureaucratic consensus for decision-making. Medvedev made his 
decisions without the Siloviki or military traditionalists on the Russian Security Council 
being able to insert themselves into the process. The presidential prerogative was the 
overwhelming force in this decision-making process, and Medvedev used it to suit both his 
needs and plans. 
 The 1993 Russian Constitution further allowed the President to utilize the different 
arms of government without interference from other branches outside of the executive 
structure or within it.
682
 Throughout Medvedev’s presidency neither the State Duma, nor 
the Russian Supreme Court was able to successfully raise objections to any of his decisions. 
The 1993 Russian Constitution effectively neutralized every facet of the government at the 
cost of empowering the office of the Russian presidency. Medvedev, in the interests of 
implementing his decisions, only needed to communicate his wishes to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in regards to taking action on the United Nations Security Council. The 
Minister of Defence’s position was fully able to implement any decisions with regards to 
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engaging Russia’s defence capabilities because of the Serdyukov reforms that centralized 
all power in the top position of the Ministry of Defence.
683
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
doctrine was virtually unchanged in terms of operating mechanisms or governmental 
powers with regards to decision-making, but the Russian Security Council continued its 
aversion to any foreign policy moves that could be viewed as capitulation to the West.  
Medvedev chose to leave the Russian Security Council on the sidelines with no discernible 
connection to his decision-making. Medvedev used the forum to make public statements 
about decisions that were formulated beforehand. The Russian Security Council’s National 
Security Concept of 2009 paled in comparison to the power of the Yeltsonian constitutional 
forces that allowed the President to block the Russian Security Council’s attempts to 
influence decisions. Medvedev, the consummate Technocrat, and his liberal temperament 
were incompatible with the Russian Security Council that was a bastion of hawkish 
truculence that was not in sync with his worldview or methodical nature. Medvedev chose 
to implement his decisions regarding Libya by utilizing the foreign affairs arm of the 
executive government without interference from any mechanisms that posed an impediment 
to enforcing his will. Medvedev was only allowed to do this because of the powerful 
Yeltsonian constitutional forces he inherited when he became President. 
 The true test of the personal dynamics between Medvedev and Putin was the 
decision to abstain from vetoing a no-fly zone resolution by the United Nations Security 
Council against Libya. Medvedev and Putin’s close working relationship, as well as 
personal relationship, experienced a rift.
684
 In the aftermath of the decision to abstain from 
United Nations Resolution 1973 against Libya, Putin vociferously protested the decision 
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that his superior in the Putin-Medvedev leadership made.
685
 There can be little doubt that 
Putin, the most influential member of the Medvedev presidency, voiced his disapproval of a 
resolution that denied Libyan sovereignty and led to intervention by Western security 
architecture beforehand to Medvedev. Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich noted, that 
‘Putin’s instincts were against what Medvedev did on Libya.’686 Putin’s Silovik tendencies, 
as his comments after the fact point to, categorically place him in the opposition to 
Medvedev’s decision to abstain from vetoing Resolution 1973.687 It is not certain when the 
decision for Putin to run for President in the 2012 election was made, but in 2011 
Medvedev was the most powerful member of the Russian government as envisioned by the 
1993 Russian constitution. Dr. Mark Galeotti commented, ‘He (Medvedev) was still toying 
with the idea of challenging Putin for the presidency.’688 The influential Prime Minister was 
aware that Medvedev possessed the power to dismiss him from his position without the 
need for legislative, judicial, or bureaucratic approval. Putin was entangled in a situation 
that made his role in government subservient to his mentee whom he handpicked to be his 
successor.  
 For the first time in the Putin-Medvedev duo’s tenure during the Medvedev 
presidency, the Yeltsonian forces of a powerful presidency by virtue of the 1993 Russian 
Constitution was overshadowing the personal dynamics within the Kremlin. Dr. Mark 
Galeotti noted, ‘The rift was real. When Medvedev came in, he knew he was just the front 
man and Putin was in charge of security. The trappings of the presidency appealed to 
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Medvedev over time, as well as people around Medvedev pushing for this. He was 
beginning to be more challenging to Putin.’689 Medvedev’s will was to stop the bloodshed 
of innocent Libyans, and while Putin’s involvement in this decision precluded a full 
endorsement of the sanctions by voting in favour of Resolution 1973, Putin could not 
successfully convince the President to veto the United Nations Security Council action 
against Libya. Putin’s Silovik-inspired concerns were acknowledged by Medvedev not 
completely joining the international community’s action against Libya and continuing a 
‘diplomatic but assertive’ foreign policy that did not equate to capitulation. Medvedev used 
the foreign policy apparatus, including the advice of his influential Prime Minister, to 
implement his own will. Putin was fully aware that if he voiced his opposition to Medvedev 
prior to the measure being taken, he risked being dismissed by his partner who was 
empowered by the powerful Yeltsonian forces. Putin understood well that the personal 
dynamics between Medvedev and him were insufficient to counter the powerful forces 
Medvedev inherited as a result of Boris Yeltsin’s legacy of a superior presidential system. 
Conclusion: 
 The Medvedev presidency was faced with the Libyan crisis amid the Arab Spring 
that led to unprecedented uprisings in countries ruled by regimes that lost legitimacy with 
their respective citizenries. The Libyan Civil War was prominently monitored by the 
international community because of the abuse of human rights by the Khadafy regime. 
Medvedev’s technocratic leanings made him highly sensitive to the plight of innocent 
Libyan civilians, and his presidential will led to the enforcement of two United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions that ultimately signalled the death knell for Khadafy’s rule. 
Medvedev’s calibration of foreign policy and his manner of implementing it is a testament 
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to the powerful Yeltsonian forces that allowed him to control his government to an unusual 
degree. Furthermore, Putin’s lack of ability to stop United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1973 is another event that illuminates the powerful Yeltsonian forces that 
blocked his attempt to deter Medvedev’s decision with regards to Libya. Putin’s cognizance 
that the Russian Federation’s Constitution of 1993 as authored by Boris Yeltsin gave 
Medvedev the full power to dismiss Putin without any justification or bureaucratic 
wrangling was a powerful deterrent that stopped a ‘civil war’ within the Kremlin between 
the respective leaders of the Technocrats and Siloviki. Putin had no choice but to be silent 
and only have his Silovik views and objections known after the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution was abstained from, which effectively authorized it. Putin did not want 
to foment public opposition to Medvedev’s presidency because this may lead to an erosion 
of legitimacy among the Russian people in relation to the Putin-Medvedev regime. Putin’s 
political leadership rested on the legitimacy of his inner circle, while he waited to run for 
President again in 2012. In addition to this, Putin did not want to foment opposition by 
publicly stating his objections that could potentially impede Medvedev’s decision-making 
beforehand. Infuriating the Russian President who could potentially dismiss the Prime 
Minister because of the powers granted in the 1993 Russian Constitution could have led to 
Putin’s political demise. Putin was cautious not to compete against or sabotage Medvedev, 
who was far more superior in terms of constitutional power over the government because of 
the Yeltsonian forces. The new political environment of the Russian Federation of a 
powerful presidency as envisioned by Yeltsin and an empowered citizenry as envisioned by 
Gorbachev subdued Putin’s Silovik leanings and forced him to remain on the sidelines, 
while Medvedev resisted a veto to a resolution that was ideologically incompatible with 
Putin’s worldview. 
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 The personal dynamics within the Kremlin were important factors in the 
implementation of both United Nations Security Council Resolutions against Libya. 
Medvedev had little regard for the Russian Federation’s Security Council as he has not held 
a single meeting in this advisory forum to deliberate a vital foreign policy decision. All 
decisions are announced at these meetings to the chagrin of the Siloviki and military 
traditionalists who sought and seek to direct the foreign policy debate with a Cold War 
warrior worldview, rather than one espoused by Technocrats, which would be an 
independent, assertive foreign policy characterized by cooperation with the West and the 
international community. The technocratic President had an aversion to the hawkish 
bureaucrats and the foreign policy mechanisms they occupy. Medvedev sought to 
implement his decisions unimpeded by the hawkish truculence he would have to compete 
with during meetings with the Russian Security Council members if he allowed them the 
opportunity to insert themselves into the foreign policy debates. Medvedev used the 
Yeltsonian forces of an empowered presidency to effectively relegate the Russian Security 
Council to a position of minor importance. Medvedev was able to use the advisory forum 
as a tool for communication, rather than deliberation because of the constitution authored 
by Yeltsin in 1993. 
 As seen throughout the Medvedev presidency, his decisions were formulated within 
the ruling tandem and communicated to the technocratic Minister of Defence or Yeltsin 
Liberals in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for implementation. Both arms of government 
were led by individuals who were compatible with Medvedev’s liberal temperament, 
methodical style, and non-Cold War worldview. The Russian President implemented his 
decisions through channels that posed no risk of sabotage or impediment to his will. 
Furthermore, as seen during the Libyan episode, Medvedev’s close relationship with Putin 
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did not consistently dictate a foreign policy that was completely compatible with Putin’s 
worldview. Medvedev allowed Putin unlimited influence and access to the affairs of the 
Russian government, but this did not enable Putin to fully control his handpicked successor. 
Medvedev’s liberal temperament and concern for the human rights abuses in Libya were 
empowered by the Yeltsonian forces that allowed the Russian President to be the sole 
decision-maker, notwithstanding any personal dynamics within the government. Medvedev 
formulated decisions regarding the Libyan violence on his own terms and implemented it in 
a manner that would neutralize opposition within the Kremlin. 
 In essence, the Russian decisions regarding Libya were the acts of an independent 
and assertive foreign policy that cooperated with the West and the international community. 
Medvedev did not share Putin’s hawkish worldview and believed that sanctions against the 
Libyan regime would preserve the sanctity of human life and protect human rights. 
Medvedev used the powers of his office to implement his decision, which he had by the 
fourth year of his presidency fully mastered, and his influential Prime Minister had no 
remedy but to remain on the sidelines. Putin neither impeded the decision within the 
Kremlin beforehand, nor did he publicly disparage the decision to abstain on the United 
Nations Security Council before it was conveyed with regards to Resolution 1973. Putin 
was fully aware that a decision regarding Libya that conflicted with his Silovik beliefs 
would be made. Putin chose not to foment public opposition before the decision was 
conveyed in order to not damage the President who possessed the power to dismiss the 
Prime Minister. The powerful Yeltsonian and Gorbachovian forces resulted in Putin 
choosing not to defy the Russian President, which would directly lead to a weakening of 
Medvedev’s legitimacy. The Russian political system that resulted because of the legacies 
of Gorbachev and Yeltsin precluded Putin from doing anything to stop a United Nations 
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Security Council Resolution that was compatible with Medvedev’s core beliefs and 
worldview. After the Khadafy regime was deposed and its leader executed, the Assad 
regime in Syria became the fixation of the international community. The Russian 
Federation’s decision with respect to Syria is mired in the aftermath of United Nations 
Resolution 1973 against Libya and the announcement that Vladimir Putin, not Dmitry 
Medvedev, will run for President in the 2012 election. 
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Chapter 7: The Refusal to Consent to Sanctions against the Assad Regime in Syria 
Introduction:  
 Prior to 2011, the Assad regime in Syria seemed beyond reproach and completely 
ingrained in the governmental system. Similar to the Soviet Union during the late 1980’s, 
Syria started undergoing a transformation from within. Syrian constituents began to rebel 
against their government in a manner reminiscent of the Moscow Spring. The viability for 
the Assad regime’s demise was now becoming a reality akin to how the unshakable grasp 
of the Soviet government became increasingly weaker and led to its fall from power. The 
Syrian crisis was one of most violent civil wars that erupted as a result of the Arab Spring 
in 2011. After forty years of the Assad family’s rule, Syrians protested against the pseudo-
democratic regime. The protestors wanted free and fair elections and the enjoyment of their 
full civil liberties. In the context of the change sweeping the Middle East, the Syrian 
protestors demanded that President Bashar al-Assad step down and allow democratic 
reform to take place. President Assad refused and engaged in a violent battle with rebel 
forces similar to Khadafy in Libya. Assad refused to make any major concessions and this 
only fuelled civil discontent. The international community was now desperately trying to 
keep the Middle East from erupting into further mass chaos and the use of sanctions was 
conceivable after the Libyan intervention. The use of military and economic sanctions as 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council was now open for debate.  
 The Russian Federation, as did the rest of the world, watched these events unfold 
with no foreseeable data or reports that prepared them for the consequences. The Kremlin’s 
foreign policy had since 1991 been wholly centred on relations with the West, the United 
States, NATO, China, and the former Soviet Republics. The Arab Spring now posed as a 
theoretical and practical dilemma. The Kremlin’s foreign policy apparatus was faced with 
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Middle Eastern countries experiencing civil wars as a result of denying citizens freedoms 
that have come to shape the new Russian political environment. Namely, Russia now had a 
political environment that the protestors in the Middle East theoretically strived for. The 
abandonment of Communist totalitarianism has created a powerfully informed and engaged 
Russian citizenry. The Russian government now espoused principles that were adverse to 
the rule of leaders such as Khadafy and Assad. The Russian role in these events posed the 
existential question of whether Russia will commit itself to spreading the principles it has 
been formed by and whether multilateral intervention in Syria is the proper course. 
 The Libyan Civil War came to an abrupt end on October 20, 2011 with the murder 
of a captured Colonel Khadafy by the rebels he had sought to defeat.
690
 The eyes of the 
world now shifted to Syria where the bloodshed had been disproportionate and Assad 
refused to make any concessions to his constituents or the international community. The 
widely publicized bloodshed and the sudden conclusion to the Libyan Civil War now 
enabled the international community to continue its efforts to quell the violence and attempt 
to bring stability to a region severely destabilized by a democratic reform movement that 
has enveloped several countries. Syria’s representative to the United Nations, Ambassador 
Bashar Ja’afari, has publicly stated on numerous occasions that President Assad was 
foremost a democratic reformer and that he did not violate any international norms.
691
 The 
Assad regime made no attempt to indicate that it may leave the corridors of power or agree 
to a deal that would save it from prosecution in the event Assad was removed from 
government.
692
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 The Russian Federation however was internally beginning to show its own civil 
discontent. The scope was not of the Arab Spring, but the citizenry began to show its mild 
support for United Russia and the Putin-Medvedev regime.
693
 In 2011, Medvedev and Putin 
announced that the latter would be the presidential candidate for the 2012 election, not 
Medvedev.
694
 The Russian citizenry was initially polarized by this announcement and 
United Russia lost its nearly complete control of the legislature, which had lessened from 
64% to 50%.
695
  In addition to this, Russians began to protest the decision to return Putin to 
the presidential office.
696
 The younger generation began to form a powerful democratic 
reform movement that resulted in the Kremlin’s political posturing and concessions to 
pacify the vociferous citizens who were opposed to the return of Putin.  
 There was the Libyan crisis which saw Russia consenting to what eventually 
became a NATO and Western military intervention. The hawkish elements of the Kremlin 
were outraged that the Russian Federation allowed the West and NATO to gain another 
strategic foothold on the world stage, which was seen as a threat to Russian security. The 
Siloviki and military traditionalists attempted to reform the levers of power in the 
Kremlin’s foreign policy apparatus by strengthening the position of the Chief of 
Presidential Administration, which became occupied by an influential Silovik, Sergei 
Ivanov.
697
 The decision to strengthen this role was to be a counterweight to the technocratic 
President who decided to risk NATO intervention for the sake of Libyan citizens. This 
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sensitivity to a human rights issue was seen as a leading cause for Medvedev’s decision to 
abstain from a veto in the United Nations Security Council vote. The rivalries within the 
Kremlin were now manifesting itself in reforms of the Kremlin’s machinery. The attempt to 
strengthen the Russian Security Council’s role in presidential decisions by national edict in 
May 2011 in the foreign policy apparatus is an important theme in this chapter.  
 In the decision to deny the United Nations Security Council the opportunity to 
enforce military and economic sanctions that may have entailed regime change in Syria, the 
Medvedev presidency’s last foreign policy decision of intransigence is a vital point in 
understanding the foreign policy of this time period for the Russian Federation. The 
decision to veto the United Nations Security Council Resolutions against the Assad regime 
that would have ended the violence and possibly seen the ousting of President Assad played 
an important role in the continuation of the Syrian Civil War. This issue has carried over 
into the Putin presidency and remains a source of international tension at the time of this 
writing.
698
 The decision to deny the international community the opportunity to end the 
conflict was analyzed in the context of the Russian civil discontent, the aftermath of the 
Libyan intervention, the recalibration of the Chief of Presidential Administration role in the 
Kremlin, and a presidential edict that strengthened the Russian Security Council. The 
official Russian policy of intransigence in the effort to end the Syrian Civil War by 
proposed sanctions imposed by the international community will contribute to 
understanding the Medvedev era foreign policy. 
Libyan Aftermath: 
 The aftermath of Medvedev’s surprise decision to abstain from vetoing United 
Nations Resolution 1973 against the Khadafy regime had powerful political implications 
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for his leadership. For the first time since becoming President in 2008, Medvedev and Putin 
openly sparred in the public arena over the decision.
699
 Medvedev repeatedly affirmed that 
the massacre against Libyan protestors must be stopped and international norms must be 
preserved.
700
 Putin, a Silovik with little regard for the human rights of innocent protestors 
in a foreign country, remained vociferously opposed to Russia’s indirect endorsement of 
United Nations action against Libya that led to Western intervention.
701
 The outcome of the 
civil war, which ended with Khadafy’s murder, was condemned by the Russian Prime 
Minister.
702
  Putin stated, ‘Nearly the entire Gaddafi family was killed. His corpse was 
shown on all world TV channels. It’s impossible to look at it without disgust!’703 Putin was 
appalled by the murder of a leader of a sovereign country.
704
 The sovereignty of Libya was 
denied in these exceptional circumstances by the international community, and Putin’s 
hawkish tendencies precluded him from supporting this action. Dr. Graham Allison notes, 
‘Medvedev thought he agreed to a humanitarian mission in Libya, but it was converted to 
regime change. Russia felt double-crossed. It definitely had an impact on the Syrian 
case.’705 Putin’s Silovik tendencies would have dictated staying out of a conflict that had no 
impact on the Russian Federation. This disagreement was the first public rift between the 
two men, and the news media promptly followed the verbal sparring. The Silovik and the 
Technocrat were on different sides of the policy divide, and the extension of the inner 
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rivalries between the Technocrats and Siloviki who controlled the Kremlin played out at the 
highest level of government.  
 The NATO imposed no-fly zone was not included in the text of United Nations 
Resolution 1973 and this detail was left unresolved.
706
 Medvedev’s technocratic sensitivity 
to the plight of Libyan civilians caused him to intentionally disregard the specifics of the 
security architecture needed to enforce United Nations Resolution 1973 against Libya. 
NATO forces intervened and amounted to decimating the Khadafy regime. ‘What kind of 
no-fly zone is this if they are striking palaces every night?’ Putin said.707 ‘What do they 
need to bomb palaces for? To drive out the mice?’708 RIA Novosti noted: 
Putin also suggested that Libya's waste oil resources could be “the main object of 
interest to those operating there. Libya has the biggest oil resources in Africa and the 
fourth largest gas resources. It raises the question: isn't this the main object of interest 
to those operating there.”709  
 
 Putin was completely against NATO intervention. The Prime Minister’s security 
impulses precluded his consent to an intervention; this refusal was incompatible with the 
humanitarian sentiment sweeping the international community. The intervention to Putin 
was just another ploy by the West to empower its control of international security. Putin 
rejected the notion that NATO intervened on humanitarian grounds and attributed this 
action to the West’s greed for oil.710 In public, Medvedev was forced to reinforce the 
logical rationale for his decision and indirect consent to the military venture for 
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humanitarian purposes in Libya.
711
 NATO took full command of the military campaign in 
Libya and this amounted to being a Silovik’s nightmare, another incursion by NATO that 
further loosens the security grip of the Russian Federation in the Eastern hemisphere. Putin 
viewed every move by the West in terms of international security, while Medvedev did not. 
The different personalities and formative backgrounds of Medvedev and Putin were now 
responsible for this rift. The President and Prime Minister disagreed on Russian foreign 
policy in Libya because of different priorities and perceptions. The rift continued and was a 
major aspect of the decision with regards to Syria by the Russian Federation.  
 The public spectacle of having the technocratic President urging an end to the 
Libyan crisis on humanitarian grounds and the Prime Minister disavowing any 
responsibility for what he viewed as ‘immoral NATO domination’ played out in the eyes of 
an engaged citizenry that was fully informed of the events and disagreements now plaguing 
the Kremlin. The public rift of the Putin-Medvedev regime alerted Russians to the focal 
point of the Kremlin’s foreign policy debates, the Arab Spring. While these events were 
occurring, Russian interest revolved around far more relevant matters such as NATO, 
European politics, and relations with the West. Russians were not notified by Medvedev 
beforehand that he would consent to a possible intervention entailing Western security 
architecture attempting to resolve the Libyan crisis. NATO was a major point of contention 
in the Russian public’s perception and Medvedev skilfully avoided the political 
entanglement by obfuscating the inherent predisposition of the international community to 
use NATO to achieve its objectives.  
 In the aftermath of the Libyan intervention by NATO, WCIOM independent polling 
of Russian opinion pointed to the fact that Medvedev avoided facing opposition from the 
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anti-NATO, anti-foreign interventionist Russian public by abstaining from a veto of United 
Nations Resolution 1973 by acting quickly and efficiently.
712
 Dr. Kimberly Marten 
commented, ‘They felt betrayed. Russians wanted to make the point that that the West 
won’t be able to do the same thing they did in Syria that they did in Libya.’713 A few days 
after Russia abstained from vetoing the United Nations Resolution that resulted in the 
ouster of Khadafy because of NATO intervention, Russians overwhelmingly opposed these 
measures.
714
 ‘Most of Russians think other countries should not intervene in the conflict 
and leave the citizens of Libya tackling their problems alone (62%).’715  The polling took 
place on 19-20 March, 2011.
716
 NATO command of the Libyan campaign was not in full 
effect until March 31 as the official statement declared.
717
 The Russian public was not clear 
on the fact that NATO and Western-dominated agendas were now set to ‘invade’ and 
topple a criminal regime. Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich opined, ‘the confusion was 
whether it was a no-fly zone or to unseat Khadafy.’718 The Russian public was grappling 
with the new age of multilateral diplomacy in the forum of world institutions of which 
Russia was an active and important member. Medvedev believed in the preservation of 
international norms as evident by his indirect consent to intervening in Libya and stopping 
the bloodshed of innocent civilians, while Putin represented the Cold War era security-
based worldview of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty. The two approaches to 
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the world stage were inextricably linked together politically and the rift was a result of the 
different visions of foreign policy clashing.  
 The Russian public that monitored these events closely and benefited from the 
Gorbachovian forces that empowered them fomented a powerful aversion to foreign 
interventionism. The resulting outcome when NATO took full command of the military 
operation in Libya only reinforced this majority view. The opinion of the Russian public, 
which suggested a powerful opposition to any possible intervention in Libya, clearly 
indicated that the majority of Russians polled do not feel that even humanitarian reasons 
justify an invasion to topple a criminal regime.
719
 WCIOM published the following poll 
results: 
Most of Russians do not support the international military operation in Libya (64%). 
An overwhelming majority of Russians considering the conflict in Libya to be the 
internal problem of the country oppose the international military operation (85%). 
From the point of view of the majority of Russians, Russia should be neutral with 
respect to what is happening in Libya and should not intervene in the conflict 
(56%).
720
  
 
 Medvedev’s method of evading the major obstacles to his decision are telling signs 
of the powerful factors that posed a detriment to his presidential will. Medvedev 
manoeuvred the foreign policy apparatus in a manner that alienated the Siloviki and 
military traditionalists. The powerful Yeltsonian constitutional forces envisaged a President 
who completely and unquestionably controlled the decision-making apparatus, and 
Medvedev’s decision to forgo the advice of the Silovik controlled Russian Security Council 
and the advice of his mentor are attributes of the superior presidential system he was now at 
the apex of. The Russian President made a decision by virtually ignoring the Silovik 
concerns of important bureaucrats in the Kremlin who possessed influential vantage points. 
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Neither the Prime Minister, nor any Silovik bureaucrat who opposed the Libyan 
intervention was able to successfully persuade the President to veto United Nations 
Resolution 1973. The Yeltsonian forces that allowed him to manoeuvre his decision in a 
manner that allowed the decision to be implemented by abstaining from the vote were clear, 
but the Yeltsonian forces of a powerful presidential office were impervious to the powerful 
Russian public that Medvedev until now acted in concert with. The Russian President in the 
democratized Russian political environment made a decision that was not in sync with the 
Russian public’s ardent views against interventionism.721  
 Before the decision regarding United Nations Resolution 1973, Medvedev never 
attempted to act in a manner that would foment public opposition. The Gorbachovian forces 
of an empowered Russian citizenry granted Medvedev the legitimacy he needed to 
successfully and effectively lead the Russian government in its domestic and foreign 
affairs. No speech by Medvedev, Lavrov, or Churkin indicated that United Nations 
Resolution 1973 would entail Western security architecture in Libya. This fundamental 
omission was a politically expedient tactic in order not to have the President of the Russian 
Federation fall out of favour with a Russian public whose granted legitimacy was a 
requirement for his tenure. Within the Kremlin it is fairly certain that Putin and the Siloviki 
attempted to warn Medvedev that if the Russian Federation were not to veto a resolution 
that would enforce a no-fly zone by dubious means it may result in NATO receiving an 
opportunity to assert its security control in Libya, which would be adverse to Russian 
interests.
722
  After the NATO intervention in Libya, the Russian public was resistant to any 
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similar action taken in Syria, a country with a strong historical link to the Russian 
Federation.
723
 
 The Russian public would not have supported any multilateral effort against 
violence in a foreign country if it entailed NATO intervention.
724
 Therefore, Medvedev had 
to use the Yeltsonian forces of his presidential office to stifle the internal opposition within 
the Kremlin. Putin understood that once the decision was made and NATO intervention 
occurred that Medvedev’s legitimacy would be damaged. The Russian public viewed the 
decision to abstain as the President of the Russian Federation appeasing NATO and the 
West. Putin used every interview in the aftermath of the NATO intervention to distance 
himself from this decision. He vociferously responded to questions of who was responsible 
for allowing NATO to ‘invade’ Libya. It is not certain at what point the decision for Putin 
to run for President in 2012 was made, but Putin’s political ambitions created the rift that 
caused him to disavow any decision made that the public viewed as a concession to NATO 
and the West, which infringed on Russian security. 
 Putin’s rift with Medvedev was intentional. He did not agree with Medvedev and 
believed that public support for his presidency was becoming endangered with increasing 
NATO domination of Libya. Khadafy’s bloody end only punctuated the longstanding 
Silovik contention with this decision. Putin’s Silovik tendencies were much more 
compatible with the Russian public, than Medvedev’s belief in humanitarian 
interventionism by cooperation with Western security architecture. Putin’s eventual run for 
the presidency required him to distance himself from a decision made by Medvedev that 
intentionally obfuscated the presidential order to not veto United Nations Resolution 1973 
that would inevitably clash with the Russian public’s views on the matter. NATO was the 
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de facto security architecture to be used by the international community as conventional 
wisdom suggested. Medvedev acted surreptitiously in relation to the Gorbachovian forces 
by not fomenting opposition with the convenient omission of possible NATO intervention. 
The Russian public’s opposition ignited after NATO effectively took the country from 
Khadafy’s regime by force.725   
 Medvedev’s decision to manipulate his decision to shield him from the 
Gorbachovian forces of an empowered, informed citizenry cost him politically as will be 
discussed later. Furthermore, the Siloviki attempted to rein in the powerful President with 
his humanitarian inclinations by strengthening another mechanism within the Kremlin for 
the benefit of the hardliners, the Chief of Presidential Administration position. Medvedev’s 
decision enraged the Silovik faction as this decision was seen as being dangerous to 
Russian security interests and a rift with his mentor and most influential member of the 
Russian government ensued.
726
 The political ramifications after the NATO intervention in 
Libya within the Kremlin and a chagrined Russian public now posed the most significant 
threats to Medvedev’s presidency. He exercised his powers because of the 1993 Russian 
Constitution that made him the ultimate decision-maker, but with the current state of 
Putin’s inner circle dominating the Kremlin, this did not preclude him from fracturing the 
sensitive personal dynamics that had until now been characterized as productive 
coexistence between two competing factions. The Syrian crisis and Medvedev’s support for 
sanctions against Libya are interrelated because of the political fallout after Russia’s 
abstention of United Nations Resolution 1973. 
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Protests: 
 In September 2011, the role of Putin’s tenure as Prime Minister was finally revealed 
when both he and Medvedev announced that Putin, not Medvedev, would run in the 
presidential election as the candidate for United Russia in 2012.
727
 Ambassador Stephen 
Sestanovich comments, ‘During the Medvedev interregnum, the thought of Putin returning 
gave people the feeling that this return was out of the confines of the European political 
theatre.’728 The tandem democracy was never believed to be anything less than an 
opportunity for Putin to maintain his influence in the government, but Medvedev did show 
independent initiatives and rhetoric different from Putin. Dr. Sergei Khrushchev notes, 
‘Medvedev had many independent initiatives.’729 The anti-corruption campaign by 
Medvedev, for example, gave citizens the impression that Medvedev would seek to 
continue his role as President by running again. The Russian public supported Medvedev 
because of his close association with Putin, and during the Medvedev presidency Putin 
generally resisted any attempt to voice criticism or anti-Medvedev sentiments. The Russian 
public was now informed that Putin would return to the presidency, and this ignited protests 
and opposition. The younger voters believed that Medvedev was a younger non-Cold War 
era member of government who sought to modernize the government as he claimed in 
speeches and statements. The return of the former KGB operative and Yeltsin’s handpicked 
successor was a reversal of the progression in national politics since Putin stepped down 
and became Prime Minister. The Russian citizenry and political intelligentsia felt deceived. 
Dr. Nina Khrushcheva opined, ‘All hell broke loose in September 2011 when Putin 
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announced he will return to the presidency. Libya was important and this announcement 
only infuriated the Russian citizens more.’730 United Russia’s legitimacy was dealt a severe 
blow by the Gorbachovian forces of democratization. 
 The enraged, informed citizenry began protesting on the streets and the internet.
731
  
The Russian public viewed the switch as a political manoeuvre to remain in power. Putin’s 
reputation from ‘saviour’ during his presidency evolved into ‘puppet master’ toward the 
end of the Medvedev presidency. The legitimacy of the Putin-Medvedev duo had already 
been dealt a serious blow with the public rift of the two men over the Libyan Civil War, 
which resulted in NATO intervention. The foreign policy decision, which was made by 
obfuscating the probability of NATO involvement, violated key security fears of the 
Russian public. NATO was an undesirable entity in the Eastern hemisphere, and the 
Russian public nervously watched the further integration of NATO’s security architecture 
in various countries. Medvedev’s decision to not veto such a measure polarized the public 
and the regime’s legitimacy had already entered the crucible of the Gorbachovian forces 
that determine whether an elected official can operate in a political environment that makes 
public support a foundation for governance. 2011 saw the unravelling of the political 
partnership between Medvedev and Putin in addition to the latter making his intention to 
seek the presidency again. Putin seeking the presidency nullified the political pregnancy of 
Medvedev’s tenure as President. Russian citizens were now simultaneously questioning 
Medvedev’s foreign policy decisions and Putin’s morally dubious control of the Kremlin. 
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The events of 2011 contributed to a significant erosion of support for the Putin-Medvedev 
regime, and the 2011 Duma elections were evidence of this fact.
732
 
 According to The Guardian, United Russia’s composition in the Duma fell from 
64% to 50% and this marked the first serious political loss in its history during the Putin 
and Medvedev years.
733
 The non-United Russia political candidates were voted into 
government in significant numbers when considered how unremarkable their performance 
was in past elections. Putin’s popularity and the legitimacy of his political party were 
waning. Vladimir Ryzhkov, a liberal opposition politician stated: 
These elections are unprecedented because they were carried out against the 
background of a collapse in trust in Putin, (President Dmitry) Medvedev and the 
ruling party. I think that the March (presidential) election will turn into an even 
bigger political crisis; disappointment, frustration, with even more dirt and 
disenchantment, and an even bigger protest vote.
734
   
    
 The presidential election in 2012 which almost certainly meant Putin’s return and 
the confirmation of Medvedev’s role as a ‘puppet’ were now prominently points of 
contention among the Russian public. ‘Free and fair elections’ as brought in by the 
Gorbachovian reforms were now dubious in the Putin-controlled Russia. The Russian 
public began to seriously question the validity of the Putin-Medvedev regime’s legitimacy. 
Mikhail Gorbachev stated on Ekho Moskvy radio: ‘We do not have real democracy and we 
will not have it if the government is afraid of their people, afraid to say things openly.’735  
Putin’s actions that can be described as the ‘bait and switch’ between him and Medvedev 
were viewed in the most repugnant manner. The Russian citizenry was not completely 
shocked, but felt it was quietly deceived. Russian public opinion was confirmed that United 
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Russia was a political organization intended to keep Vladimir Putin in power while 
democratic change was stifled. The Gorbachovian forces of democratization therefore 
posed a serious threat to Putin’s return to the office of the Russian President, as well as the 
final months of the Medvedev presidency. The crucible of the Gorbachovian forces was set 
on a collision course with the next moves of the Putin-Medvedev regime. After United 
Russia’s abysmal performance in the parliamentary elections in late 2011, Vladimir Putin 
stated: 
I want to speak to all citizens of the country and, above all, those who voted for the 
party, “Putin said, his eyebrows twitching and his gaze wandering.” Despite a rather 
complicated period in the life of our government, despite the [financial] crisis, despite 
the fact that responsibility for these difficulties has laid and lies on the shoulders of 
the party, people – our voters, our citizens – kept us as the leading political party in 
the country.
736
 
  
 For the first time in Putin’s career since he became President in 2000, his rhetoric 
from resolved, unyielding leader changed to a politician willing to make concessions. 
During his statement, he was visibly nervous and made sure to reinforce the notion that all 
political imperatives stem from the people’s consent.737 Vladimir Putin’s reputation as ‘the 
saviour’ no longer applied to him in the eyes of the Russian public. His statement 
emphasized that the Russian citizenry was responsible for keeping United Russia in 
power.
738
 This was a veiled reference that his eventual return to the presidency requires 
legitimacy from the Russian citizens. The Gorbachovian forces of democratization dealt 
United Russia a serious blow to its legitimacy, and Putin was well aware of the powerful 
forces that could potentially end his political career. This cautious attitude was to become a 
permanent fixture for the remainder of the Medvedev presidency. The bureaucratic 
rebellion by the hawkish elements of the Kremlin against Medvedev continued and resulted 
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in his elevation of the Silovik and military traditionalist bastion, the Russian Security 
Council.  
Presidential Edict of May 2011: 
 On May 6 of 2011, President Medvedev convened a routine Russian Security 
Council meeting in which he announced the signing of a decree that would theoretically 
strengthen the role of the Kremlin’s Security Council and the position of Russian Security 
Council Secretary.
739
 The role of the Russian Security Council during the Medvedev years 
had been marginal. Medvedev used the forum to convey decisions and make 
announcements. The Russian Security Council was not an important mechanism in the 
Medvedev presidency’s foreign policy apparatus. The Siloviki and military traditionalists 
who controlled the Russian Security Council were among Medvedev’s harshest critics who 
possessed the general ideological fixation for truculence and hawkishness. This was 
incompatible with Medvedev’s liberal temperament. Medvedev chose to evade the Russian 
Security Council’s attempts to influence his decisions. The Yeltsonian forces granted 
Medvedev the unlimited power to use the foreign policy mechanisms according to his 
wishes. Medvedev’s presidential powers made it unnecessary to build a consensus among 
the quarrelsome group of bureaucrats from different factions. 
 Medvedev’s decision to abstain from vetoing a United Nations Resolution against 
Libya that facilitated NATO intervention clashed deeply with hardline elements within the 
Kremlin. The Siloviki and the military traditionalists would have firmly protested such a 
decision and would claim that the risk to Russian security outweighed the plight of the 
Libyan civilians. The multilateral humanitarian intervention to the Siloviki and military 
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traditionalists would have been viewed as another ploy to enhance NATO’s stranglehold of 
the international security sphere. Medvedev disregarded this collective opinion of the 
hardliners and as he repeatedly did with other foreign policy decisions, he marginalized the 
Russian Security Council by merely communicating his decision to it. The decision was 
formulated beforehand and the chagrined members of the Russian Security Council were 
left no option but to accept the decision by Medvedev whose use of the Yeltsonian forces of 
a powerful presidency prevented others from thwarting his will. Medvedev was the ultimate 
decision-maker and the 1993 Russian Constitution gave him the authority to relegate any 
mechanism within the executive branch of the government in order to successfully 
implement his decisions.  
 Until the Russian Federation’s decision to abstain from vetoing United Nations 
Resolution 1973 against Libya, the relationship between Medvedev and Putin was close, 
amiable, and respectful. Medvedev showed little regard for hawkish bureaucrats, except for 
his mentor, Vladimir Putin. Putin handpicked and groomed Medvedev for the presidency, 
and Medvedev always regarded Putin as a senior colleague whom he admired.
740
 Putin’s 
appointment by Medvedev to the position of Prime Minister reinforced the belief that Putin 
and Medvedev were members of a close political partnership. Putin never expressed any 
disagreement with Medvedev about any decision until the United Nations Security Council 
decision against Libya, which Medvedev could have vetoed, that opened the possibility and 
eventual outcome of NATO intervention. The outcome of the resolution against Libya 
deeply disturbed Putin and he repeatedly condemned and disavowed responsibility of 
Medvedev’s decision.741 The Silovik tendencies within Putin were ignited when NATO 
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forces became present in Libya and the West gained another strategic foothold in the 
Eastern hemisphere. The Siloviki and military traditionalists within the Kremlin were 
similarly disturbed by this decision they believed would contribute to the erosion of 
Russian security. The Russian Security Council’s Patrushev and Baluyevsky would have 
condemned the move and urged Medvedev to act in Russia’s interests, not for those of the 
Libyans. Medvedev knew of the possible outcome and he evaded those who would seek a 
reversal of his decision. Putin and Medvedev’s public sparring after the decision was made 
highlights the first major clash between the Russian President and his Prime Minister.  
 The internal politics of the Kremlin were set to create a bureaucratic rebellion. Both 
Putin and the Russian Security Council had a common grievance against Medvedev. Putin, 
Patrushev, and Baluyevsky attempted to strengthen the role of the hardliners within the 
Kremlin by convincing Medvedev that a new presidential edict that would give the Russian 
Security Council and the Security Council Secretary expanded roles should be signed into 
law.  
 Alexander Golts, an analyst for The St. Petersburg Times wrote: 
From now on, the Security Council secretary will be responsible for “the control of 
Russia’s armed forces, other forces, military formations and bodies,” according to 
Medvedev’s decree. That is to say the secretary will control not only the armed 
forces, but also law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Moreover, Medvedev’s 
decree stipulates that the Security Council secretary will “participate in formulating 
and implementing foreign policy.” The secretary will also “make proposals to the 
Security Council for coordinating the work of federal and regional executive bodies 
in national emergencies.” In effect, the country’s Siloviki, who previously answered 
only to the president, now have their own “czar.”742 
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 Medvedev announced the edict during a Russian Security Council meeting and then 
switched the subject to recent forest fires in Russia.
743
 The President did not focus solely on 
this new edict that may strengthen the role of the Russian Security Council. The President 
because of the Yeltsonian constitutional powers still controlled all the levers of power 
regardless of any document that theoretically strengthened a mechanism in the foreign 
policy apparatus.
744
 The edict gave Patrushev a more visible presence in policy debates and 
provided new regulations for the Russian Security Council, but the Russian President’s will 
was the overwhelming factor in whether this new edict that theoretically gave the Siloviki 
and military traditionalists a stronger platform on which they can advocate their beliefs in 
foreign policy matters would be implemented.  
 The new edict and Medvedev’s signing of it, however unenthusiastic as it was, 
reveal that Medvedev had no choice but to appease the hawkish bureaucrats, especially 
Putin with whom he had had a public rift. The internal dynamics of the Kremlin began to 
form a serious challenge to Medvedev after his persistent marginalization of the Russian 
Security Council and decision to ignore the concerns of Putin with regards to Libya. The 
decision to abstain vetoing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 created an 
internal conflict within Putin’s inner circle. The Russian President chose to make a decision 
that alienated the hawkish bureaucrats who occupy important roles in the government. Dr. 
Mark Galeotti commented on the edict, ‘In symbolic terms, these moves were important, 
but in the Russian government the official rules are not always the same as the rules that are 
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unofficially practiced.’745 The signing of an edict that theoretically strengthened the 
hardliners was Medvedev’s attempt to pacify important members of the Kremlin who felt 
disenfranchised. The bureaucratic rearrangement and new edict were now to go in effect in 
confronting the decision of whether to consent to sanctions against the Assad regime in 
Syria.  
Decisions: 
 The Russian Federation during the Medvedev presidency chose to veto United 
Nations Security Council sanctions against the Assad regime in Syria in October 2011 and 
February 2012.
746
 Dr. Mark Galeotti notes, ‘Russia felt cheated in Libya, so with Syria the 
Russians feel they have to go the other way to show they will not tolerate being treated that 
way.’747 The position of intransigence in consenting to multilateral humanitarian 
intervention was characteristically different from the response to Libya. Putin announced 
his intention to return to the presidency, public support for the Putin-Medvedev regime was 
eroding, and the hardliners in the Kremlin attempted to expand their influence by reforming 
the internal machinery responsible for foreign policy formulation. The Kremlin was wary 
of the ramifications of making a decision that may have another NATO intervention 
because of Russian consent. The parliamentary elections and the protests were indicative of 
the precarious position United Russia was in. The Siloviki and military traditionalists were 
now determined to ensure that another ‘NATO invasion’ would not occur. Politically, Putin 
understood that in order to return to the presidency the Russian government must refrain 
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from making any foreign policy decisions that would ignite further tension among the 
Russian public.  
 With the foreign and defence arms neutralized because of loyal diplomats and a 
non-ideological Minister of Defence, the centre of foreign policy debate lay within the 
Kremlin between the technocratic President and hawkish bureaucrats belonging to the 
faction led by Prime Minister Putin, who sought to reassert the government under his 
control in order to safeguard his election and any ‘spill over’ effects from Medvedev’s 
tenure into the new Putin presidency. Vladimir Putin was politically endangered and his 
relationship with his liberal handpicked successor was tested. The public rift, which lasted 
until Khadafy’s bloody murder, was over and the necessary shift of the levers of power 
from the President to his inevitable successor was taking place. Medvedev’s begrudging 
handling of the Syrian issue illuminates the internal dynamics that were chaotic within the 
Kremlin and the political ramifications in Russia’s political environment. Putin needed to 
act cohesively with a Russian President who showed an independent nature in foreign 
policy, which was a quality that Medvedev lacked until the decision with regards to Libya.  
 The Gorbachovian forces of democratization were now working against a regime 
that had its legitimacy stem from the popularity and public image of Vladimir Putin. Putin’s 
return to the presidency tarnished his image as well as United Russia’s. The Libyan crisis 
that saw the intervention of a Western security organization did not stir any positive 
emotions from the Russian public. The surprise decision to abstain from vetoing the 
resolution against Libya was executed in a manner to evade the Russian citizenry from 
voicing its opposition. In June 2012 independent polling in Russia asked citizens about 
whether they believe Russia should intervene in Syria: ‘Russians do not support any of the 
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parties involved in the conflict (57%).’748 A majority of Russians believed that Russia 
should remain neutral and not support any factions involved.
749
 The Russian public did not 
believe that the Libyan outcome was the proper course and this affected the public view of 
Syria’s crisis. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva asserts that, ‘The Russian public was very angry about 
the Libyan outcome. Russians keep saying that with Assad we don’t trust the West in 
Syria.’750 
 In addition to the distrust stemming from United Nations Resolution 1973 against 
the Khadafy regime, Russian-Syrian ties were vastly different from the Russian-Libyan 
relationship. Syria and the Russian Federation had closer historical, political, and cultural 
links.
751
 David Speedie asserts, ‘Russia’s history with Syria is much closer. Syria is a key 
player in the Middle East, where Russia tries to maintain influence. Syria is also a bulwark 
against regional powers. There are a million Russians working in Syria. Syria is vital for 
Russia’s interests in the Middle East.’752 The Putin-Medvedev regime, already experiencing 
an erosion of its legitimacy, had to act cautiously in order not to foment further public 
opposition in a political environment that made the support of the governed a requirement 
for governance.  
 Putin repeatedly disavowed his responsibility for the Libyan outcome and became 
much more sympathetic to the anti-Medvedev sentiment within the Kremlin displayed by 
the hardline elements.
753
 Putin was in fact fighting for his political survival after Medvedev 
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made a foreign policy decision that resulted in the unpopular NATO ‘invasion’ and the 
newly announced political arrangement that revealed Medvedev’s role as nothing but a 
mere ‘seat warmer.’ The simultaneous events began a steady erosion of United Russia’s 
control of the government. Therefore, Medvedev’s political future was in danger as well. 
Putin’s inner circle was collectively anxious over whether any possible future decisions will 
worsen the situation in relation to the constituents and further erode the legitimacy of the 
bureaucratic clan in power. The foundation for the regime’s legitimacy was experiencing 
the most powerful tremors in its history, and the Gorbachovian forces of democratization 
had the potential to create mass discontent that could result in the democratic ouster of any 
politician or political party. The Russian public was fully informed and engaged with the 
affairs of domestic and foreign policy matters. Every decision was now tremendously 
important in continuing the transition into the Putin presidency and the continuation of 
United Russia’s rule in Russian politics. As influential and popular as Putin was, the tides 
of popular opinion were now relegating him to a mere mortal fighting for political survival.  
 The world’s attention was fixated on the current events in Syria after the Libyan 
crisis had come to an abrupt end. The Russian Federation rejected passing a United Nations 
Security Council statement condemning the Assad regime earlier in 2011 and now it was 
faced with motions to enforce sanctions.
754
 With the new presidential edict strengthening 
the role of the Russian Security Council in May 2011, the presidential advisory forum had 
the opportunity to be a relevant mechanism in the decision-making process. Immediately 
prior to the vote on the United Nations Security Council, Medvedev convened his Security 
                                                 
754 Paul Harris, ‘Syria resolution vetoed by Russia and China at United Nations’, The Guardian, 4 Feb. 2012., Google News Archive 
[online database], accessed 2 Dec. 2012. 
300 
 
Council to discuss pertinent matters on September 30, 2011.
755
 The meeting was 
‘operational’ and did not evoke any sense of emergency over a looming decision on the 
United Nations Security Council against Syria.
756
 Medvedev, in his attempt to unify the 
fractious group of bureaucrats from distinctive factions, was forced to allow the Russian 
Security Council and its hawkish members to inquire about any possible decisions. Given 
this opportunity, the Russian Security Council, which is controlled by Siloviki and military 
traditionalists, would almost certainly attempt to sway the President into making a decision 
that would be compatible with the hawkish worldview that NATO should not be allowed to 
intervene in the domestic matters of a state for the sake of international security. This 
meeting then followed the Russian Security Council Secretary’s meeting with the Supreme 
Allied Commander of NATO.
757
 The meeting was described by the Russian government as 
follows: 
During the meeting generally agreed on the importance of understanding and strategic 
partnership between Russia and NATO.  They discussed issues of cooperation 
between the Russian Federation and the Alliance for a settlement in Afghanistan, 
international security, the fight against piracy and the European missile defence 
system.
758
 
 
 The Silovik Patrushev was beginning to meet with high-ranking members on the 
world stage, and this marked a significant difference from his previous role as lower-level 
bureaucrat who met with unimportant foreign dignitaries. Patrushev was communicating 
directly with NATO and the Silovik faction was able to further widen its influence because 
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of the new opportunity and expanded role in foreign affairs. Patrushev and the Russian 
Security Council were now using the text of the presidential edict of May 2011 and the 
discouraged Prime Minister to mount a powerful offensive against Medvedev’s foreign 
policy direction. The outcome of the Libyan Civil War and NATO intervention severely 
fractured the relationship between Medvedev and the Siloviki in the foreign policy 
apparatus. The expanded role was a move to pacify the disenchanted Prime Minister and 
Siloviki that Medvedev led in the formulation of foreign policy decisions. The tremors 
within the Kremlin because of what the hawkish bureaucrats viewed as ‘the Libyan 
debacle’ now shifted the personal dynamics and resulted in a stronger role of the faction 
opposed to Medvedev’s ‘multilateral humanitarian intervention’ policy. Patrushev’s 
meeting with the chief commander of NATO was a significant stroke of power that the 
Siloviki now enjoyed. Medvedev understood that the political fallout within the Kremlin 
because of his decision regarding Libya necessitated employing the Russian Security 
Council in a more potent manner for foreign policy matters and the need to pacify the 
disenchanted members of Putin’s inner circle who occupy vital positions in government.  
 Patrushev’s expanded role in the Kremlin took full force. In January 2012, 
Patrushev made an important statement with regards to a possible veto on the United 
Nations Security Council if sanctions were sought against Syria.
759
 Nikolai Patrushev said, 
‘We are getting information that NATO members and some Persian Gulf States, operating 
according to the Libya scenario, intend to move from indirect intervention in Syrian affairs 
to direct military intervention.’760 The Silovik worldview had an expanded platform and 
was reaping the rewards of the presidential edict of May 2011. It was akin to a ‘new lease 
on life’ for the Russian Security Council Secretary who was persistently marginalized by 
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Medvedev. Technocrat Medvedev’s concessions to the Silovik faction included an 
important presidential appointment in addition to the presidential edict and a generally 
more favourable treatment of the Russian Security Council. 
 Sergei Ivanov, an ardent Silovik and powerful voice in Russian politics, was 
appointed to Chief of Presidential Administration in December 2011.
761
 Medvedev, the 
liberal-minded Technocrat, appointed one of the most forceful Siloviki in Russian political 
history to serve as his chief of staff and incidentally become a member of the Russian 
Security Council. Sergei Ivanov spent six years as the Russian Minister of Defence and 
notoriously opposed Putin’s plans to cooperate with NATO and American military 
operations in Afghanistan.
762
 Sergei Ivanov is fanatically anti-NATO and his appointment 
to become Medvedev’s chief of staff is certainly an act in giving the Siloviki more 
opportunities to assert their policy beliefs. This further appeased the Silovik faction after 
the internal political fallout over the Libyan outcome.  
 On January 27, 2012, a week before the decision by the Russian Federation to veto 
a United Nation Security Council attempt to enforce sanctions against the Assad regime, 
the Russian Security Council was convened with Sergei Ivanov present, as well as the other 
influential Siloviki who were emboldened with an edict that was signed by Medvedev as a 
concession.
763
 Medvedev was convening an advisory board with a strengthened role, 
controlled by bureaucrats with policy beliefs adverse to his liberal temperament. Medvedev 
was evidently kowtowing to the Siloviki who were mounting a powerful force against any 
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decision that may help NATO gain another strategic foothold in the Eastern hemisphere. 
Sergei Ivanov, Nikolai Patrushev, and Vladimir Putin who were present during this meeting 
now had a united agenda: to prevent the Russian government from allowing any sanctions 
to be implemented against Syria that may become another excuse for NATO intervention. 
The Siloviki were united in their ideological policy pursuit and Medvedev was conciliatory 
in his treatment of them. The new balance of power within the Kremlin was a technocratic 
President making amends at the urging of the marginalized Siloviki whose leader was 
going to return to the presidency. Medvedev’s technocratic style also precluded him from 
lashing out at the bureaucracy. The legal professional, who found that he was leading a 
Kremlin full of ideological clashes, was now mediating between himself and the Silovik 
faction for his political survival. The Syrian crisis was treated with greater Silovik 
involvement at the behest of a President who sought to prevent the inner circle from 
erupting into chaos.  
 Medvedev’s decisions to veto the United Nations Security Council sanctions against 
Syria in October 2011 and February 2012 were made with the Silovik worldview becoming 
a powerful factor in the policy debates. The debates were not confined to personal 
discussions between Medvedev and Putin, but made it necessary within the inner sanctum 
for Medvedev to listen to the opinions of other influential Siloviki and military 
traditionalists during Russian Security Council meetings. The rift between Putin and 
Medvedev over Libya made Putin’s loyalty lie more with his faction than his handpicked 
successor. When Putin’s advice against the Libyan resolution was ignored, the rift 
contributed to a loss of internal political support from Putin. This transferred to the hawkish 
bureaucrats who with Putin now had a common grievance. While the internal dynamics had 
altered, the method with which the Kremlin implemented its decision still lay with the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Lavrov and Churkin remained loyal diplomats who believed in 
assertive diplomacy based on Western principles. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
chameleon-like quality to project an assertive Putinist Russia with the hopes of solving 
issues in diplomatic forums has remained. Both decisions in October 2011 and February 
2012 were conveyed to Lavrov and Churkin without any friction or ideological differences. 
Vitaly Churkin was noted as saying the following at the United Nations Security Council: 
Russia's UN ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, told the council after the vote that his 
country did not support the Assad regime or the violence but opposed the resolution 
because it was “based on a philosophy of confrontation,” contained “an ultimatum of 
sanctions” and was against a peaceful settlement. He complained that the resolution 
did not call for the Syrian opposition to disassociate itself from “extremists” and enter 
into dialogue.
764
 
 
 ‘Based on a philosophy of confrontation’ is the Kremlin’s inherent fear that NATO 
will ‘invade’ Syria akin to the Libyan crisis.765 The Siloviki and military traditionalists in 
the Kremlin feared that any sanctions against a state in the Middle East experiencing a civil 
uprising will lead to NATO and American intervention. The encroachment on international 
security in the Eastern hemisphere conflicts with core principles of the hawkish bureaucrats 
who view the world with a Cold War lens. The imminent NATO intervention was 
obfuscated during the Libyan crisis and the Russian Federation, even though it was 
characteristically against any Western intervention, indirectly consented to the sanctions 
against Libya with the myopic belief that the plight of Libyans outweighed the risk of 
NATO intervention. The United States, the West, and NATO were wilfully ignorant of 
Russian grievances against NATO in the aftermath. The Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs reflected this fact in a statement by its United Nations Ambassador regarding a 
possible outcome in Syria akin to Libya: 
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Russia's U.N. envoy, Vitaly Churkin, accused the resolution's backers of “calling for 
regime change,” pushing the opposition toward power and not stopping their 
provocations and feeding armed struggle. Some influential members of the 
international community, unfortunately including those sitting around this table, from 
the very beginning of the Syrian process have been undermining the opportunity for a 
political settlement.
766
 
 
 Churkin forcefully voiced the need for a peaceful solution and a ‘political 
settlement’ that do not involve the use of military force from foreign sources or regime 
change reminiscent of Khadafy’s murder on live television.767 The Kremlin was 
collectively against the Syrian regime being toppled by circumstances similar to the Libyan 
situation. After United Nations Resolution 1973 was passed, the outcome in Libya was 
vociferously protested by Putin.
768
 He made no attempt to hide his disgust with what 
happened in Libya.
769
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs channelled the Kremlin’s wishes and 
reflected the general sentiments of the Russian foreign policy apparatus. The Kremlin was 
always prone to implement decisions through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without any 
bureaucratic obfuscation, meandering dialogue, or politicization of decisions. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs was the dependable arm of the government because of the existence of 
the Yeltsin Liberals who remained loyal to the new leadership after Yeltsin’s resignation. 
Lavrov and Churkin remained obedient and competent throughout their tenures that have 
spanned from the 1990’s until the current day. 
 The defence and foreign affairs arms of the government were neutralized with loyal, 
obedient ministers who did not have political agendas of their own. This essentially meant 
that the only obstruction for policy decisions was within the Kremlin, especially when 
Medvedev’s decisions were discussed and dissected beforehand as the presidential edict has 
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expanded the role of the Russian Security Council. The internal mechanics of the Kremlin’s 
foreign policy apparatus now allowed for Putin and the Siloviki to successfully influence 
against and possibly intervene in decisions that clash with central tenets of the Silovik or 
military traditionalist worldview. The Russian President addressed the possible United 
Nations sanctions against Syria: 
“Russia will use its rights as a permanent member of the Security Council. However, 
other appeals or statements on Syria, including under the UN Security Council's 
auspices, are possible,” Medvedev said in an interview with the Financial Times 
newspaper published on Monday. “What I will not support is a resolution similar to 
1973 on Libya, because I am convinced that a good resolution has been turned into a 
piece of paper to cover a senseless military operation,” the President said.770 
  
 Medvedev’s reasoning behind his decision to veto sanctions against Syria is directly 
related to the outcome of the Libyan sanctions that he chose to abstain from vetoing. David 
Speedie notes, ‘Russia felt it was lied to about Libya, and it refuses to play a pivotal role in 
Syria, which is a closer ally. There was a sense of betrayal.’771 Medvedev’s statement is a 
clear reflection of the Silovik faction’s expanded influence. The statement sounds almost 
directly from the mouth of Vladimir Putin. With the Russian Security Council meetings 
taking on a more important role, Sergei Ivanov, Vladimir Putin, and Nikolai Patrushev 
possessed the initiative and opportunity to voice their concerns regarding a possible 
intervention in Syria if Medvedev chose to consent to or abstain from United Nations 
Security Council sanctions. The collective voice was strengthened as a result of 
Medvedev’s authority and concessions to the bureaucrats who were dismayed with his 
decision regarding Libya. The Siloviki were unconcerned with civilian casualties in Syria if 
it meant Western security architecture were able to firmly insert itself into another country. 
The world stage for the Siloviki revolved around the balance of power in the international 
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security arena. Medvedev now faced this internal rebellion that also made him appoint 
Sergei Ivanov, a member of the opposite side of the political spectrum, to be his chief of 
staff. Medvedev knew that his presidency was facing internal dissent in the Kremlin and it 
was important to not marginalize the Siloviki further, especially since Putin announced his 
intention to return to the presidency.   
 The personal dynamics between Putin and Medvedev had always shielded the latter 
from the ideological and bureaucratic wrath of the Silovik faction, but Medvedev’s actions 
with regards to Libya thwarted the ruling tandem. Putin allied himself with his fellow 
Siloviki and internally moved to give his faction more authority to return Russian foreign 
policy to a more independent, non-Western sympathetic set of policies. Intervening in a 
foreign country during a civil uprising and facilitating Western intervention violated core 
tenets of Putin’s worldview. The appointment of Sergei Ivanov and the Russian Security 
Council’s strengthened role now shifted the policy debates in a more Cold War worldview 
of international affairs. Putin’s eventual return to the presidency was beginning to erode the 
Medvedev era’s uniqueness. The Russian government reminiscent prior to Medvedev’s 
inauguration in 2008 was beginning to reassert itself.  
 Medvedev’s response to the internal backlash because of his Libyan decision 
reveals that the personal dynamics within the Kremlin maintain a powerful incentive for 
concessions as evident in his edict and appointment of Sergei Ivanov to the Chief of 
Presidential Administration position. Dr. Mark Galeotti comments on the importance of the 
appointment, ‘Sergei Ivanov was another Putin, speaks to the same constituency and to the 
same issues.’772 The Russian President had severely fractured his relationship with his 
mentor and the hawkish bureaucrats who occupy powerful positions in the Kremlin. Putin 
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had announced his intention that he will run for President in the 2012 election. Medvedev 
was a loyal, obedient Technocrat who possessed little ambition of his own. He publicly 
acknowledged the support of Putin as a cornerstone of his presidency, and he gladly 
stepped down from the presidency in 2012. Putin and Medvedev’s relationship may have 
been strained, but Medvedev’s respect for his mentor remained. Medvedev still desired to 
remain active in Russian politics and knew that his relationship with Putin needed to be 
rehabilitated in order to remain in the highest corridors of power. The Yeltsonian forces 
were shifting from Medvedev to Putin; this fact meant that Medvedev’s decisions must not 
further create tension within the Kremlin. Medvedev’s political survival in terms of having 
an important role in the Russian government rested on the opinion of one man, Vladimir 
Putin. Medvedev’s furious mentor was the man who would most likely become President in 
2012 and possibly remain in that position until 2024.  
 The Medvedev presidency was in full conciliatory mode to appease Putin and the 
Siloviki with whom Medvedev would have to compete with for influence in the post-
Medvedev presidency. The Yeltsonian forces of the Russian presidency would soon 
become Putin’s again and as important as Medvedev’s career has been for Russia, Putin 
will be able to theoretically dismiss him without any justifiable reason when he returned to 
the highest office in government. The 1993 Russian Constitution gives the Russian 
President unlimited power over the executive branch of government, and Medvedev’s 
arrangement will make him susceptible to the powerful Yeltsonian forces when he steps 
down. A decision to consent to sanctions against Syria after experiencing a personal rift 
with Putin after the Libyan outcome would have certainly made Medvedev a prime 
candidate for dismissal by Putin when the latter eventually became President. Medvedev 
was cautious not to further infuriate the man who most likely will be empowered by the 
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constitutional powers authored by Yeltsin to give the occupant of the presidential office 
unquestionable, unchallengeable power to wield authority over the bureaucracy that served 
the Russian President. Medvedev was now unable to agree to sanctions against the Assad 
regime because his political future within Putin’s inner circle depended on it. 
 Announcing the return of Vladimir Putin to the presidential arena and Medvedev 
consenting albeit indirectly to NATO intervention in Libya severely damaged the 
legitimacy of the Putin-Medvedev regime that had until now governed with the 
overwhelming confidence of the Russian public. The decision to enforce sanctions against 
Libya that resulted in Khadafy’s bloody demise on live television and NATO’s 
‘domination’ of another country resulted in a public questioning of Medvedev’s intentions. 
The Medvedev government made a decision that led to foreign intervention by the West 
and resulted in the infringement of Libyan sovereignty. NATO taking full command of the 
military operations offended the security instincts of the Russian public that had historically 
viewed the collective military organization as a threat to Russia. The Russian government 
was seen as ‘emboldening the enemy’ and Medvedev’s foreign policy intentions were now 
open for debate and criticism. The Russian President effectively allowed the West to 
commence a military intervention that toppled a foreign government; the domestic political 
scene was left wondering why Medvedev, a stalwart ally of Putin, would allow this to 
happen. The Russian public was left to debate over whether civilian casualties in a foreign 
country gave Medvedev the moral justification to allow NATO intervention. The foreign 
policy credentials of the Medvedev presidency were now being actively examined by the 
Russian public. 
 The NATO intervention of Libya and the announcement of Putin’s return to 
presidential politics were fomenting active opposition by the engaged Russian citizenry. 
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The Gorbachovian forces of an empowered Russian public now posed a challenge to Putin, 
Medvedev, and United Russia. The political party suffered substantial losses during the 
parliamentary elections in December 2011.
773
 Public legitimacy for United Russia and its 
leading politicians was eroding. The Libyan outcome and Medvedev’s intention to step 
down were driving forces behind the Russian public openly and vociferously questioning 
the ruling party and its leader, Vladimir Putin, and his ‘pawn,’ Dmitry Medvedev. The 
Kremlin was subjugated to months of protests and activists criticizing the Putin-Medvedev 
regime. The political environment that heralded the democratic forces facilitated by 
Gorbachev now gave Putin and Medvedev powerful imperatives to not act in any way that 
can be interpreted as against the interests of the Russian citizens and their country. Risky or 
dangerous moves were not an option during a time of such civil discontent. The tone of the 
Kremlin became conciliatory and United Russia and its presidential candidate were for the 
first time in political danger.  
 Medvedev, even if he had desired to, could not make a decision that would consent 
to sanctions imposed by Western security architecture. The timing within the Russian 
political environment was during an erosion of legitimacy. The political future of all 
important members of United Russia now depended on quelling public discontent by acting 
cautiously and in concert with public opinion. Making a decision that emboldened NATO 
and revealing that Medvedev was a mere ‘seat warmer’ for Putin posed powerful risks to 
the credibility and validity of the Putin-Medvedev regime. Medvedev could not consent to 
sanctions against Syria. If he had made that decision, the erosion of support may have been 
catastrophic for Putin’s inner circle and Putin himself. The Gorbachovian forces of 
democratization were working against the Medvedev presidency and the cautious behaviour 
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of the regime is a testament to how the public opinion of constituents is the most powerful 
force within the Russian Federation. No leader of the Russian government can neglect the 
wishes of the governed without risking the end of his or her political career. 
Reflections: 
 The final legacy of the Medvedev presidency will be one of intransigence in relation 
to the Syrian crisis that is ongoing at the time of this writing. The Russian Federation’s 
decision to not veto sanctions against Libya and its outcome had a direct impact on the 
foreign policy decision with regards to Syria. The Putin-Medvedev regime was suffering 
from an erosion of legitimacy at a time when foreign policy crises erupted in the Middle 
East. Prior to the announcement of Putin’s return to presidential politics, the Russian public 
was increasingly critical of the NATO intervention in Libya that Medvedev chose not to 
veto. The confluence of these events put the Putin-Medvedev regime through the crucible 
of the Gorbachovian forces of democratization. The empowered masses began to vocally 
and actively question the leaders in the Kremlin. For the first time since Putin was 
inaugurated to the Russian presidency in 2000, the Russian public chose to confront the 
government with the full force of an informed, engaged citizenry that was moulded by the 
Gorbachovian reforms of Glasnost and Perestroika. The Putin-Medvedev regime during 
2011 and 2012 was acting in a political environment that threatened its leadership and had 
the ability to facilitate its ouster. The parliamentary elections in 2011 and Putin’s 
conciliatory tone were a testament to the power of the Russian citizenry.
774
 The Russian 
Federation’s government was subservient to the constituents it served. United Russia’s 
existence in political life was being threatened, and the bureaucrats who were affected by 
this now acted cautiously to not further foment public opposition.  
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 The foreign policy decision made by Medvedev with respect to Libya clashed with 
Putin and the Siloviki in government. Giving NATO the opportunity to further increase its 
control of international security did not please the hardline elements of the Kremlin. Putin 
and Medvedev’s public rift was proof that Medvedev chose to exercise his own judgment 
over the objections of his mentor. Whether Putin was set to run for President again at that 
time is not certain, but with the announcement that he would made in September 2011 it 
became clear that Medvedev was now making decisions with the full knowledge that his 
Silovik mentor would hold the reins of power again. Medvedev understood that with Putin 
in the office of the Russian President again he was now ending his presidency with the 
necessity that he must act according to the wishes of the man who would eventually 
reassert his control of the Yeltsonian constitutional forces. Prime Minister Putin could only 
criticize the decisions of President Medvedev, but President Putin could seek to rectify past 
grievances that existed in his mind by demoting or dismissing Medvedev from United 
Russia completely. Medvedev was also acting in the interest of preserving his close 
relationship with Putin, who opposed sanctions against Syria and could potentially seek 
political revenge against his handpicked successor within the ‘palace politics’ of the 
Kremlin. 
 The Medvedev presidency for the first time in its history was experiencing internal 
tremors within the Kremlin and a harsh political environment that was beginning to 
vociferously oppose United Russia and its leaders. Medvedev sought to pacify the Siloviki 
by signing a presidential edict strengthening the role of the Russian Security Council, 
appointing an influential Silovik to be his chief of staff, and vetoing any United Nations 
Security Council efforts to sanction the Assad regime in Syria. These concessions clearly 
show that Medvedev aimed to preserve his connection to Putin and the Siloviki he leads in 
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government in order to maintain a close personal and professional association with them in 
the future of the post-Medvedev presidency. The statements Medvedev made about a 
possible resolution against the Assad regime echoed all of the sentiments of Putin, the 
Siloviki, and any security-obsessed bureaucrats. The Medvedev presidency was predicated 
on the Technocrats and Siloviki of Putin’s inner circle working productively together and 
Medvedev’s decision to abstain from vetoing the Libyan resolution severely fractured the 
personal dynamics upon which his presidential career relied. The Medvedev presidency 
was transitioning into the Putin presidency, and now the Gorbachovian and Yeltsonian 
forces obstructed Medvedev’s ability to produce any vote other than a veto of the Syrian 
sanctions on the United Nations Security Council. In addition to this, Medvedev’s need to 
pacify his mentor and the Siloviki led to significant changes in the bureaucratic 
arrangements of the Kremlin. Namely, the Russian Security Council featured more 
prominently in policy debates and the Chief of Presidential Administration position was 
given to a Silovik who rivalled Putin’s influence and anti-Western sentiment in the 
Kremlin. Repeating the Libyan outcome in Syria was not viable. 
 Medvedev’s presidency ended with the inauguration of President Putin and his 
appointment to Prime Minister in 2012. Medvedev’s political career was secure to the 
extent that his decision with regards to Syria did not further damage his relationship with 
his hawkish mentor. Had his decision in response to Syria taken a similar course to that in 
Libya, Medvedev’s reputation for conceding Russian security to NATO would have further 
destroyed his reputation within Putin’s inner circle and may have even led to a Russian 
uprising against the Putin-led government. Medvedev did not therefore risk enraging his 
mentor who would eventually possess the Yeltsonian powers that enable the termination of 
Medvedev’s career, nor did he seek to allow NATO to intervene again to the chagrin of the 
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Russian public and the hardline elements within the Kremlin. Medvedev’s final decision 
was made with the full knowledge that the next Russian President must be appeased and 
that the Russian citizenry must regain trust in United Russia by witnessing a rejection of 
NATO’s expanding security grip. Medvedev’s rejection of the resolutions against Syria was 
influenced by the Yeltsonian and Gorbachovian forces that posed a threat to his career and 
United Russia’s rule. The only viable option was to veto a possible repetition of the Libyan 
outcome in Syria. Medvedev’s decision appeased the Russian public who had the potential 
to oust United Russia from government. It also appeased the Siloviki and their leader, 
Vladimir Putin, whose own presidency in 2012 was characterized by the same 
intransigence with respect to the Syrian crisis. The Governmental Politics Model was 
utilized by the principles expressly included earlier in this thesis. The issue of decision-
making with respect to the Arab Spring uprisings and the current state of Putin’s inner 
circle dominating the Kremlin make Graham Allison’s mode of analysis convenient for 
examining the personalities, ideologies, and informal networks of power involved in this 
foreign policy episode. 
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Chapter: Conclusion 
Introduction: 
 The thesis introduced a foundation for understanding the modern day Kremlin 
through the prism of Graham Allison’s Governmental Politics Model. The introduction and 
the first chapter of this thesis both detailed the necessary framework from Essence of 
Decision for the analysis of foreign policy episodes during the Medvedev presidency.
775
 
The chapters that followed using this framework illuminated the foreign policy decision-
making for the reader by consciously assessing the five central principles of the 
Governmental Politics Model. 
 Ultimately, this thesis took the view that institutions are controlled by people with 
particular characteristics, tendencies, and perceptions. The modern Kremlin is no exception. 
As was evident in previous chapters, Kremlin bureaucrats have reacted to foreign policy 
issues with the personal dynamics playing out in the new Russian political atmosphere, 
which was moulded by both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, respectively. No 
modern day Russian President or political circle occupying the Kremlin can now wilfully 
ignore the passions of the governed. The President of the Russian Federation is beholden to 
the constituents he or she governs as a result of the Gorbachovian forces of 
democratization. By the same token, the government agencies and mechanisms within the 
executive branch and outside of the executive structure are beholden to the President of the 
Russian Federation. This is, as has been argued, because of the Yeltsonian forces stemming 
from the vastly superior presidential entitlements of the Yeltsin-authored constitution in 
1993. The personal dynamics of the bureaucrats occupying powerful positions within the 
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Kremlin play out within this political atmosphere created by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris 
Yeltsin. The thesis traced these respective legacies throughout the chapters. 
The Power of The Citizenry: 
 The Gorbachovian forces of democratization have made the Russian public and its 
perceptions and opinions a vital cornerstone of the Kremlin’s decision-making and political 
posturing. The Russian public is mistrustful of the West more so than any other political or 
geographical aspect of the world stage. Dr. Sergei Khrushchev notes, ‘Western countries 
are responsible for more deaths and violence in the Russian mind.’776 The United States, the 
symbolic leader of the West, has never been regarded by the Russian public as a 
harmonious partner in the international community. The Soviet era may be over, but the 
perception of the United States as a country that acts for its own interests persists among 
the Russian citizenry. 
 Russians are not particularly concerned with rogue regimes, such as Iran or North 
Korea. In addition to this, Russians are not motivated to support any foreign intervention on 
humanitarian grounds when it does not concern Russia directly. The international 
community’s calls to enforce human rights norms are viewed as inspired by the United 
States widening and strengthening its hegemony. This clashes with the view that Russia is 
still a great power, notwithstanding the fall of the Soviet Union. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva 
opines, that ‘Russians are Russians and believe they are a great nation.’777 This nationalist 
sentiment among Russians is undeniable and is a key reason for the aversion toward the 
West and NATO. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva also asserts that, ‘Russians believe America 
dictates the world. NATO is an extension of the West and that whole Missile Defence 
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Shield is an extension of this.’778 This refusal to wholly cooperate with NATO stems from 
the mistrust of the West and the belief that Russia’s great power status must not be thwarted 
by the United States or any Western collective security organization. 
 The Kremlin was able to order military operations against Georgia in its breakaway 
regions because the Russian public linked Saakashvili to NATO enlargement. Saakashvili’s 
pro-West, pro-NATO foreign policy made him a major enemy of the Russian Federation in 
the court of public opinion. Medvedev was fully empowered to make this decision because 
Russian public opinion was overwhelmingly against Saakashvili and his regime. 
Medvedev’s first major foreign policy act, which was the Russian Federation’s first 
unilateral war against another country, was ordered in concert with the public opinion of his 
constituents upon whom the careers of Medvedev and Putin, as well as the inner circle, 
depended. Military action against a country next to Russia’s borders moving closer to 
NATO when a Missile Defence Shield installed by the West existed in the Czech Republic 
satisfied the Russian constituents because this was done for the express reason to safeguard 
citizens against Western security architecture. 
 The Russian public is unconcerned with any nuclear threat from North Korea or 
Iran because it does not consider these countries to be ‘rogue regimes.’ Russians are 
hesitant to accept any such Western characterizations because ulterior motives are always 
attributed to American foreign policy and intervention. The Kremlin however was fully 
observant of all events on the world stage and the events in Kyrgyzstan are proof of this. 
Kyrgyzstan is not a major country of importance in the minds of the Russian public, but the 
Kremlin made the decision to support and implement the ousting of President Bakiyev, 
who had reneged on his agreement to evict the American military base in his country. The 
                                                 
778 Ibid. 
318 
 
decision to support his ousting and endorse the new government after Bakiyev was a 
concerted effort by the Russian foreign policy apparatus that had its tentacles reach 
throughout the uprising and establishment of a new pro-Russian government in Kyrgyzstan. 
The Russian public required coaxing in order to grant legitimacy to the Russian political 
leadership for such a foreign policy approach. For several months, the Kremlin directed all 
state-owned media in Russia and Kyrgyzstan to perpetuate anti-Bakiyev propaganda to 
sway public opinion against him in both countries. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva observed the 
blatant use of media control for the Kremlin’s goals in Kyrgyzstan in the following terms: 
‘In propaganda, war is a breeding ground for propaganda. You need to convince your 
people that the decision was right.’779 The Kremlin, after months of anti-Bakiyev media 
propaganda inundating the lives of citizens in Russia and Kyrgyzstan, was fully empowered 
by the Russian constituents to support and openly play a hand in establishing a post-
Bakiyev government. The Kremlin manipulated the powerful forces of Gorbachovian 
democratization for its own purposes, and this manipulation is evidence that when Russian 
public opinion matters in foreign policy decisions, the political leadership must coalesce 
and court the public opinion of its constituents. A blatant disregard for Russian public 
opinion when Russians are fully involved in foreign policy events is the equivalent of 
risking political demise. 
 Dmitry Medvedev’s decision to abstain from vetoing United Nations Resolution 
1973 against Libya is a case in point. The decision was made quickly as events both in 
Libya and the international community were occurring rapidly. President Medvedev 
wilfully neglected the concern that the resolution may entail NATO intervention and he 
chose to proceed, even though the Russian public would disapprove of this resolution if the 
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Western collective security architecture added Libya to its myriad of strategic footholds in 
the Eastern hemisphere. Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich has asserted that NATO 
intervention in the event the resolution was passed was unquestionable.
780
 This signifies 
that Medvedev chose to indirectly endorse a resolution that would bring in Western security 
architecture into Libya, which his constituents feared and mistrusted. This was a foreign 
policy act that clashed with Russian public opinion. In addition to this, the decision for 
Putin to return to the presidency was announced months later. The Russian public was 
furious over Medvedev’s role in NATO’s ‘domination’ of Libya and the fact that the 
‘tandem democracy’ was a political ploy to keep Putin in power. Russian public opinion 
against the Putin-Medvedev regime was now in full force.  
 The Medvedev presidency was in conciliatory mode until Medvedev handed Putin 
the reins of power in 2012. The Syrian crisis enveloped the attention of the international 
community, and Medvedev could not make a similar decision that would involve a possible 
foreign intervention to end the Assad regime’s violence. Russian public opinion after the 
Libyan intervention was overwhelmingly against similar action, and the polls asking 
Russian citizens about a possible intervention in Syria cemented the need for the Kremlin to 
choose a policy of intransigence by its refusal to commit to sanctions against the Assad 
regime or repeat an abstention. The politically damaged Kremlin and Putin’s candidacy for 
the presidency did not counter the powerful Gorbachovian forces of an empowered 
citizenry that was going to elect the next President of the Russian Federation in 2012. The 
parliamentary elections in 2011 indicated that United Russia’s poor performance was a 
result of the damaging actions taken by the Putin-Medvedev regime. Sanctions against 
Syria akin to the Libyan outcome were not viable because Russian public opinion was 
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already eroding the legitimacy of the Kremlin’s inner circle. The 2012 presidential election 
precluded any sanctions against the Assad regime because of the precarious ground the 
Kremlin stood on in terms of Russian public opinion. The reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev 
and his empowerment of the Russian citizenry were therefore arguably in full fruition.   
The Yeltsonian Office of The Russian President: 
 While the Russian President is beholden to the Russian constituents because of 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s legacy, the Russian government is wholly subservient to the Russian 
President because of Boris Yeltsin’s legacy. Boris Yeltsin’s constitutional crisis in 1993 
resulted in a vastly more powerful Russian presidency. Dr. Sergei Khrushchev notes, ‘It 
was this event by Yeltsin that created the current presidential system.’781 The Yeltsonian 
forces of a superior presidential office in relation to the other branches of government and 
the agencies and mechanisms within the executive branch have established Medvedev’s 
firm control over the bureaucracy that served him. No facet of the Russian government can 
obstruct or compete with the office of the Russian presidency because of the broad 
constitutional powers it possesses.  
 In every foreign policy decision analyzed in this body of research, Medvedev 
ordered and implemented his decisions without any involvement, interference, or 
supervision of the judicial or legislative branches of the Russian government. No Supreme 
Court Judge or Duma elected official can pose any obstruction to the will of the President, 
which is the overriding force shaping the modus operandi of the Russian government. The 
decision to commit to a war against Georgia only required the order of Dmitry Medvedev. 
No member of government was constitutionally entitled to inquire about the decision, nor 
was any member of government able to sway the decision or implementation to any degree 
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that would be against Medvedev’s wishes. Furthermore, the decision to intervene in the 
Kyrgyz uprising against Bakiyev required only the office of the Russian presidency to be 
involved and make pertinent decisions regarding goals with respect to this country. In spite 
of the National Security Concept document of 2009 and the edict in 2011 strengthening the 
role of the advisory mechanism, Medvedev chose not to involve this facet of his office to 
help him formulate and implement decisions with respect to foreign policy issues until the 
end of his presidency because of the tense personal dynamics involved. Medvedev was 
characteristically and temperamentally incompatible with Nikolai Patrushev and General 
Baluyevsky, who controlled the Russian Security Council. The Yeltsonian forces of a 
powerful presidency allowed Medvedev to impede and marginalize this presidential 
mechanism that sought a more important role during his presidency. The will of Dmitry 
Medvedev was the ultimate factor in the utilization of the Russian Security Council. 
Medvedev’s foreign policy decisions however always entailed consulting his Prime 
Minister and instructing the relevant ministry for implementation. The Yeltsonian forces 
relegated the Siloviki and military traditionalists with whom Medvedev did not want to 
conduct foreign policy. The will of the Russian President was the supreme and 
unquestionable factor in how the office of the Russian President chose to facilitate the 
desired outcomes of pressing foreign policy issues.  
 The most important example of the powerful effects of the Yeltsonian forces was 
Medvedev’s ignorance of concerns by the hardline elements of the Kremlin, as well as 
those of his mentor and Prime Minister, when the Russian President chose to abstain from 
vetoing United Nations Resolution 1973 against Libya. Medvedev used his presidential 
powers to ignore the concerns of all influential Siloviki and military traditionalists by 
instructing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to abstain on the United Nations Security 
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Council. This important foreign policy episode is a testament that even though the Prime 
Minister was immensely influential and his inner circle occupied the Kremlin, the President 
of the Russian Federation was the final authority on the Libyan matter. Medvedev’s will to 
save innocent Libyans from the Khadafy regime’s wrath was the overriding factor in this 
foreign policy decision. 
 The decision for Putin to return to the presidency was announced in September 
2011 when the Syrian crisis was escalating. Medvedev was still in control of the executive 
branch of the government and he theoretically was able to make the decision to consent to 
sanctions against the Assad regime. The Medvedev presidency was transitioning into the 
Putin presidency with the latter’s victory a foregone conclusion. The powerful Yeltsonian 
forces would soon be in the hands of Vladimir Putin and Medvedev would become 
constitutionally subservient to him reminiscent of the first Putin presidency. Medvedev 
could not make another decision that would entail foreign intervention in Syria when Putin 
was furious because of the NATO ‘invasion’ in Libya. Medvedev’s future career would 
soon be in the hands of Vladimir Putin, who would be entitled to dismiss Medvedev 
because of the 1993 Russian Constitution. Medvedev chose not to risk his political demise 
within Putin’s inner circle because the powerful presidential entitlements would soon make 
Medvedev completely subservient in relation to his infuriated mentor. Medvedev’s refusal 
to consent or abstain from sanctions in Syria resulted from his cognizance that Putin was 
the final authority in determining the path of Medvedev’s career in a second Putin 
presidency. The case studies in this thesis provided the analysis that confirmed the two 
powerful legacies of Gorbachev and Yeltsin were respectively ingrained in Russian foreign 
policy-making. 
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 Chapters 3 and 5 examined the Russian Federation’s approach toward nuclear 
security issues. The Medvedev Administration faced international calls to enforce sanctions 
against rogue regimes developing illegal nuclear weapon arsenals. The Russian 
predisposition to consent to United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iran and 
North Korea is well established; the Putin presidency consented to similar sanctions against 
both countries several times. During the author’s interview with the former United States 
Assistant Secretary of Defence, Mr. Richard Perle comments, ‘The Kremlin is largely in the 
hands of former KGB operatives.’782 As evident by the continuation of this trend of 
consenting to sanctions against rogue regimes that pose a significant nuclear threat, the 
Medvedev presidency was strongly influenced by the security-obsessed bureaucrats to rein 
in these regimes from acquiring nuclear potential. 
 The security threat of nuclear-armed Iran and North Korea are horrifying to the 
Siloviki who would not allow these issues to be ignored. David Speedie asserts that, ‘The 
pattern Russia has is fear of unstable regimes to its south. Russia is a neighbour to every 
nasty situation from North Korea to the Middle East.’783 North Korea’s nuclear range 
would be able to target eastern Russia, while Iran’s nuclear weapons might start a war in 
the ‘near East.’ Both possibilities are of great relevance to Putin and the Siloviki who 
believe that Russian security must come first in terms of priority. There is a striking 
nuance, however. Russia still enjoys fruitful relations with both countries that are 
considered flagrant violators of international law. As examined earlier, during the 
Medvedev presidency, Russia still supports China in its defence of North Korea in 
denuclearization negotiations and even after sanctions against the regime of Kim Il Jung 
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were passed by the United Nations Security Council, Vladimir Putin called the North 
Korean government on one of its public holidays to express warm wishes. In a similar 
situation during the Medvedev presidency, the Russian government reached out to Teheran 
after the United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iran passed. The ‘diplomatic 
but assertive’ foreign policy that dictates complete independence from the West has not 
evolved from the early days of the Putin presidency in 2000. The sanctions passed against 
rogue regimes are blunted because Russia insists that United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions should not affect the citizens or economies of respective countries. The 
Russian foreign policy approach with respect to rogue regimes has not changed since it was 
originally initiated by Vladimir Putin in 2000.  
 Chapters 2 and 4 examined the Kremlin’s approach toward issues in the post-Soviet 
space, which of course the Russian Federation aims to influence and dominate. The 
Medvedev presidency began during a time when an increased focus on the Central Asian 
region had been in fruition since after the September 11 attacks.
784
 David Speedie notes, 
‘Putin has a strong nationalist strain that focuses on a Eurasian foreign policy.’785 The 
episode with Georgia proved that the Central Asian sphere and its control by the Russian 
Federation was a primary goal of the Medvedev Administration. While the Yeltsin 
Administration placed a powerful emphasis on its foreign policy with the West, the post-
Yeltsin Kremlin has reasserted Russian involvement in the Central Asian region.
786
 The 
Russian Federation had watched the American involvement in the Middle East increase 
exponentially after the terrorist attacks in September 2001. The Kremlin began a collective 
                                                 
784 Roy Allison, ‘Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy.’ International Affairs Journal, 80/2 (2004), 277-293 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569242>, accessed 2 Feb. 2013. 
785 D. Speedie, ‘Russian-American Strategic Engagement’ [interviewed by Julian Reder], 11 January 2013, Carnegie Council for Ethics in 
International Affairs, New York, New York. 
786 Roy Allison, ‘Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy.’ International Affairs Journal, 80/2 (2004), 277-293 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569242>, accessed 2 Feb. 2013. 
325 
 
effort to solidify its grasp on Eurasia as a result of the new tentacles of power in the Middle 
East. Furthermore, the Missile Defence Shield in the Czech Republic hastened Russian 
foreign policy-makers to assert the Russian Federation in regions where the United States’ 
influence was tenuous. The strategic battle over military basing in Kyrgyzstan further 
proves this point. The Russian Federation’s security dilemma stemmed from American 
domination in the Middle East and NATO security architecture looming in Eastern Europe. 
Central Asia was Russia’s last hope to preserve its ‘great power status.’ The balancing and 
jousting for influence and control was centred in this region.
787
  
 Pro-active manoeuvres in the Central Asian region were manifested in the orders to 
launch a war against Saakashvili in Georgia and support the ouster of Bakiyev in 
Kyrgyzstan. Both of whom were considered pro-West, pro-American by the Kremlin in a 
region that Russia sought to dominate. The war against Georgia, which was motivated by 
Tbilisi’s alignment with the West and NATO, was ordered by Dmitry Medvedev by virtue 
of the order being given to and implemented by the Minister of Defence of the Russian 
Federation. The personal dynamics of the Kremlin played out in this episode with Georgia. 
Namely, Medvedev intentionally left the Russian Security Council out of the equation 
because of his personal aversion to those who control it. Dr. Mark Galeotti stated, that ‘The 
Medvedev team had no real traction with the Siloviki. With Georgia, it was clear that Putin 
had to consent first.’788 Medvedev showed absolutely no loyalty toward or acknowledgment 
of the other Silovik bureaucrats serving him, except for Vladimir Putin who was his 
mentor. In addition to this, Medvedev allowed time between the Georgian attack against 
Russian personnel in the breakaway regions and his order to respond militarily. Medvedev, 
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the new President of the Russian Federation, delayed the order for the purpose of being able 
to have Putin insert his input in the decision. Putin admitted to being in communication 
with the Kremlin while he was in Beijing during that time period. Dr. Mark Galeotti notes, 
‘Medvedev knew he couldn’t give the order without Putin. That would have been a 
declaration of war in more ways than one because of the internal dynamics.’789 Medvedev 
implemented this order by using his presidential prerogative not to include hawkish 
bureaucrats with whom he had no ideological or personal affinity and delaying the order to 
allow Putin’s involvement in this decision, which Medvedev claims was his own. 
 Former republics of the Soviet Union were experiencing uprisings and revolutions 
that ignited the security concerns of the Kremlin, especially Vladimir Putin who increased 
Russian involvement in these countries during his first presidency. Dr. Alexander Cooley 
comments, ‘After the Colour Revolutions, the Kremlin began to think the West is 
facilitating these and now they were jostling with the US for influence. It offended Russia’s 
image of its power and prestige.’790 Russia’s perception of its ‘great power status’ is a key 
motivation for its intricate involvement in the region. The pro-American Bakiyev and his 
regime in Bishkek became persona non grata in the Kremlin when he reneged on his plans 
to close the American military base in Kyrgyzstan. His ousting, which the anti-Bakiyev 
opposition attributes to the support of Vladimir Putin, has facilitated a pro-Russian 
government that now espouses the Kremlin as its primary political and economic link on 
the world stage. Dr. Alexander Cooley states, ‘Today, Kyrgyzstan is very close to Russia 
politically and economically. Russia sees the country as a client outpost.’ 791 
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 The Kremlin publicly denied any involvement, even though the anti-Bakiyev forces 
revealed the extensive role Russia played. Medvedev and Putin made this decision to 
support Bakiyev’s ousting, but the decision continues the Russian trend in Central Asia 
started by Vladimir Putin during his first term as President. Dr. Alexander Cooley opines, ‘I 
don’t see Medvedev’s imprint on the ousting of Bakiyev. This was implementing Putin’s 
vision.’792 The Russian goal of securing the Central Asian region most notably began when 
Sergei Ivanov voiced his opposition to Russia assisting the United States and NATO with 
access to military bases in Uzbekistan or any other post-Soviet country. While Vladimir 
Putin consented to assisting with military operations in Afghanistan, he rejected any 
possibility for assistance with the Iraq War.
793
 This is an example of today’s Russia that is 
assertive and defines its involvement in world affairs by the vision of Putin and the 
Siloviki. Russian security and the balance of power were paramount to prosperity according 
to the security-obsessed bureaucrats. 
 NATO enlargement concerned Putin and every Silovik and military traditionalist in 
the Russian government. New START and the episode with Kyrgyzstan occurred 
simultaneously. While New START provided a cogent diplomatic summit, it did not 
amount to any tangible gains by either side. Russian consent to the treaty stemmed from its 
wishes to begin discussing alternatives to the Missile Defence Shield system in Prague. Dr. 
Alexander Cooley comments, ‘Russia wanted new world security architecture, so they see 
it (The New START Treaty) as a building block toward this goal of replacing NATO. It 
was mostly summitry.’794 The security interests of Russia were the guiding force in 
cooperating with this act of summit diplomacy. When the Kremlin’s wishes to negotiate the 
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Missile Defence Shield were ignored, Medvedev promptly and uncharacteristically issued a 
warning of an impending arms race if the United States did not address this situation with 
Russia in an equitable manner.  
 The Russian Federation today still believes that the post-Soviet space is a 
‘privileged interest’ as it has officially stated. No bureaucrat who believes Russia is a great 
power is willing to concede countries that once belonged to the Soviet Union to NATO and 
Western influence. Kyrgyzstan began drifting toward the West during a time NATO 
enlargement was increasing and Western security architecture in the Czech Republic 
concerned bureaucrats in the Kremlin. Russia’s ‘privileged interests’ were being trampled 
on. The mercurial Bakiyev and his cooperation with an American military base in 
Kyrgyzstan now posed a significant threat in the minds of Russian Cold War warriors and 
former intelligence operatives. Dr. Alexander Cooley comments on Russian unease over 
Kyrgyzstan, ‘Putin’s vision of the world was that Kyrgyzstan should have consulted him 
about allowing the Americans to use Manas for their military purposes.’795 The Kremlin’s 
outright anger over Bakiyev’s ‘double-dealing’ made him an enemy in the collective 
sentiment of the Russian foreign policy apparatus. It was this issue that led the Kremlin to 
covertly support his ousting by ordering government-owned media to begin a propaganda 
offensive against him. Putin’s vision of a Russian-dominated post-Soviet space and its 
jostling with the United States and the West were manifested in a strategic battle of control 
over military bases in Kyrgyzstan. The Russian Federation acted in a manner to countervail 
the increasing Western and NATO security architecture inhibiting or infringing Russian 
security at a time NATO and the United States were intricately involved in the Middle East 
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and Europe. Putin and the hawkish bureaucrats acted in the interests of preserving Russian 
influence to ensure the prosperity and security of the Russian Federation.  
 Chapters six and seven examined Russia’s responses to the uprisings in Libya and 
Syria as a result of the Arab Spring. In every foreign policy decision until the Libyan crisis, 
Medvedev had alienated the Siloviki and military traditionalists, but accommodated his 
Prime Minister. David Speedie notes, ‘Putin and Medvedev have a mentor-mentee 
relationship.’796 The relationship between these two men was robust and politically 
necessary for Medvedev’s leadership. While Medvedev was a legal professional who 
believed in international norms with respect to human rights, Putin resisted any attempts by 
the West to intervene in foreign matters on ‘humanitarian grounds.’ The latter always 
remained sceptical and was cognizant that the Libyan issue was another excuse to tip the 
security balance on the world stage in favour of the West at Russia’s expense. The 
international calls to enforce sanctions against the Khadafy regime in Libya happened at 
rapid speed as the escalation of violence was unpredictable. Ambassador Stephen 
Sestanovich comments, ‘There was a misunderstanding over what the mission entailed. 
This was all moving very fast.’797 Medvedev believed in the humanitarian justification for 
intervention in Libya, even though NATO intervention was expected. Every public 
statement by Medvedev alluded to his concern for the well-being of innocent Libyans who 
were being murdered. Putin, on the other hand, was not concerned with a civil uprising in a 
country that had little strategic importance to the Russian Federation, nor did he believe the 
West should intervene. The intelligence officer’s worldview precluded Putin from feeling 
sympathy for Libyans whose government posed no risk to Russia’s security or prosperity. 
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The different perceptions and priorities of the two men clashed for the first time during the 
Medvedev presidency, which resulted in a public rift. 
 Regardless of Putin’s opposition to intervention in Libya, Medvedev was the most 
powerful member of the Russian government. The mentor was the junior member of the 
Putin-Medvedev duo, and Medvedev’s decision was made during a muddled period within 
the Kremlin. Dr. Mark Galeotti notes, ‘Medvedev had lost control of the security agenda 
when Putin had not re-established control of the security agenda. There was disarray in the 
Kremlin.’798 The decision for who would run in the 2012 presidential election was 
evidently not made yet, and Medvedev was theoretically and practically able to marginalize 
his influential Prime Minister, which he did. However, Medvedev abstained from a veto 
instead of consenting directly, which is evidence that he chose a cautious approach not to 
evoke the complete ire of the hawkish bureaucrats within the Kremlin he would have to 
explain his decision to. The internal tremors resulted regardless of the indirect endorsement 
of the Libyan intervention. 
 The political fallout within the Kremlin resulted in a public rift between Medvedev 
and Putin with the President insisting he made the proper decision with respect to United 
Nations Resolution 1973. The issue of Syria and the Assad regime’s violent response to 
protestors became the focal point of the international community after Khadafy’s murder by 
the Libyan rebels. Syria was far more vital to Russian interests than Libya had been. David 
Speedie comments, ‘Syria is the only Russian foothold in the region.’799 The Russian 
government’s close political and economic relations with the Assad regime remained a 
primary obstruction to any similar events akin to Libya. The humanitarian crisis in Syria 
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was comparable to the Libyan situation, however. Any of Medvedev’s inclinations to 
support intervention in Syria would have been forcefully opposed by Putin and the hawkish 
bureaucrats in the Kremlin. The decision for Putin, not Medvedev, to run in the presidential 
election was made at the same time the Libyan intervention resulted in Khadafy’s murder 
and NATO ‘domination’ of Libya. The Russian public was wholly unhappy with the 
simultaneous events and the legitimacy for the Putin-Medvedev regime began to erode. 
Medvedev’s cognizance of the fact that his future role in Putin’s next presidential 
administration was on precarious grounds precluded the possibility of a Syrian intervention. 
Putin and Medvedev’s relationship was damaged because of the Libyan outcome, and 
Putin’s candidacy for the presidency may have come into jeopardy with the constituents 
who chose whether to re-elect Putin and United Russia if similar action were taken in Syria. 
Medvedev had no choice but to resist any sanctions against the Assad regime because his 
relationship with Putin and future career in government depended on it. The Syrian decision 
was directly related to a great extent to the internal backlash of the Libyan outcome and 
Putin’s decision to run for President again. The personal dynamics of foreign policy 
decision-making within the Kremlin were throughout the Medvedev presidency a persistent 
interwoven facet of the decisions examined in this thesis. 
Personal Dynamics: 
 Graham Allison’s Governmental Politics Model, which espouses the importance of 
personal relationships, informal networks of power, and perceptions among bureaucrats, is 
an effective method to understand the Kremlin’s foreign policy from 2008 to 2012. The 
Medvedev presidency’s foundation was the personal relationship between Dmitry 
Medvedev and Vladimir Putin. President Medvedev allowed his underling unlimited access 
and influence in the Kremlin. Medvedev’s unyielding respect for his mentor is illustrated 
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by this very fact. In policy debates, the Putinist vision of the world in which Russian 
security and prosperity were major priorities became a fixture of Russian foreign policy 
during the Medvedev presidency from 2008 to 2012. Dr. Graham Allison notes, ‘Putin 
remained the more influential player than Medvedev.’800 Putin’s influence was a major 
component of the personal dynamics that influenced decisions and their implementation. 
Dr. Sergei Khrushchev opines, ‘Putin was more dominant. It was very difficult to challenge 
Putin.’801 Medvedev’s elevation of Putin was a result of Putin’s overwhelming popularity 
among Russian constituents and Putin’s control of the Siloviki and hawkish bureaucrats in 
the Kremlin. As evident by Medvedev’s persistent marginalization of the Russian Security 
Council, he had no sympathy for any Siloviki or military traditionalists. Putin was the only 
non-Technocrat with whom he consulted and chose to engage in the majority of foreign 
policy decisions. Medvedev chose to implement his decisions by communicating with 
Technocrat Serdyukov or Yeltsin Liberals Lavrov and Churkin, while Silovik Patrushev 
and military traditionalist General Baluyevsky were neglected in the decision-making 
process.  
 The Russian Security Council was not a primary tool for foreign policy formulation, 
but the inherent nature of this mechanism illuminates the inner turmoil and collusion of the 
Kremlin elites. Throughout this thesis, the Russian Security Council has been examined to 
understand how the fruitless efforts to gather all bureaucrats together in relation to foreign 
policy have resulted in revealing the feuding factions and bureaucrats and how the tense 
and close relationships play out when decisions are formulated. The Russian Security 
Council with the National Security Concept Document of 2009 and presidential edict in 
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May 2011 provided evidence that the hardline elements within the Kremlin sought to 
empower the institution that they control in order to rein in the Technocrat Dmitry 
Medvedev whose presidency clashed with hawkish bureaucrats after choosing to exclude 
them from foreign policy formulation and ignoring the Siloviki by acting on his 
humanitarian inclinations. The hawkish faction has attempted to empower the Russian 
Security Council to prevent Russian foreign policy from becoming overly dovish at the 
expense of Russian security and prosperity. The Russian Security Council, therefore, was 
an important facet in this thesis to understand how the conflicts of Putin’s inner circle 
manifested themselves in the foreign policy apparatus during the Medvedev presidency. 
 During the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, the foreign affairs arm was frequently 
utilized to implement decisions. Sergei Lavrov, the perennial Minister of Foreign Affairs 
since Putin’s first term before the Medvedev presidency, has chosen to engage with the 
world stage as a consummate diplomat who advocates the diplomatic route, such as the Six-
Party Talks and denuclearization negotiations with Iran, but when the decisions are made 
within the Putin-Medvedev duo, Lavrov maintains his role as chief spokesman. His 
liberalism is non-negotiable and maintains its relevance in his performance because of his 
diplomatic upbringing, career elevation during the Yeltsin years, and general propensity to 
deal with the West on favourable terms. 
 While he is unquestionably an extension of the Putin-Medvedev regime by virtue of 
his top position in the foreign affairs arm of the government, he maintains a careful balance 
between being a stalwart Yeltsin Liberal and obedient Putinist spokesman. Lavrov’s 
diplomatic impulses and affinity for diplomatic solutions remain as he has advocated a non-
security based approach to pressing issues on the world stage. His orders from the Kremlin 
were never sabotaged or ignored. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was guided during the 
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Medvedev presidency by a man who is institutionally and professionally opposed to 
hawkish truculence, but he maintains an obedient nature. Sergei Lavrov continues to 
balance his diplomatic impulses as ingrained in every Yeltsin Liberal to cooperate fruitfully 
with the West and his advocacy of what the highest level within the Kremlin has envisioned 
Russian foreign policy to be.  
 Medvedev had no political or personal connection with the hawkish bureaucrats 
who were characteristically and temperamentally incompatible with the technocratic 
President. Dr. Mark Galeotti asserts, ‘Medvedev knew the Siloviki were important; he 
genuinely did not have the power to control them.’ 802 The bureaucratic wrangling before, 
during, and after foreign policy decisions that were made are an extension of these two 
factions, the Technocrats and Siloviki, that are in conflict with each other inside the 
Kremlin. The Russian President had the constitutional authority to manage the bureaucrats 
in any fashion he wished and during the Medvedev presidency every hawkish bureaucrat, 
except Putin, was generally marginalized. Dr. Mark Galeotti states, ‘Putin’s supporters 
were being constantly pushed to the side by Medvedev.’803 In the decisions regarding 
Georgia, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, and Libya, Medvedev wilfully obstructed the 
ability of undesired bureaucrats, who happened to be either Siloviki or military 
traditionalists, to influence his policy deliberations and the Russian President 
communicated his decisions for implementation to either the defence or foreign affairs arm 
of the government over which he occupied unquestionable authority. In the decision 
regarding Libya, Medvedev chose to alienate Putin and his Silovik concerns. This cost 
Medvedev great political cohesion as Putin for the first time had aligned himself with the 
hawkish bureaucrats that Medvedev had persistently marginalized in the aftermath of the 
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Libyan intervention. The harmony between Putin and Medvedev was over. Medvedev was 
in full conciliatory mode until the end of his presidency. Medvedev appointed an influential 
Silovik to be his chief of staff, signed an edict that theoretically strengthened the Russian 
Security Council and began using it to engage with NATO officials, and resisted United 
Nations Security Council sanctions against the Assad regime in Syria. Medvedev’s 
intentional marginalization of Putin during the Libyan crisis cost him dearly and is directly 
related to Medvedev’s intransigence in terms of the Syrian Civil War.  
 Medvedev, the liberal-minded, methodical legal professional did not possess the 
personal characteristics to forcefully and successfully challenge his influential Prime 
Minister. Dr. Sergei Khrushchev opines, ‘Personality and power are very important.  
Medvedev’s initiatives did not challenge Putin.’804 Medvedev could not be as influential 
over the many bureaucrats from Putin’s inner circle that occupy positions in the Kremlin 
when compared with Putin. Medvedev arrived into government because of Putin’s 
influence, and he became President because he was Putin’s handpicked successor. Putin’s 
domination of the inner circle and popularity among Russians made him a formidable force 
that Medvedev could not challenge. Medvedev understood that influence and power lay in 
Putin’s hands and he therefore consented to becoming President with Putin as a guiding 
force in the affairs of the Russian government. Dr. Kimberly Marten notes, ‘There is an 
informal contract they (Putin and Medvedev) have reached with each other. Medvedev as a 
statesman is incredibly weak.’805 
 Five of the six foreign policy decisions examined in this thesis reflect the Putinist 
vision of the world. Putin’s vision of Russia is ‘a great power’ exercising unlimited 
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influence in the post-Soviet space and living in a world where NATO and the West do not 
have complete control of the world stage. Dr. Mark Galeotti states, ‘The degree to which 
Medvedev controlled the agenda was limited.’806 The one instance in which Medvedev 
deviated from the Putinist vision with respect to Libya resulted in a ‘political earthquake’ 
within the Kremlin. Medvedev used the Yeltsonian forces of a powerful Russian presidency 
to make his decision to abstain from vetoing sanctions against Libya which conflicted with 
Putin’s wishes and he chose to omit the likelihood of NATO intervention from his 
constituents by using mercurial political tactics to obfuscate this fact, which aroused an 
anti-United Russia sentiment among citizens. Medvedev may have mastered the levers and 
mechanisms of presidential power, as well as the art of political obfuscation, but the 
ruptured personal dynamics within the Kremlin led him to be conciliatory for the rest of his 
presidency. The people occupying the Kremlin and the internal dynamics were powerful 
factors in the conduct of Russian foreign policy. 
 Medvedev’s foreign policy was inherently exercising the Putinist vision with his 
own presidential and personal preferences stemming from his liberal temperament and 
methodical style, which was not similar to the Silovik modus operandi. Dr. Nina 
Khrushcheva comments, ‘The President and Prime Minister became an absurdity. 
Medvedev’s foreign policy became symbolic of these two characters.’807 In the final 
analysis, the Russian constituents are the overriding force determining who does and who 
does not occupy powerful positions in the Russian government. Putin and his like-minded 
bureaucrats are publicly appreciated to a far greater extent than the Yeltsin Liberals or 
Technocrats. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva opines, ‘Siloviki are everywhere. Russia views them 
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much more favourably than the Yeltsin Liberals. Siloviki are respected.’808 Putin and his 
vision of the world are ultimately the guiding force of Russian foreign policy because of the 
Gorbachovian forces of democratization. With the Yeltsin Liberals relegated to non-
influential positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Siloviki compete with the 
Technocrats. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva notes, ‘The Technocrats are incredibly pervasive, but 
they are invisible. No one can pinpoint who they are or what they do.’809 The Technocrats, 
including Medvedev, are not forceful advocates of their disagreements with the Siloviki. 
Similar to Medvedev rarely challenging the Putinist vision, the Technocrat base does not 
have any bureaucrat with the comparable influence or vociferousness of Vladimir Putin, 
Igor Sechin, Nikolai Patrushev, or Sergei Ivanov. The Siloviki are inherently more forceful 
in advocating their positions, while the Technocrats are not. This is also true of the Silovik 
and Technocrat occupying the Putin-Medvedev duo during the Medvedev presidency. 
 Putin’s foreign policy stances were in concert with the anti-West, anti-NATO 
Russian public, and these positions were forcefully advocated while President Medvedev 
was loyally and quietly cognizant of the decisions that would result from Putin’s advocacy. 
The Silovik worldview is emboldened as the guiding policy of Russian foreign policy 
decisions because it is in concert with the public opinion of Russian constituents and 
advocated by powerful personalities who overshadow the objections of the Technocrats. 
The Libyan decision was one instance where Medvedev took advantage of the internal 
disarray and muddled process with which the situation was being dealt with by the 
international community, and he intentionally abstained to save innocent Libyans to the 
chagrin of hawkish bureaucrats who opposed a foreign or NATO intervention. This one 
rogue act that deviated from the Putinist vision of the world cost Medvedev personally in 
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terms of the fallout with his mentor. Medvedev’s intransigence in relation to intervention in 
Syria is the effect of the internal backlash against his leadership. Ultimately, the forces 
shaping the Russian political atmosphere were shaped by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris 
Yeltsin, but the personal dynamics within the Kremlin are never predictable, nor 
predetermined. The personal dynamics played out in a manner that suggests Vladimir Putin 
and his Silovik base navigate Russian foreign policy to a powerful extent, even with a 
Technocrat President who was incompatible with the Silovik worldview and style.  
 The Medvedev presidency from 2008 to 2012 provided six major foreign policy 
decisions that both revealed key trends of the personal dynamics within the Kremlin, as 
well as important political factors in the Russian Federation. Technocrat Medvedev was 
President with the full support of his mentor, Vladimir Putin, who casts a long shadow over 
Russia’s government and people. Medvedev’s use of the presidential powers 
unquestionably allowed him to firmly control the government and formulate decisions to 
his liking. Furthermore, the members of United Russia did not trample on the desires of the 
Russian public, which holds the key to the Putin-Medvedev regime’s legitimacy. Medvedev 
acted in accordance with either popular will or the absence of any discernible position by 
the constituents. The Libyan episode and the policy toward Syria of intransigence suggest 
that Medvedev’s presidency was wholly dependent on maintaining a favourable opinion in 
the eyes of Vladimir Putin and the Russian public. After Medvedev abstained from a veto 
against Libya and obfuscated imminent NATO intervention from the Russian public, his 
presidency was severely weakened internally and externally. Vladimir Putin had no 
ideological contention with sanctioning North Korea and Iran with moderately stringent 
sanctions to prevent the regimes from developing nuclear arsenals further, nor did the 
Russian public that only views these countries as minor issues that the West is exaggerating 
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for its own purposes. Vladimir Putin still harbours a longing to maintain influence in the 
post-Soviet space against the West and NATO, which the Russian public views as former 
Russian territory that must be safeguarded. Medvedev’s presidency saw military action 
against a government in Tbilisi that sought to align with the United States, NATO, and the 
European Union. Vladimir Putin’s security instincts would have created a fixation on the 
military base in Kyrgyzstan at a time the Missile Defence Shield in Prague already posed a 
threat to Russia. The Russian public viewed Georgia and President Saakashvili as 
dangerous elements on the world stage that threaten Russia’s peace and prosperity. In 
addition to this, the Kremlin used its vast media control to perpetuate anti-Bakiyev 
propaganda to convince the Russian people that Moscow’s hand in the events that led to 
Bakiyev’s ousting was inserted in order to rid the world of a corrupt politician who 
threatened Russia and Kyrgyzstan.  
 Medvedev deviated from his role as President who always considered his mentor’s 
opinion and the position of the Russian public in the case of Libya. Medvedev was 
damaged internally and externally by the fallout with Putin, who aligned himself with the 
hawkish bureaucrats on the Russian Security Council, and the Russian public that lost 
confidence in Medvedev for the decisions with regards to Libya and his support for Putin 
running in the 2012 presidential election. Medvedev’s last year in the presidency was a 
testament to the powerful Gorbachovian forces of democratization that pose the risk of 
political demise if the Russian public is disregarded, and the personal dynamics within the 
Kremlin that play out in the formulation of foreign policy decisions. The decision to resist 
sanctions against the Assad regime in Syria is proof that the Russian public’s appeasement 
is a necessary factor for political rule, as well as the intricate web of personal relationships 
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and the Yeltsonian superiority of the Russian presidency that play out within the Kremlin’s 
overall responses to foreign policy dilemmas. 
 This thesis examined the Kremlin during the Medvedev presidency utilizing the  
 
Governmental Politics Model to simultaneously assess the current inner circle and its  
 
bureaucrats acting in the Russian political atmosphere moulded by Mikhail Gorbachev and  
 
Boris Yeltsin. The Putin-Medvedev regime is beholden to the constituents it serves, and the  
 
overriding force within the government is the will of the President of the Russian  
 
Federation. Every foreign policy decision made by the Kremlin was affected by the need to  
 
acquiesce to the wishes of the constituency and formulate policies in a manner suiting the  
 
preferences of Dmitry Medvedev, regardless of his Prime Minister’s influence. The state of  
 
personal dynamics during these years suggests that personalities, friendships, and  
 
perceptions among the bureaucrats have a powerful collective effect on decision-making.  
 
The personal dynamics of the Kremlin played out in a democratized country with a  
 
powerful presidential office. Graham Allison’s Governmental Politics Model fits the new  
 
democratic Russian Federation precisely because of the reforms by Gorbachev and  
 
empowerment of the Russian presidency by Yeltsin, which is the exact type of  
 
government Allison’s theoretical framework was created for. This thesis has added to the  
 
body of knowledge in Kremlinology by using the Allisonian mode of analysis to  
 
understand how personal relations and political forces collide, coexist, and diverge in the  
 
context of the Kremlin’s foreign policy decisions and the inherent process of their  
 
formulation. The Allisonian framework has allowed the author to enhance the  
 
understanding of the Kremlin during the Medvedev presidency with respect to vital foreign  
 
policy decisions. 
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